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ABSTRACT 
Chapter 1: examines the economic, social and religious charac-
teristics of the Lancashire industrial region. Heavy 
industry and extensive urbanisation favoured the 
development of large scale trades unionism. Industrial 
specialisation prevented the segregation of social 
classes except in the conurbations of Manchester and 
Merseyside o 
Chapter 2: the industrial growth of the cotton unions determined 
their political outlook and policy. Comparative 
industrial success produced only an inconsistent pro-
gramme of political action. 
Chapter 3: the mining unions were weaker than the co~ton unions 
in industrial matters, yet achieved strength through 
co-operation with the Miners' Federation of Great 
Britain, a national union, and accepted the parliamentary 
programme of this union. 
Chapter 4: the new unions formed during the later 1880s exhibited 
many of the techniques of the older established unions, 
though affected a more revolutionary political outlook o 
Yet their links with socialism were often tenuous. 
Chapter 5: examines the issues and events of parliamentary 
politics, 1885-1906, drawing the conclusion that elec-
toral issues unfavourable to the Liberal party tipped 
the political balance towards the Conservatives until 
1906. 
Chapter 6: the religious influences in politics are examined 
against the background of denominational rivalry. 
Toryism appears to have been the product of a xenophobic, 
nationalist reaction to Irish Catholic immigrants. Social 
leadership was a further important! influence in shaping 
the political make up of the region. 
Chapter 7: looks at the earliest forms of labour representation 
in local elections, inspired by trades councils o None 
of these local movements was particularly successful 
in establishing a significant labour movement. 
Chapter 8: traces the development of political policies in 
general among the cotton and mining federations. The 
United Textile Factory Workers' Association concentrated 
on piecemeal factory reform whilst the miners engaged 
in direct parliamentary campaigning at Wigan and Ince 
in 1892 and 1895. 
Chapter 9: examines the work of the socialist orgaDisations -
the S D F and the I L P - in attempting to bring together 
working class political action under socialist leader-
ship. The S D F success as a working class group at 
Burnley is contrasted with its lack of success elsewhere. 
The I L P, until the 1895 General Election, was also 
largely unsuccessful in winning support for its 
parliamentary policy. 
Chapter 10: continues the discussion of the two socialist parties 
from 1895 to 1905. During this period socialist unity 
failed in general, despite its being attempted at local 
level. The relationship with, and the contribution to, 
the new Labour Re pre sentat ion ',Committee is examine d. 
Chapter 11: the reasons for the increased trade union interest 
in politics at the turn of the century, with special 
reference to the cotton and mining unions. The local 
labour parties that subsequently developed are analysed 
to assess their political composition and outlook. 
Chapter 12: a survey of the 1906 General Election, especially 
the Labour campaigns, to show the issues on which Labour 
candidates depended for votes. A brief, explanatory 
survey of Labour party development after 1906 is included 
to place the period 1885 to 1906 in perspective. 
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PREFACE 
The main part of the work on this thesis was carried out during 
the tenure of a Research Studentship at the University of Keele, 
from 1965 to 1968. I should like to record my thanks to the 
University for giving me the opportunity to do the research. 
It would not have been possible to complete the work without 
the advice, encouragement and active co-operation of many 
people, to whom I am deeply indebted. I would like to extend 
my thanks to all the historians, political party officials and 
trade union secretaries who have spared the time to write to 
me and talk with me on the problems of Lancashire politics; 
though too numerous to mention by name they deserve great credit 
for much that may be vaiuable in this study. The Librarians and 
staff of all the major public libraries and record offices in 
Lancashire have also been both patient and resourceful in 
answering my enquiries and unearthing material for my use. 
Similarly the staffs of the British Museum Newspaper Library at 
Colindale and of the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science at the London School of Economics have shown immense 
help and kindness. A great deal of the material I have used is 
the private property of political organisations and trade unions; 
for their ready consent to my requests to see documents in their 
possession and for their warm hospitality during my visits to 
v 
their offices the following people deserve a special note of 
thanks: Lord Wright and Mr H Kershaw of the Amalgamated Weavers' 
Association; Mr W Lee of the Amalgamated Association of Operative 
Cotton Spinners and Twiners; Mr J King of the National Associa-
tion of Card, Blowing and Ring Room Operatives; Mr J Milhench 
of the United Textile Factory Workers' Association; Miss Hilda 
P Unsworth of the Bolton and District Weavers' and Winders' 
Association; Mr 11 Dickinson of the Burnley and District Weavers', 
Winders' and Beamers' Association; Mr A Shaw of the Nelson and 
District Weavers' Association; Mr J Gormley of the National Union 
of Mineworkers, North West Area; Mr W Blaby of the Middleton, 
Prestwich and Whitefield Conservative Association; Mr A L 
Williams and Mrs Irene Wagner of the National Labour Party; 
Mr E Tomlinson of the Manchester Liberal Federation; Mr E 
Hirons of the St Helens Trades and Labour Council; and Mr P Bond 
of the Ince County Constituency Labour Party. My thanks are also 
due to Mr Stephen Swingler, Member of Parliament for Newcastle-
under-Lyme, for his assistance in attempting to secure access to 
documents. 
Finally, I owe a special debt to Mr J H Y Briggs of the 
University of Keele for his guidance and encouragement as my 
supervisor during three years of research. 
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Table 1 
Lancashire Occupational Patterns, 1901 
Occupation 
I Primary and Heavy Manufacturing 
Mining and Quarrying 
Engineering and Metals 
Text He s 
Chemicals 
II Agriculture 
III Other Manufacturing 
Clothing 
Building 
Paper and Printing 
IV Service Trades 
Professions, Commerce, Servants 
Transport 
Food and Drink 
Misce llane ous 
Proportion of total 
work force 
14.8 
24.2 
2.8 
6.2 
10.1 
2.1 
15.7 
2.6 
7.0 
7.8 
100.0 (1,984,046) 
Source: Census of England and Wales, 1901 (Cd., 1002) 
Table 2 
Proportion of Main Industrial Occupations; 
Major Lancashire Towns, 1901 
Textile s Mining Chemicals Metal & Building Transport Food Profes- Genera 1 
(/: inc. Engineering (/: inc. and sions, Trade s, 
glass) (/: inc. ship docks) drink commerce Miscell. 
building) 
Barrow 3 1 0 401. 7 91. 5 7 29 
Birkenhead 0 0 0 151' 7 18)b 7 13 40 
Blackburn 55 0 0 6 5 2 5 4 23 
Bolton 38 3 0 12 5 3 6 5 27 
Bootle 0 0 0 8 6 20/: 8 10 48 
Burnley 55 6 0 4 4 1 5 3 22 
Bury 38 0 0 6 5 0 5 3 43 
Liverpool 0 0 0 7 7 16/: 11 13 46 
Manchester 8 0 1 9 7 5 9 7 53 
Oldham 42 1 0 18 5 9 4 5 17 
Preston 45 0 0 6 7 4 8 5 25 
Rochdale 45 0 0 10 6 3 6 5 25 
St Helens 0 20 26" 6 7 3 6 4 28 
Salford 14 1 0 8 7 5 4 7 54 
Stockport 28 0 0 4 11 6 7 6 36 
Warrington 8 0 2 22 10 6 9 6 ~r 
Wigan 15 24 0 8 5 4 6 4 34 
Source: Census of England and Wales, 1901 (Cd. 1002) 
x 
Table 3 
Dependence on Industrial Trades, Manufacturing Districts 
(other than major towns), Lancashire 1901 
Proportion of 
working population 
employed in:-
75%.!> 
60-75% 
50-60% 
40-50% 
25-40% 
10-25% 
Textile s 
Walton-Ie-Dale, Brierfield. 
Colne, Crompton, Gt Harwood, 
Haslingden, Mossley, Nelson, 
Padiham, Rishton, Royton. 
Mining 
Haydock. 
Bacup, Chadderton, Clitheroe, Ashton-in-Makerfield, 
Metals and 
Engineering 
Darwen, Heywood, Little- Skelmersdale, Standish 
borough, Milnrow, Oswald-
twistle, Ramsbottom, Whitworth. 
Chorley, Church, Clayton-Ie- Golborne, Hindley, 
Moors, Farnworth, Middleton, Pemberton, Tyldesley, 
Rawtenstall, Stalybridge, Westhoughton. 
Tottington. 
Horwich. 
Accrington, Ashton-under- Atherton, Ince, Leigh,Gorton. 
Lyne, Droylsden, Failsworth, Little Hulton, Little 
Hyde, Leigh, Kearsley, Leyland,Lever, Swinton and 
Little Hulton, Little Lever, Pendlebury, Orrell. 
Radcliffe, Reddish, Turton. 
Denton, Gorton, Whitefield, 
Worsley, 
Farnworth, Kearsley, 
Prescot, Worsley. 
Source: Census of England and Wales, 1901 (Cdo 1002) 
Accrington, Hyde, 
Newton le Willows. 
:x 
Xl 
Table 4 
Proportion of Population engaged in Industrial Trades, 
Agriculture, Professional or Domestic Service: 101 Lancashire 
Towns, 1901 
Less than 
, 40% 
Haydock 
Latham & 
Burscough 
Litherland 
Prestwich 
St Helens 
Widnes 
(6) 
40-45% 
Abram 
Ashton in 
Makerfie Id 
Aspull 
Birkdale 
Birkenhead 
Eccle s 
Fulwood 
Garston 
Golborne 
Gorton 
Hindley 
Horwich 
Ince 
Liverpool 
Newton le 
Willows 
Ormskirk 
Orrell 
Pemberton 
Pre scot 
Ske lmer sda le 
Southport 
Standish 
Walton le 
Dale 
Warrington 
Waterloo 
(25) 
45-50% 50-55% 
Atherton Accrington 
Barrow Ashton u 
Droylsden Lyne 
Eccles Bolton 
Failsworth Brierfield 
Gt Crosby Burnley 
Heaton Norris Chadderton 
Kearsley Chorley 
Leigh Clayton le 
Levenshulme Moors 
Gt Hulton Clitheroe 
Manchester Colne 
Middleton Crompton 
Moss Side Denton 
Reddish Farnworth 
Sal ford Haslingden 
Stockport Hyde 
Swinton & Leyland 
Pendlebury Lt Lever 
Tyldesley Mossley 
Westhoughton Nelson 
Wigan Oldham 
Withington Oswaldtwistle 
Worsley Preston 
(23) Radcliffe 
Rawtenstall 
Rochdale 
Royton 
Saddle worth 
Stalybridge 
Todmorden 
Tottington 
Turton 
(31) 
55-60% more than 60% 
Bacup 
Barnolds-
wick 
Blackburn 
Bury 
Stret-
ford 
Church 
Darwen 
Gt Harwood 
Heywood 
Little borough 
Milnrow 
Padiham 
Ramsbottom 
Rishton 
White fie Id 
Whitworth 
(15) 
Table 5 
Trade Union Membership in the Cott on Industry 
Spinners, Cardroom Worker s and Weavers, 1885-1914 
Year Spinners Cardroom Weavers 
1885 16597 (A) ---
1886 15901 9370 
1887 15416 35480 (B) 
1888 15910 14655 
1889 17106 14543 
1890 17729 15598 46102 
1891 19661 28160 49414 
1892 19575 30796 
1893 19175 24468 
1894 18615 22161 75510 
1895 18234 20970 8:g~o(lJl 1896 18009 21210 
1897 17760 20485 80800 D 
1898 17813 19903 74420 D 
1899 18751 20536 81500 E 
1900 18384 22197 81500 
1901 18474 22606 81175 
1902 18391 22940 82267 
1903 18315 82597 
1904 18534 22994 80420 (E) 
1905 19451 27755 89260 
1906 20928 31328 88175 
1907 22506 40834 101842 
1908 22837 44976 115314 
1909 23124 46590 118626 
1910 22992 44730 114434 
1911 23248 46338 112462 
1912 23500 51914 137196 
1913 23787 57257 179391 
1914 23645 58402 197957 
Source: Annual Reports of the three unions of Spinners, Cardroom, 
Workers and Weavers, except:-
A Statistical Tables and Reports on Trades Unions, 2nd Report, 1888, 
(C-5505) 
B ibid, 3rd Report 1889 (C-5808) 
C Annual Report of Labour Department of Board of Trade, 1896-97 
(C-8642) 
D ibid, 1898 (C-9443) 
E ibid, 1906-07 (Cd. - 4413) 
Table 6 
Growth of the Weavers' Amalgamation Membership and 
Affiliation of Local Societies, 1890-1906/9 
9000 + 
6000 + 
3000 + 
2000 + 
1000 + 
250-1000 
10000 + 
8000 + 
4000 + 
2000 + 
1000 + 
250-1000 
11000 + 
10000 + 
5000 + 
3000 + 
2000 + 
1000 + 
250-1000 
Source: 
Blackburn 
Burnley 
Accrington 
1890 
Chorley, Hyde, Padiham, Preston 
Bury, Clitheroe, Gt Harwood, Haslingden, Nelson, Oldham 
Bamber Bridge, Barnoldswick, Colne, Heywood, Ramsbottom, 
Rishton, Todmorden, Longridge. 
Blackburn 
Burnley 
1900 
Darwen, Nelson, Preston 
Accrington, Blackburn Protection Society, Bolton, Bury, 
Colne, Gt Harwood, Hyde, Oldham, Padiham, Rochdale. 
Church, Clitheroe, Haslingden, Heywood, Rishton, Ros_ 
sendale, Todmorden o 
Bamber Bridge, Barnoldswick, Bacup, Clayton-le-Moors, 
Glossop, Longridge, Macclesfield, Saddleworth, Rams-
bottom, Whitworth, Wigan. 
Burnley 
Blackburn 
Darwen, Ne lson 
1906/9 
Blackburn Protection Society, Colne, Hyde, Preston. 
Accrington, Bury, Bolton, Chorley, Clitheroe, Gt Harwood, 
Oldham, Padiham, Rochdale. 
Bacup, Church, Haslingden, Heywood, Ramsbottom, Rishton, 
Rossendale, Todmorden. 
Bamber Bridge, Barnoldswick, Clayton-le-Moors, Congleton, 
Glossop, Longridge, Macclesfield, Manchester and Salford, 
Saddleworth, Skipton, Stockport, Whitworth, Wigan. 
Weavers' Amalgamation, Annual Reports, 1884-1914. 
Table 7 
Wages in the Cotton Industry: 1886, 1906 
(Shillings per week) 
I Cardroom Operative s 
Male 
Manchester 21-26 
Oldham 17-22 
Bolton 18-20 
Asht o n-u-LY.lle 15-21 
Stockport 14-19 
Il Weavers ( average of male and 
Preston 
Blackburn 
Burnley 
Bacup, Bury, Rochdale 
Ashton-u-Lyue 
III Spinners 
Manchester 
Oldham 
Bolton 
Ashton 
17.6 
18.5 
20 
15-17 
16-6 
35 
33 
35 
31.1 
1886 
Female 
12-15 
14 
female) 
Male 
25-40 
22-30 
20-29 
20-30 
19-29 
19.5 
22.1 
24.9 
19-20 
17.4 
40 
41 0 9 
46 
41.9 
1906 
Female 
14-20 
22.6 
IV Piecers (average for Bolton, Oldham, Preston and,Blackburn) 
Big Piecers 
Middle ) 
Little ) 
14.2 17.9 
12 
Computed from G H Wood, The History of Wa~es in the Cotton Trade 
Dllrin~ the Past 100 Years (1910). The above table attempts to 
give the average wage, but in fact there was great variation in 
wages paid. (Cardroom workers were paid on an hourly basis, 
the others by piece). 
Table 8 
Output, Comparative Ou~put and Employment in the 
Lancashire and Cheshire Coalfield, 1881-1920 
I Lancashire and Cheshire: Employment and Output 
Persons Output per 
Year Output (Tons) Employed Lancashire 
1881 19,281,810 63689 302 
1885 21,274,827 66302 322 
1890 22,801,178 76479 298 
1895 la 22,764,171 99491 256 
1900 25,541,659 87976 263 
1905 24,247,514 93896 257 
la (includes North Wales) 
11 National Output and Employment 
Ye ar Output (Tons) Total Employed 
1885 159,351,418 500,369 
1900 225,170,163 772,759 
1905 236,111,150 850,350 
1920 229,503,435 1,249,224 
Person (Tons) 
Che shire 
305 
282 
298 
·289 
264 
293 
(SourceI,II: Finlay, A. Gibson, A Compilation of Statistics 
of the Coalmining Industry of the United Kingdom. {1922} 
III Lancashire and Cheshire: Comparative 
Coalfield 
Northumberland 
Durham 
Lanes, Chesh, N Wales 
Staffs, Salop, Worcs, 
Warwicks. 
Yorkshire 
Notts, Derbys, Leics 
South Wales 
Scotland 
1875 1880 
6.7 6.8 
25.5 28 
21 22 
16.5 15.7 
15.8 17 
11.6 13 
14.1 21 
18.5 18 
Output (Tons) 
1890 1900 
9 11.5 
30 34.8 
25.7 28.6 
17 18.7 
22 28 
18,,7 26 
29 39 
24 33 
(Source: R Page-Arnot, The Miners (1948), 55-8) 
1910 
13 
39 
27 
20 
38 
31 
48 
41 
Table 9 
Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation: Membership, 
1886-1906 
Membership 
Year Full Half Total 
1886 8657 32 8689 
1887 7237 18 7255 
1888 9694 16 9710 
1889 17295 
1890 28777 95 28872 
1891 (No figure s available) , 
1892 47132 
1893 36249 477 36726 
1894 37052 207 37259 
1895 29294 348 29642 
1896 26869 288 27157 
1897 25721 
1898 24954 427 25381 
1899 27889 512 28401 
1900 28690 357 29247 
1901 34969 802 35771 
1902 36887 910 37797 
1903 35331 949 36280 
1904 33971 922 34893 
1905 30842 833 31675 
1906 31592 790 33382 
Source: L C M F Annual Proceedings, except:-
~~~ 
(3) 
(4) 
1. Board of Trade, 3rd Report on Trade Unions, 1889 (C-5808) 
2. Webb T U ColI. A,XXVII (i), 2. 
3. Board of Trade, 9th Report on Trade Unions, 1895, (C-8644) 
(This figure is undoubtedly inflated, probably containing a 
large amount of non-unionists). 
4. Board of Trade, 10th Report on Trade Unions, 1896, (C-9013) 
Table 10 
Membership of Principal New Unions in Lancashire 
1892-1907 
Society 1892 
Dock Labourers (1889) 8463 
Labour Amalgamation (1892) 3000 
Tramway Employee s (1891) 2000 
Carters & Lurrymen (Bolton 1891) 4000 
, 
Quay and Railway Porters (1889) 3038 
Carters & Lurrymen (Manchester 
1891) 900 
Machine & General Labourers (1890)1800 
Women Workers Federation (1889) 
Jewish Tailors (1896) 
Shirt & Jacket 
Cutters (c.1891) 
Paper Mill Workers (1890) 
Chemical & Copper Workers 
(1889-90) 
200 
1657 
166 
1895 1900 1906L07 
10871 14493 15569 
400 1608 1495 
4000 7536 
2500 
2982 3400 
(merged with Tramway 
employees 1894) 
1200 
61 
230 
1469 
106 
2000 
120 
1000 
220 
864 
834 
(dissolved 
1907) 
(dissolve d 1896) 
Source: Board of Trade, Labour Department, Report on Trade s 
Unions in 1899 (cd _ 422) and in 1905-07 (cd - 4651). Labour 
Party, Annual Conference Report, 1905. 
kY'(I 
Ta ble 11 
School attendance in Lancashire, 1900 
Voluntary Attendance Board Attendance 
Schools Schools 
Barrow 6 2701 11 8922 
Birkenhead 23 12986 3 2305 
Blackburn 44 18636 3 761 
Bolton 42 14827 13 9901 
Bootle 5 4112 4 3764 
Burnley 21 7386 9 5993 
Bury 28 7970 0 0 
Liverpool 112 64111 35 35658 
Manchester 96 42847 54 35058 
Oldham 29 9439 17 10347 
Preston 37 18044 0 0 
Rochdale 14 4511 13 5000 
St Helens 34 14791 0 0 
Salford 43 20023 17 12313 
Stockport 24 10622 0 0 
Wigan 17 9644 0 0 
Source: Elementary Education Returns, cd .. - 315, 1900 .. 
Table 12 
Irish born people living in England 
1841 
1851 
1861 
1871 
1881 
1891 
1901 
1911 
Irish born population 
289,404 
519,959 
601,634 
560,540 
562,374 
458,315 
426,565 
375,325 
% of total population 
1.8 
2.9 
3.0 
2.5 
2.2 
1.6 
1.3 
1,,0 
(Source: J A Jackson, The Irish in Britain, 1963, 11) 
Table 13 
Constituency Sizes in Lancashire, 1885-1906 
1885 1886 1892 1895 1900 1906 
1500-7500 5 6 5 5 3 3 
7500-12500 41 40 37 34 33 23 
12500-17500 7 7 9 12 13 20 
17500 + 1 1 3 3 5 8 
XIX 
Voting in Lancashire: General Elections 1885-1906 
Election of: 1885 1886 1892 
CONSERVATIVE Boroughs Countie s Total Boroughs Counties Total Boroughs Counties 
Candidates 31 21 58 31 20 51 38 21 
Votes 186900 91794 284694 144772 71181 215953 188216 102086 
% share of votes 54.2 50.6 52.9 54.5 52.2 52.4 52.8 50.7 
MP's 29 9 38 32 16 48 27 10 
LIBERAL 
Candidates 41 21 62 33 17 50 36 20 
Votes 158044 95628 253672 130755 65154 195909 168024 99391 
% 45.8 49.4 47.1 47.5 47.8 47.6 47.2 49.3 
MP's 9 12 21. 6 5 11 11 11 
TOTAL 
Candidates 78 42 120 70 37 107 74 41 
Votes 344944 193422 538366 275527 136335 411862 356240 201477 
Electorate 322176 231321 553417 321218 218563 539778 347961 244775 
(In this table the Liberal party vote, 1885-1906, includes 1 Irish Nationalist. fhe Labour vote 
for 1895 is that of I L P candidates, for that of 1906 it is official L R C candidates only. 
Total 
59 
290302 
52.05 
37 
56 
267415 
47.9 
22 
115 
557717 
592736 
In 1900 independent socialist candidates gained altogether 5,674 votes (183% of the total poll). 
In 1906 independent labour, socialist and conservative candidates gaine~ 25,045 votes, (3.6% of 
the total poll). The votes of these candidates have not been included in the table)o 
$(1 
Table 14 - continued 
Election of: 1895 1900 1906 
CONSERVATIVE Boroughs Counties Total Boroughs Counties Total Boroughs Counties Total 
Candidates 38 19 57 38 19 57 36 19 55 
Votes 185161 80048 265209 153358 83483 236841 175034 ' 108522 283556 
% 56.1 53.4 55.3 57.4 52.8 55.7 41.6 39.5 40.8 
MP's 34 16 50 34 15 49 7 5 12 
LIBERAL 
Candidate s 30 16 46 27 15 42 28 15 43 
Votes 132239 54001 197240 113786 69019 182805 168807 104399 273206 
% 40.1 43.4 41.1 42.6 43.6 43.0 40.2 38.1 39.3 
MP's 4 5 9 4 6 10 23 11 34 
LABOUR 
Candidates 6 2 8 10 6 16 
Votes 12412 4709 17121 65256 48328 113584 
% 3.8 3.1 3.6 1504 17.6 16.3 
MP's 8 5 13 
TOTAL 
Candidate s 74 37 111 65 34 99 74 40 114 
Votes 329812 138758 468570 267144 152502 419646 409097 261249 670346 
Electorate 351841 259677 611518 370200 285566 655766 390886 322111 712997 
~ 
-. 
--- ............. _- -------------------~----
..... 
Table 15 
Liberal Vote, 1885-1906 in:-
Cotton districts Mining districts 
Proportion of cotton Average Proportion of 
workers in constituency: Liberal miner voters 
vote 
Over 30% 51.8 Over 40% 
20-30% 47.3 10-25% 
10-20% 52.1 0-10% 
Table 16 
, 
Liberal Vote, 1885-1906 in Religious Categories 
Proportion of Catholics in 
Constituency 
Over 20% 
10-20% 
0-10% 
Average Liberal vote 
40.6 
45.8 
50.1 
Average 
Liberal 
vote 
47.6 
46.3 
48.7 
"'·11 
XXHl 
Table 17 
Liberal vote in Lancashire 1885-1906 
Ga ins and Losse s 
1885 1892 1895 1900 1906 
Constituency % gain % gain % gain % gain 
Ashton u Lyue 49.6 -0.6 49.0 -5.2 43.8 -3.4 40.4 .+15.9 56.3 
Barrow 53.1 -6.5 46.6 _4.1 42.5 ~hange (42.5) +17.8 60.3 
Birkenhead 44.3 +2.9 47.2 +2.0 49.2 (-7.7)(41.5) +15.8 57.3 
Blackburn 40.7 +2.6 43.3 -16.5 26.8 -1.2 25.6 +23.5 49.1 
Bolt on 47.6 +0.1 47.7 -7.2 40.5 +0.4 40.9 +27.9 68.8 
Burnili!y 53.7 +2.5 56.2 -4.7 51.5 -4.2 47.7 +3.9 51.6 
Bury 51.2 -6.9 44.3 +0.9 45.2 -0.9 44.3 +12.6 56.9 
Liverpool 
Abercrombie 44.0 -2.5 41.5 (-6.4) (35.1)( -7 .7) (27.4) +24.3 51.7 
°Everton 31.3 +4.1 35.4 (-6.4) (29.0)(-7.7) (21.3) +20.9 42.2 
Exchange 49.8 +0.8 50.6 -3.9 46.7 -11.6 35.1 +16.3 51.4 
Kirkdale 37.5 +5.0 42.5 -3.6 38.9 -10.3 28.6 +17.1 45.7 
Scotland 64.8 -1.1 63.9 -4.8 59.1 -1. 2 57.9 +9.2 68.1 
E Toxteth 42.0 -4.8 37.2 (-6.4) (30.8)(-7.7) 23.1 (+18.0)(41.1) 
W Toxteth 32.1 +8.6. 40.7 -6.4 34.3 -7.7 26.6 +16.8 43.3 
Walton 41.7 -1.5 40.2 (-6.4) 33.8 (-7.7) 26.1 +20.7 46.8 
West Derby 
, 
42.1 -0.3 41.8 -15.2 26.7 (-7.7) 19.0 +20.8 39.8 
Manchester 
E 45.0 +3.0 48.0 -1.9 46.1 -9.5 36.6 +22.5 59.1 
N 43.2 +9.6 51.8 +1.0 52.8 -2.7 50.1 +13.6 63.7 
NE 40.0 +9.3 49.3 -0.9 48.4 -2.9 45.5 +19.1 64.6 
NW 46.7 +0.7 47.4 -6.0 41.4 -6.2 35.2 +20.9 56.1 
S 54.8 -3.7 51.1 -1.5 49.6 -6.7 42.9 +24.1 67.0 
SW 46.1 +4.9 51.0 -4.3 46.7 -9.3 37.4 +21.4 58.8 
O'ldham 50.6 +0.4 51.0 -2.2 48.8 +1.8 50.6 +9.0 59.6 
Preston 25.0 +3.1 28.1 -1.3 (26.8) -4.6 22.2 +34.7 56.9 
Rochdale 53.8 +1.1 54.9 -7.2 47.7 +2.2 49.9 +7.2 57.1 
Re giona 1 % 47.1 47.9 42.6 43.6 57.7 
Swing +0.2 -5.3 +1.3 +14.1 
Constituency 
St Helens 
Salford N 
S 
W 
Stalybridge 
Stockport 
. Warrington 
Wigan 
Accrington 
! Bootle 
, Chorley 
Cli theroe 
; Darwen 
Eccles 
Gorton 
I 
. Heywood 
Hyde 
Ince 
Leigh 
~ ~ Middleton 
, Newton 
Ormskirk 
Pre stwich 
Table 17 (cont) 
1885 1892 1895 1900 1906 
49.6 
48.7 
% gain % gain 
no 
h 49.6 -3.1 c ange 
+3.3 52.0 -2.1 
50.3 -0.6 49.7 -0.3 
51.9 -2.2 49.7 -0.3 
48.2 -1.0 47.2 -2.3 
47.9 +3.1 51.0 -3.5 
% gain 
46.5 -5.4 
49.9 -5.4 
49.9 -7.9 
49.4 -5.3 
44.9 +4.5 
47.5 +4.2 
% gain 
44.5 +16.5 55.6 
44.5 +12.4 56.9 
41.5 +14.1 55.6 
44.1 +14.8 58.9 
49.4 +3.7 53.1 
51.7 +9.8 61.5 
44.7 +1.2 45.9 -0.5 45.4 (-2.9) (42.5) +15.2 57.7 
42.8 +6.2 49.0 -5.2 43.8 (+1.6) (45.4) -9.9 35.3 
52.3 +0.4 
36.9 +3.7 
33.1 (-1.9) 
60.4 -2.2 
52.7 -1.3 51.4 +0.2 
40.6 (-6 0 4) (34.2)(-7.7) 
(31.2)(-3.0) (28.2)(+1.3) 
58.2 (-1.3) (56.9)(+0.2) 
51.6 +8.2 59.8 
(26.5)' +22.4 48.9 
(29.5) +15.0 44.5 
(57.1) +18.8 75.9 
49.8 +0.9 50.7 -3.9 
48.6 +2.7 51.3 -3.2 
60.5 -9.4 51.1 -9.0 
53.4 +0.4 53.8 -7.1 
53.3 -5.0 48.3 -3.5 
46.6 +4.7 51.3 -3.5 
58.5 -3.4 55.1 -1.6 
46.8 +1.5 48.3 +1. 6 49.9 
48.1 +1.0 49.1 +3.6 52.7 
42.1 ~5.2 47.3 +19.1 66.4 
46.7 +2.1 48.8 +7.0 55.8 
44.8 +1.9 46.7 +8.6 55.3 
47.8 (-2.6) (45.2) +25.1 70.3 
53.5 -2.9 50.6 +7.5 58.1 
54.6 -4.1 
47.7 -2.9 
31.2 +0.1 
50.5 -4.4 46.1 +2.9 49.0 +7.6 56.6 
44.8 -3.0 41.8 (-2.6) (39.2) +13.6 52.8 
31.3 (-3.0) (28.3)(-7.7) (20.6) +17.9 38.5 
50.4 +2.4 52.8 +10.0 62.8 
Radcliffe-cum Farnworth 52.5 -2.0 50.5 -3.4 47.1 +3.2 50.3 +6.5 56.8 
Rossenda le 
Southport 
Stretford 
Westhoughton 
Widnes 
Regional 
Swing 
58.9 
51.1 
51.0 
38.4 
37.9 
-0.6 
-4.4 
-6.7 
+3.6 
+10.7 
58.3 (-1.3) (47.0)(+0.2) (57.2) +2.9 60.1 
46.7 -0.7 46.0 (+3.0) (49.0) +1.0 50.9 
44.3 (-1.5) (42.8) -3.4 39.4 +17.9 57.3 
41.0 (-2.5) (39.5)(-1.3) 38.2 +22.0 60.2 
48.6 -2.1 46.5 _16.1 30.4 +15.0 45.4 
47.1 47.9 42.6 43.6 57.7 
+0.2 -5.3 +14.1 
NOTE: Figures in brackets are estimated percentages, derived from swings in 
neighbouring constituencies, for uncontested elections. The underlined figures 
'for 1906 denote the presence of a labour candidate supported by the L R C. 
Table 18 
Social and Economic Background of Lancashire MP's 
Interest Conservative MP's Li beral 
Landowner 14 4 
Employer of labour 24 19 
Business and Commerce 13 10 
Law 14 18 
Professional Politician 
A Ministerialist 7 2 
B Radical 0 6 
Gentleman of Leisure 5 0 
Writer and Journalist 3 3 
Newspaper Proprietor 0 3 
Trade Unionist 0 1 
Totals 80 66 
(Compiled from Who Was Who, Dod's Parliamentary Companion and The 
Liberal Yearbook). 
MP's 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the chief features of the late Victorian political scene 
was its local variety. The main currents of national politics were 
identifiable through such issues as Home Rule, which had some relevance 
to most parts of the country, and through the personalities of politicians 
like Gladstone, Chamberlain and A. J. Balfour, yet people probably 
responded more to local questions than they did to national conditions 
at election times. The result was a richly varied political fabric, as 
Dr. H. M. Pelling has shown in his recent guide to the regions of England 
in the generation before 1914. (1) Because these variations in behaviour 
were more marked than they are today the historian who attempts to plot 
the course of political change during the late nineteenth century soon 
faces problems if he adopts a macrocosmic approach. Vauable though such 
methods can be in advancing broad theories they are strictly limited 
because of the many local peculiarities, which sooner or later have to 
be given closer inspection; it is at this point that the case study 
comes into its .own. 
The same applied to political parties during this period. They 
derived much less from central direction than they do today, relying 
upon local initiative and money for their influence and support in the 
provincial constituencies. So it is with the history of the early Labour 
party. Although it emerged as a national organisation at Westminster 
in 1900 its development, the way in which it arrived on the national 
scene, can best be studied by looking at local responses to working class 
problems. In general we may speak of the Labour party's significance as 
lying in its heralding the arrival of modern political behaviour, based 
largely on class loyalties, and marking the end of the sectional attitudes 
which shaped behaviour during the nineteenth century. This is quite a 
useful interpretation of Labour's significance. But how true would it be 
of the LabourJorganisation in the West Riding, or South Wales, or London 
before the first World War? The truth is that the pace of change varied 
greatly from one region to another;for instance, Labour voting was making 
clear headway in Lancashire before 1914, but in the East Midlands and North 
Staffordshire it had not disturbed the traditional Conservative and Liberal 
alignment very much at all. Why was this? Answers,:can only come through 
a closer analysis of regional trends and, thus,as the writing of Labour 
history becomes more,.'respected and more specialised the aim must be to 
build up a~series of case studies of working class politics. The present 
study aims at providing one such. 
Lancashire is the region chosen and a variety of factors have 
determined the choice. For one thing, Lancashire almost selects itself. 
At the turn of the century it was so important aniindustrial region that 
it cannot be ignored in any study of British politics. It contained the 
cotton industry, which provided more exports than any other single industry. 
It possessed a population of over 4 millions which made up a tenth of the 
national electorate returning nearly 60 MPs. It was an electoral area 
surpassed in size and significance only by London. Its social structure 
was very strongly working class which gave it particular relevance to the 
growth of Labour politics. In 1906 the parliamentary breakthrough of the 
Labour party was more marked in Lancashire than anywhere else in the 
country. Moreover, Lancashire had always exhibited a very inte:esting 
political behaviour; for an area of such working class strength the 
2. 
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Liberal party, gene:r>.all y accepted to be the \i(Orkman' s party, was 
surprisingly weak there. So, because of all these attributes, a study of 
Lancashire politics may reasonably be regarded as justified. Something 
further: Lancashire has received little attention and deserves some 
attention now, to redress previous neglect. 
In spite of the growth of Labour feeling in Lancashire during the 
1890's and early 1900's the region had not won a reputation for being 
particularly progressive in its politics. Even during the years when 
the political Labour movement was beginning to capture the public's 
attention Lancashire appeared fairly dormant for such a big industrial 
region. It had the appearance of being rather arrogant and insular: 
"W1at Lancashire does today the rest of the world does tomotrrow". The 
county had always seemed more concerned with its own problems that with 
those affecting the rest of England, more ready to pursue respectable 
endeavours than to engage in violent action. For example, in his tour 
of the manufacturing towns during 1842 W. Cooke Taylor clearly did not come 
across any '''red'' revolutionaries(2), yet it was at Rochdale, in Lancashire, 
that the Co-operative movement was established in the mid 'forties. As 
far as Chartism was concerned Lancashire workmen seemed more interested 
in paying their respects at its symbolic death than they had been to support 
it during its h~yday - 50,000 turned up for the funeral of Ernest Jones at 
Manchester in 1869. (3) During the mid Victorian period the Lancashire 
operatives subscribed to their trade unions and co-op societies (4) 
and working class leaders came to see their life's work as culminating 
not at the barricades, but on the magistrate's bench. Richard Cobden 
summed up this quietism very well: in Manchester, he said, people would 
3 
accept "uncompromising language against the aristrocracy" from Anti-Corn 
Law Leaguers like himself, whilst "they would shrink into their natural 
conservatism, ••••• if the same language were used in reference to the 'ballot' 
etc." (5 ) This sounds another way of saying that Lancashire people were 
two-faced, if not pusillanimous 7 in politics and it is perhaps not 
sUrprising that in the mythology of radicalism Lancashire has shrunk in 
significance alongside the Birmingham of Joseph Chamberlain's mayoralty. 
In the histor iography of the Labour movement the same has also 
been true. After the Third Reform Act Lancashire contributed to none of the 
generally accepted landmarks in the development of the Labour party. 
From this point of view, the focus is always directed elsewhere - the 
foundation of the Social Democratic Federation in London, the Mid Lanark 
bye-election of 1887, the London Dock Strike of 1889, the Independent 
Labour Party's establishment in the West Riding during the early 'nineties, 
the Taff Vale issue. At the 1899 Trades Union Congress, when the motion 
to set up a Labour Representation Committee was accepted, it is usually 
the Lancashire cotton union leaders who are quoted as examples of 
diehard opponents to such a move. Nonetheless, in 1906 Lancashire 
contributed 13 Labour MPs; this was by far the biggest regional 
contingent in a parliamentary party possessing only 30 members. 
To be sure, the justification for examining Lancashire in detail 
from 1885 to 1906 lies in the fact that the conditions existing at this 
time were most propitious for Labour success in the region. The initial 
Labour representation of 13 constituted a substantial proportion of the 
seats the Labour party could expect to win in the region at any time 
before 1945. Only \wice, in fact, did the party improve significantly on 
its 1906 performance up tb the General Election of 1945. (6) In 
contrast, other regions like London, South Wales and the West of Scotland 
experienced their flowering of Labour politics after the first World 
War, during the years when Lancashire's relative position in the party 
was declining. From this point of view Lancashire appears to be an 
example of precocity in the parliamentary Labour movement. 
One factor that has tended to detract from this position is the 
political complexion of the early Lancashire Labour MPs. In 1906 all 
but one belonged to what today would be called the "right wing" of 
the party; they were trade unionists who regarded Labour politics as 
simply a new back-cloth to industrial bargaining and were certainly not 
moved by socialist thinking. Their attitude was expressed~ the Cotton 
Factory Times' advice on the future course of the new Labour party in 
1906: "to begin with the party should go in for a practical policy." (7) 
It was this kind of mentality that prompted an I.L.P. observer to conclude of 
Lancashire three years later: "in no great section of the industrial class 
is the progress towards their social ideals less pronounced." (8) 
But the early Labour breakthrough and its significance was only one of 
the special characteristics exhibited in the politics of Lancashire. The 
i 
political climate after 1885 brought into prominence other developments. 
WaIter Bagehot, noting the tempo of political change in England, argued 
in the second edition of his great book that the effect of electoral 
reform was never abruptly felt, that people still continued to adopt 
ideas inherited from the previous system, whilst the new one "is not 
really tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen and~ong a people 
neither of whom are guided by a different experience." (9) So it was in 
Lancashire, where none of the region's mid Victorian attitudes FIn ;""0.4 
such lasting strength as working class Conservatism. For this feature 
alone the region deserves investigation. The Third Reform Act of 1884 
strengthened Lancashire's Conservatism, which had been growing since the 
1860's (10), while the Liberal party declined until its temporary revival 
at the turn of the century. The strong Tory tendencies among Lancashire's 
heavily working class population have been noted by many writers, but 
few have given the problem adequate attention; lacking the opportunity to 
conduct opinion polls historians have too often explained this phenomenon 
, 
G 
in terms of deference or apathy (11), ill though the best recent survey of the 
region, H. M. Pelling's essay in his Social Geography of British Elections 
(1967) casts doubts on previous interpretations and opens the way for new 
thought. 
Similarl¥ there is a need to look more closely at the local development 
of such. national movements as the Social Democratic Federation and the 
Independent Labour Party. The history of the S.D.F. in Lancashire is 
interesting enough to cause some misgivings about the attention previously 
directed by historians almost solely at its London based group of leaders. 
From the early 1890's, however, S.D.F. branches in Lancashire were usually 
as numerous as those in London and often as vigorous. It was, 
, 
significantly, to Burnley that H. M. Hyndman went on four occasions to 
seek election to Parliament as an S.D.F. candidate. In short, the dictum 
of Dr. Hobsbawm may be applied to the S.D.F. in Lancashire: "it cannot 
simply be approved, it cannot be simply condemned. It certainly cannot 
be dismissed." (12) The lack of local study of the I.L.P. has also been 
(13) 
noted by one of the party's more recent historians. Yet only by 
looking at its local roots may we test the assertions of some early I.L.P. 
partisans who attempted to explain its growthdn terms of its social 
and religious appeal (14);" it lacked the rigid clarity of Marxism, yet 
it was well suited to English trade unionists," is the verdict of a more 
recent sociological investigation of the I.L.P. (15) But how far are either 
of these assessments correct? 
Since the present study will concentrate on the interaction between 
the trade union and socialist traditions in the development of working class 
politics, and it is now necessary to define some of the terms used and 
outline some of the problems encountered in presenting this subject. 
In the first place the region chosen is defined by its economic 
characteristics rather than by administrative boundaries. For this 
reason three parliamentary divisions in the administrative county of 
Lancashire - Blackpool, Lancaster and North Lonsdale - have been omitted 
from consideration because they were agricultural and residential areas 
and not at all industrial. On the other hand the districts of Ashton 
under Lyne, Stockport, Hyde and Birkenhead have been included, even though 
they fell, either wholly or in part, within the county of Cheshire, because 
of their industrial interests. However, in order to preserve the integrity 
7 
of the district between the rivers Ribble and Mersey it has been thought best 
I 1 
to take into consideration the rural areas of West Lancashire around 
southport, Ormskirk and Chorley, even though these were very similiar 
in economicmaracterw the areas excluded. Despite this apparent 
artificiality the region under investigation constitutes a well integrated 
whole, having comm~n interests through the interdependent nature of its 
industrial structure. Finally, it remains to be mentioned that there is 
one outlier - the town of Barrow in Furness, an iron: and steel producing 
--------------------------------------- --
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centre on the fringes of the Lake District. 
/ Another term that is frequently used in the following chapters 
is "working class". As a broad working basis class is defined according 
to economic situation in the Marxian sense. The working class can thereby 
be described as it existed in relation to the means of production; those 
who own the means of production and who control finance capital are 
bourgeois whilst those who are hired to work for wages are members of 
the working class. Broadly speaking, therefore, the working class are 
wage earners. Such a definition is, ~f course, rather too schematic 
since class barriers were constantly infiltrated; the self employed 
attisan who hired a few workers posed the greatest problem for he might 
be bourgeois one day and proletarian the next, depending on economic 
fluctuations. (16) Another difficulty is presented by 'self-assigned" 
class - the status category in which the individual would have placed 
himself. Nonetheless, for the purposes of political study, an obje~tive 
definition offers the most suitable approach since it allows a wide area 
of investigation within which 'any group subjectively defining themselves 
as .non-working class are quickly perceived. 
One of the greatest problems in dealing with political behaviour in 
the period before universal suffrage lies in assessing the influence 
of working class people at the polls. Even in such a pronounced working 
class area as Lancashire the electoral system was weighted in favour of the 
middle classes. The third Reform Act of 1884 extended' . the franchise 
to include owners and tenants of property in both borough and county 
constituencies, but universal adult male suffrage did not come until 1918 
and the proportion of men entitled to vote was often quite low. Being 
based on property qualifications the voting right was therefore the more 
secure for wealt~people, many of whom could in fact vote twice by 
virtue of holding borough freehold property (carrying a vote in both the 
borough and in the county within which the borough was situated) or by 
owning business premises (which allowed the owner to vote in both the 
constituency of his residence and his business). the additional proviso 
of l~ months continuous residence in a constituency in order to 
qualify for a place on the electoral register was a seve~ disability 
to working men, especially those in large cities such as Liverpool, 
Manchester and Selford where a labourer might require to change 
his residence fairly regularly in order to find employment and thus 
have to move into a different parliamentary division. Lodger voters, 
largely working class people, found it extremely difficult to qualify at 
all because of rental requirements and uncertain definitions of their 
status; the proportion of lodgers qualified to vote at Liverpool and 
Manchester in 1911 was barely more than 3 per cent of the electorate. (17) 
a strongly 
Thus in what might seem at first sigh~working class constituency the 
greater part of the electorate might well have been middle class. (18) 
In many ways local elections offered working class electors and 
candidates a better chance, and it was at local level that the first 
significant moves were made to secure labour representation. At such 
elections female suffrage operated whilst in School Board elections a 
voter had some dozen -votes which he might "plump" for a single candidate, 
so that with a carefully directed body of support labour campaigners had 
a fair chance of success. But by far the most serious obstacle to 
labour representation was money. Political campaigns were costly affairs 
at this time and a candidate required not only ample funds but, in 
addition, an army of willing helpers to do the necessary canv,assing; 
10 
moreover, a competent registration agent to direct the campaign was an 
expensive item, as were conveyances to bring people to the polls. All these 
aids were more readily available to middle class groups than they were to 
Labour candidates in fighting elections and it is not surprising that the 
key factor in a working class campaign was the availability of trade 
union funds. 
One final difficulty for the historian who deals with Lancashire 
politics at the turn of the century lies in the lack of major studies 
on the subject. Until recently the field has been quite fallow. (19) 
The more specific topic of working class political development has been 
even more neglected. Especially striking is the lack of a historical 
work on the cotton unions to supplement H. A. Turner's valuable 
Trade Union Growth, structure and Policy (1962). A full scale study of the 
Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation has yet to appear. There are 
surprisingly few monographs on any aspect of working class political life 
in the region. (20) So the task with Lancashire is to establish a 
historical account with raw material that is not always easily manageable. 
Whilst there are some excellent economic and social studies of Lancashire 
towns (21) they are too few in number and the regional historian must 
come to terms at an ,early stage with local histories and handbQoks, census 
/ . 
returns and trade union reports and, above all, the immense wealth of 
material contained in the pages of local newspapers. 
PART ONE 
Setting: The Background to Working Class Politics 
The fortunes and characteristics of the Labour party, as of all 
political parties, were determined by the social and economic climate 
in which it developed. In the following six chapters, therefore, we 
look at the basic elements that shaped the course of working class 
politics in the Lancashire industrial region during the twenty years 
after the Third Reform Act. 
The social and economic patterns of the region (Chapter 1) gave 
rise to the particular brands of trade unionism examined in Chapters 2 - 4. 
In the unions lay the roots of an independent development in working 
class politics. By the mid 1880s they were the strongest expression 
of working class interest; the two groups best placed to influence 
politics were the cotton workers and the miners and their policies 
are examined to assess the likely outcome of their position in 
working class politics (Chapters 2 and 3) whilst the other group of 
unions - the "new" unions formed at the end of the 1880s - provide a 
different example' of trade union political behaviour (Chapter 4~. 
At the beginning of this period working class political loyalties 
1 
at parliamentary level were split between the Conservative and Liberal 
parties. The question of how successful the traditional parties 
were in winning votes between 1885 and 1906 is considered in Chapter 5; 
in the following chapter attention is directed to the bases of party 
loyalty and the prospect of critical change in electoral behaviour. 
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12. 
1 
THE REGION 
The industrial region of Lancashire lies between the river 
Ribble and the river Mersey. To the east it is bounded by the 
Pennines, which separate it from the industrial towns of the' West 
Riding of Yorkshire, whilst its western edge stretches almost to the Irish 
Sea coast. This area, covering some 1,600 square miles, is identified by 
its industrial character and thus has a quite different economic 
appearance from other parts of the North West, particularly those to 
the north of the Ribble and to the south of the Mersey, which at the 
end of the nineteenth century were largely agricultural. 
1 Industry 
Lancashire's industrial development dates from the beginning 
of the cotton trade in the region during the seventeenth century. 
During the following two hundred years Britain experienced an industrial 
revolution that had been based initially on an expansion of cotton 
production and by the late 1700's Lancashire had become one of the 
foremost industrial districts in the country. The region possessed 
early~vantages for cotton manufacturing - good port facilit~es at 
Liverpool and a ready supply of cheap coal - and these enabled its 
interest in the fustian trade to be transferred comparatively 
easily to the mass production of cotton goods. By the 1790's the 
agronomist Holt, surveying local agricultural developments in 
Lancashire, acknowledged that by then the area had already become 
"famous for its manufacturers" (1) and by the early nineteenth 
century Lancashire had established its primacy as a cotton producing 
district over all others. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Lancashire still 
retained its position as one of the foremost industrial regions in the 
British Isles (2) and its reliance on cotton was still very 
pronounced (table 1). During the nineteenth century output of 
Lancashire cotton mills had increased year by year, the peak being 
achieved in 1913 when the total of raw cotton consumption in Britain 
was 2,178 million pounds: in 1800 it had been 52 millions and in 1850 
588 millions. (3) This seemingly inexor~ble rise in cotton output 
produced in Lancashire an unshakeable belief in the industry's strength; 
on the eve of the First World War cotton employed over half a million 
people in the region and accounted for more exports than any other 
single British industry. Not surprisingly, then, an observer of 
pre-war Lancashire noted that "if the Lancashire of 1880 had been 
quietly proud and the Lancashire of 1900 aloofly prou~, the new 
Lancashire was arrogant." (4) 
Many of the other industries that had grown up in the region 
were directly linked to cotton. Coalmining, for instance, had become 
important to provide power for the local mills and throughout this 
\3 
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period the biggest part of Lancashire's coal production was consumed within 
the county. (5) The coalfield, a difficult one to mine because of its 
geological complexities, was extensively and often wastefully exploited 
during the nineteenth century to meet the demqnds of the cotton trade 
and consequently began to experience problems of readjustment sooner 
than most other English coalfields. Engineering was another occupation 
geared to a large extent to cotton: much of the output of engineering 
works was made up of textile machinery and boilers, either for Lancashire 
mills or for export to overseas cotton industries. The building industry, 
accounting for a comparatively high proportion of the region's labour, 
as in most other regions, was also affected by the fortunes of the 
dominant trade, though in a different way from mining and e~gineering; 
building was a purely domestic trade and was therefore less affected by 
fluctuations in the export trade yet its prosperity in Lancashire may 
have been measured in large part by the demand for private housing and 
industrial premises in the cotton towns. (6) 
So it may be said that about a half of the region's labour force 
was, to a greater or lesser extent, affected by the state of the cotton 
trade. Was there any sign of development in less dependent trades? 
Engineering, to be sure, was beginning to display some signs of moving 
away from the dependence on cotton especially in the Manchester and 
Preston areas. At Manchester, lliefore the First World War, skills that 
had been acquired in the making of steam engines were being diverted to 
motor vehicle development. At Preston a significant industrial 
breakthrough came with the establishment of Dick, Ker~'s electrical 
engineering plant which began to supply the new electric tramways. Yet 
1 
the other branches of engineering which were less reliant on cotton were 
nonetheless "old" industries - shipbuilding and the production of 
Iq. 
railway engines and rolling stock. The most significant "new" industries -
chemic als and Sleet glass making - were in fact running into difficulties 
at .the end of the nineteenth century. Chemical industries had been 
established at Widnes and st. Helens over fifty years before using local 
coal and Cheshire salt, but technological backwardness and foreign 
competition were posing severe problems by the 1890's. Widnes was able to 
remain a major chemical producing town by improving its plants and 
diversifying its processes, though only after a period of uncertainty. (7) 
At St. Helens there began a rapid decline, so much so that by the 1920's all I: 
the chemical works had been closed down. It was fortunate, therefore, 
that the town retained an important glass industry based on the Pilkiggton 
family works. (8) 
As for other trades and occupations there was little capable of 
rustaining a regional economy. As might be expected in a heavily 
industrialised area there was quite a high proportion of people employed 
in professional and service capacities - managers, clerks, hotel and 
j~nkeepers, transport staffs and so forth - though the demand for them was 
conditional upon the buoyancy of the basic industries. Agriculture was not 
a prominent employer of labour although south west Lancashire possessed 
some fertile land for crop growing it was in fact one of England's main 
potato producing areas. The size of agricultural holdings in the region 
tended to be smaller than the national average,- being mostly below 50 acres 
at the turn of the century, but intensive farming methods permitted maximum 
output with a fairly small labour force. (9) 
As may be judged from table 2, then, the economy of Lancashire at the 
turn of the century was heavily reliant on the cotton trade. There were 
very few towns where the work force was not primarily employed in one 
or another of the great Victorian staple industries, so that if the 
prosperity of the traditional economy began to decline Lancashire would 
feel the effects most sharply. 
What did the future hold? Since about one in every two of the region's 
\Jor/t.ers 
Jwas affected by the cotton industry's ability to sell its products, it 
is perhaps pertinent to ask about the likely future development of this 
trade. At this stage the dangers of relying on a narrowly based 
economic structure were not to be demonstrated so devastatingly in 
Lancashire as they were to be during the 1920's and 1930's, yet after 
about 1880 the signs of weakness were emerging and Lancashire was beginning 
to experience periodic, short term upsets as a result of the increasing 
fluctuations in cotton trading. 
The real problem lay in cotton's being an export trade. Probably 
two thirds of its output, and more than this proportion of its total 
value of products, were exported. The industry was therefore particularly 
sensitive to foreign conditions, both as regards supply, all of which 
was imported, and demand. Supply of raw cotton was not often seriously 
affected during the later nineteenth century, certainly no shortages 
as serious as thos6::of the "cotton famine" during the American Civil War 
of the 1860's occurring at this time. Demand, however, presented a more 
serious problem. There was a variety of reasons for this, the main one 
being that Lancashire could not hope indefinitely to maintain its leading 
position as the world's supplier of cotton goods. The ease with which 
developing nations could set up cotton industries was already being 
demonstrated on the European continent and in the USA. By the end of the 
century Lancashire had lost these markets to domestic producers who 
sometimes had the advantage of being able to operate behind tariff 
barriers. Moreover, because of the "horizontal integration" of the 
Lancashir.e mills, that is their near total specialisation in either 
spinning or weaving, and the further localised concentration of these two 
" 
branches of the industry within the region, rising competition from 
overseas tended to affect some areas of Lancashire worse than others; for 
example, centres producing coarse goods - the inferior quality cloths -
were the first to feel competition from foreigners and towns like Oldham, 
the focal point of the coarse spinning trade, and Blackburn,. the major 
coapse weaving centre, began to be affected by the world situation sooner 
than places like Bolton and Nelson, which specialised in finer quality 
goods. In addition, the whole industry could be hit by conditions in the 
markets of India and China upon which Lancashire had come to rely heavily 
at the turn of the century. During the 1890's alone both markets were 
disrupted; China by the Boxer troubles of 1900 and India more severely 
by the adoption of a protective tariff in 1893 and by the famine which 
occurred there during the later 'nineties. The gradual decline in the 
eastern silver currencies posed a further problem for Lancashire, rendering 
its exports more expensive for Indi~ and Chinese purchasers and explaining 
the attention paid in Lancashire to bimetallist schemes for manipulating 
(10) 
exchange rates. Another factor which affected Lancashire, in 
corrmon with other industrial districts, was the "trade cycle" - the 
regular troughs and crests in output occurring on four occasions between 
1880 and 1914. (11) The downswing phase of the cycle usually brought 
short-time working in the cotton industry and demands froftl employers 
for wage reductions and coincided with the worst periods of industrial 
relations. The effects of the trade cycle on the cotton industry, along 
with the problems of foreign competition and the state of overseas 
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markets all combined to produce a marked deceleration of output in the later 
years of the nineteenth century. (12) The industry was in a far less 
---- ._-------------------
healthy condition than it had been during the mid-Victorian period. 
All these developments had a significant effect on the management 
structure of the cotton industry. Cotton had traditionally been 
manufactured by small to medium sized family firms and at the beginning 
of the 1880's there were over 1,500 individual establishments in the 
spinning and weaving sections. But as competition increased there was 
an appreciable trend towards larger scale units which were sometimes 
brought under the control of a single company. The aims of amalgamation 
varied from the need to achieve economies in production, administration 
and marketing to the desire for standardising prices at a relatively 
higher level and thus increase profit margins. The most notable 
example of this trend was the Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers 
Association, formed in 1898 out of 31 firms in cotton spinning and with 
a total capitalization of almost £st millions. Such giants were rare 
in England at this time, of course, and the Fine Cotton Spinners had 
no equal in cottoh, nonetheless joint stock enterprise, e?pecially in the 
spinning~ade, was responsible for a marked increase in the size of 
firms. (13) 
This development did not in the long run save Lancashire's 
cotton industry but it was an essential feature of the region's economic 
structure by the turn of the century and in common with the other features 
displayed it exerted considerable influence on the region's political 
I~ 
characteristics. The same is true of the social structure and relationships 
of Lancashire, to an investigation of which we should now turn. 
2 Social Structure and Social Relationships 
The industry of Lancashire had important effects upon the region's 
social structure. The incidence of heavy industry meant that there was 
a limited range of occupations with a high proportion of people engaged 
in employment for weekly wages. (Tables 3 and 4). The overall impression 
of 
is that/an area with a prohounced working class character. 
This p~oture would also tend to suggest a tradition of working class 
action through co-operatives, trade unions, religious sects, political 
groups and so on. To a certain extent this was true yet it would be 
misleading to underemphasise the importance, in social terms, of middle 
class influence and leadership. During the 1880's H. M. Hyndman, one of the 
founders of the Social Democratic Federation, spoke of NorthernEngland in 
general cs having "no middle class to break the force of collision between 
the capitalist and those whom he employs", (14) but this observation suggests 
the wrong conclusions about the nature of social relationship in large 
parts of Lancashire; although the professional and managerial classes, 
and even the "black coated" workers following clerical pursuits, were 
numerically small they were still able to exercise an influence on their 
communities. The reason is partly to be found in the industrial structure 
of the region. 
During the nineteenth century Lancashire experienced an immense increase 
of its population; from 672,500 in 1800 to over 4t millions by 1911. 
The dispersal of these people, however, was determined by the location 
of industry and varied as between the localised communities of the 
cotton districts and the big conurbations of Manchester and Liverpool. 
Regional specialis*tion in the cotton industry, which had become fairly 
settled by the middle years of the century, is a particularly impo~nt 
feature in this process. The spinning trade was located in south east 
Lancashire whilst weaving came to be carried out in the towns and villages 
in the north-east section of the coalfield. The mill economy of 
Manchester, described by Elizabeth Gaskell in her novel of the l840'st 
Mary Barton, declined fairly quickly and the tD~n took on the 
responsibilities of a commercial centre and provincial metropolis, the 
hub of a growing conurbation. (15) Liverpool, as the region's major 
port, similiarly assumed a commercial character and became the focal 
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point for urban development on Merseyside. By the 1860's, therefore, there 
was developing a marked contrast between the cotton towns and the areas being 
enveloped by the big cities. The cotton towns were able to retain a 
separate identity, being largely self-supporting and self-contained; the 
working populations became stabilised around a fairly well defined 
nucleus with a minimum amount of commuting to andrJfrom work required. 
As a result the social integrity of the communities was maintained, 
the classes not becoming separated by any great distances. Thus, both 
middle class and working peop~e could still participate in the same 
social and political life. The bridge between them was not yet broken. 
This was as true of the larger towns like Blackburn, Oldham and Bolton 
as of the smaller manufacturing towns like Great Harwood or Padiham, 
and a measure of this feature is provided by the manner in which the whole 
of the cotton district was dealt with in the Redistribution Act of 1885. 
Although the Act was designed to redraw the boundaries of parliamentary 
constituencies according to the pursuits of the population the only 
action taken was to give the larger cotton towns double representation; 
.. ! 
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it proved impossible to create viable middle class constituencies. 
Consequently, whilst the constituencies in this district were 
predominantly working class in character there was none which did not 
contain an element of middle class influence. 
In contrast to the neat topography ot the cotton districts the 
southern area of the region was beginning to experience urban sprawl. 
Although the mining and chemical towns around Wigan and st. Helens 
shared many of the features of the cotton districts Liverpool and 
Manchester were swallowing up their more immediate neighbours. By the 
turn of the century Manchester and its environs had a total population 
of over two millions, whilst Merseyside possessed over one million. 
On the eve of the First World War the town planner, Patrick Geddes, 
predicted the growth of "another Greater London, as it were - a city 
region of which Liverpool is the seaport and Manchester the market •••• ,,(16) 
which be named "Lancaston". It is ttlAe that many of the smaller townships 
being sucked into the influence of the big cities were ancient boroughs 
and managed to salvage some local identity at this time (17) yet there 
was nonetheless a noticeable growth of suburbs with the social classes" 
being segregated by residence and distance. This was the area in which 
I 
middle class people were withdrawing, into their own local i ties and losing 
touch with the working class. (see It\ap 2.) 
Commerce and trade were drawing Liverpool and Manchester closer 
together, with the extension of the Mersey waterfront and the construction 
of the Ship Canal in the 1890's with its attendant trades. At the 
LiverpOOl end of the axis the newer docks built during the later nineteenth 
century went further inland than the original ones near the city centre, 
forcing the wealthier classes further inland still. With the introduction 
of cheap workmen's trains in the 1880's (18) it became possible for the 
better off artisan to move out of the more crowded districts. Liverpool 
consequently developed a very marked three tier residential pattern: 
the historic city centre was largely abandoned to the immigrant Irish, 
whilst an inner residential zone comprising such areas as Toxteth, Everton 
and Kirkdale contained the indigenous working class and a distant 
peripheral area for the professional people developed out of previously 
outlying villages such as Garston, Allerton and Childwall. (19) The 
opening of the Mersey railway in 1886 and its electrification un 1903 
enabled more prosperous businessmen to settle in the Wirral but it was 
not until after the First World War, and particularly after the building 
of a road tunnel in the 1930's, that suburban growth really boomed on 
the south bank of the Mersey. 
Liverpool was thus able to expand into the agricultural land of 
south west Lancashire, but Manchester's middle class could move only 
southwards. To the north was the cotton district whilst the Ship Canal 
had, but the turn mf the century, joined up the western townships of 
Eccles, Patricroft and Barton and was to lead to the creation of an 
I 
industrial estate at Trafford Park in Stretford, which had been a fairly 
middle class area in the 1880's. To escape industrialisation the wealthier 
Mancunians followed the rail lines south. In the twenty years before 1914 
Manchester Corporation added only one northern district, Heaton Park, to 
its administration whilst at the same time big extensions of the city 
boundaries were taking place to the south and providing recently settled 
populations with additional public services. With the accretions of 
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Chorlton-cum-Hardy, Didsbury, Moss Side, Bur~age and Withington in 
1904 Manchester's population increased by 63,000 and five years later 
Levenshulme was added. ( 20) All were at this time mainly middle class 
residential suburbs. 
The social pattern9 of the region therefore display a sharp contrast 
between the industrial communities of the cotton and mining districts and 
the growing conurbations of Liverpool and Manchester. At the turn of the 
century the degree of involvement by middle class people in the community 
life of the industrial towns was still significant and had important effects 
on the political character of these areas, as may be judged from Philip 
Snowden's account of electioneering in 1900 at Blackburn, a town of over 
(21) 100,000 people. . On the other hand the working class was being 
increasingly left to its own devices in the bigger cities. 
However, the situation was complicated by a further factor: the 
structure of industry and its effects on(the development of working class 
solidarity. The process of industrial rationalisation, especially marked 
in cotton, had, by the end of the century, been carried through two 
distinct stages; first had come the regional specialisation of cotton 
production which generally tended to separate weaving and spinning and, 
secondly, the gradual merging of production into larger units. These 
/ 
developments had an important effect on those towns in which relationships 
between the classes were closer, for it was precisely in these areas that a 
community of interest among working people was more likely to develop - an 
apparently paradoxical situation. The reason lies in the effects of 
rationalisation upon trades unionism. It seems likely, in fact, that as a 
result of the processes discussed there developed a greater degree of 
occupational homogeneity (table 3) which assisted the growth of trades 
unionism. 
. _ .. --_ ... -.. -.---.. - -.-- - - .. _/ 
It might be worth pausing for a moment to consider this association. 
Figures of trade union membership for this period are, unfortunately, not 
very reliable and it is difficult to obtain a sufficiently wide coverage 
of figures for various trades to make comparisons. For the local weaving 
societies, however, there exists a reasonably good set of membership 
figures which allow us to investigate the nature of trade union strength 
against the occupational background. Map 3 shows the dispersal of trade 
union i.membership in the two biggest groups of unions, the cotton wcrkers 
and miners (see also tables 5, 6 and 9); following from this it would 
appear that it proved easier to organise workers where the labour force 
was mo~ homogeneous and the manufacturing process more standardised. The 
weaving towns provide the best example, for not only were they dominated 
by a single trade but there were fewer distinctions between people engaged 
in weaving than in spinning, where theltlquite di fferent outl ook and status 
of spinners and cardroom workers ha~e to be considered. It we look, for 
irs tance, ~t the places where over hal~ the work force was employed in 
weaving, and for which reliable trade union membership figures are 
available, we see that a fairly constant proportion of workers were 
prganised: the results may be tabulated as follows: 
Town % employed in Approx strength %lcotton 
cotton weaving c 1900 of local union workers organised 
Blackburn 55 14,300 36 
Burnley 55 9,000 32 
Colne 60 3,000 41 
Gt. Harwood 72 2,000 40 
Haslingden 62 1,550 23 
Nelson 70 5,000 40 
Padiham 62 3,000 70 
Rishton 62 1,500 62 
Clearly the connection is not as strong in all places, as the disparity 
between Haslingden and Padiham shows. Why this should be is difficult to 
say although it might depend on a variety of factors such as the size of a 
town's mills, the vigour of the local union secretary, the state of trade 
at any given time, the size of the town and the dispersal of the workforce, 
and so on. But it seems that, given a fairly high concentration on weaving 
the local union could expect to enrol at least two weavers out of every 
five. 
In other textile districts where production was not so standardised, 
where cotton was not so much of a dominant trade and where both spinning 
and weaving was carried out we may observe a different pattern: 
Town % employed in Approx strength of % cotton workers 
cotton c 1900 local cotton unions organised 
Accrington 35 4,500 54 
Bacup 50 750 12 
Leigh 30 350 7 
Oldham 42 17,650 58 
Preston 45 6,000 23 
Rochdale 45 3,700 19 
Wigan 15 1,000 24 
Here we see that, although in some cases the incidence of union membership 
is as high as in the more homogeneouS towns, the overall pattern is much less· 
consistent, with more marked fluctuations. 
It may be, for example, that in a town with a relatively small number 
of cotton workers they nevertheless worked in a limited number of factories 
and the local union organisers found it easy to recruit. Su~h may well be the 
case with Oldham, the centre of the coarse spinning trade, with its many big 
mills built by the "limiteds" towards the end of the century. Clearly, 
however, a variety of factors made up the strength of trades unionism, 
though it would appear that in general a greater degree of standardisation 
helped to lay the basis for union growth. In cotton weaving towns such as 
Walton-le-Dale or Brierfield (for which no individual trade union membership 
figures are available) it must have Neen a very straightforward task to 
organise a trade union, 
./ 
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and enrol members with this degree of community integrity. (23) On the 
other hand the more mixed character of south Lancashire militated against 
this process; even where fairly large groups of workers in one trade 
existed, as in the docks at Liverpool or Bo~le, the work was often irregular 
with a high turnover of personnel, thus making it difficult to keep 
together a solid base of workers on which to build a union. Hence, as will 
be seen in the following three chapters, trade unionism in mining and 
cotton developed earlier and was always stronger than that of the trades 
in Liverpool and Manchester. 
Yet another aspect of this process was the growing scale of 
industry and the changing nature of management. As factories grew in size 
and family firms gave way to limited companies with boards of directors 
so the patetnalist authority of the boss with his workmen disappeared, 
replaced by a more impersonal and far less individual relationship. In 
general Lancashire already had, by the late nineteenth century, a factory 
rather than a workshop economy (24) and the small master, Birmingham 
style (25) was no longer common in the manufacturing districts. There 
was still some small scale enterprise in the region, to be sure, notably 
in the old workshop quarter of Ancoats in Manchester and on the Liverpool 
waterfront where the worker - stevedores were still important 
sub-contractors of labour. But the scale of industry varied generally 
between the medium sized family concerns in the weaving trade and the 
vast industrial companies of the ;,engineering and mining districts: 
between, for example, the Dugdales~ family firm engaged in weaving at 
Blackburn and employing about 500 operatives and, on the other hand, the 
giant Wigan Coal and Iron Company which owned almost 30 collieries in 
Lancashire and had thousands of miners on its payroll. The fact is 
that the bigger the workforce and the more extensive the scope of the 
company's production the more difficult it became fo the workman to 
discuss his problems on an individual level with the boss~ The 
worker's strength now lay in his trade union, that is, through collective 
action, and with the institutionalisation of industrial relationships 
there emerged a marked division between the world of the ordinary working 
man and the world of the bosses. (26) 
Thus the social relationships which ultimately came to bear upon 
the political attitudes of the region were subj~t to contradictory 
pressures which added to the political and religious complexities 
of Lancashire. Nevertheless, it is clear that during this period there 
were certain factors that were beginning, in the words of Frederick 
Engels, "to weld the proletariat into a compact group with its own 
ways of life and thought and its own outlook on society." (27) The 
process was, of course, slow, and in consequence the development of 
independent political action by the working class in Lancashire was 9r6d~~. 
Yet in the long run the establishment of a labour party was a 
reflection of a more assertive working class community. 
3 Religion 
Of all the regions of England Lancashire was probably the most 
varied in its religious life, whilst its local peculiarities in religicn 
had a profound effect on the political and social attitudes held by 
many Lancashire people. 
The most striking religious feature of the region was the weakness 
of the churches among the working class. The official religious census of 
1851 showed that in every major town in the region attendance at worship 
was below the national average. In only three towns - Warrington, Wigan 
and Rochdale - was attendance above the average for large manufacturing 
centres, which meant that perhaps more than half the population went to 
church. In all the other towns attendance was limited to between 
30 and 45 per cent of the population. (28) A second problem, whose 
complexities the census of 1851 did not sufficiently encompass, was the 
comparative strength of the religious denominations within this general 
impression of apathy. From haphazard returns it became clear that more 
than half of all worshippers in Rochdale, Oldham, Stockport, 
Asnton-under-Lyne and Bury were Nonconformists; sizeable groups existed 
at Wigan, Liverpool, Preston,Manchester and Salford. In none of the 
large.towns did the Church of England have an absolute majority of 
worshippers, though in Wigan and Liverpool it had the largest single 
following. (29) 
There was no further census after that of 1851 from which to gauge 
the changing religious position during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Nevertheless, scattered surveys made by independent organisations 
during the early 1880's do help to convey the impression that nothing was 
changing very much. In 1881 attendance at church services at selected 
towns was not significantly higher than thirty years previously (Maps 4 
and 5), whilst the comparative strengths of the various denominations had 
only marginally altered. (Maps 6 and 7J 
Lanca~hire owed much of its religious character to the industrial 
development of the region and the immense inflow of labouring people 
from places such as the West Riding of Yorkshire, Wales and Ireland 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The distribution of church 
support by the later 1800's still revealed the basic immigration patterns 
of the region, with Catholicism strong in the western districts where 
Irish people had settled and, on the eastern side of the country, an 
influential brand of Methodism predominating. At the same time, the 
weakness of religion was common to most areas which had undergone industrial 
change. (30) In such circumstances the Church of England usually 
experienced severe disadvantages as a result of its failure to adapt to 
demographic changes during the eighteenth century. The problem was 
never tackled systematically by the Anglican~', in Lancashire until 
the third quarter of the nineteenth century; in the early 1840's, for 
example, Cooke Taylor noted in his Lancashire tour that "the number 
of the clergy of the established church in th~anufacturing district 
is inadequate to the duties which the clerical body is boundto perform. 
Personal acquafuntance with members of each congregation, domestic 
visitation and moral superintendence ha~e become physically impossible.,,(31) 
During the second half of the century, and especially under the guidance 
of James Fraser, Bishop of Manchester from 1870 until 1885, the 
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Anglican Church in the region made attempts to strengthen their position 
by building more churches and providing more extensive educational 
supervision. By the 1880's, it is true, the Church of England had 
succeeded in making itself the largest single 'denomination, although 
in some parts of Lancashire the combined strength of nonconformity was 
greater, especially in the cotton towns around Burnley and Nelson. Yet, 
in terms of extending their influence directly over the working population 
it is doubtful whether any of the churches had succeeded in achieving 
anything more than to hold their own with the increasing population. 
According to an independent survey made by a Congregationalist minister 
William Hewgill of Farnworth, in 1885 the overall hold of religion had 
, 
increased only slightly during the period since the 1851' census; at that 
time 40 per cent of the population had been provided with church 
accommodation, whilst in 1885 the figure stood at 42 per cent. (32) 
Hewgill's yardstick was church sittings and he produced no evidence 
to show how many of these were actually occupied so that his results 
proved very little about the nature of attendance at religious worship(33); 
but if less than half of the population could attend church or chapel at any 
one time the propori.tion of regular worshippers could not have been very 
high, as may be judged from the returns of the Nonconformist and Independent 
surveys, published in 1881-1882 (see also :Maps 5 and 7). (34) 
It appears, therefore, that the direct influence of religion on 
Lancashire people during the later years of the nineteenth century was not 
very strong on account of the tendency of the greater proportion of the 
populat i on to stay away from church services. Nevertheless, religion, 
despite its apparent weakness, must rank in importance alongside the 
economic and social conditions of the region as a major determinant of 
political attitudes. When the main areas of support among the religious 
denominations are compared with the distribution of party loyalties there 
emerges a sharp contrast between Tory and Catholic strength in the west 
and the Liberal - Nonconformist support in the eastern parts of the 
region. An analysis of this proble~ forms the basis of Chapter 6. 
" 
4 Economic and Social Conditions 
Finally, a word or two must be said about the conditions in which 
the Lancashire working class lived during this period. 
It will be appreciated that with a high proportion of wage earners 
in the region and with many towns dependent on a single trade 
fluctuations in trade could easily spark of widespread unemployment; 
the worst periods were the depressions of the mid 'eighties and 
'nineties, 1903-04 and 1908-09. Before 1909 ther,e was no state 
provision for old age and until 1911 no compensation for workers not 
covered by trade union' benefits against sickness and unemployment. 
There was therefore no substitute among the majority of wage earners 
for thrift and parsimony as guarantees against hard times. 
As well as economic uncertainty working people experienced a 
variety of living conditions. Evidence given to the Royal Commission 
on Labour (1891-93) gives the impression that many cotton operatives 
managed to rent four-roomed cottages at prices of about four shillings 
a week; at best these would be;situated on the steep slopes of cotton 
villages, open to pleasant Pennine Moorland and scoured by prevailing 
winds and rain. At the other extreme were the courts and back~to-back 
I 
houses of Oldham. In only a few places had philanthropic industrialists 
laid down model villages for their workers, the planned village of Port 
Sunlight at Bebington being a tribute to Mr. Lever's soap empire. 
The population boom of the nineteenth century had inevitably created 
a chaotic huddle of bad houses and overcrowding, particularly in the 
ttNt 
newer towns of Oldham~Widnes,and even in a planned settlement like 
Barrow-in-Furness housing conditions could be dreadful. (35) Manchester 
~, 
" 
and Liverpool were notorious for their mortality rates; Liverpool's 
was the highest for any of the large English towns of the 1880's ,(36) 
more serious in the ancient parish than in the out-townships. The problem 
of housing shortage and overcrowding was exacerbated by colonies of 
imhigrants established near the principal railway stations. Liverpool 
acquired a reputation as a pioneer city in housing reform when the 
Council began building workers' flats in the city centre and demo 1 i shing 
slums; but knocking down far exceeded re-building;in 1913 there were still 
almost three thousand people living illegally in cellar dwellings,and the 
percentage of its population living more than two to a room showed no 
marked decline between 1891 and 1931. Nonetheless in 1914 Liverpool held 
the doubtful honour of having a greater proportion of its population 
municipally housed than any other British city - 1.3 per cent.(37) 
Manchester City Council favoured "re-conditioning" existing houses 
rather than spending money on big demolition schemes; although conditions 
had improved since Engels' days the problem of shortage and overcrowding 
was not tackled sufficiently, so that by 1930's the housing problem was 
worse in many cases that it had been in the early years of the century.(38) 
T. R. Marr's report, Housing Conditions in Manchester and Salford (1904), 
reveals the exten~ of slum property in the two cities and shows very 
clearly its static Location in the districts bordering the city centre, 
against the peripheral development of better housing with open spaces 
(39) 
and gardens in middle class suburbs. In both Liverpool and 
Manchester house building fluctuated after 1900, the index being lower 
. (40) 
than the national average ln 1913. 
Yet such conditions were not necessa:Hly the seedbeds of political 
militancy. Lancashire was not in a state of continuous social unrest 
and it may even be questioned whether large sections of the working 
class were ever really interested in questions of social reform and 
improvement, especially if they involved interference in peoples' lives 
by the state. (41) Rather than rebelling and trying to change society 
most people attempted to make the best out ~!of their everyday existence, 
developing a rich variety of attitudes that formed the basis of a 
rather conservative social philosophy. The Lancashire landscape still 
today bears the marks of the working class culture that was created as 
people came to accept their surroundings - co-ops, commercial football 
and cricket, seaside holidays, brass bands, allotments: all testify to 
the life style of the working class at the end of the nineteenty century. (42) 
5 Summary 
We may now conclude by drawing together the main features of 
Lancashire life during our period. The region clearly derived its 
character from the growth of industry during the nineteenth century, 
the effects of which were to give to Lancashire a large working class 
population. Because the economy remained relatively prosperous until 
the first World War no real problems of unemployment arose during this 
period, although the inherent vulnerability ofrhaving so many workers 
employed in traditional, staple industries was beginning to reveal 
itself on occasions. 
The class structure of the region provided fertile ground for 
the development of trade unionism, a process that could be further 
assisted by the I 
arge scale nature of industrial undertakings. 
But whilst on the one hand conditions seemed promising for working class 
action in industrial and political life contradictory pressures were 
brought to bear through the influence of middle class leadership in 
some areas. Moreover, the region's immigration patterns, with their 
effect on religious behaviour, were a Source of division within the 
working class. 
Lancashire therefore provides a good setting in which to examine 
the development of independent working class:~olitics, with all the 
difficulties that attended such a process. 
2 
THE COTTON UNIONS 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the Lancashire cotton industry 
had completed its technological revolution (1) and entered a fully developed 
factory stage. During the next 75 or so years its form, structure and 
methods of production changed very little. The great leap forward in 
cotton production had come during the 1850's (2) after which, because of 
increasing competition from abroad, the industry's growth rate slowed down. 
It was during this phase of deceleration, lasting roughly from the 1870's 
to 1914, that the workers in the spinning, weaving and cardroom sections 
of the industry developed and consolidated their.trade union organisation 
and by the turn of the century these three groups of unions possessed a 
combined membership of some 125,000 operatives, a figure representing about 
35 per cent of the total labour force in cotton textiles. (3) Clearly 
then, the cotton unions must bulk large in any discussion of working dass 
institutions in Lancashire at this time. 
In the .following pages an attempt will be made to outline the 
industrial development of the cotton unions in order to provide the 
necessary context for a later discussion of their political manoeuvres. 
For the cotton unions adopted a rather sphinx-like attitude tow~rds 
political activity; not until 1895 did they make an attempt to promote 
labour candidates at parliamentary elections and then their endeavours 
were distinctly half-hearted. It was only in 1903, when they affiliated to the 
Labour Representatiom Committee, that the cotton unions began to display 
a consistent political policy. Before this, it is true, the cotton workers 
had put pressure on Parliament from time to time to obtain reforms that 
would bring improvements in factory conditions, but this was ~entially 
an opportunist gambit that took very much a second place to industrial 
action. Such behaviour contrasts markedly with that of the other big group 
of trade unionists in Lancashire, the Miners, whose political and industrial 
developments proceeded pari passu. The Miners, of course, had undoubted 
electoral ~vantages - high concentration of membership in a relatively 
small geographical area and sufficient organisational and financial 
resources to spon~r parliamentary candidates - but these qualities were 
possessed by the cotton unions, if perhaps to a slightly lesser degree. 
Why, then, were the cotton workers so slow to exploit politics? 
One answer may lie in the political differences that existed between 
individual workers, the conflict of Tory and Liberal sympathies making it 
difficult for the unions to embark on any political action) without arousing 
dissent among rank and file members. Union leaders certainly regarded this 
as a serious obstacle, though by the 1890's the cotton unions had cultivated 
a substantial loyalty that might have been expected to offset traditional 
sympathies in the political arena. The truth is that these loyalties were· 
not really p~t to the test before 1906 and it must be assumed that the urge 
to do so did not exist before about the turn of the century. In any case, 
the Lancashire Miners experienced political conflict in the rank and file 
just as much as the cotton unions but it did not prevent a successful 
parliamentary campaign by a Miners' leader in the heart of the coalfield 
in 1892. There is, however, a second reason that might be advanced to 
explain the laggardly pace of political development in the cotton unions; 
this involves the very substantial industrial bargaining position achieved 
by the unions in the 1890's which to a great extent seemed to obviate the 
need for political action. If the unions could get what they wanted by 
industrial action there seemed little point in lobbying cabinet ministers 
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and sponsoring parliamentary candidates. The key to this attitude lies 
in the industrial history of the cotton unions, and pa~ticularly in the 
stage reached by them during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
so that if their industrial experiences are understood, it is possible to 
appreciate their political stance. 
1. Spinners and Weavers: Origins, Development and Consolidation. 
The early industrial experiences of the cotton workers go far to 
explain the modes of behaviour adopted by their unions. The essential 
elements in the aims of the spinners' and weavers' organisations were 
forged during the period of industrial change that began in the eighteenth 
century and lasted until the 1840's. During this time the two groups of 
workers experienced different fortunes and consequently adopted different 
tactics to control their working environment. 
The most important achievement of the spinners' in their early 
history was the imposition of a system of machine manning and entry control 
in the spinning factories. The mechanisation of the spinning processes in 
cotton production was a comparatively gradual affair. The hand-mule 
spinners had known factory conditions from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century following the adaptation of Crompto~'s mule. In this context the 
'( 
spinner established his seniority over the other members of the spinning 
team, who became, in effect, his assistants. When more fully automated 
"self-actor" mules were introduced in the factories from the 1820's onwards 
the process of change was sufficientlyrestrained to allow the spinner to 
retain his control over the working group. It became usual for one spinner 
to supervise two mules with the help of two "piecers" who were recruited and 
paid by the spinner; the piecers were usually younger men though their status 
was not equal and the senior of the two was often an experienced f actory 
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hand. 
The effect of this strategy was to create in the spinning trade the 
appearance of an apprenticeship system designed to regulate the intake of 
labour into the spinners' ranks and to maintain comparatively high earnings 
for the spinners against low ones for the piecers. But since the 
differential between spinner and piecer was an artificial one - there was no 
difference between the two in skills - the spinners had to ensure that their 
assistants did not become a source of danger in time of strikes; if the 
spinners struck work the employers might in theory break the strike by 
dismissing all the spinners and appointing piecers in their stead. To 
counteract this the spinners unions had to attempt recruitment of a sufficiently 
high proportion of piecers to an~illary unions, dependent upon the spinners 
for strike pay, and ensure that when spinners were on strike piecers were 
also. This policy demanded constant action by spinners' unions at local 
level and even so there were occasional revolts by piecers against the 
tutelage of their supervisors; but in~general the policy was successful and 
the piecers repressed their grievances against the day when they would 
themselves, in the course of time, be promoted to the senior position of 
spinner. (4) 
Success in control of the labour supply therefore ensured the spinners' 
high earnings (5) and made an important contribution to the later success 
of their unions. On the other hand, the weavers were unable to adopt such 
a position; their union history was based on a more open principle. The 
weavers found their transformation from self-employed artisans, a status they 
enjoyed in theaghteenth century, to proletarian outworkers a much less 
favourable process. (6) Automation came to weaving with the power-loom in the 
1830's, by which time the old hand-loom apprenticeship system was almost 
eX~~~:_~L~::~n._~_~_~~ ___ ~h_a~g~_s __ ~~:r~ ~Illplemented fairly quickly and threw the 
workers into great confusion. (7) In addition, they came after the weavers 
had been suffering reduced earnings for about a generation. Trade 
unionism among the new power-loom weave~was therefore based on a 
free-entry system, with little or no attempt made to regulate labour supply, 
and its main preoccupation was with the establishment of standard wage rates. 
Where the spinners could leave wages to find their own level, the weavers 
had to use the union to bargain for wages with the employers. 
By the end of the nineteenth century both groups of unions had 
perfected their methods and reaped tangible rewards. The spinners' unions 
reached maturity earlier, partly because of economic developments in the 
cotton trad~ which assisted their growth. Improvements in spinning 
techniques had increased the number of spindles to each mule so that by the 
1870's it was possible to run a thousand spindles and with improved carding 
machines cotton was produced which spun more easily. Consequently output 
increased; yarn produced per man hour went up from 0.41b in 1830 to 2.3 1b in 
1892 whilst after 1860 the labour force remained constant, even showing a 
slight drop in the 1890's. (8) 
Local separatism at first prevented the spinners' unions from taking 
full advantage of this situation. Although the Spinners' Amalgamation dates 
from 1853 no real centralised action was pursued until 1870 when lev~es 
were collected for the Amalgamation (9) and a stronger federation organised 
by the grouping of areas with the same wage price - lists into "provinces" 
centred upon Bolton and Oldham, the two main spinning towns. During the 
depression at the closa of the 1870's the Amalgamation carried out 
extensive fights to avoid wage reductions spending £37,000 and borrowing 
from its reserve fund. (10) The result was an inability to support members 
and about a fifth of them were lost. 
. ... / 
The Spinners' fortunes began to improve with the appointment in 
1878 of James Mawdsley as General Secretary. Mawdsley had served for three 
years as assistant secretary to the Preston Spinners and was well versed 
in the intricate negotiation of price-lists, having been appointed 
following an examination of candidates in this technique. (11) His skills 
and vigour in carrying out the routine tasks of union management amounted to 
one of the most important factors in the Spinners' progress during the 1880's. 
Mawdsley's policy was to build up the Amalgamation's potential wealth and 
thereby secure its industrial strength. By exacting contributions of over 
a shilling a week from every member the treasury was replenished and a wide 
range of benefits became possible. (12) 
Mawdsley was less concerned with the wages problem than were the 
officials of the weaving unions. Although payment by the list system was 
the accepted practice in the spinning trade, as in weaving, no agreed standard 
list was negotiated for Oldham until 1876, whilst Boltondd not have me until 
1887. (13) General wage reductions during periods of bad trade were 
quite different, however, and Mawdsley set himself to guarantee that his 
members would not suffer because overstocked markets pushed down prices and 
caused employers to demand wage cuts. By the mid 1880's the Spinners 
Amalgamation was strong enough to challenge the employers on this question. 
The teS:t came with the Oldham strike of 1885. Bad trade in that year had 
brought threatening rumours about reduc tions in operatives' wages (14) 
and the Spinners decided to make a stand against economies which they 
considered to be brought on by overproduction. In July the masters insisted 
on ten per cent cuts but the Executive Council of the Amalgamation proposed 
five per cent reductions with a four day week, to clear stocks. (15) In 
Oldham the employers took matters into their own hands and undertook to fight 
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a battle on behalf of the whole trade. The operatives' proposals were 
rejected and on July 20th a strike began that was to last for thirteen weeks; 
in all some 5,000 spinners were idle but their stoppage affected almost 
19,000 others in dependent trades. (16) 
The strike outlined the great strength of the Spinners' Amalgamation. 
At first this seemed false; tactics demanded a retreat and the Spinners 
accepted an immediate reduction of five per cent without short-time working; 
in addition, provisions were made for a review of trade in three months time 
with the possibility of another five per cent.~Jt?) yet the owners desisted 
from enforcing this and whilst prices remained low the Spinners resisted 
half-hearted attempts by the masters to enforce the extra five per cent cut 
in January and August 1886. (18) The strike had convinced the employers 
of the Spinners' solidarity and immediately afterwards steps were taken to 
form employers' associations. (19) Equally important was the effect of the 
strike on ?'-other groups of workers; it had thrown out of work thousands of 
piecers and cardroom hands and was directly responsible for the formation 
of the Cardroom Amalgamation in 1886. Repercussions were felt in the 
weaving districts where serious shortages of weft were experienced. (20) 
Thus the Oldham strike of 1885 showed that the Spinners were prepared to use 
their industrial strength to fight wage reductions during bad trade and if 
necessary disrupt the whole of the cotton industry. As a result they suffered 
no further cuts until 1892. 
Trade unionism among the weavers took longer to develop and did not enjoy 
41 
real strength quite so early. Nevertheless, their policy of achieving standard 
wage rates contained, in the words of Professor H. A. Turner, " ••••••• the 
key to their own early consolidation." (21) In the task of establishing lists 
for piecework payment in the various localities the weavers' societies came to 
rely upon the services of skilled negotiators whose job it was to supervise 
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the correct payment of wages, fix adjustments to rates and calculate new 
lists as the range of products increased. The earliest lists, of which the 
Blackburn one of 1853 was the prototype, were arranged by committees of 
operatives, but the function soon became a full-time occupation. Thomas 
Birtwist1e, appointed Secretary of the East Lancashire Amalgamated Power 
(22) , Loom Weavers' Friendly Association in 1861, was the first of the 
full-time officials - "a combination in the trade union world of the 
accountant and the lawyer". (23) The objects of his Association, which may 
also be regarded as a statement of Birtwistle's duties, were: 
"(to) keep up our present rate of wages to the standard list 
and to be able to resist any attempts to reduce the same 
and also to prevent one employer paying less than another 
for the same amount and quality of work and particularly to 
bring up the prices of those who are paying the lowest rate 
of wages." (24) 
Here were the origins of the weavers' struggle for a Uniform List. 
Birtwistle's immediate task was to negotiate piecework price lists, however, 
and during the following few years he arranged several in the Association's 
area (25); at the same time local weavers' societies began to appoint 
their own secretaries to deal primarily with the wages question but also to 
assist unpaid "collectors" and committee members in the recruitment of new 
members and the supervision of strike action. 
I 
But the "First Amalgamation", as Birtwistle's East Lancashire Association 
later became known, had serious short~mings. It was too small and, because 
of its localised development, had unequal funds. Provisions for a central 
strike reserve fund, the weavers' real need, were inadequate. These failings 
were under lined by two strikes ,; in 1878 and 1884; the first - liThe Gre at Strike "-
involved about 100,000 weavers and revealed a serious lack of union 
discipline and control. (26) The second, fought at Blackburn, failed to 
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restore wage cuts of up to ten per cent made in 1878. (27) This latter event 
provoked Birtwistle and some local weavers' officials, including David 
Holmes of the Burnley Weavers' Association, to embark upon immediate 
reorganisation on a wider, more centralised, basis. At a series of all 
Lancashire delegate meetings at Bury and Blackburn in May 1884 a "Second 
Amalgamation" was established as the Northern Counties Amalgamated Associations 
of Weavers. (28) 
In spite of its hasty formation the Amalgamation prospered during the 
1880's. Its main assets were an existing structure from which to operate 
and a vigorous leadership. The bases of the original Amalgamation were used, 
remained 
though extended and given greater cohesion. The objects~substantially the 
of 
same: to "establish and maintain a uniform and fair rate~wag~ in proportion 
to the quantity of the work performed" and to "prevent unnecessary 
reductions and inflictions and when trade and circumstances will allow, 
obtain an advance in the rate of wages." (29) The secretary dealt with the 
specialised problem of wages besides looking after office work and 
communicating with local officials. At least two officials were detailed 
to the important task of recruiting members; from the middle 'eighties until 
their deaths in 1905 and 1906 Joshua Barrows and David Holmes undertook this 
duty. Both were veteran trade unionists; Holmes, born in Manch~ster in 1843, 
had settled at Padiham, near Burnley, in the 1850's and worked there as a 
handloom weaver. Though still quite a young man he had participated in union 
work at Burnley, experiencing victimisation by employers because of his 
activities. In 1872 he was elected President of Burnley Weavers' 
Association and was to hold the position for over thirty years. Holmes' 
personal SUccess through adversity had produced in him a toughness tempered 
with a desire to see trade .. . 
unIonIsm grow In strength by the application of 
re~p.ectable methods. (30) 
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he had worked as a weaver for many years before he became active in union 
affairs. Barrows quickly then made a name for himself as a forceful 
advocate of union reorganisation throughout Lancashire and his work in 
ffitablishing the Second Amalgamation was justly rewarded by his appointment 
as the first official Agent of the new body. (31) 
DUring the late 'eighties the Weavers fought a series of strike actions 
to enforce standard wage lists against employers' attempts at under payment. 
At this time the number of looms in the weaving trade was expanding at a rapid 
rate, but output was increasing at a slower pace than that of the labour 
force and naturally the employers tried to reduce costs by increasing the 
number of looms supervised by each weaver. The amalgamation was fairly 
successful, however, in opposing his trend and limiting the loom ratio to 
four to one (32) thus helping to distribute the work load more~enly and 
stave off unemployment. But the effect of this pmlicy was to maintain a large 
pool of workers in employment and the Weavers Amalgamation had to be very 
careful that no districts suffered under payment. Hence the idea of a Uniform 
List from which all weavers' wages could be negotiated. To some extent, most 
employers were prepared to accept such a list, which would prevent under 
cutting by individual firms, (33) but agreement on details was slow to 
materialise between the employers and the union. In 1885 the. ~algamation 
fought a two week strike at Burnley where the masters were abusing the 
Blackburn List; between 1886 ahd 1888 two massive strikes were ordered at 
Ashton-under_Lyne and Barnoldswick to demonstrate the Weavers' position 
on under ~ayment. Even so, a Uniform List for plain cloths was not agreed 
upon until June 1892. On the whole, all weaving districts gained from the 
new arrangements (34) and Amalgamation membership rapidly increased during 
the next few years. New branches were formed and by the time of the First 
W~_~~~ __ ~:~t_~~ __ ~_a_lgamation was supported in all towns where weaving was 
carried out. (35) 
By the early 1890's, therefore, the Spinners' and Weavers' Amalgamations 
had made considerable progress by their efforts in industrial action and were 
able to use their power to a significant degree in effecting decisions in the 
management of the cotton industry, as we shall see. It would be wrong to 
suggest that at this time the two groups of unions faced no major problems; 
there were still many areas of the cotton workers' industrial environment 
needing attention, but it seemed reasonable to assume that such problems as 
there were could successfully be tackled by industrial action. 
2 The Cardroom Amalgamation and the Brooklands Agreement 
The third major group of cotton workers, those employed in the card and 
blowing rooms of spinning factories, only began to exploit collective action 
by the mid 1880's. But their development was quick and by about 1891 the 
new Cardroom Amalgamation was fairly well established, its prese.nc.e helping to 
weld the cotton unions into a strong federation during the last few years 
of the century. 
Cardroom workers were engaged in the preparatory stages of yarn spinning 
and although their work was a long established feature of factory production 
it was of a lowly nature, without the craft ancestory which the spinners and 
, 
weavers might in theory claim; this is borne out by the fact that unlike most 
4f 
workers in the cotton trade the cardroom operatives were designated by the 
location of their work rather than by the function of their job. They were 
also very much dependent on the actions of the highly organised spinners; a 
widespread spinning strike, as at Oldham in 1885, forced idleness, willy nilly, 
upon the cardroom hands. Moreover, cardroom operatives were paid by time, 
not by piece, and were t~efore ill-equipped to take advantage of the speeded 
up machinery that helped to increase the piecework yield. Their 
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unorganised condition also left them vulnerable to any~onomies wrought by 
the employers, especially those resulting in '~oubling up", involving an 
intensification of the burdens placed on the worker. (36) 
The cardroom operatives, then, had a poor union record, except at 
Oldham, where a federation of local societies with a longish history had 
held rather tenuously together. The need to extend and strengthen this 
coverage was obvious and was constantly urged in the early 1880's by a 
Blackburn worker named Richard Cocking. But it was the Oldham strike that 
really provided the impetus for action and on a wave of discontent in the 
cardrooms, reaching a crest in April 1886, an Amalgamation was formed. (38) 
The body was in most respects simply an extension of the Oldham union and 
was controlled from the outset by Oldham officials. It was based on the 
open union principle of the Weavers' Amalgamation and similarly attempted to 
recruit its members from both men and women operatives. Its original aims 
were: 
"to afford pecuniary assistance to any member who may be 
victimised or without employment in consequence of a dispute 
or lock-out, or when permanently disabled by accident, and to 
provide a fund for a'decent interment of its members at death." (39) 
It seems fairly clear, however, that this was far too ambitious a scheme. 
LeVies were only two pence a month, less than the Weavers' Amalgamation which 
attempted to provide only strike pay. 
; 
William Mullin, the Amalgamation's 
secretary, was convinced from the beginning that the cardroom workers 
should pursue a policy similiar to that of the Weavers in order to build up 
a fighting strength. In his own words: 
"We should prepare ourselves for a strike. The present is 
the most opportune time we can ever hope for to both increase 
our membership and our funds so that when times of adversity 
come we shall be in a position to meet all demands." (40) 
The history of the Cardroom Amalgamation during the next few years 
__ 6~~~e~ __ ~~~,~_~_~~1~~'~ ideas were fully justified but it took much cajolinq to 
rouse local societies from their in"':ema. Mullin continued to express 
his fears of a "gigantic society of weakness" (41), despairing that the 
prime object of protecting wages during bad trade would be achieved. (42) 
The Cotton Factory Times, which had done much to encourage trade unionism 
in the cardrooms, even referred to the unwillingness of some workers to 
remit adequate subscriptions - expecting their officials to "make bricks 
without straw." (43) 
This attitude can partly be explained by the exceptionally easy growth 
of the Amalgamation during the improved trade of the late 'eighties, making 
it difficult to enforce self-discipline on members. Wage advances were 
secured in May 1888 and January 1891, by which time the membership of the 
Amalgamation had soared to over 28,000. (44) But when trade began to 
deteriorate at the end of 1891 the Cardroom Amalgamation was forced to look 
to the Spinners for support against the possibility of wage reductions. 
After local attempts to secure an alliance (45) the Cotton Workers' Association 
was formed in that year to assist both groups of workers in the event of a 
strl'ke. (46) , It was designed to achieve total stoppages in spinning mllls 
and gave the cardroom hands an assurance that sympathetic action on their 
part in SUpport of the spinners would be paid for out of a common strike 
treasury. (47) This arrangement, of course, benefited the Spinners' 
Amalgamation and particularly fulfilled the aims of James Mawdsley, who 
had bng been advocating co-operation of this nature in the spinning trade. 
Yet the scheme came too late to help the Cardroom Amalgamation, for in 
1892 the SPinning trade became involved in a major lock-out that grew out 
of a dispute at Stalybridge over "bad spinning" - when speeded up machines 
and inferior quality cotton caused threads to snap, hence slowing up the 
production process and reducing the operatives' hourly output, upon which 
their wages depended. (49) The Stalybridge dispute was hardly over when 
(48) 
another followed, provoked this time by employers' demands for wage reductions 
because of the poor state of trade. The unions proposed remedial action in 
the form of short-time workin~ to clear the overstocked market and stimulate 
demand for yarns once more; this approach was rejected by the employers, who 
were adamant on the cutting of wages. (50) Eventua~ly, on November 5th 1892, 
a lock-out began in south east Lancashire which lasted for twenty weeks putting 
around 50,000 workers and 16,000,000 spindles out of operation; a "large 
though indefinable" (51) quantity af weaving machinery was also stopped 
and partial idleness caused in the bleaching, dyeing and other finishing 
trades. The Cardroom Amalgamation supported the Spinners and some 24,000 
cardroom operatives were locked out. (52) None of the~~~~sisted from the 
funds of the Cotton Workers' Association, which had not yet had time to 
accumulate, and Mullin had to appeal in the trade union press for donations 
from sympathisers; though he met with a little success the overall response 
was insufficient. (53) 
The conclusion of the lock-out was embodied in the Brooklands Agreement 
of March 1893. (54) The operatives agreed to submit to a reduction of 
sevenpence in the pound on their earnings but in return secured a planned 
wages programme for the future. There was to be a twelve months moratorium 
on wage adjustments and after that time they were to be limited to the 
sevenpence standard either way. Local committees were to be set up to settle 
individual disputes, especially those concerning "bad spinning" which 
required to be concluded speedily. For the Cardroom Amalgamation an 
important exe'mption was made to the general terms of the Agreement allowing 
male cardroom operatives to negotiate for whatever wage rises they could 
obtain by free market b .. (55) arga~n~ng. 
Thec,Brooklands Agreement, and the lock-out that had brought it about, 
------ - - - -- - - ---- -_._---_ .. 
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served to underline the extent of cotton union development by the early 
1890's. In the first place it re-emphasised the massive strength of the 
Spinners' Amalgamation; after what was by any standards an exhausting 
stoppage the Spinners were able to recoup their losses so quickly that by 
1895 their central treasury held over £150,000 and Mawdsley could with 
justification claim them to be "the wealthiest trade union in the world." (56) 
In fact his verdict was supported by the Webbs who, writing shortly afterwards 
in their Industrial Democracy, spoke of the Spinners as "one of the strongest, 
most efficient and most successful of trade unions"; they added, 
"in good years and bad alike (the Amalgamation) has for a whole 
generation maintained the net earnings of its members at the 
relatively high level of from 35 to 50 shillings a week." (57) 
By comparison Brooklands was something of a Janus face for the Cardroom 
Amalgamation. Up to a point the union gained, its status greatly elevated 
by its association with the Spinners. In reality, however, the lock-out 
created havoc within the union, with funds exhausted and a fifth of the 
membership lost. For the next ten years the Cardroom Amalgamation struggled 
to maintain a hard core of members as subscriptions were raised to restore 
liquidity, (amove that caused a slight falling away of members in the 
Spinners also), (58) and for the remainder of the 1890's union membership 
became something of a luxury for the comparatively poorly paid cardroom 
hands. To be sure, a more rational position on benefits resulted from the 
1 k (59) t oc -out, for in July 1893 the costly death benefit was abolished , ye 
it took a decade for the union fully to recover its position of 1891. 
In general, however, Brooklands vindicated the cotton unions' policy, 
confirming the value of their industrial activity over the years. It brought 
- a settled wage policy that helped to banish the effects of trade fluctuation on 
workers' standards of 11·v1·ng. A t 1- El··ah H 1 con emporary oDserver, 1J. e m, whose 
~~~?at~~~~_ i~_~~e lock-out were with _the_employers. notl'>rl .,.Qn· .... ~+flll1" +h. ... +_ .j..\"" 
unions had introduced a new principle into labour relations: that "whilst 
wages may' be advanced in times of prosperity they ought never to be 
reduced." (60) This was the climax to the steady development of union power; 
Brooklands represented the highest point of their industrial consolidation. 
Moreover, by securing such an agreement the unions were seeking power with 
responsibility in the cotton industry and there is good reason to regard 
Brooklands not ltierely as a step towards the greater security of the cotton 
workers but as a seal on the unions' position as equal partners, with the 
employers, in the guardianship of the industry. 
4. "A Union of All the Producers •••••• " 
By the 1890's there were obvious reasons for wanting to preserve the 
buoyancy of the Lancashire cotton trade. During the last quarter of the 
fo 
nineteenth century the industry had begun to lose its dynamism; it was no 
longer expanding as it had done in the 1850's and 1860's, and though the 
(61 ) magnitude of its production was still a contemporary wonder the important 
markets of Europe and America were quickly slipping away, to be lost forever 
by 1900. Lancashire came to rely on exports to India and, to a lesser extent, 
China. At the same time competition in the output of cotton goods from 
America and continental Europe reduced Lancashire's shares in world markets. 
, 
Technological improvements were also passing to foreigners; for example, the 
self-actor mule and the Lancashire loom were still used extensively, 
almost exclusively, in Lancashire mills at the tUrn of the century whilst the 
machinery of the future, the ring-frame and the Northrop loom, were being 
adopted by competitors. (63) 
The response of the cotton unions to this situation was to co-operate 
(62) 
as farras Possible with the employers to regulate the industry for the benefit 
of the. half million people whose jobs it provided. The balance of power 
---'---, 
between unions and employers permitted such a policy and, more so than 
in any other industry duringfuis period, there was displayed in the Lancashire 
cotton trade a unity of purpose aimed at maximum harmony in industrial 
relations. 
By the late 1880's all three major cotton unions were beginning to 
extend their activities to guard against disruptions in the industry that 
might threaten wages and ultimately jobs. Three examples serve to 
illustrate this trend. ' 
In the first place there was the attack on middlemen. The union 
leadership despised the position in the trade of the brokers and merchants; 
according to James Mawdsley, 
"so long as employers allowed themselves to be robbed by 
brokers and middlemen the operatives ought never to submit 
to a reduction of wages however small the profits of employers 
were." (64) 
Mawdsley was clearly conscious of the disproportionate rewards accruing to 
these "middlemen" and the attitude of the unions was summed up by the Cotton 
Factory Times when criticising those people who, 
"for doing nothing at all but handling the goods the, 
merchants, brokers, wholesale dealers and agents generally 
get as much as the operatives who produce the goods, and, 
many times over the amount which goes to the employers". (65) 
In 1889 an opportunity arose for Mawdsley and other union leaders to act 
in concert with the'employers against a group ~f Liverpool and New York 
merchants who were conspiring to corner raw cotton and force up prices. 
By common consent of union and management some spinning mills were put on short 
time working and the "ring" was quickly broken, an achievement that brought 
a jubilant editorial from the Cotton Factory Times and an expressed wish to 
see, in the future, 
"the whole of the cotton industry managed on strictly scientific 
lines. with a view to paying good wages to the hands and giving 
a sahsfactory return to the owners of the mills." (66) 
The incident had been successful in part, though of course it did not 
eliminate the influence of the merchant who continued to take his cut from 
the profits of the trade. Yet its greater significance lies in the mutuality 
of interest that was beginning to develop between unions and employers. 
A few years later a more striking example of this relationship was to 
be seen over the Bimetallist question. As Lancashire began to rely more 
heavily on the eastern markets of India and China the cotton trade began to 
press more vigorously for a revision of the world's monetary system in order 
to stabilise trade between east and west. In the 1870's silver, the 
currency of the east, had in effect been demonetised and its value in 
relation to gold has slumped drastically, causing traders in India and the 
east to look to some form of manipulation as a means of restoring silver's 
value. This current of opinion was expressed during the 1890's by a volatile 
pressure group known as the Bimetallist League, whose object was to: 
"promote an International Monetary Union of the leading Commercial 
Nations whereby silver shall be re-monetized and gold and silver 
monies made available ••••• for all purposes of international money 
and international trade." (67) 
To be sure, many people at the time associated depressions in trade with 
monetary causes and in Lancashire there was a widespread belief that the 
bimetallist theory offered strength to the cotton industry; in f~ct, to 
judge from the cry of a correspondent in the Cotton Factory Times there was 
not a moment to lose: 
" .•••• are we to speak out and demand that a thorough inquiry 
into the matter in all its bearings be made before it is too 
late, that is before our merchants are bankrupt and our operatives 
starving?" (68) 
During the bad trade of the mid 'nineties the Bimetallic Ueague received 
constant financial support from Lancashire mil10wners and the cotton unions, 
whose leaders called for joint conferences of the world's chief commercial 
nations as a prelude to establishing a fixed ratio of value between gold 
and silver. Several delegations of owners and union representatives visited 
Whitehall; for example, in 1892, when bimetallist agitation in Lancashire 
was at its height, led by the Cotton Factory Times, Mawdsley told the 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, G. J. Goschen, that he considered 
the bimetallist question would "have no little weight in deciding the verdict 
. . (69) 
of the County Palatine" in the parllamentary electlons of that year. 
For a time it did appear that Goschen might come up with an answer(70) but 
ultimately he proved immovable. The failure to sway the Conservatives 
was crucial because the Liberal party, champions of laisser-faire, refused to 
entertain the idea of financial manipulation and as the years passed the 
bimetallist issue lost much of its appeal in the face of hostile 
governments. Yet the cause still lingered among working class groups in 
Lancashire; as late as 1899 the Trade Union Monetary Reform Association 
could attract working men of almost all shades of political opinion (71) 
(72) 
even though in the labour movement as a whole bimetallism had no support. 
A further example might be cited, moreover, to illustrate the keen 
sensitivity of unions and employers to the fortunes of the eastern market 
and their willingness to act together to protect the cotton trade. Quick 
as it might be to suggest the manipulation of a laisser-faire economy in its 
own interests, the cotton industry was equally speedy when it came to 
attacking protectionist measures that operated in favour of its rivals. 
An instance of this had been seen in the 1860's when the Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce had led an agitation against Canning's Indian Cotton Tariffs. (73) 
In 1893 a very $imiliar situation arose once more. Faced with a large 
financial deficit the Indian Government had imposed a 5 per cent duty on all 
goods gOing into India, including cotton manufactureSs; the Secretary of 
State for India, however, had ordered an exemption for English cotton goods 
'" 
\ 
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but when H. H. Fowler took over the India Office in 1894 he reviewed the 
order and in the following year consented to the inclusion of manufactured 
cotton goods in the Indian tariff system. At the same time, in order to 
mollify feeling at home, Fowler proposed a 5 per cent "countervailing" duty 
on fine yarns spun in Indian mills. Yet after six months of this excise 
duty, deSigned to avoid total protection for Indian manufacturers, Lancashire 
was convinced of its failure. The Cotton Factory Times complained: 
"The Indian producer pays the tax on the value of his yarn 
although it may subsequently be made into cloth, whilst we 
have to pay the tax on the cloth we send them as cloth and 
on its full face value as such." (74) 
The upshot was that there developed in Lancashire during 1895 a vigorous 
agitation against the Indian duties and in the House of Commons Conservative 
members for Lancashire constituencies attacked Fowler in debate, though on 
the crucial occasion the Secretary of State was defended by his own party's 
Lancashireoombers. (75) The duties were carried on and it did not take long 
for the cotton trade to adjust to them, though at the time of the Commons 
debates few Lancashire workers, faced with bad trade and short time working, 
had kind words for the Liberal party. Wi11iam Mullin noted with particular 
distaste the behaviour of Liberal M.Ps who "with a few honourable exceptions ••••• 
voted party as against the interests of so large and important an industry." (76) 
It was not surprising that the Liberals made such a poor showing in the cotton 
towns during the General Election that year. 
These episodes, then, help to clarify the outlook of the cotton unions 
in the 1890·s. Th t th . h t t . a ere was a "cotton interest", WhIC 0 a cer aIn 
extent transcended class and party boundaries was undeniable and it is 
Possible to agree~th Beatrice Webb on the exist~nce in the cotton trade 
of "a union of all the producers in one trade against the outside world." (77) 
The cotton union leadership had, in fact, become more interested in 
compromise with the employers than in conflict, an attitude that contrasted 
markedly with the miners' leaders' position at the same period. The cotton 
union standpoint was well summed up by W. H. Wilkinson, secretary of the. 
Weavers' Amalgamation answering a question before the Royal Commission on 
Labour in 1892: 
"And you think that a complete union of all employers and a 
complete union of employed brings about the best understanding 
and promotes uniformity of wages?" 
"Yes, I believe we could get on very well if that were so." (78) 
3 Summary 
tM 
At the time ofABrooklands Agreement there seemed little prospect 
of any major political action through the cotton unions in the immediate 
future. The industrial policy they had pursued brought great rewards and, 
what is more, it was not a policy that provoked the sort of conflict 
between employers and men which was likely to spill over into the radical 
brand of politics common in the mining districts. This is not to say that 
the policy of harmonious relations was a product of weak-willed, non-mili:tant 
leadership; on the contrary, harmony developed because the cotton unions had 
proclaimed their militancy during the 1880's and shown that they were quite 
prepared to exploit their strength to acquire a voice in the management of the 
cotton trade. It was therefore a harmony derived from strength and mutual 
not 
respect,~from weakness. It is true, however, that because of this policy 
there had grown up in the minds of cotton union leaders a feeling that 
industrial actl'on was tl . t l't' 1 t' th t th grea y superIor 0 po 1 lca ac Ion, a ere was no 
substitute for strong~ade unionism and industrial bargaining. David Holmes, 
------_._--._-------
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for example, the Weavers' leader, was in no doubt ~s to which was the 
better Course to adopt and he was fond of pointing out that continental 
workers subscribed to "socialist" methods (by which he meant politics) 
to attain their industrial ends and that as' a result their unions were in a 
"pitiable" condition. (79) It would seem undeniable that attitudes such as 
that expressed by Holmes did detract from thinking about political action, 
but the important thing to remember for the future is that the cotton unions 
were not afraid to use their strength to safeguard their interests; because 
of this it would be misleading to suggest that by lS93 the cotton unions had 
fixed a course from which they would never deviate. 
Nonetheless, at the time, their outlook had seemingly depressing 
implications for other working class leaders. Not only was the cotton unions' 
own political development retarded by their industrial success but it also 
seemed clear that the future of working class politics in Lancashire looked 
bleak without cotton union support. The conversion of the cotton unions to 
political action at this stage would have been a significant breakthrough; 
the sheer size of their membership (SO), matched in absolute terms only by 
the unions in the shipbuilding and engineering, mining and building 
. d t (SI) ln us ries , meant that almost one in every three of LancashirT trade 
unionists was left out of politics through his union by the isolation of the 
cotton workers. (S2) The exten~ of unionisation in the cotton trade, 
running at over ninety per cent in spinning and around half in the cardroom 
and weaving sections (S3), coupled with:.the geographical concentration of 
the membership, meant that the cotton unions were in almost as commanding a 
position as some county mining associations should they wish to mobilise the 
vote in Lancashire cotton constituencies. (S4) The waste of this potential 
._------- -------
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power constituted a disappointing gap in the region's independent working 
class movement. 
Yet the outl&ok was not entirely bleak. Even at the height of union 
power during the time of the Brooklands Agreement the situation was beginning 
to change. The fact is that a legislative programme was coming to be 
accepted by the union leadership and its significance in union business was 
immensely greater by the mid-'nineties that it had been ten years before. 
There was no guarantee that the security of the unions would continue to 
be defendable simply by trade union methods nor that the need to pursue a 
more coherent legislative programme would not disturb harmonious relations 
with the employers. Thus we shall see in Chapter 8 the significance of a 
slowly evolving political programme. Another important factor coming to 
bear upon the development of union policy by the middle of the 1890's was the 
challenge to the union leadership by local societies where socialist 
influence was strong. Not all the rank and file membership accepted 
unquestioningly official policy and, as we shall see, the Eight Hour Day 
issue was largely an example of a policy developing from the districts to 
challenge central orthodoxy. There was also the likelihood that established 
leaders would sooner or later have to relinquish their priMacy because of increas~l 
ing age and that an infusion of new blood at the top might bring a change of 
policy. All these factors were capable of changing the cotton unions' stance 
by the turn of the century. 
3 THE MINERS 
The development of trade unionism in the Lancashire mining 
industry presents an interesting comparison with that of the cotton 
industry. At first glance, the history of both groups of unions 
appears to follow a parallel course; both had their origins in the 
middle years of the nineteenth century and struggled to achieve 
industrial strength by the 1890's; both secured, at this time, 
impressive wage agreements by collective bargaining; both became 
affiliated to the Labour Representation Committee in the same 
year - 1903. But these resembl~nces are superficial and serve 
to distort the true picture; the fact is that, on important points, 
the development of the miners' union and the cotton unions 
differed fundamentally. For one thing, the miners did not experience 
a steady, cumulative growth in industrial strength; during the 
1880's the unions in the coal trade were very weak, only succeeeding;· 
in establishing real strength as a result of a period of,g~od trade 
and high coal prices which lasted from about 1888 until 1892. In 
addition, the relations between the coal owners and the miners 
remained bitter, even at the height of union power, and there was 
, 
never any sign from the miners of the managerial philosophy that 
characterised the cotton unions and helped to promote harmony in 
that trade. A further point of divergence was the manner in which 
the miners rose to prominence. This was done by co-operation with 
unions in other coalfields, for from the early 1880's the 
Lancashire miners were always striving to achieve their victories on 
a wide front, fighting t o secure their position in Lancashire by 
helping the miners' movement to reach its objectives nationally. 
Becaus~ of all these considerations, then, the Lancashire miners 
attained maturity by a noticeably different process from that of the 
cotton unions, the most important effect of this lying in the shaping 
of political attitudes among the miners. From an early stag'e in their 
development political weapons became a crucial part of their 
armoury, brought into action when their industrial strength was too 
weak to sustain the fight against the employers by trade union strategy. 
leg~slative 
There was always a markedAundercurrent in the miners' methods and 
Parliament bulked consider~bly larger in their outlook than it did 
in that of the cotton workers. Moreover, when the miners' national 
network had been cemented by the establishment of the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain in 1889 the Lancashire miners moved into 
the forefront of a political movement for an Eight Hours Day in the 
coal trade which necessitated parliamentary candidates from the 
miners' ranks in Lancashire, as well as in other coalfields. 
Compared with the other county' unions Lancashire's success in the 
movement was not striking, largely because the traditional party 
loyal ties which divided the colliers' sympathies held back po\i ti cal 
progress, but when compared with the cotton workers the miners of 
Lancashire had gone far by the mid 'nineties towards the cr~ation 
of an independent tradition in working class politics. 
This,then, is the general picture of the Lancashire miners' 
development, determined as it was by a variety of factors stemming 
mainly from the conditions of the coalfield in which they worked; it 
is to an examination of the coalfield and the way in which it 
influenced trade union development that we 'must now turn. 
1 General Considerations: the Lancashire Coalfield 
The Lancashire coalfield covered most of the industrial part of 
the region; it was roughly triangular in shape with its apex at Colne 
in the north east and its base running in an arc between Manchester 
and St Helens; there was also a narrow salient which stretched out 
along the edge of the Pennines from the Manchester district to North 
Staffordshire. The whole area was some 500 square miles in extent. 
Coal measures were accessible over almost the entiDe coalfield but 
because of transport facilities and industrial demand coal 
workings had come to be centred on four principal local ties by the 
late nineteenth century: Wigan - st. Helens, Bolton - Worsley, 
Manchester - Oldham and Burnley. The most striking feature of 
coalmining in these areas was the difficulty experienced in getting 
the coal; miners had to overcome the severe problems posed by the 
geological nature of the land - faulting, flooding and steep inclines, 
to which should be added the hazards of subsidence where workings were 
located under heavily urbanised areas. The physical hardship in the 
miner's working day began to loom longer as time passed and the more 
accessible seams became exhausted, so that mine' '-, were dug deeper and 
. f 
galleries extended further from the pit shaft. (1) The collier's 
time underground was thus lengthened because of the distances 
involved in travelling to the coalfaces whilst his shift was often 
interrupted by the need to make time - consuming repairs and carry 
out maintenance work, for which he was not paid. Hence the miner's 
output sUffered and his earnings were reduced. (2) For the{)owners, also, 
the situation was fraught with difficulty; Lancashire presented a 
striking illustration of diminishing returns for coalowners, with 
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output remaining almost static from the 1880's onwards whilst the 
labour force increased. (3) In the effort to supply neighbouring 
manufacturing industries with cheap coal there seemed little 
alternative but to keep down to a minimum the biggest item in 
output costs - wages. (4) Moreover, because of the slight profit 
margins involved in the trade, the colliery owners were unwilling to 
make concessions to their employees in the form of free coal, or 
even free explosives, whilst facilities supplied by the colliery 
companies for the,mining villages, such as schools and libraries, 
frequently found in more affluent coalfields in the Midlands were 
very rare in Lancashire. (5) With the interests of the employers 
and the men so sharply contrasted, therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that the Lancashire coalfield was not marked by 
harmonious industrial relations. 
The physical nature of the coalfield was not the only source 
of conflict. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
face of industry 'in the mining districts was changing, as smaller 
colliery companies gave way to bigger combines. Perhaps the effects 
of this trend should not be over estimated, since it was less 1 
perceptible in Lancashire than it appears to have been in other 
coalfi'elds (6); yet there can be no doubt that by the end of the 
century the region's mining industry was becoming increasingly 
dominated by the monolithic Wigan Coal and Iron Company, by far the 
biggest employer of labour with over 30 collieries, and to a lesser 
e~tent by the influential Richard Evans company of st Helens. There 
were still ample small firms (7) though their influence tended to 
be overshadowed in the counsels of coalowners by the voice of the 
combines. It is, of course, difficult to assess exactly how much the 
move towards monopoly capital influenced miners' attitudes, though it 
may well be suggested that the more impersonal nature of industrial 
relations that resulted when older mineowners, who had been in close 
touch with their men, were replaced by managers of combines brought 
about a less understanding and more conflict-ridden relationship. 
Acrimonious relations might have been avoided had it not been 
for another factor: the formidable obstacles to union development 
presented by the difficulties and general nature of mining in the 
region. To begin with, mining was not the most important industry 
in Lancashire (8) and there were relatively few communities that could 
( 9) be termed 'pit villages' because of their total reliance on coal. 
Most Lancashire colliers lived in towns with mixed economies such as 
St Helens, Oldham and Burnley. In this kind of setting the pit culture 
which marked the mining villages in other coalfields, derived from 
social and occupational homogeneity, had little chance of developing 
to any significant degree and in consequence there was lacking that 
social base upon which strong trade unionism could easily be 
const~ucted. It is also worth noting that in Lancashire there ~as 
none of the religious uniformity found among other groups of miners 
h (10) 
w 0 generally had common ties through loyalty to the chapel; 
as 
in the Lancashire coalfield the miners were/divided in their religious 
opinions as they were in their political sympathies, for not only was 
there a keen Church and Chaplel ~ struggle but also a sizeable 
proportion of people supporting the Catholic Church. 
With these diverse social pressures, then, certain disruptive 
inflUences appeared to assume a more significant barrier to 
---_./ 
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collective trade union action than otherwise might have been the 
case; for instance, the hierarchical,work structure among miners, 
fairly common in any coalfield, which set hewers, underground day 
wage hands and surface workers strictly apart in a recognised order 
of merit (11) was likely to have had a divisive effect on trade 
union development. Ano~her feature of disharmony may well have been 
Irish immigration, especially high in the Wigan and St Helens 
districts, although admittedly tailing off towards the end of the 
century. But in the earlier periods it would have probably created 
hostility between immigrant and indigenous workers, whose 
customary routine might have been upset by newcomers eager to secure 
jobs by working hard and temporarily increasing output. (12) On 
balance therefore, it would appear that the common bonds among miners, 
fostered by such factors as social cohesion, a sense of exploitation, 
suspicion of authority and a unifying religion, were countered in 
Lancashire by equally powerful divisions. ~iilst there was an obvious 
need for strong trade unionism to overcome the adverse economic 
situation in the coalfield and secure decent wages, the social bases 
for organisation were most unfavourable. It took time to nurture; 
loyalty to the trade union and it was not until the 1890's that the 
Lancashire miners were able to meet the employers on anything like 
equal terms. 
2 Development of the Lancashire Miners' Federation 
The difficulties of union organisation among the Lancashire miners 
are illustrated by the fortunes of the mining unions, from their 
beginnings in the early 1860's to the last decade of the century. 
During this period the basic consideration of the miners was that of 
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the wages problem; the issue involved the securing of suffioient 
strength in order to confront the employers and negoUate a settled 
wages policy. This aim had been established during the 1860's when 
several local mining societies in Lancashire had joined an 
prganisation known as the Amalgamated Association of Miners, set up 
in 1869 by a Lancashire miner called Thomas Halliday. Halliday's 
object was to bring together those areas in the country where trade 
unionism was too weak to allow of independent industrial action and 
by unity create an amalgamation strong enough to bargain for better 
wages. Thus the two principal characteristics that were to dominate 
Lancashire mining trade unionism during the next generation were 
formed - wages and national solidarity. However, during the bad 
trade of the 1870's Halliday's organisation collapsed, having failed 
to est~blish any permanent collective bargaining machinery. The 
only national movement that survived during these years was the 
Miners' National Union, an association that had been created in 1863 
by the Scottish ~iner Alexander MacDonald. MacDonald's union 
combined the stronger county associations, particularly Northumberland 
and Durham, whose primary interests were not in wages but rathe.r in 
pressing for legislative reforms in the coal industry. In the 1870's 
the members of the Miners' National Union had perfected their own 
system for regulating wages - the 'sliding scales' which assessed 
wages, after consultation between employers and union,according to 
the selling price of coal. This device suited very well exporting 
coalfiel&such as Northumberland and Durham where coal prices 
fluctuated far more than I'n home d' l'k pro uCIng areas I e Lancashire; on 
the other hand it offered little to Lancashire miners, whose main 
interest lay in establishing a wage level that would support a 
collier's family adequately. Thus, although some local s~cieties 
in Lancashire did ~ffiliate to the Miners' National Union, there 
was never much sympathy in the region for the methods of the north 
eastern miners, and during the 1870's Lancashire stood still so far 
as any progress on the wages question was concerned. ( l3) 
The break~hrough was not to come until the late 1880's and 
meanwhile much of the credit in Lancashire mining unionism was 
built up as a result of the work of one man. After the collapse 
of the Amalgamated Miners Halliday's schemes were taken up and 
exploited by Thomas Ashton. Ashton, born at Openshaw, near 
Manchester, in 1844 was fairly typical of the generation of union 
leaders who became prominent in the 1880's. Born in a collier's 
family and bred in the pitman's life, Ashton was self-educated, 
singled out for vigour and intelligence to become a checkweigher, 
dismissed for organising a union at Bradford in Manchester, forced 
into ,unemployment and eventually established as the Secretary of 
Ashton under Lyne Miners~ Association in 1879. Thomas Ashton was no 
demagogue, rarely seeking the limelight with explosive oratory;t his 
value lay in planning trade union strategy, as was revealed by a 
county secretary in later years: "his letters to us'; it was recalled, 
"were like the directives issued by a general in a campaign." 
Thomas Ashton's strategy for the Lancashire miners involved the 
creation of an aliance between all the unions in the home producing 
central coalfields in order to set up a wage system more congenial 
to the miners than the sliding scales. Ashton's first opportunity 
to put his scheme to the test came in 1880 when some local unions 
--------, 
had dectded to strike for an advance of 15 per cent from owners in 
Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, North Wales and Lancashire. 
As it happened only the Lancashire miners came out, some fifty 
thousand of them, only to find to their dismay that coal was being 
supplied to Lancashire cotton mills from the very districts whose 
SUpport they had expected. (15) Ashton seized the chance of calling 
together several Lancashire societies after the strike and in April 
1881 was able to form the Lancashire Miners' Federation, a loosely 
centralised body which he hoped to mould into an effective wage 
bargaining instrument. (16) 
Ashton continued to urge inter county liaison to bolster up 
his own weakness in Lancashire. His most likely source of support 
seemed to be in Yorkshire, where the men's leaders, Ben Pickard and 
Ned Cowey, had persuaded the union to reject a sliding scale in 
1881. Ashton maintained informal contact with the Yorkshiremen and 
in 1882 attended the conference of the Yorkshire Miners' 
Association to offer Pickard the support of the Lancashire Federation. 
Following the disastrous strike of 1880 Lancashire had achieved two 
sets of advances - mainly because of improved trade - (18) and Ashton 
saw the opportunity of creating from this a completely new wage 
system. The results was a Special Conference of miners' representatives 
from the central coalfield unions, called by Ashton and Pickard, in 
October 1882. (19) 
The wage structure sought by Ashton differed fundamentally from 
that 
embodied in the sliding scale system. Whereas the sliding scale 
represented mainly the exporting coalfield's fears about the 
fluctuation f th 
o e export market and provided a suitable means of 
-- ------- --- -~~ - -- - - - - ~ --
(17) 
adjusting wages to coal prices, (20) it was felt in the home 
producing districts, whose market was more stable, that co-operation 
with the employers to such an extent was impossible and that the 
unions must press for a living wage from a position of strength. In 
any case, wages in Lancashire, as in many other districts, were too low 
to allow of a sliding scale; several districts in Lancashire had in 
fact adopted them faute de mieux in th~ late 'seventies but all were 
terml" t d b t d h d b felt. (21) na e e ween 1883 and 1885 as soon as wage a vancs a een 
In Yorkshire the scales were rejected when they led to wage cuts. Thomas 
Ashton admitted that "neither men nor leaders in Lancashire have ever 
been strongly in favour of a sliding scale" (22) whilst W.E.Harvey 
of the Derbyshire Miners claimed in 1889 that there was "no bottom in 
them" ( 23 ) "t 
; 1 was frequently said by miners that employers made long 
contracts in the summer, when coal prices were low, in order to keep 
down wage (24) In short, it was a stable wage the miners averages. 
demanded, not a fluctuating one, and Ashton was determined from the 
early 1880's to achieve union solidarity as the first step in the 
implementation of his wages policy. 
It was first tested in early 1883 when owners in North 
Staffordshire demanded reductions. The district had become affiliated 
to the Lancashire Federation in November 1882 with 1~~0 members (25) 
so that Ashton was able to take responsibility for organising the 
battle. He urged Lancashire colliers to support their colleagues 
or face wage reductions and a strike in their own pits. The men 
responded and levied sufficient contributions to give North 
Staffordshire a weekly strike pay of ten shillings for each miner 
for five months. (26) But the strike gained nothing whilst wage 
~------.-------
advances of the previous year began to be "nibbled" away by the 
Lancashire coal companies. The subsequent general attack on wages 
broke Ashton's intended federation of county unions but at the same 
time served to underline the pressing need for such an organisation. 
At their annual conference in 1883 the Lancashire miners resolved to 
be "in favour of a national organisation being established that would 
consider all matters relating to trade and wages questions and 
legislation both legally and politically." (27) But there was no 
response from other county associations at the time and Ashton made 
one more attempt to maintain inter-county collaboration. During the 
hot SUmmer of 1884 coal prices in Lancashire dropped (28) and 
emplO.yers followed "nibbling" cuts at local pits by demanding a 
general wage reduction of ten per cent. Ashton called a national 
conference in the hope of planning joint defensive action; he was 
ordered by a meeting of the Lancashire Federation to telegraph 
immediately to Pickard about a conference and received the directive 
that "if he (Pickard) delays to call the conference, we hereby 
instruct our secretary to call such a conference himself." (29) 
Goodwlll was preserved; the conference met but Ashton received a 
shock. When plans were laid to fight the reduction by strike~J at two 
groups of collieries in Lancashire the local men involved refused 
to co-operate and resistance collapsed. This was a severe blow to 
Ashton's deSign and it was hardly surprising that the prestige of the 
Lancashire Miners' Federation fell sharply. In seven weeks membership 
slumped from over 16,000 to 11,500. (3~) 
Ashton's scheme for an alliance within the cent~al coalfields 
is 
had aimed at building local strength through corporate action. 
The reverse had taken place and during adverse periods local 
separation had become evident. Union development in Lancashire, 
so dependent on success in wage bargaining, therefore received a 
setback in 1884 with the failure of Ashton's policy. 
There followed a stagnant period in the mid 'eighties as wage 
negotiations made little progress. A ten~per cent reduction had 
been enforced by the employers in 1884 and later that year preparations 
were made to arrange another sliding scale, a sure sign of failure 
on the part of the Federation. During the next two years, however, 
employers and union,representatives failed to arrive at any 
arrangement on what should constitute a "fair and equitable basis" 
for a scale and talks eventually broke down when the employers 
f (31) re Used to entertain as a basis the 1886 wages level. The 
wages question in the coalfield had, by this time, become more than 
a mere collection of figures and scales; for one thing, colliers' 
earnings could be seen to be generally lower than those of other 
groups of ~orkmen (32) and many colliers were undoubtedly having 
difficulty in making ends meet. As Thomas Aspinwall of theWigan; 
Miners' Association pointed out to a joint meeting of coalowners 
and /'flliners' delegates in 1887, wages in Lancashire were at an 
irreducible minimum. "Poverty", he asserted, 
"is rampant in the families of your workmen. It is 
perhaps greater now than it has been during any other 
period in my experience •••• l think there will be no 
exception taken to the statement I am now about to 
make, that is, that wages vary at present from ten 
to eighteen shillings per week, and when you deduct 
f~om these sums house rent and fire, and school fees 
w a~ a miserable pittance remains upon which our average 
famlly of four can exist." (33) 
Shortly before this meeting the Lancashire Miners Federation 
had decided to ask for a wage rise of ten per cent, arguing that 
earnings, especially in the west of the coalfield, were "considerably 
too low" and resolving "that no reduction in wages whatever be 
submitted to at the present time." (34) But another factor entered 
into the question at this point - was the Miners' Federation strong 
enough to carry through its resolution~ Since the establishment of 
the union in 1881 organisation had been very fluid; the local miners' 
societies retained a good d~al of influence and although on occasions 
the miners had acted in concert union membership had been too low 
to support any strike on a large scale. Most major decisions 
affeCting the men's position were taken at "Pit Set" conferences, 
at which non-unionists attended on equal terms with society men. 
This was nec~ssary in order to achieve solidarity, since the 
federation could not afford to alienate the thirty thousand or 
more (35) who had not joined the organisation. During a stoppage 
fOf"e 
the non-unionists were a potential strike breakingAand it was 
therefore Federation policy to pay non-unionists a strike levy in 
order to secure their support. But in practice it was not the union 
but the hewers, 
hierarchy that controlleci miners' meetings/whether unionists or not; 
branches were allowed one vote at Pit Set conferences for every 500 
underground workers. (36) Surface workers werei.ignored and day-wage 
hands were usually strongly influenced by the hewers. Union influence 
was further weakened by the structure of the branches, based on a series 
f 1 (37) 
o odges, themselves the creation of a group of pits. Membership 
in 1882 was said to be over 13,000 following the North Staffordshire 
affiliation, but in 1885-86 both St. Helens and North Staffordshire 
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left the Federation (38) and the~mbership a~ this time represented 
J 
only a small proportion of the region' s mi~'eworkers. (39) Ashton 
himself admitted in 1886 that the organisation was in a "deplorable 
condition". (40) There was too much district autonomy and the means 
of providing concerted action were lacking. 
One drawback was that the instrument of centralised policy, the 
Federation itsel~ was badly understaffed. Besides Ashton there were 
only three officers; Sam Woods, Aspinwall and Robert Isherwood. All 
three were local secretaries and had to administer their own 
branches, besides travelling throughout the coalfield asserting the 
Federation's presence at individual collieries. Their untiring 
efforts, it is true, helped to keep the organisation active. Woods, 
from Ashton and Haydock branch, was the Federation's first President. 
His background was similiar to that of Thomas Ashton, two yea~his 
senior; pit boy, hewer, checkweigher, local agent - the traditional 
pattern for the union officer. Woods was an extremely talented 
, d' (41) ln lvidual; a writer of pit life prose and the hdder of a manager's 
certificate, he was also a Baptist preacher and a prominent Radical, 
undeniably handsome, respected and a teetotaller. (42) Thomas Aspiowall, 
born at Bickerstaffe in the same year as Woods, 1846, had been 
dismissed by Bromlow, Fosters' collieries ~n 1880 for leading a strike. 
In the mid 1880's he was elected agent at Skelmersdale and in 1887 
succeeded William Pickard as miners' agent at Wigan. He too was a 
local Radical, a man of immense stature, physically and intellectually. (43) 
Isherwood was a less prominent figure; he had no pretensions to oratory 
but was nonetheless an able administrator and shrewd businessman who 
managed the Federation's finances. 
7{ 
The agents covered a particular area of the coalfield where they 
attempted to med1ate at disputes in local collieries. This involved 
interviewing managers, who, as representatives of the owners, were not 
always friendly. In the mid eighties the agents' relations with the 
colliery owners were generally abrupt and often ill-tempered.' (44) This 
slowed down union progress and the inability to reach quick settlements, 
especially over the sliding scale question, exposed the Federation to 
a good deal of pit separatism. For instance, in 1886 the miners of 
Ellerbeck Colliery, near Chorley, submitted voluntarily to a wage 
reduction whilst Ashton and Woods were pursuing negottations with the 
employers. (45) It was not therefore easy to achieve a united front 
against wage reductions, nor a binding wages policy, and it seemed that 
despite the efforts of the agents, the Federation's claims of 1887 
to resist wage reductions were beyond its means. 
The agents were, however, already groping towards the -
establishment of a union structure which would gradually diminish local 
Pit hegemony. The Federation was slowly working towards a policy of 
not accepting branches, formed around groups of collieries, as 
affiliates in their own right. Instead they were persuaded to join 
t 
a district, or association of many branches, which would be the unit 
affiliated to the Federation. The gradual creation of a three tier 
system was achieved by the later 1880's and though not wholly 
satisfactory, many districts being too large, it did at least allow 
the agents to operate within an established system of responsibility 
which aimed at direction from above. Despite these moves, membership 
in January 1887 was only about seven thousand, a figure which included 
boys; yet in ,the long term union reorganisation did help the miners to 
~~~~------- . ---~-------------
take fuller advantage of the good bade that was to come during the 
next few years. 
3 Wages, Hours and the 1893 Lock Out 
The Lancashire Miners achieved relative prosperity along with the 
other county unions in the central coalfields during the wages 
movement of 1888 to 1893. The story of this movement, involving the 
creation of a new, national trade union - the Miners' Federation of 
Great Britain - has been well documentated by R.Page Arnot (46) and 
it is really unnecessary to recount it. Note may be taken, however, 
of the fact that the movement was concerned with both wages and hours. 
These two considerations were very closely linked because as wages 
rose the miners began to realise that they could afford to work a 
shorter day. It was their concern for an Eight Hours Day that brought 
the mining unions fully into the political arena. 
Firstly, however, came the wage breakthrough in 1888. Pickard 
of Yorkshire had taken the initiative in August of that year to set 
in progress a joint wages movement. Ashton gave support (47). In 
October miners in West Lancashire received a ten per cent wage advance 
after threatening to withdraw their labour; some owners in north east 
Lancashire and Cheshire resisted but were brought into line by one 
or two small strikes. Trade was very good indeed, the average selling 
price of coal having risen in the Mf.~area from over five to over 
eight shillings a ton between 1888 and 1890 ~48) Wages rose 
correspondingly. By the summer of 1889 a second advance of ten per 
cent was secured, a~though it did not come in Lancashir~ without a 
strike, the first major stoppage in the region for more than eight 
years, which seriously depleted the Lancashire Federation's funds. (49) 
7~ 
Yet continued pro~perity helped Lancashire to ride its problems and by 
August 1890 the miners' wages had risen to 40 per cent above those of 
1888. (50) 
It was during these years of seemingly unbridled boom that the 
MEGB.elaborated its wage theory, based on.the concept of an implied 
minimum wage that would ensure a decent standard of living for every 
collier; as Thomas Ashton stated in 1893, "the Miners' Federation of 
Great Britain was established to get and keep a comfortable living 
rate of wages for its members," adding, "who will say that miners' wages 
are too high at present?" (51) The acceptance of such a standpoint had 
to take into account the length of hours worked. In Lancashire, for 
example, there had long been great variations in the length of shifts 
worked; colliers in the Manchester, Tyldesley and Leigh districts worked 
a shorter day than those of Wigan and st Helens, yet in some pits with 
a short day the men had to work six days a week. (62) There had been 
no unanimity as to the most suitable shift length, the owners claiming 
that colliers preferred longer hours in order to maintain their 
earnings whilst the union maintained that in general shifts were too 
long and caused over production of coal. With no export trade to 
consider Lancashire miners could afford to propose a restriction 
in output by working shorter shifts and between 1882 and 1887 three 
. (53) 
resolutions to this effect were made by the FederatlonJ though 
low wages prev,ented the miners from fully committing themselves to their 
ideas. In 1887 the Federation even went to the extent of calling a 
strike to enforce an eight hour day and five day week but the plan had 
to be dropped thro~gh lack of support, (54) even though later in the 
year "enormous majorities" were returned by the colliers in a ballot on 
the question of restriction. (55) It appeared that Lancashire was 
wholly in favour of the reduced working day in principle but that the 
men felt it to be an impossibility so long as wages reM~ined low. 
Yet it was easy to see why miners should desire such a move. 
Eight Hours combined economic and social aspirations in one measure 
of utter simp~icity. For one thing, a limit to the working day offered 
the prospect of regular shifts during good and bad trade alike; in bad 
times miners had often asked for longer hours in order to push up 
yet 
earnings/in poorly organised districts it had been difficult to secure 
a reduction in shift lengths when trade improved and earnings proved 
satisfactory. (56) Lancashire had experienced such hazards in the past 
and this was one reason why the county federation pressed for a 
legislated restriction in hours. (57) Shorter hours also brought an 
improvement in the miners' social conditions, for it allowed them more 
time to enjoy the open air activities ~o important to them. (58) 
Not surprisingly, during the period of wage advances between 1889 
and 1891 absenteeism in the pits greatly increased as the miners began 
to feel that they could now afford to have more spare time to 
themselves. (59) Moreover, questions of health and safety were also 
involved in the demand for a shorter day since it was felt that an 
overtaxed collier would become more of an accident risk than one who was 
being asked to work for a reasonabl~ length of endurance. (60) So 
for all these reasons the Eight Hour Day became the common objective 
of the unions in the central coalfields at the beginning of the 1890's, 
and because it seemed to offer the best prospect of success the miners 
pinned their faith on the legislative method outlined by Thomas Aspinwa11 
at the Trades Union Congress of 1889 (61). 
7) 
Yet the issue produced antagonism. The employers not only 
disputed the validity of Eight Hours in economic terms, (62) but 
objected that they were being bullied by the unions, who had already been 
attacking them over the question of employers' .liability for mining 
accidents. In Parliament, where the coalowners had an insuperable 
advantage over the men, the Eight Hours Bill was effectively blocked 
after its introduction and the traditional enmity between employers and 
men began to assume a political character, with far reaching consequences 
for union policy. (63) In addition to this new dimension to the 
struggles of the miners came a fresh bout of conflict on the industrial 
front over the question of wages, ~ that by 1893 both sides of the 
industry were locked in a seemingly irreconcilable battle. 
Deteriorating relations in the coal industry were amply 
illustrated by events in Lancashire. During the period of good trade 
both employers and union had been strengthening the organisation of 
their respective camps; although the Lancashire coalowners had no 
county wide body to deal with the wages question they had now 
begun to coalesce on parliamentary issues in the South Lancashire 
and Cheshire Coal Owners' Association (64) an organisation which 
helped to break down the traditional parochialism of the owners. (65) 
From 1889 to 1893 the Lancashire Miners' Federation also increased 
. t t th (66) mb h" . f f Id . d 1 S S reng ,me ers Ip IncreasIng our- 0 as Improve 
earnings encouraged miners to join their colleagues in the union. (67) 
With the establishment of the MF~.much political and legislative work 
was taken out of the hands of the Lancashire Federation leaving it more 
free to concentrate on its own problems. The most significant 
development of these years was an attack on non-unionists and a 
7, 
corresponding decline in the number and importance of Pit Set 
Conferences; by 1892 the Federation was seriously attempting to enrol 
more members, even contemplating strike action as a means of 
enforcing full union membership at collieries, (68) whilst Thomas 
Ashton was instructed to issue a bold circular "pointing out the 
benefits of the Federation ••••• with a view of (sic) getting all men 
to join the union." (69) This new assertiveness on the part of the 
Lancashire Federation helps to explain the increased conflict in 
industrial relations during the early 1890's, a period which contrasted 
sharply with the more peaceful 1880's. 
By 1892 Lancashire had adapted to the new conditions sufficiently 
to allow of its participation in the open trial of strength with the 
employers over the wages question. When, during 1892, coal prices 
began to drop after almost four years of boom, wage reductions were 
accepted by the men of South Wales and Northumberland, whilst Durham 
was considering accepting a cut. Sam Woods of Lancashire voiced the 
MEGB.. determination to stand firm: " to depend on our own strong hand 
and our own right arm." (70) In March 1892 a complete stoppage 
was ordered in the MEGB.area to clear stocks; it was neither strike 
nor lock out, the men simply took a week's holiday. But the gesture 
had little effect on the economic situation even though in Lancashire, 
for example, no coal was brought to the surface. (71) However, the 
display of strength by the unions, with the suggestion that they were 
acting in a responsible manner to safeguard the coal industry, (72) 
was probably the main reason for miners' wages remaining intact in the 
MF~. area until the middle of 1893 whereas in Durham the men were 
locked out for twelve weeks during 1892 ana t 11 h even ua y ad to accept 
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a ten per cent wage reduction. Forseeing the drift towards a similiar 
position in their own district Lancashire had demanded another general 
stoppage early in 1893 in order to keep prices up, (73) but the idea 
was rejected by a national conference. (74) By the summer, the 
employers were beginning to demand a 25 per cent cut; since the demand 
was totally rejected a general lock out of MEGB.members began in the 
last week of July. Altogether about 300,000 miners became idle. By 
August almost all Lancashire pits had ceased production except for 
those in districts where non-unionists were willing to carry on. 
The conduct of the lock out from Lancashire reveals the extent to 
which the Federation depended on national co-operation to achieve 
its success. By itself it is certain that Lancashire would have 
capitulated to the co~lowners as Durham had been obliged to do in 
the previous year. The Lancashire Federation began the lock out with 
an almost depleted treasury, the July balance sheet showing only £214 
to support 38,000 members. Union leaders had to make appeals to local 
trades councils and tour Lancashire towns asking for donations. (75) 
Locked out miners in the Wigan and Ince districts, according to one 
account, (76) clearly suffered formidable deprivations for their 
support of the union, whose resources had been reduced by the frequent 
strikes of the early 1890's and the expensive election campaigns of 
Aspinwall and Woods in 1892. (77) Aid from the MEGB.eased matters, but 
Robert Isherwood, the Federation Treasurer, realised that some men would 
have to be returned.to the pits as quickly as possible. In August 1893 
he reported to an MF~.executive committee meeting that several employers 
were offering to pay the old wage rates if miners were prepared to 
return to work. (78) 
_ When Thomas Greeno.H of Pendlebury Miners' 
7't 
Association suggested that some men be allowed to go back the MEGijt 
agreed. 
Thus began, in apparent defiance of a popular ballot against 
a resumption (79), a gradual reduction of the numbers involved in 
the lock out; the Lancashire union leadership was keen to return men 
at the old rate (80) where possible and over 4,000 miners quickly 
resumed their jobs on this basis, helping to support those still out 
by 'paying a levy of a shilling a day for the duration of the lock 
out. The Lancashire Federation collected over £13,000 in this way. 
Moreover, by October 1893, about 60,000 colliers throughout the MF.GB. 
area had gone back to work at the old rate of wages. (81) 
When the lock out was eventually terminated in November 1893 
the MEGB.was able to wring concessions from the employers that 
amounted to a major breakthrough on the wages issue. A Board of 
Conciliation was set up, with equal rep~esentation from unions and 
employers, which was to have power to determine wages in the coal 
industry from February 1894, until which time the men were to receive 
the old rates. (82) As prices continued to fall the MEGaagreed to a 
wage reduction of ten per cent, but it was agreed that u~ti1 1896 
the wage rate should not fall below 30 per cent over and above the 
rate of 1888, and not rise more than 45 per cent above it. The MF.Ga 
had established a wage-floor 
This undoubtedly represen~ed a considerable industrial victory 
for miners' co-operation, helping to dispel the old theory that prices 
should bind wages in an iron yoke. Yet, in other respects the 
aftermath of the lock out produced k 
a wea position for the county 
federations, and this was noticeable in Lancashire. For one thing, 
union membership was affected and without strength in numbers the 
Federation was rendered less effective. Membership had reached a high 
water mark in 1894 but then slumped drastically over the next five 
years, not recovering until the temporary boom in coal prices and 
wages during the South African War. Such a loss was experienced at the 
same time by the Cotton Spinners and may even have been expected as 
subscriptions from members were increased to restore depleted funds; 
the Lancashire Miners' Federation certainly realised the need to 
maintain morale after a bad stoppage and even went to the extent of 
issuing a silver badge to all colliers who rema,ined loyal to the 
union. (83) Yet a more profound and disturbing reason for loss of 
members was probably the dksatisfaction felt by many miners over the 
union leadership's handling of the lock out. The loss of Woods' seat 
at Ince in 1895 may well, in part, have been a reflection of such an 
attitude. In addition, it may be doubted whether the new wage structure 
bestowed as many benefits as might be assumed; certainly during the 
1890's wage increases were slow in coming and conflict with the 
employers remained a prominent feature of the Lancashire coalfield, 
as may be seen from the fact that in 1896 miners at st Helens were 
demanding a ten per cent advance whilst at several other groups of 
collieries attempts were being made by the owners actually to reduce 
wages. Moreover, one outstanding question of great importance to 
ordinary miners still seemed AO nearer a solution - the Eight Hour Day. 
---------------------- .. 
4 Summary 
By the mid 1890's the Lancashire Miners' Federation had achieved a 
degree of industrial strength that had seemed very remote in 1881 when the 
Federation was established. It was now far better equipped for treating with 
the employers and for safeguarding the interests of its members. Yet industrial 
security did not imply a withdrawal from political activity for the miners 
as it did for the cotton workers; quite the opposite, for it had become 
clear that the miners could not dispense with the political weapon. The 
success of the wages movement rendered the achievement of an Eight Hour D~y 
all the more necessary and it was the need to complete their policies by 
securing a restriction of working hours that made the Lancashire Miners 
consistent advocates of labour representation, keeping working class politics 
alive in Lancashire during the 'nineties. 
The political commitment was therefore established at an early stage, 
but what form was political action likely to take, and how quickly would it 
proceed? Certain characteristics ~lere already beginning to emerge that made 
future patterns of development seem more predictable. For one thing, the 
L.C.M.F. could not fail to understand that the keynote of its success had 
been its position in the M.F.G.B. - a national union. Lancashire's weak 
position of the 1880's would never have been improved upon so quickly had it 
not been for the help it received through the M.F.G.B. At the same time 
co-operation in the industrial' field led to political liaison of the same 
nature; by 1892 Lancashire was attempting to contribute towards the 
M.F.G.B. programme to send miners' candidates to parliament. This activity 
in tUrn gave rise to the realisation that Lancashire stood in a peculiar 
position so far as the miners' electoral influence was concerned. Neither 
political party had in the past felt the need to co-operate with a miners' 
union that was anything but strong and, in any case, political horse-dealing 
was ruled out because of the deep divisions within the colliers' ranks; in 
consequence the L.C.M.F. had never negotiated electoral alliances such as 
those secured by the miners of Yorkshire and Derbyshire. Hence, when it came 
to sponsoring parliamentary representatives for the Eight Hour Day Lancashire 
felt that its disadvantages prevented a proper discharging of its 
responsibilities within the M.F.G.B. In fact, of all the other mining 
regions, the position was probably as bad only in Scotland, especially 
Lanarkshire, where the religious divisions among the miners and the weakness 
of the unions were more marked even than in Lancashire. 
The result was that by the turn of the century the Lancashire Federation 
was only too willing to consider joining a political movement which had the 
twin vi~t~es of being both a national organisation and independent of the 
established parties. The eventual affiliation of the L.C.M.F. to the Labour 
party in 1903 - the first county association to join - may therefore be seen 
as the outcome of a long term development starting in 1889 with its 
adhesion to the M.F.G.B. 
It is also worth noting a further feature of the Lancashire miners' 
development which was beginning to emerge by the middle years of the 1890's, 
assuming more significant proportions at the turn of the century. This was 
the increased militancy arising from the rank and file miners after 1893 
which led ultimately to the creation socialist strongholds within the 
Federation structure based on prominent local branches. There seems little 
doubt that this process also had its prigins in the industrial history of 
the miners for it appears to stem from the dissatisfaction felt by the miners 
with the slow progress of the Eight Hours Bill in parliament and with the 
forms of conciliation arranged after the 1893 Lock-Out. (84); it marks 
a shift of attitude between the union leadership and the rank and file, 
the latter taking up the initiative in political pacemaking and through 
the more vocal branch unions providing a spur to the pace of political 
development. 
4 THE NEW UNIONS 
DUring the late 'eighties and early 'nineties a brand of trade 
unionism rose to prominence in Lancashire that was in many senses, both 
real and apparent, new. At the close of the 'eighties, to be sure, there 
was a significant boom in union membership among groups of workers, 
largely unskilled and poorly paid, who had no previous experience of 
trade union protection. In this sense the unions were undoubtedly new. 
But in other respects too the working men involved claimed to be 
introducing a new approach to the methods of industrial organisation 
and the aims of combination; for instance, they professed to hold a 
more militant, less compromising, attitude than the established 
societies of craftsmen, miners and cotton workers - which they dubbed 
"old" . unlons; moreover, they affected to build their unions on more 
inclusive, comprehensive lines, eschewing the old tatic of creating 
one union for one trade. But it was not because of these claims that 
the new unions became a prominent feature of working class life; in 
fact their industrial footholds were, for the mlost part, precarious, 
many of them failing to resist employers' attacks and trade 
depreSSions and subsequently passing into oblivion. Those unions that 
did survive succeeded precisely because they adopted the techniques 
of older trade societies and even of these successful ones none was 
able to match in industrial strength the miners or the cotton unions, 
which 
at least before the First World War. The feature)reallY gave the unions 
their novelty and set them apart was the greater political awareness 
they displayed almost from the beginning of their existence. Of 
Course, not every union established at this time exhibited an interest 
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in politics but in general the special character of new unionism 
lay in its seeing the industrial future bound up with some form of 
inherentl y 
political movement. Because many of these unions were/weak they 
sought to gain strength not simply by industrial combination but also 
by asserting the power of the working class in politics. It is no 
coincidence that many new union leaders were socialists. Above all, 
the line of descent from this form of trade unionism to the concept 
of an independent workers' party in local and national politics is 
very marked and for this reason a discussion of working class politics 
in Lancashire would be incomplete without an assessment of the new 
unions' influence. To begin with, therefore, we must turn to the 
particular industrial environment that produced them. 
1 New Unionism: the Industrial BacKground. 
All industrial towns in the region experienced, to some extent, 
the trade union boom of the late 1880s and witnessed the arrival of 
the new unions. But their greatest impact was felt in one area more 
than anywhere else: the industrial zone stretching from the north 
and east of Manchester to Liverpool, and including the town of st. Helens. 
This area may be termed the Mersey - Irwell belt since it was located 
principally around those two rivers. Its industrial landscape was 
quite different from that of the east and centre of Lancashire; there 
were no massive staple industries such as cotton and coal but a more 
pronounced concentration of service and distributive trades, connected 
with the commercial and transit activities of Manchester and 
Liverpool. Neither of these two cities, nor their neighbouring towns 
and villages, possessed one single, dominant trade and so the workforce 
; 
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tended to be diverse, split up amongst many different occupations. 
Of the three main manufacturing towns in the area, both St Helens 
and Warrington followed a variety of industrial interests, whilst 
only Widnes could be said to be a on~-trade town. (1) In all, the 
area probably had more in common with the great conurbation of 
London, in respect of its industrial appearance, than with the rest 
of Lancashire. (2) Something more: the Mersey - Irwell belt foreshadowed 
the economic and social pattern of the twentieth century, with its 
newer industries, electrical and chemical, its shop and clerical 
workers and its sprawling landscape, in which the social classes 
were already being segregated according to wealth. Nothing could. be 
more different from the traditional character of the coalfield and 
the cotton towns. The Mersey - Irwell belt was an area of great 
potential, whose economic peak was to come at a later date, ~hen the 
great staple industries were in decline. Yet even in 1894, at the 
opening of the Manchester Ship Canal, a contemporary expressed the 
hope that: 
"eventually along its banks will be an unparalleled 
concentration of works transferred there on account 
of the economy of production, either in obtaining cheap 
coal or cheap salt .••••.•• and facilities of transport." (3) 
At the end of the 1880'5, however, prosperity rubbed shoulders with 
depression in this region. Comercially, the future looked bright. 
The two cities of Liverpool and Manchester experienced an almost 
unbroken commercial growth during this period; both benefited from the 
opening of the Ship Canal. Manchester, no longer a cotton manufacturing 
centre, but soon to become an important engineering district, was a 
typical regional capital, cosmopolitan in outlook and content , with 
----, 
a particularly high proportion of foreign workers, such as Jews and 
Russians, in the clothing trade. Manchester had a proud history of 
municipalisation, which reflected its commercial success and 
consequently employed a large amount of workers'in the various 
Corporation departments - water, gas, electricity, transport and 
markets (4)-and after 1894 had its own dockside population. Liverpool, 
almost equal in size to Manchester, was an even greater seaport, the 
centre of the transit trade. The growth of its facilities testified 
to increasing trade; at least six new docks were built between 1866 
and 1888, four of these in the 1880's, by which time the city's 
dockland area had been extended to six miles of waterfront. (5) 
towns enjoyed sufjficient commercial bouyancy to provide ample 
employment in various trades. 
Both 
The situation was not so promising in the area's manufacturing 
towns of st. Helens, Warrington and Widnes. From.tHe 1860's 
considerable chemical plants had developed at st. Helens and Widnes, 
drawing on local raw materials and enjoying excellent water and 
rail communications. However, the production of soda at both towns 
., 
was geared to the le Blanc process and by the early 1890's was beginning 
to suffer from the competition of other industries which adopted the 
newer ammonia soda techniques. The result was an attempt by the 
Lancashire employers to sustain their industries by making intensive 
alterations of their production techniques, the most significant 
effect of which, from the workmen's point of view, appears to have 
been that the work was rendered more unpleasant. Though good wages 
could be earned in the chemical t d th h . ra e, e p YSlcal drain on energy was 
quickly becoming intolerable. In addition to this job opportunities 
were declining; basic technological inefficiency, coupled with the 
introduction of b-riffs in export rmrkets, oonspired to produce a 
disturbing slump in the Lancashire chemical trade during the 1890's. 
For example, Widnes, a new town in theill60's, experienced a sharp 
population decline after 1891 as people left the town in search of 
employment elsewhere; the workforce of the United Alkali Company, the 
town's biggest employer, fell over by a thousand between 1890 and 1900. (16) 
A very similiar situation occurred in the plate glass industry at 
St Helens, whose chemical trade fared worse than that of Widnes; the 
adverseafects of American protection and Belgian competition almost 
wiped out-the plate glass industry, only the giant Pilkington 
company surviving as glass producers in St. Helens by the early 
~entieth century. (7 ) 
Becaus~ of these setbacks, therefore, the Mersey - Irwell belt 
remained only 'pul~atinglY prosperous' (8) before the First World War 
and it was not simply unbridled industrial and commercial boom that 
fostered new unioni~~ in the area. At st. Helens and Widnes, for 
instance, union"growth was determined by worsening rather than 
improving, conditions; but the unions established in these towns were 
demonstrably those that failed to endure. Other groups of workers were 
able to take advantage of increasing prosperity and more regular work 
to form unions and wring concessions from employers who were anxious to 
avoid strikes during good trade. Thus, although the general economic 
background of the area provides a clue to the origins of the new 
unions, their rise did 
not have a single cause. We must therefore look 
--__ J 
more closely at some of the unions involved. 
2 The Rise of the New Unions, 1889 - 1892 
Most of the new unions that appeared between 1889 and 1892 were 
genuinely new in the sense that their members had never previously been 
organised, whether they were workers in industries that had no 
tradition of unionism or simply examples of backward regional 
development in old establIshed, unionised trades. (9) Although it 
has been shown that the new unionism which developed in London during 
1889 h d b t · . t d ft b f • th . (10) a een an lClpa e ,0 en y a ew years, 1n e provlnces , 
few of the new unions were evident in Lancashire before 1889. (11) 
The earliest sparks in the region were seen immediately after the 
London conflagration, the more stable elements of the unskilled 
reacting first - dockers, gas and chemical workers. The ~eginnings of 
unionism among the dockers and gas workers were directly inspired 
by movements elsewhere. The Liverpool dockers were pressured into 
action' by stoppages enforced by J. Havelock Wilson'S Sailor's and 
Firemen's Amalgamation (12) whilst the gas workers of Manchester were 
influenced by the success of Will Thorne's organisation in London. By 
the summer of 1889 the stokers and labourers of the Manchester and 
Salford municipal gas works' had been organised into a branch of 
Thorne's National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers, partly as 
a result of assistance received from the Salford social democrats 
W. K. Hall, George Tabbron and Bill Horrocks. (13) They secured eight 
hour shifts shortly after their London colleagues. At Liverpool the 
dockers combined to form the National Union of Dock Labourers under the 
inspiration of two Ulstermen, Richard McGhee and Edward McHugh, neither of 
-------! 
whom were working dockers; but according to a later official of the 
union, who at this time was an observer, "the Liverpool men flocked in 
their thousands to join the union when the looal branch was opened." (14) 
Societies had by this time also been established among the plate glass 
and chemical workers at st. Helens; the two principal ones appeared to 
be the United Plate Glass Workers, which claimed about 800 members, (15) 
and the Chemical and Copper Workers, established by a former'party' 
political agent, P. J. King, who was quite soon able to win a general 
pay advance for his members. (16) 
Trade recovery, increased demand for labour, socialist inspiration 
and localised concentration of the workforce, all these factors aided 
the establishment of the first new unions in Lancashire. Yet within 
months of their formation all three groups suffered setbacks. At 
Liverpool and Manchester the issue between unions and employers 
was non-unionism. James Sexton, a founder member and later secretary 
of the Dockers, believed that trouble came to Liverp90l when the port 
employers inspired a seven weeks strike in the winter of 1889-90 in order 
to "stamp out the union before it attained its full strength", (17) 
although the dockers tnemselves seem to have been keen to test their 
union's power. McGhee had devised a "Docker's Button", changed 
quarterly and issued to all paid up members; he had attempted to 
secure the wearing of a button as a condition of employment in the 
docks. The employers rejected the idea, countering by refusing to 
employ dockers who wore the button. Members deserted the union and 
quickly as they joined. (18) After a disturbed stoppage work was resumed 
in April 1890 when the union agreed to abandon the non-unionist issue (19) 
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by dispensing with the button. Sexton estimated that the men's 
working conditions improved immensely as a result of the strike, though 
soon afterwards old standards began to creep back, and since the 
employers refused to recognise the union (20) it seemed that by the end 
of 1890 trade unionism had made little progress in the Liverpool docks. 
A combination of union ineptitude and truculence on the part of 
the employers accounted for the defeat of the Manchester Gasworkers at 
the same time. A STike arose at the close of 1889 over the employment 
of non unionists; the Gas Committee had decided to offer better wages 
and working conditions to all those who would leave the union and the 
local branch nautrally opposed the scheme, although according to Will 
Thorne, the national secretary, it was over-~ous in its action. In 
Thorne's view the men handed in their strike notices against his and 
the local secretary's advice. Thorne attempted to get the notices 
withdrawn but failed. In due course the Manchester men struck work and 
were followed unofficially by those in the Salford gasworks. The 
strike ran on to a disastrous end; substitute labour was ~ccessfully 
imported by the Gas Committee and many of the union men were unable to 
go back to their old jobs. "I thought, and still think", commented 
Thorne much later, "it was one of the most foolish strikes that the union 
was ever connected with." (21) In reality, however, the blame cannot 
be laid entirely on the men's shoulders; the local secretary appears 
to have given strong backing to the attempt to enforce the principle 
of "every man with a ticket" ~22) and even Pete Curran, a national 
organiser of the Gas Workers, admitted in 1891 that the defeat had been 
• 
caused by,,,the injudicious actio~: of the local officials. (23) 
1, 
Whenever the employers chose to resist they were able at this 
stage to defeat the unions. The st. Helens workers were content, 
during the first year of their union's existence, with the initial 
advances gained, but at the end of June 1890 the men of the United 
Plate Glass Workers came out of Pilkington's Cowley Hill works because 
they said wClges were being reduced. (24) Pilkinj:on' s introduced btlckle>g 
labour to keep the processes going whilst Bradbury, the union 
secretary, conducted the strike for over four months; then he 
accepted meditation by the Mayor of st. Helens, who promised that 
. , 
"work was ready for the good boys as soon as they chose to give in 
their names". ( 25) Bradbury advised a return to work at the old 
rates, a move supported by the recently formed st. Helens Trades Council, 
but not by P. J. King. King had been leading a sympathy Srike at 
Pilkington's Sutton works and tried unsuccessfully to keep the Sutton 
men out when the others returned. His manoeuvres were further 
disappointed the following month when some of the members of his union 
walked out of Pilkington's chemical works at Widnes. The strike may 
well have been engineered by the employers to deplete union funds, since 
about two thousand men became idle. King reluctantly supported his 
members,though the payment of fifteen shillings strike money a week 
was a heavy drain on union resources and he warned that "this was the 
last time an affair of this description would be tolerated," adding that 
he would "lead or leave". (26) 
These setbacks, however, did not inhibit the development of new 
unionism and by 1891 its effects could be seen over a wide area of 
south east Lancashire. Ideas were no doubt spreading through personal 
contact, socialist encouragement and the ease of organising during good 
trade. Some unions were very local in scope, others the result of 
national planning; for example the Navvies, Bricklayers' Labourers and 
General Labourers, a London based union, established branches during 1890 
for men working on the Manchester Ship Canal construction and by 
September was well supported at Eccles, Salford, Cadishead and Warrington. (27) 
of 
The most prominent of the local unions were those/transport workers and 
shop assistantsj. by September 1890 the Tramway Employees originally 
based at Manchester and Sal ford, had spread to Oldham, Rochdale, 
Ashton and Stockport under the direction of G. T. Jackson, whilst the 
.\ 
more extensive Carters' and Lurrymen's Union, organised by John Kelly, 
was set up at Salford about thesme time. In the case of the latter 
organisation a specific grievance accounted for its birth; the coal 
carters' low wages, computed by length of journey rather than by time 
worked, forced them to put in long hours and the union's task was to 
change the system. (28) A similiar grievance led to the establishment 
of the Shop Assistants' Union under the leadership of the socialist 
William Jackson, whose main object was to achieve an early-closing 
day in the Manchester region. The same sort of process went on among 
many other groups of smaller unions and the new unionism was able to 
extend its influence from the original districts around Manchester 
and Liverpool to most Lancashire towns; by early 1892 the Workman's 
Times was speaking of an unprecedented trade union boom •• (29) 
It should be added, however, that industrial success was rarely 
very promising. The more cautious union leaders realised that 
incipient unions could not hope to take the employers on in battle 
until adequate funds and organisation had been achieved. This 
~ .-----~-. 
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attitude was vindicated by the example of the Labourers' Union, 
organised in the Bolton district by Robert Tootill, a Liberal - Labour 
town councillor, during 1890. (30) Tootill concentrated upon building 
up his funds before engaging in wage claims and by late 1891 could 
point to 26 branches incorporating about 5,000 members; from this 
for advances 
base he was able to negotiate fin labourers' pay in the Blackburn, 
Darwen, Rochdale. and Radcliffe areas. (31) Against this may be 
noted the experience of a carters' organisation in the Darwen district, 
organised by the local social democrat William Atkin~on; shortly after 
the founding of the union the men struck work at a local haulage firm 
to win better wages, but after being idle for over a month with no 
response from the employers the union was forced to capitulate, 
surrendering its claim. (32) Throughout Lancashire it became obvious 
to the new unionists that they could hardly begin to emulate the cotton 
and mining unions at this stage and that the best they could hope for on 
the industrial f~ont was to confirm the establishment of their unions 
and build from a sound basis. But this was a slow process and by 
about 1892 even it had produced its casualties. 
The stumbling blocks of employer opposition and returning 
economic depression were too much for some unions; the most 
resilient were the pioneers - the dockers and gas workers - who were able 
to retain a hard core of membe~. This was achieved on the waterfront 
by a steadfast application of the "ca-canny" process (33) by the 
union men and the wearing of the dOGker's button in the belt to keep 
up morale. Even though the National Union of Dock Labourers only 
possessed a handful of members when James Sexton became its secretary 
---
in 1893 it became possible shortly afterwards to lead a revival, building 
around the more experienced dockers and co-operating with some of the 
master- stevedores and quay porters. (34) In 1894, with the opening 
of the Ship Canal, the Dock Labourers extended their coveraqe to 
Manchester and Salford and were immediately presented with the same 
problems they had experienced at Liverpool four years earlier. But now 
with greater strength and experience they were able to deal with the 
dock employers in a more business-like fashion; by the summer of 1895 
the dockers had successfully established the union principle in the 
Salford Docks after a short strike settled by a Joint Board of 
Conciliation. (35) 
In contrast with this success was the failure of P. J. King's 
Chemical and Copper Workers. Although between 1893 and 1894 the 
union's membership appeared to fluctuate between five and ten thousand,(36) 
its real strength was never above a fifth of these figures. By 1895 
it had disappeared altogether, weakened by the hard times in the 
chemical trade and by the stern resistance to unionism by the companies. 
A similiar fate, not quite so drastic and differently determined, befell 
the Navvies' Union; here, separatism and weak administration was 
responsible. After John Ward had achieved a membership of around three 
thousand along the Ship Canal by 1892 a secession movement was created 
by a local socialist named Leonard Hall. Hall, the son of a doctor, 
had been something of a footloose young man who travelled the world 
doing a variety of jobs before settling in Manchester where he set 
up the Navvies' Guide to help recruitment to Ward's Union. But his 
ambitions in the local socialist movement gradually began to override his 
---
interest in union solidarity and in 1892 he carved out of Ward's union 
his own Lancashire and Adjacent Counties Labour Amalgamation. (37) For 
a time this new growth provided Hall with a sound base for his political 
manoeuvres but eventually his political preoccupations and his capacity 
for making enemies with other union leaders became detrimental to the 
Lancashire Labour Amalgamation~ (38) By 1895 its membership had 
dropped from over two thousand to about 400 and its fortunes did not 
begin to improve until Hall was replaced by Tom Fox, who enlarged the 
union's scope by including more settled groups of building trade 
labourers. (39) 
The apparent disappearance of many other small unions may be 
accounted for by other reasons. Some organisations, initially active 
in Lancashire, found greater strength and stability in other regions 
and shifted their emphasis accordingly. The late 1890's saw the Tramway 
Amalgamation and the Shop Assistants with a far wider network, the 
latter finding South Wales an especially profitable area. (40) The 
histories of the smaller unions of a local nature - involving a 
multitude of tradesmen such as paviors, quarry workers, hairdressers, 
plate moulders, hackney carriage drivers and bakers - are to be seen 
reflected in the growth of the Trades Counci~during the 1890's. 
Many experienced a substantial increase in affiliations; for example 
the Bolton Trades Council's membership increased from just under 
14,000 in 1891 to 19,500 in 1896 with the affiliation of about thirty 
new, small societies which raised the Council's total number of 
affiliated unions to over ninety. (41) 
Yet, in general, the new unions did not provide a significant 
breakthrough in purely industrial terms. A glance at the strength 
of the principal new unions in Lancashire during the 1890's (42) 
reveals a shallow industrial base. We should look elsewhere for the 
main significance of the new unionism. 
3 New Unionism: Theory and Practice 
The special characteristic of the unions that grew up during these 
years resided in the id~ological diff~rences they exhibited against their 
predecessors. 
There was no lack of contemporary awareness for the existence of 
"old" and "new"; for instance, John Malcolm of the Twisters' and 
Drawers' Amalgamation, a cotton union, referred in 1891 to 
"the wave cbf trade unionism which during the past 
twelve months has swept over the country, has not 
yet receded from us, nor been without its favourable 
and beneficial results in Lancashire ••••••• " (43) 
The older trade union officials, whose societies were largely unaffected 
by the boom of 1889, often unconsciously shaped the new unions by their 
attitude towards them. John Fielding, for example, of the Bolton 
Spinners, represented the view of "two schools" of trade union thought 
whose interests were beginning to merge after initial divergences; 
writing in 1892 he pointed out: 
"The general position of the Labour movement seems just 
now to be one of breathing time and consolidating the 
work already accomplished. The great wave in favour 
of trade unionism which swept over the country three 
years ago appears to have spent itself ••••• the 
disposition to look askance at each other by the old 
and newly founded unions is fast dying out: the latter 
discerning that much they took exception to in the 
former was after all the result of experience which 
they would have to copy". (44) 
The main difference between old and new, and which was 
responsible for a theoretical difference in outlook, was the fact that 
new unionists were usually unskilled. The established societies had 
skimmed off all those whose crafts decided their ~arcity value; the 
vast numbers of dockers, gas stokers and transport workers had no 
scracity value except insofar as they ~ere prepared to do tedious and 
often dirty work. It seemed, therefore, that the only way of 
achieving strength and solidarity among these groups of workers was by 
including everyone in a single big union. (45) Hence the very widespread 
aspirations of many essentially local unions - the National Union of 
Dock Labourers on Merseyside, or the National Amalgamated Union of 
Shop Assistants at Manchester, or Tom Fox's British Labour Amalgamation, 
of south east Lancashire. As Dr. Hobsbawm has aptly noted: "this was 
not grandiloquence but - so it was thought - the bare recognition of 
facts." (46) 
Being unskilled made the new unionists conscious of their weakness. 
It was fairly easy to break their strikes, unless, as J. R. Clynes of 
. d d . t (47) S h the Gasworkers urged, each unIon exten e I s coverage. uc a 
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need threw great emphasis on organisational techniques - especially on tacklin, 
the question of non-unionists. Pete Curran of the Gasworkers argued in 
1891 the need for all gas stokers to join his union in order to prevent 
their replacement during winter months by cheaper labour drawn from the 
ranks of the unemployed. (48) Watson of the General Railway Workers 
adopted a more hostile attitude towards non-unionists when speaking in 
Lancashire during the same year, advising non-society railwaymen to join 
the union quickly or find life made "thundering hot" for them. (49) 
--- ~---~ 
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In 1892 Leonard Hall pressed the Trades Union Congress to adopt moral 
sanctions against unions that allowed their members to replace strikers.(50) 
Seen in this light it is not surprising that many people should have 
regarded the new unionism as violent. 
Yet, whilst the concept pf general and industrial unions was 
implicit in the new unionist philosophy, such organisations rarely 
materialised on a wide scale. Separatis~ was evident from the 
beginning. It has already been noted that the most successful unions 
were those which gained an industrial or geographical hardcore, 
thus depending far more on their footholds in certain industries than 
on their ability to recruit indiscriminately. (51) This fact served 
even more to thin the new unionists' ranks and weaken their industrial 
bases. Inter-union rivalry consequently became quite intense. A good 
example of this development is provided by the various unions of 
carters and transport workers which grew up; for instance, John Kelly's 
Manchester and Salford Lurrymen differed very little in its occupational 
content from the Amalgamated Carters' and Lurrymen's Union, organised 
by James Kirkman and Robert Tootill in the Bolton district. Both 
societies competed for members in south east Lancashire~ Similarily, 
Leonard Hall's union was duplicated by the Machine Workers and General 
Labourers, which operated around Bolton and Bury, and when Hall 
attempted to recruit from this area, in 1891, he was promptly told 
by his opposite number in the local union to keep to his own 
territory. (52) In short, the new unions in Lancashire tended to hang 
separately, rather than together, and it would be misleading to suggest 
what they lacked in industrial unity they made up for in political 
cohesion. 
{co 
What were the political attitudes of the new unionists? Did they 
become the backbone of a new political party? In answering these questions 
it should first be remembered that many new unions had been encouraged by 
the assistance of social democrats and, equally, it may be suggested that new 
unionism provided a stimulus to the S.D.F. (53) Salford, for example, which 
was a good area for the S.D.F. until about 1892, displayed a close connection 
between the new unionism and social democracy; Horrocks, Tabbron and W. K. 
((.;; , 
Hall had been instrumental in setting up the Sal ford branch of the 
Gasworkers whilst Purves was to organise the dockers there. Leonard Hall 
may possibly have been a member.;of the S.D.F. when he became an official 
of the Navvies' Union. In general, however, Lancashire new unionism was 
not characterised by strong social democratic leanings. The main task of 
• 
the party was to make socialists and the demands made upon the individual 
by the party probably meant that its appeal was confined to the more 
politically conscious, militant working olass leaders. The role of Marxist 
socialism in the political development of the new unions in Lancashire was 
never as prominent as it was in London during the same period. 
In Lancashire a more marked division between the social democrat and 
the non-socialist worker was evident. There was an influential body of 
opinion which pulled against social democracy. It came from the columns 
of the Workman's Times, launched in 1890 by Joseph Burgess, a former writer 
with the Cotton Factory Times. Burgess was a socialist, though not an S.D.F. 
man, and displayed great sympathy with the new unionist cause, providing moral 
encouragement for those engaged in the struggle to establish trade unions 
against employers' opposition. The Workman's Times gave much space to small 
groups of workers, airing their grievances, offering them practical advice and 
praising 
/ 
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their achievements. It became an invaluable guide to anyone engaged 
in union organisation at this time. 
When the new union movement began to lose its impetus during 1892 
the Workman's ~imes subtly changed its tone from an industrial to a 
political emphasis, using the sense of economic oppression it had 
conveyed to urge the creation of local parties representing the working 
man's point of view; as Pete~ CUrran put it, the worker had been 
bulldozed for too long at election times. (54) The political character 
of the new unionism came to be shaped ~ess by an overtly socialist 
outlook as by an interest in the creation of an independent working man's 
point of view in politics. This was the attitude of the young activists 
who were to set up the Indendent Labour Party in Lancashire and 
Yorkshire during 1892 and 1893: James sexton of Bootle, secretary of the 
Dock Labourers, James Bartley, who wrote for the Workman's Times, Aif 
Settle of Manchester and Leonard Hall, the Navvies' leader. Perhaps 
the most able was J. R. Clynes, the son of an Irish Labourer from 
Oldham. Clynes, born in 1869, had been educated at a local catholic 
school where he revolted against the harsh discipline. In 1879, he 
started work as a piecer in an Oldham cotton mill, revolting against 
this as well by writing letters to the local newspapers against the 
conditions of factory life. His concern for the plight of the piecers 
led him to organise a separate union for them in the mid 'eighties (in his 
own words "it did not last very long" (55)) whilst his unbounded energy 
brought him into great demand as a speaker at workers' meetings. 
Clynes experienced his first taste of politics in the Irish National 
League and developed his own eclectic soc' 1 h l' . h f la p 0 lSOP Y rom reading 
Ruskin, Carlyle, J. S. Mill and R. W. Emerson. Shortly after the gas strike 
in Manchester Clynes was enlisted by Will Thorne of the Gasworkers as a union 
organiser, thus transferring from the mill to a wage of thirty shillings a 
I" (56) 
week with the Gasworkers. 
Such men attempted to lead a working class political revolt. They shared 
a common outlook: young rebels with no respect for established systems, 
often uprooted, footloose and aggressively aware of the social and economic 
injustices of Victorian England. Although it was perhaps inevitable that 
such people should find their way into trade unions their vision was never 
limited to purely industrial action. They were often prepared to 
acknowledge the limits of trade union methods, as in 1892-93 when the cotton 
trade lock out \. r revealed the great disparity between the strength of the 
established unions and that of the new ones: "this is something like trade 
unionism", commented the Workman's Times on the Spinners' position,"and 
ensures a fair fight between employers and employed". (57) Since few new 
unions could hope to achieve this position there was a chance that their 
members might accept political action through an independent working man's 
party. 
4 Towards and Independent Party 
The new unionis~had begun to underwrite legislative action on industrial 
t " ". 1890 (58) Th· ques lons when they arrived at the Trades UnIon Congress In • IS 
did not necessarily mean the acceptance of an independent position, however; 
John Kelly of the Manchester Carters, for example, remained a confirmed 
Liberal, as did Robert Tootill, who continued to represent the Lib-Lab 
position on the Bolton Town Council. Some still retained a wish to 
emulate the cotton unions: 
T. S. Nuttall of the Paper Mill Workers observed that, 
"with leaders animated by reasonable wishes and purposes for 
the interests of their trade as a whole, and commanding the 
respect and confidence of the workpeople, they could not 
fail to exercise a beneficial influence. They would lift 
Labour problems out of the atmosphere and the arena of class 
pOlitical prejudice (Cheers)". (59) 
Furthermore, those new unionists who followed the Workman's Times 
lead and believed that it might be possible to pursue an independent 
position in municipal politics soon discovered that it was extremely 
difficult to break the hold of the established craft unions in the 
trades councils. (60) An examp~e of this may be found at Oldham. 
The Trades Council was the biggest in Lancashire but its political 
interest was very limited, the executive cuuncil being composed of 
representatives from the three major cotton unions and the local 
engineering workers, all comparatively strongly organised. Thomas 
Ashton of the Spinners, as Trades Council secretary, had taken great 
care to assist the affiliation of new societies and by 1891 a substantial 
increase in membership had taken place; yet th~re was no change in the 
Council's political policy, still designed to accommodate the old 
unions. (61) Similiar trends were seen in other trades councils in the 
south east Lancashire district. 
At one town, however, circumstances combined to present a more 
favourable situation: this was at Manchester, the area most affected by 
new unionist growth. Yet even here the progress towards an independent 
working man's party was not a straightforward one; it depended upon an 
initial movement of all working class groups in the area away from 
liberalism. In 1889 the Manchester and Salford Trades Council began to 
open its ranks to new unionists, 
carrying out a campaign f 
or municipal 
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contracts to be given to trade union firms. The City Council agreed 
to this system in 1891. (62) During this time there developed a quite 
close community of interest between the older established societies, which 
still controlled the Council, and the new unions; G. D. Kelley, the 
secretary, helped considerably in new union recruitment (63) whilst 
other members of the executive committee held views that chimed well 
with new unionist attitudes. At the 1890 Trades Union Congress, for 
example, G. J. Davies of the Carpenters and Joiners voted for the idea 
of an eight hour day bV legislation and was able to put the weight of 
the Trades Council behind this policy without too much opposition. (64 ) 
issues 
On political/the Council was still firmly aligned with radicalism in 1890, 
when it became affiliated to the Labour Electoral Association, a 
liberal labour organisation of which G. D. Kelley was president. 
Consequently a scheme was drawn up to run Kelley as Liberal labour 
candidate for st. Geo~ge's Ward in the 1890 City Council elections and 
although he did not go to the poll owing to an unfavourable political 
climate in that ward the Trades Council still maintained its interest 
in labour representation and instructed the executive committee "to 
consider and report to the Council the best means to adopt to secure 
the representation of labour on the City Counci1." (65) 
Nonetheless, Manchester still seemed a long way from achieving the 
kind of independent labour party that had been established across the 
Pennines in Bradford during May 1891. At this time Manchester offered 
little hope for the Workman's Times desire to see an organisation by 
which the working class could take the reins of political power. (66) 
An attempt by Matt Arrandale of the Trades Council to gain a seat on the 
i 
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City Council as a Liberal brought forth bitter criticism from the 
Workman's Times about, working men who "hob-nobbed with party politicians. ,,( 67) 
The situation seemed hopeless. 
Yet two events helped to alter the course of development. First of 
all, a meeting took place in July 1891 comprising all shades of political 
opinion in the Manchester and Salford area. The object was to discuss 
the means whereby a Manchester labour Party might be established; 
nothing very significant came out of the meeting, except the 
disclosure of much disagreement. (68) But a second, and more crucial, 
decision was taken shortly afterwards; this was the acceptance by the 
Trades Council of the idea of an independent party. Over the previous 
year the Council's relations with the Manchester Liberal Association, 
with whom it had co-operated in local politics, had become increasingly 
strained; Kelley's proposed candidature of 1890 had been given no 
encouragement by the Liberal party, which in addition had proposed only 
one working man's candidate for the 1891 School Board election. 
Even before this apparent ~ub by the Liberals there had been 
considerable heated discussion in the Trades Council about the attitude 
of the Liberal Association, Jenkins of the Bakers Amalgamation, a 
self confessed "rabid radical", furiously denouncing its conduct. (69) 
When the Trades Council sent a letter to the Liberal headquarters 
requesting a meeting on the subject of labour representation no reply 
was received for almost two months, a delay considered by the Council 
to be a gross breach of courtesy. It was then resolved to have no 
further dealings with the Libel'al Association over labour candidates. 
In August 1891 the Trades Council refused to join a Free School Board 
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Party, a radical front which offered working men a small share in the 
Liberal campaign. (70) The Trades Council was ready to sink its future 
in a new working men's party. In the same month a pilot body, the 
Salford Labour Electoral Association, was launched. 
It proved easier to establish the Electoral Association than 
it did to secure agreement on its political alignment. The principal 
figures in attendance at its inception represented the various 
interests in the Manchester labour movement. Jackson of the Tramway 
Employees and John Kelly of the Carters spoke for the new unions, 
Roberts of the Bookbinders for the Trades Council and its craft 
unions, whilst the S.D.F. in Salford was represented by several delegates 
including Geo~ge Tabbron who was also a member of the Brassfounders' 
Union. Rogerson, a member of the Carpenters and Joiners, opened the 
discussion by suggesting that the Electoral Association should be 
designed to include the '~housands of workers" outside the pale of 
trades unionism, although Roberts countered this by arguing for a closer 
identification with trade union aims. The socialis$present sensed that 
any attempt to confine the party solely to trade unionists could mean 
its slipping back into the Liberal fold and so Alf Settle, a young man 
who had connections with both the S.D.F. and the Fabian Society admitted 
that he would attempt to make the organisation subservient to 
socialism. The scope of the debate was thus considerably widened. The 
next speaker proposed that the Association's aim should be to obtain 
parliamentary and municipal representation for working men, an idea 
favoured by the S.D.F. and accepted by the meeting unanimously. Settle 
then went on to convince the gatherlOng th t ffo ° 1 f lOtO a 0 lCla s 0 po 1 lcal parties 
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should be denied membership, at which point Tabbron made a most 
significant gesture of independence by suggesting that the party should 
not give support to candidates of any other political organisation 
but should support only working men. (70) 
At this point, the meeting ended with the newly formed Labour 
Electoral Association clearly endowed with a protean character. All 
members were united in their hostility to official liberalism (72) but 
the question of the new party's ideology was not solved. Friction 
between the radicals and socialists soon developed. At the Salford 
municipal council elections in 1891 the L.E.A. sponsored two candidates, 
Rogerson and Settle, the latter in the same ward where he had polled well 
for the S.D.F. in 1890. The antagonisms in the L.E.A. were revealed during 
the elections, however, since Settle was opposed by John Kelly, whose 
union had sponsored him to fight specifically against socialism. 
The vote was split and with Rogerson also defeated the L.E.A.'s 
impact was negligble. (73) Relations were not improved by wranglings 
during the summer over a parliamentary candidate to represent the 
workers in the South Salford constituency. The L.E.A. had chosen 
Thomas Harris, a Fabian, who worked as a journalist with the Sunday 
Chronicle. But at the end of February 1892 Harris resigned from his 
position because of ill-health and W. K. Hall, a nominee, of the S.D.F., 
stepped into the breach. Working class radicalism was therefore further 
1 d (74) exc u ed from the L.E.A. 
Other events had alsofcontributed to the widening breach between 
radicalism and socialism. In December 1891 Robert Blatchford's socialist 
journal the Clarion had appeared, shortly after the Fabian Society 
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had carried out a successful campaign in Lancashire which converted 
many working peop~e to socialism. (75) At the beginning of 1892 
Joseph Burgess began to spread the idea of an "independent labour 
party" through the columns of the Workman's Times and in May of that 
year he opened a subscription list for the collection of funds to 
establish such an organisation. The effect of such propaganda in 
Manchester was to bring together leading socialists and independent 
labourites and to cause ,the setting up of an Independent Labour Party 
following a meetil!g of these people in the office of the Clarion. (76) 
On May 17th a crowded public meeting in st. James' Hall, Manchester, 
decided upon a constitution for the new party; it stated a 
socialist objective and an independdnt working class political 
position: 
1 That the new party's programme be 'the nationalisation 
of the land. and the instruments of production". 
2 Th&the party shall devote itself to securing the election 
of members to all representative bodies for the purpose of 
realising the programme of the party. 
3 That no members of any organisation connected with the 
Liberal, Liberal Unionist or Conservative parties be 
eligible for membership in this party. 
4 That all members of this party pledge themselves to abstain 
from voting for any candidate for election to any 
representative body who is in any way a nominee of the 
Liberal, Liberal Unionist or Conservative parties. (77) 
The formation of the I.L.P. marked a significant development of 
working class politics. Initially, however, its stature was slight and 
it by no means unified the many different labour organisations throughout 
Lancashire. It was, in 1892, only a Manchester party and could not even 
be ~aid to have captured the political 
support of the new unionists. 
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5 Summary 
It is, perhaps, easier to decide what effects the new unions 
did not have on the labour movement in Lancashire than it is to agree 
on their more positive significance. For one thing, it would be unwise 
to stress too much the industrial impact of the new unionism. From a 
strictly numerical pOint of view the unions established after 1889 did not 
have sufficient strength in the labour force to be able to match the 
power of the cotton and mining unions. By the close of the ninet~enth century 
the number of permanently organised trade union members in the ~egion 
had been increased marginally by the establishment of new union; t78} , 
although not significantly enough to ha~e created an influential body of 
opinion. Moreover, two other factors should be considered in 
assessing the overall influence of the new unions; firstly, they were 
never united in aim and policy and no single organisation was powerful 
enough to take the lead and stamp its character on the movement so that 
sectional interests were always evident, and this makes it difficult to 
expression 
speak of new unionism as a cOherent/of opinion; secondl~, it may be seen 
that the ideological characteristics' of the new unionism were largely 
illusory: in practice the revolutionary interpretation of trade union 
policy and structure offered by the new unions failed to materialise and 
most unions fell back on the methods of the old established societies. 
For these reasons, therefore, it would be misleading to assign to the 
new unions the role of a "third force" in Lancashire working class 
poll tics. 
And yet there are undoubted links between the new unions and both 
a revived and new socialist movement. How is this to be exolained? 
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We cannot say with any certainty that as a general rule new unionist 
industrial policy led directly to political action. The revolutionary ethos 
of the new unionism, with its comprehensive solutions for working class 
action, rarely became anything more than an idea; it was hardly ever 
translated into practice. Since many new unions adopted the same industrial 
tactic9 as established societies it is reasonable to assu~e that many of 
them also took up similiar political attitudes. It is, of course, likely 
that the industrial weakness of new unions made them willing to adopt 
the political weapon; yet many kept out of politics, particularly if they 
were content with industrial progress made through local trades councils, 
as was the case with the several small societies in the cotton districts 
which made some advances in this manner. To be sure, some unions did tUrn 
to political action to secure ~eforms such as Fair Contracts or because they 
had accepted the arguments of the Workman's Times. But the outcome of such 
activity was not necessarily socialism. John Kelly's Carters and Lorrymen 
for instance, is a good example of a union prepared to support candidates 
at local elections, though these were usually Lib - Labs and outrightly 
opposed to socialism. In fact, the early manoeuvres in Manchester to form a 
workingman's party revealed the variety of opinion that existed among new 
unionists. Moreover, the union which displayed the most consiste'nt interest 
in left-wing politics was the Liverpool Dockers (79) and this was one of the 
biggest and probably strongest (it was certainly not the weakest) of all 
the Lancashire new unions and it had achieved its strength by creating a 
solid base among a single group of workers in a clearly defined geographical 
area - hardly a reflexion of new union theory. 
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It is clear~y unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that the industrial 
experiences of the new unions produced a different attitude to working 
class politics from that displayed by the cotton and mining unions. The 
fact is that the links between socialism and the new unions were mainly 
personal. Many, though not all, of the new unions were led by socialists 
.. 
and there developed a co..dre of left-wing leaders such as Cl ynes, Sexton, 
", 
Leonard Hall and Alf Settle all of whom achieved prominence in politics. Their 
views, however, were not formed as a result of their experiences in industrial i 
unions; all were socialists, either Marxists or of the more "ethical" 
variety, before they became union officers. The I.L.P. was partly the 
creation of such people and,in particular, of those among them who did 
not accept the S.D.F. approach to socialism but it was never/the 
straightforward projection of new unionist aims into the political arena and 
the party could never rely on a ready-made body of support among new 
unionists. The I.L.P. was, in fact, an elitist movement, just as the 
S.D.F. was, and differed from the later Labour Representation Committee 
in that it was based on individual support and not, as the L.R.C., on trade 
union affiliation. 
In the final analysis, therefore, it may be suggested that the shift 
towards an independent working class position in Lancashire, culminating in 
the foundation of the I.L.P., sprang from the same economic and social 
background that gave rise to the new unionism, but that the institutional 
links between the industrial and the political movements were very 
tennous and therefore not significant enough to product a Major 
political breakthrough. 
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Chapter 5 
Parliamentary Elections, 1885-1906 
Between 1885 and 1906 Lancashire began to aSSillne its modern political 
appearance. The traditional party alignment of Conservative and Liberal, 
which characterised the nineteenth century, was gradually being replaced 
by the confrontation of Conservative and Labour that we know today. In 
general it might be said that the rise of the Labour party introduced the 
concept of class as the principal determinant in political behaviour and 
that this was ulti~ately to override the sectional loyalties of the 
earlier period, hence the basic difference in the politics of this century 
compared with the nineteenth. Clearly, though, the process of political 
change is both complex and long-term and it may be misleading to over-
simplify it. For instance, the Labour party in Lancashire still had a long 
way to go in 1906 before it would be able to compete on eq'.lal terms with 
its main adversary; can we therefore terminate the story of its development 
before the General Election of 1945? Moreover, there continued u~til well 
into the twentieth century a hardy breed of working class Conservative in 
north west England(l), a predominantly industrial region where, according 
to our rule of thumb interpretation of political change, the Labour party 
ought to have swa~ped all opposition with working class votes. 
Nevertheless, the problem remains of attempting to delimit a period 
of political chan~e when developments of long-term significance can be 
picked out. The years between the General Elections of 1885 and 1906 
provide this critical period. The main intention of the present chapter is 
therefore to examine the issues that dominated the election campaigns in 
Lancashire at this time. Of course, an initial 
objection may be raised 
I 
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against this method of approach: do electoral issues really have any 
influence on the way people vote? It is now generally accepted that the 
electorate does not behave very rationally during elections; that it does 
not weigh the arguments of the contending parties dispassionately as, 
for example, a judge and jury might scrutinise the evidence in a court 
of law. Voting considerations are shaped by a variety of factors among 
which the economic and social environment of the individual has an important 
influence; according to Professor Blondel, "politics is probably affected 
by all the forces which shape the social structure of a countryo,,(2) There 
is no reason to believe that this was any less true in the late nineteenth 
century and, that being so, any survey of voting behaviour and political 
change which failed to take into account economic and social change would 
be very shortSighted. Hence this problem is tackled in Chapter Six. And 
yet the issues involved at General Eiections cannot be ignored entirely; 
some of them do produce a critical attitude on the part of sections of the 
electorate and help to explain changes in voting behaviour. Electoral issues 
may therefore be a partial cause of change. In addition, the study of 
elections assists in determining the extent of change, reflected in the 
shifting balance between the parties. 
The present chapter therefore attempts to provide both a yardstick 
against which the progress of the political labour movement may be measured, 
and a preparatory discussion for the problems looked at in the following 
chapter. 
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1. Electoral Structure of Lancashire(3) 
The redistribution of seats in 1885 gave this region 54 constituencies, 
returning 59 Members of Parliament. This more than doubled the number of 
seats in the region largely because of the sub-division of the former 
county constituencies. Previously there had been 4, each returning 2 MPs. 
In 1885 there emerged 21 separate divisions with single representation. 
The boroughs also increased their representation. Liverpool and Manchester, 
each with three Members under the old system, were given nine and six single 
Member divisions respectively. Sal ford became a three division city whilst 
Blackburn, Bolton, Oldham, Preston and Stockport were allowed to retain 
their dual representation. Wigan, however, lost one of its two Members, 
as its population had dropped below 50,000 (the electorate was between 6 
and 7,000). Clitheroe was the only borough to lose its status, being sub-
sumed into a new county division bearing its name. After 1885, therefore 
there were 38 borough and 21 county seats in the region. 
The Redistribution Act also had the effect of grouping the majority 
of Lancashire seats into one category, that with between 7,500 and 12,500 
electors, (4) which included most of the medium sized towns where middle 
class influence over the industrial workers was still important. Significantly, 
however, this type of constituency was becoming less prominent. In 1885 four 
fifths of all the region's constituencies were of this nature; by 1906 only 
half were - the trend was to bigger uni~in which the working class was 
more concentrated in its own urban quarters. 
Declining electorates were rare, although in the commercial 
centres of large towns such as Manchester and Liverpool they were sometimes 
seen. With business people moving out into the residential suburbs the 
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electorate of Manchester North West fell by over 1,000 in 20 years, 
whilst that of Liverpool Exchange dropped even more heavily. The only 
other seats to lose electors were the Scotland and Abercrombie divisions 
of Liverpool, though probably for a different reason: the high proportion 
of lodger voters making registration extremely difficult. 
Participation in elections was generally very high in Lancashire 
during the later nineteenth century, with polls of over 90 per cent 
regularly being recorded.(5) A probable reason for this is that, with a 
high proportion of fairly small, closely kn~t towns in the region, people 
could easily record their vote in the time between arriving home from work 
and the closing of the polling booths at S.p.m. (6) Yet, whilst an obvious 
advantage, this need not commit a person to voting and it remains doubtful 
whether the high tUrn-outs were a reflection of interest in the campaign, 
or of a more profound social tradition.(7) 
2. General Outline of Voting, 1867-1906 
In the 1850's Lancashire moved away from Liberalism and in the 
period between the Second and Third Reform Acts its Conservatism took root. 
At the General Elections of 1868 and 1874 the Conservative party captured 
a comfortable majority of the seats, but in 1880 the Liberals prospered by 
their greater popularity nationally and 22 of the 36 Members returned were 
Liberals. With the limited franchise the Conservatives always did well in 
the four big county divisions where the small town workers were without the 
vote. No Liberal was retUrned in any of these divisions until 1880. The 
industrial towns generally gave the Liberal party more support, but over-
all the Conservatives held the electoral balance, winning almost two thirds 
of the entire contests during the period 1867 to 1885. 
Between 1885 and 1900 this superiority was consolidated; the party 
held an absolute majority of the votes cast in the region.(8) The pattern 
was established in both the boroughs and in the county divisions, although 
in the latter the margin of the Conservative ascendancy was never so 
clearly marked. 
Few expected the Tories to profit in this way in 1885: "1 suppose 
we are out for twenty years to come", remarked one of their ministers on 
the eve of the General Election.(9) Yet, ironically, the party was to enjoy 
political pOwer for most of that period, its tenure of office punctuated 
only by the short Liberal administration of 1892 to 1895. Again, much to 
contemporary surprise, this control was in part due to support won in the 
great cities. After 1886 the Conservatives dominated London, Birmingham, 
Liverpool and Manchester, and always polled a majority of the votes in the 
west Midlands and south east England.(lD) The Liberal party still counted 
on the urban working class but its grip on their votes was clearly weakening 
and it could no longer hope for a majority at all times. Consequently the 
party of Gladstone began to look towards the newly enfranchised county 
divisions (which still accounted for a majority of the House of commons)(ll) 
d b . . . F· d f t( 12) an ecarne IncreasIngly reliant on a "CeltIc rInge" bo y 0 suppor ; 
it began to tailor its policies for rural rather than industrial conditions. 
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The general character of the Tory party in the counby at large 
was that of a middle class group closing the door against advanced radicalism 
and socialism: in the words of one of its more recent historians - "a 
party combining the defence of the constitution and the social order with 
the pursuit of cautious progress.,,(13) In Lancashire, however, among a 
population that was very heavily working class and where constituencies 
of this nature predominated the Conservative party returned between 1885 
and 1906 233 MPs against 121 Liberal (including Labour representatives in 
1906). Overall, the Conservatives clearly made more sUbstantial inroads in-
to the working class voteb~ore 1906 than did the Liberals,(14) and in the 
five General Elections between 1885 and 1900 the Conservative share of the 
vote in Lancashire was always greater than its share in the country at 
large(l5). 
In 1906 the picture was quite different. The issues of the campaign 
were almost all unfavourable to the Conservative party, which lost votes 
in all regions and among all classes. The Liberal and Labour parties had 
been organised in,a secret electoral pact (16) which in Lancashire resulted 
in many Labour candidates contesting seats in the major industrial towns 
where working class Toryism had previously been strong, thus allowing the 
Liberals to concentrate on their better areas. This winning formula 
produced 47 MPs and 55.6 per cent of the vote for the Liberal Labour coalition, 
but its importance lay not in the ability of the Liberals to increase their 
vote in traditionally Liberal districts, but rather in the Labour party's 
~pacity to tap working class support that had previously gone to the Tories. 
In an electorate vastly enlarged since 1885, and with a high average turn-
out, the Conservative party was unable to raise its share of the vote above 
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the previous level; it might therefore be suggested that if the 
circumstances of 1906 were ever to re-appear, or, alternatively, if the 
Labour party was able to tUrn its support into permanent party loyalty 
then the hold of the Tories on the working class vote would be seriously 
weakened. 
3. The Parliament~~~aigns. 1885-1906 
The General Election of 1885 roughly established the main centres 
of party sUpport for the period before 1906,(17) the Liberals being at 
their strongest mainly in the eastern part of the region, with the 
Conservative strongholds situated on the western side of Lancashire. 
The most important issues that prevailed in Lancashire at this 
election were those of Irish nationalism and education. Following C S Parnell's 
Manifesto the Irish were urged to vote against the Liberal party in order 
to brin::J pressure to bear for the introduction of a Home Rule Bill. (l8) 
In addition, the Catholics, both English and Irish, ranged themselves against 
the Liberal party on the education question after Joseph Chamberlain's 
"Unauthorised Programme" had attacked the principle of sectarian teaching 
in schools.(19) Consequently the strange sight was seen in many areas of 
Catholic and Orangeman voting in the same way.(20) The Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Salford, Herbert Vaughan, an Englishman who cared little for 
Irish nationalism, shared the priests' aversion to Chamberlain and advlsed 
his flock to demand assurances of parliamentary candidates that they would 
defend voluntary schools against the School Boards and support a plea for 
a Royal Commission to investigate the workrg of the Education Acts.(2l) 
His advice was probably most influential among the English Catholics, 
especially in the borough of Preston, where they were reportedly 
"so powerful that if they should ever be led to act as a 
unit in local politics, they would assuredly tUrn the scale.,,(22) 
Preston had no School Board and the voluntary principle was in consequence 
firmly established, but the Catholics supported the Liberal candidate 
T W Russell, probably because he was the party's sole candidate in the 
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double member constituency and one Tory was therefore bound to be returned.(23) 
This tactic proved ineffective, however, for both Conservatives were 
returned, possibly as a working class reaction to the depressed trade 
which had coincided with the Liberal administration.(24) 
Elsewhere the Liberal vote fell according to the strength of the 
Catholic population, the tactics of the Irish Nationalists thus being 
vindicated. At Blackburn, . for example, where Michael Conway's Irish 
Nationalist party was considered to be a bastion of Liberalism, the Irish 
voters abstained or supported the Tories, both of whom were returned.(25) 
At Darwen, were "some hundreds" of Irishmen were resident in the borough, (26) 
the Liberal was defeated by a narrow margin although the Irish voters were 
clearly not unanimous against him and the adverse vote probably sprang 
from poor registration.(27) The Nationalist issue clearly had its greatest 
influence at Liverpool where religious antagonism between Irish and 
Protestant workers was very marked. The city contained a sizeable element 
of Ulstermen who supported the Orangeist faction, headed by a small but 
vociferous group of Protestant clergymen whom the Irish Nationalist writer 
John Denvir described as "bigoted, virulent and eloquent Irish parsons.,,(28) 
.-~--.-----------------.-
----------~-~--------------~ 
The Orangemen were intense loyalists. Moreover Liverpool had a powerful 
Working Men's Conservative Association, founded in the 1860's, an 
exclusively Protestant organisation which played an important role in the 
Tory party machinery. (29) Archibald Salvidge, a local brewer who joined 
the Association in 1885 and who became its elected Chairman in 1892, later 
outlined the religious and patriotic spirit of the movement: 
"The first and fundamental principle of Conservatism is 
the maintenance of State and Church. Whilst the working 
men look to the Government to maintain the constitutional 
law as attached to the State, I trust they may look to 
them, and not look in vain, to do all that lies in their 
power to enforce the law with the Protestant and National 
Church."(30) 
In such an environment the Liberal party could hope for success in normal 
times only among Irish electors; whilst it polled badly in the Liverpool 
divisions where Irishmen were not a powerful force in the electorate, the 
party's performance at Exchange presented a quite different picture even 
11.0 
in 1885. Here the Irishman O'Shea was the Liberal candidate and with Parnell's 
sanction the Irish voters supported Liberalism, almost recording a victory.(3l) 
In general,however, the Nationalist interest proved a powerful stumbling 
block to the Liberals in this General Election; T.P.O'Connor; the Irish 
Nationalist M.P. for Liverpool Scotland, (32) claimed that the Irish party 
had attacked thirty seats in Lancashire, twenty five of which were won by 
the Conservative party. (33) In the county divisions of Gorton and Hyde the 
Irish supported the Liberal candidates for local reasons, but for this act 
the Irish party at Gorton was repudiated by O'Connor and stripped of its 
status in the Irish National League.(34) 
The new county divisions offered the Liberal party greater support 
and were a more encouraging pointer for the future. Even in the counties, 
however, the religious question remained prominent with Liberalism a more 
vigorous movement in the east, where Irish immigration was far less 
pronounced. The newly enfranchised workers in the small cotton towns were 
particularly quick to give their votes to the radicals who possessed a 
ready political leadership in theclite of manufacturing bosses; a typical 
example of this group was Caleb Wright, who won Leigh, a scattered 
constituency of comparatively strong Nonconformity supplemented by immigrant 
Welsh Miners. Wright was a veteran fighter for radicalism and had worked 
his way up the social ladder from a childhood of poverty to become a mill-
owner, finally being elected IJlember of Parliament at the age of 75(35). 
The Liberals carried many of the county divisions as the party which had 
brought democracy to these areas; in addition they drew on the support of 
many immigrant cotton workers from the West Riding of Yorkshire who had 
settled at towns such as Nelson, where "much higher wages"(36) coUld be 
earned. Nelson, it was said, was 
"a political town and political discussions are as regular 
as the sunset. The Liberal club is a nightly rendezvous for 
men of intelligent political thought ••••••• " (37) 
There was a staunchly individualist political strain in these areas which 
proved suitable ground for popular radicalism, the alliance of workers and 
middle class against the established Tory squirearchy. Election policies 
such as the one issued by Kay Shuttleworth of Clitheroe, with appeals to 
"equal rights for all", "Lords Reform" and "free trade in land,,(38) un-
doubtedly moved the people. Moreover the county constituencies were 
provided with new Liberal associations in 1885 to give the stimulus to 
electoral participation.(39) Although Conservatism was by no means eclipsed 
in these eastern industrial divisions the Liberal party generally proved 
the more powerful after 1885 for one major reason: there was a lack of anti-
Irish feeling and therefore no Tory "backlash" against the immigrant, thus 
allowing the Liberals to become associated with reform and therefore with 
the working class. FUrthermore in the Rossendale and Rochdale areas Non-
conformity was influential. It should not be forgotten, though, that the 
cotton workers were everywhere strong and well org~ed, as were the miners 
at Radcliffe, Burnley and Accrington, and would be likely to constitute an 
effective pressure group when trade issues were prominent. 
The more westerly county divisions were much less congenial for 
Liberalism. In the first place there was more agriculture carried out and 
consequently a strong landlord influence on the Conservative side.(40) 
This was an important factor in constituencies which were large and scattered, 
such as Ormskirk, Chorley, Newton-le-Willows and Westhoughton; it provided 
a unifying influence among the electors, who knew no tradition of a middle 
class leadership. Chorley was an example of such a constituency which the 
Liberal party found extreme difficulty in contesting. The division had a 
strong element of native Catholics who voted Conservative, whilst its 
industrial population was confined in the 1880's to the town of Chorley, 
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which had some cotton mills, and the southern edges of the division which 
marched with the coalfield. The biggest part of the division was agricultural 
and much of the land was owned by the Lindsay family, who held a strong 
influence over the selection of Conservative candidates.(4l) In 1885 
Richard Feilden, a local landowner and retired Army officer, fought the 
seat for the Conservatives against a Liberal barrister from Birmingham. 
The result was an overwhelming victory by over 3,000 votes for Feilden, who 
had ample funds at his disposal which enabled him to employ a ~reat many 
carriages to convey voters to the polling stations throueJrut the consti tuency. 
The Liberal calculated that he was even unable to secure the normally 
reliable Nonconformist vote.(42) In the county divisions of Widnes and 
Bootle, which had considerable Irish populations that might have been 
expected to vote Liberal under normal circumstances, the Conservative 
influence was also strong, either through the predominance of outlying 
. (43) 
agrlcultural areas or the presence of freeholder voters. The only 
county division to afford the Liberals some hope in 1885 was Southport, 
where a middle class commercial community existed.(44) 
The broad religious cleavage in the General Election of 1885 is 
perhaps the best general guide to the politics of Lancashire, though it 
does not help to explain the behaviour of Manchester. The Conservative 
party won all the working class divisions there in 1885 with the Liberal 
success confined solely to Manchester South, a middle class area. Moreover, 
this cannot be explained by the switch in the Irish vote since only at 
Manchester North were the Irish strong.(45) The poor Liberal performance 
was a surprise to contemporary party officials since it was reckoned that 
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powerful radical working class groups were favourable allies at Hulme, 
Bradford, Newton and Pendleton in Salford.(46) The Conservative machinery 
had been pbinly effective, however, in getting out the vote; before 1885 
the party had never fostered much hope in the large towns and largely 
through neglect it had lost its hold over them in l874.(47) It was the 
provincial Tory bosses, rather than the national leaders, who provided the 
fire for the electoral resurgence in the cities(48) and Manchester Tories 
benefited from a working class vote compounded of deference rather than 
anti-Catholicism. 
The General Election of 1886 fUrther strengthened the Conservative 
hold on Lancashire; in terms of seats the Liberal party experienced a 
disaster at the polls, reduced to 11 members of parliament in the region. 
There can be no doubt that the division within the party over Home Rule 
caused this decline. The Liberals failed to find candidates for 10 
constituencies because of disagreements over policy.(49) Gladstone had 
IlA. 
gone to the country in July 1886, only eight months after the previous 
General Election, with the sole issue of Home Rule for Ireland; the proximity 
of the elections and the repeated emphasis on the Irish question caused 
a great slackening in interest and the Liberals could not be expected to 
make any headway in the western areas of Lancashire where they had polled 
badly in 1885. The reversal of the Irish vote only _ brought the party 
two gains, in the North and South West divisions of Manchester, whilst 
Unionist splits accounted for the loss of three important Liberal seats 
in north east Lancashire - the backbone of Lancashire liberalism. 
--------- ---- ---
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The sitting Liberal at Rossendale was Lord Hartington, the Whig 
leader, who revealed to his constituents in April 1886 his opposition to 
Gladstone's policy. Peter Rylands, the radical Member for Burnley, had 
already intimated to the Burnley Liberal Association that he very much 
regretted 
"that Mr Gladstone has thou9ht it right to propose a 
measure for the establishment of a separate and 
independent parliament for Ireland." (50) 
Both were supported by leading Lancashire radicals. (51) Sir H,=nry James, 
the Member for Bury, who had clashed with the Irish Nationalists over the 
Parnell Manifesto of 1885, had refused a place in Gladstone's third 
administration (formed in January 1886), not so much because of his 
opposition to Home Rule but through his hostility towards the Irish party 
and its influence.(52) In a meetin9 with the chairman of the Bury Liberal 
. 
Association he had been told that he would lose the backing of the local 
party if he for~ook Home Rule. (53) But James decided to contest Bury in 
1886 as a Unionist with Conservative support, whilst the Liberal party 
failed to find a candidate.(54) James retained the seat at the expense of 
leading his personal followers into the Tory camp. 
Rosendale and Burnley were lost in the same way. Six of the fourteen 
members of the Burnley Liberal Executive threatened to resign unless Rylands 
was adopted; the others nominated their Chairman, Alderman Greenwood, to 
oppose Rylands, (55) who retained his seat with a majority of 43. Hartington 
caused a more decisive split at Rossendale the Unionist cause was espoused 
------------------ ---~ 
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by Brooks, his chairman, and the Liberal party was left completely dis-
organised with no money even to engage a registration agent.(56) Hartington 
achieved a massive majority in a low poll since, as at Burnley, there 
were many Liberal abstentions. This trend also caused the Liberal party 
to lose Accrington, whilst at Leigh and Radcliffe-cum-Farnworth the party's 
majorities of 1885 were drastically reduced. Home Rule thus wrought the 
nadir of Liberal fortunes and displayed the extreme vulnerability of a 
reliance on the Irish question in Lancashire; there were simply too few 
constituencies with a strong enough Irish nationalist vote to turn the 
scale in the Liberals' favour whilst the Home Rule issue clearly had no 
appeal to English workers. 
In the later 1880's there were signs that the Liberal party might 
eradicate the disaster of 1886 and return to, or even improve upon, its 
position of 1885. Bye-election results throughout Britain seemed to 
confirm this progress (57) although by the time of the 1892 General 
Election the swing in most parts of the country from the 1885 party balance 
was markedly in favour of the eonservatives.(58). In the Lancashire 
industrial region there was a minimal swing of +0.2 to the Liberal party(59) 
(Table 17), which meant that the Conservatives were still ahead in terms 
of seats. 
This situation was undoubtedly determined by the same conditions 
which helped the Conservatives in 1885; the religious division within the 
working class was even more clearly illustrated in 1892, however, since 
the Liberal party had by then the advantage of the Irish nationalist vote. 
-_._------
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A bye-election in the Exchange division of Liverpool confirmed this in 
January 1887. The seat had been marginally Conservative in 1885, although 
in 1886 it changed hands. The Irish were politically strong in the 
division, especially in the Vauxhall ward area where there was a well 
organised branch of the Irish National League,(60) which provided a sound 
basis for the Liberal organisation. The Conservativas had put forward 
their Chancellor of the Exchequer, G J Goschen, who h3d been looking for 
a seat in the Commons; his platform supported the Union and though he 
emphasised his erstwhile Liberal sympathies managed only to present a 
somewhat two sided image whereas the Gladstonian candidate offered Home 
Rule in a satisfactory manner.(6l) The result, a majority of 7 for the 
Liberal party, reflected both the strength of the Irish vote and the party 
organisation, as well as the disappointment of the Conservatives over their 
inability to woo Irish electors.(62) It might be doubted, however, that 
the Liverpool Daily Post's comments on the victory constituted sound advice 
to the victors: 
"It proves that English Liberals are beginning to realise 
that Home Rule is a principle worth fighting for and that 
they can, by their unaided efforts, make it triumph."(63) 
Events in other bye-elections in following years seemed to show that 
English Liberals were looking for something more in their party's policies 
than Home Rule. In the late 1880's demands were beginning to be voiced for 
1J.7 
labour representation and groups of trade unionists were making their 
influence felt in local pOlitics.(64) Their cry was for greater participation 
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by working men in party councils and for parliamentary legislation to redress 
economic injustice. Out of these demands was to grow the Independent Labour 
Party, which called for a shorter working day as the antidote to misery 
and unemp1oyment(65) whilst wanting "the men who made the profits to share 
the profits to a larger degree".(66) The Liberal party was presented with 
the opportunity for voicing the appeals of the politically conscious working 
men and implementing their demands. 
This advantage was not fully realised, although it was potentially 
far more important than the Irish Nationalist vote. Two by-elections at which 
the party made gains were illustrations of this point. At Burn1ey in 
February 1887 an election was caused by the death of Peter Rylands; despite 
his adherence to Unionism in 1886 Rylands had strong radical tendencies 
and for this reason the Lancashire Unionists tried to replace him with 
G 0 Treve1yan. Trevelyan, a former Liberal, refused the nomination and 
his place was taken by J 0 5 Thursby, a local coalowner and pro~inent 
Conservative.(67) The Liberal party chose as its candidate John 51agg, the 
Chairman of the National Reform Union, who had been defeated at Darwen 
in 1886. Burnley was a quite different constituency, however; there was an 
Irish vote of some 400 and a strong group of coa1miners, although the bulk 
of the electorate was composed of cotton workers among whom Nonconformity 
was comparatively influential. 51agg was therefore able to offer a mixed 
programme which emphasised religious equality, temperance reform and local 
self government but ke~Home Rule in the baCkground;(68) by winning the 
Irish and miners' votes he returned a majority of over 500. (69) Eccles, 
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where a bye-election took place in 1890, was a similar industrial 
constituency, though miners were more prominent than cotton workers and 
there were engineering workshops at Eccles itself in addition to some 
agricultural areas. The Irish vote was not especially strong and the most 
important single factor in the campaign was the miners' Eight Hours Bill.(70) 
The seat had been won comfortably by the Conservatives in the two previous 
General Elections, by a representative, in fact, of a local landowning 
family, the Egertons. On the death of the sitting member in 1890 the local 
Conservative party nominated his brother against the local manufacturer 
and scholar H J Roby. Roby supported the miners' demands, concentrating 
his campaign on the Eight Hours question and local veto issue, whilst the 
Conservatives made the mistake of importing Northumbrian miners to speak 
aganst Eight Hours at Pendlebury, the centre of the mining vote.(71). 
Roby was able to win the seat with a majority of over 200 by refraining 
from rtome Rule entanglements, though the Annual Register made the astute 
comment that 
"observers on the spot declared that it was only in the 
districts where the colliers' vote was heavy that the 
Liberals increased their poll." (72) 
Clearly the Liberals could win working class votes if they advanced 
suitable policies, although in winning back Rossendale in 1892 they placed 
their faith in the willingness of Nonconformists to rally to the party. 
Hartington had been elevated to the peerage in 1891 as D~ke of Devonshire 
and his replacement as Unionist candidate, Sir Thomas Brooks, was unable to 
wield the same personal influence. On the other hand the Liberal candidate, 
I, .-----~--
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J H Maden, was the son of an important local employer who had no doubt 
greatly assisted to restore the depleted funds of the local Liberal ass~ation. 
The division was strongly Nonconformist in character, ~ith cotton workers 
in the small towns such as Rawtenstall, Bacup and Haslingden, and also a 
few agricultural workers. The Irish vote was just over 400.(73) Maden's 
policies were tailored to fit the religious and occupational tone of the 
division and included Disestablishment in Wales and SCotland, local veto, 
land reform and Home RUle.(74) The Irish question was a dangerous political 
issue in Rossendale but Maden did not emphasise it too greatly despite 
the assistance he received from four professional Irish nationalist 
organisers.(75) The Liberal party was encouraged by its successes in the 
1891 municipal elections at Rawtenstall (76) and threw evarything into the 
campaign; Maden was supported by Herbert Gladstone, Campbell-Bannerman and 
the rising star, H H Asquith; a half day holiday in the local mills on 
polling helped his majority to rise to over 1200.(77) The result brought 
immediate demands for a dissolution of Parliament.(78) 
At the ensuing General Election, however, the Liberal party was 
still associated predominantly with the Home Rule question, whilst some of 
its other policies such as Welsh Disestablishment and local veto on the 
sale of alcohol could only be considered successful vote catchers in 
strongly Nonconformist constituencies, of which there were comparatively 
few. The only new approach which could have proved capable of winning working 
men away from the Tories was the adoption by Liberal candidates of the 
Newcastle Programme of social reform.(79) Even this was rather reluctantly 
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accepted by Gladstone and was far more positive in its pledges of Home 
Rule than on questions affecting the payment of Members of Parliament and 
a shorter working day.(80) Moreover, the Newcastle Programme did not find 
favour with the middle class elements in the Liberal party who preferred 
the big issues of popular radicalism, such as Lords reform and 
Disestablishment, as the basis of party policy. Nevertheless the interest 
shown in social reform was an important factor in the election of Sam Woods, 
the Miners' President, as Liberal Labour representative at Ince, and in 
Thomas Aspinwal1's encouraging campaign at wigan.(81) 
Yet by failing to adopt a positive line on economic and social 
questions the Liberals lost ground to their opponents. In addition to the 
areas where they had polled well in 1885, the Conservatives were able to 
make gains in 1892 at three important industrial constituencies. A tight 
hold was secured in Barrow by the Liverpool shipowner G W Cayzer. The town 
had many immigrant workers, both Irish and Scottish, who found employment 
in the shipyards and steelworks and who were likely to support a candidate 
with influence in the shipping trade; the town was also becoming increasingly 
concerned with armaments manufactures and saw its future tied to a foreign 
1 · l' I'l' (82) po lCY W11C called for a strong army and navy to support mperla lsm. 
The ,Conservatives also succeeded in making Gorton, safely Liberal in 1885, 
a highly marginal seat. Though it stayed Liberal in 1892 the sitting Member, 
Sir Wi1lia~ Mather, lost many votes by his equivocal attitude towards the 
Eight Hours question, (83) on which the miners and railwaymen in the division 
based their votes. At Bury, Unionism still further increased its influence 
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through the popularity of Sir Henry James; his work on behalf of the 
cotton unions' factory bill(84) made the cotton workers determined to keep 
one of their most productive allies in Parliament.(85) The Liberal party, 
hoping the seat would revert to its former allegiences in the manner of 
Burnley and Rossendale, put forward a local candidate, Alderman Parkes, a 
former Mayor of Burnley, who supported an advanced programme which included 
the payment of Members of Parliament.(86) But James, with his personal 
following and a splendid campaign machinery which was "working like clock-
work,,(87) recorded a big majority in a poll of over 90 per cent. The 
contest was very much one of personality as James himself realised when he 
noted that 
"I felt •••• my political, almost my personal character 
came up for judgement before the electors of Bury." (88) 
The Liberals had therefore proved incapable of raising their share 
of the vote with sufficient uniformity to eat into the basis of Conservative 
support. Their striking improvement on the 1885 position at Liverpool West 
Toxteth, for example, was made with the help of Irish and Catholic supporters 
aided by a large contingent of Welsh Nonconformist voters, though even this 
did not outweigh the indigenous Tory support in the Dingle and the "higher 
parts of the division"; the seat therefore remained solidly Conservative. (89) 
At Widnes the Liberals had an exceptionally strong candidate in the local 
radical Wade Deacon, who almost succeeded in winning the seat. His support 
came from the town of Widnes, with its high population, at least half,of 
Catholics in the population(90); had the election been decided solely on' 
the performance in the town the Liberal party would have won easily but the 
constituency also included outlying agricultural districts, strongly Tory, 
I~l 
and a middle class residential area at Garston.(9l) Moreover, Liberal 
support was on the decline during the 1890's as the local chemical trade 
contracted because of foreign competition and many workers were forced to 
leave the town.(92) 
Thus the Liberals made substantial gains only where their traditional 
supporters, Irish and Nonconformists, were switching back after 1885 and 
1886. The party was able to regain many of the seats in the eastern part 
of the region where anti-Catholicism was not in evidence but even in 
marginal areas the Tories fought doggedly, as at Darwen, to defend the 
Established Church, religious education and the principle of "one kingdom, 
one Sovereign, one Parliament.,,(93); wherever a possibility existed of 
Catholic votes being cast for the Liberals (94) or of Home Rule entering the 
debate(95) the Conservatives were able to whip up some support from 
loyalist Protestant voters. 
DUring the remainder of the 1890's the Liberal party declined 
seriously in the Lancashire industrial region. Little of the hostile feelings 
against Liberalism were revealed, however, before the 1895 General Election. 
The bye-elections which took place in the region during Gladstone's fourth 
administration were unexceptional. The conservatives retained Liverpool 
West Derby and a Stockport seat whilst the Liberal party held Burnley. A 
more important contest took place at Accrington in December 1893 after a 
very long parliamentary session had ended with the House of Lords' 
rejection of the Home Rule Bill and its mutilation of an Employer's Liability 
Bill introduced by the Liberal Government.(96) The Accrington Liberals 
Supported the Government bill on liability whilst their opponents defended 
th~ Lords' decision.(97) Although the local Liberal candidate received 
133 
some support from the cotton workers and railwaymen which enabled him to 
win the contest, there was a noticeable drop in the Liberal share of the 
poll against the 1892 position.(98) The Annual Register could therefore 
justifiably comment that 
"the election was ••••• negative evidence as to the interest 
taken by a distinctly working men's constituency in a measure 
which was ostenSibly brought in for their benefit;"(99) 
it might also have added that the election had been a veiled contest of 
"Lords v. People" but had ignored the Eight Hours issue which was prominent 
in the cotton towns at the time. 
A bye-election also took place at Birkenhead in October 1894. The 
borough had been consistently Tory since 1868 but the majorities had 
dwindled steadily after the retirement of the local shipbuilder - politician, 
Laird. In 1892 the Liberals had polled well with W H Lever, a local radical 
and one of the founders of the Sunlight Soap works at Port Sunlight. His 
benevolence was well known among local workers since he had created a 
housin::J scheme for his employees and was a keen advocate of "proper housing 
for the people,,(IOO) When the Birkenhead seat was vacated in 1894 the 
Liberal party therefore put forward Lever in the hope that he would improve 
on his performance of 1892, especially since the Conservatives had 
i~ported Elliott Lees, a candidate defeated at Oldham in the previous 
General Election. The constituency was mixed in social character, with 
Irish districts,(lOl) "a considerable villa vote" and an active Orangeist 
fa.cti.<n (102) Whilst Lees emphasised Unionism and defended religious education 
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Lever promised support for an Eight Hours Bill, employers' liability, 
local veto and old age pensions.(103) The election was decided on national 
issues, but with the Lords question in the background Lever came within 
106 votes of victory. (104) 
Roy Jenkins' assertion that "the election of 1895 was a disaster 
for the Liberals" is no less true of Lancashire than of the country in 
general. (105) There were a series of different reasons for this. Firstly 
the party was divided: the splits among the leadership - Harcourt, the 
party's leader of the House of Commons, did not support Rosebery, the 
Prime Minister(l06) - were reflartedat constituency level in Lancashire, 
where the party failed to contest 10 seats. Secondly, the Liberal 
administration under Gladstone had been generous on time spent in attempting 
to pass a Home Rule Bill but it had provided no answers for unemployment, 
nor had it achieved its other major legislative plans for a local veto 
bill and Welsh Disestablishment. These factors served to discredit the 
Liberals in the eyes of the electorate, at the same time contributing to-
wards a muddled election programme with some candidates emphasising the 
Home Rule question, othe~reform for workmen and some the Lords question. 
Consequently there were swings against the party in all but four of the 
region's constituencies - Birkenhead, Prestwich, Manchester North and Bury. 
One seat was gained, at Bolton, where a local employer's son and active 
Anglican, George Harwood, managed to take second place in a two member 
. (107) . 
constltuency. Harwood campalgned for Home Rule and land nationalisation 
and won the Nonconformist middle class vote through his support of local 
veto and Welsh Disestablishment.(l08) 
But the third and most important reason for the Liberal decline in 
Lancashire was the Government's espousal of Indian import duties on cotton. 
In December 1894 H H Fowler, the Liberal Secretary for India, had agreed 
to the Indian Government's extension of import duties to cotton goods, a 
move which convinced Lancashire workers that their staple trade was being 
mulcted to solve India's financial problems. All candidates at the General 
Election in the cotton towns were obliged to oppose the tariffs: 
" •••• if one does not vote with one's constituents one 
may as well save oneself the trouble of standing again 
by resigning one's seat at once," 
commented R G C Mowbray, the Conservative Member for Prestwich.(109) The 
effect of the cotton tariffs was most noticeable in south east Lancashire. 
The Conservative electoral compaign grew naturally out of the opposition 
to the tariffs. Trade union leaders were appearing on the same platform 
as Conservative politicians at the beginning of 1895(110)whilst Liberal 
Members supported their own party in the Corrunons. (111) Th·= election campaign 
at Oldham provided an excellent example of the Conservative party's 
advantage. The Liberals had been comparatively successful at Oldham before 
1895 and had in fact won both seats in 1892, although their representatives 
proved equivocal on the tariff question.(112) Both Conservative candidates 
were lawyers, one of them, J F Oswald, a complete stranger to the town but 
the other, Robert Ascroft, was a well known local solicitor who had worked 
for the cotton trade unions in the negotiations for the Brooklands Agreement. 
Trade unionists were therefore quick to recommend Ascroft to the working 
class electorate. (1l3) The two to ° t d th 1 0 th Conserva lves aSSOCla e emse ves Wl 
the trade question, as "bread and butter champions" and even as "labour" 
I 
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candidates.(114) They also enhanced their standing with the traditionally 
Conservative supporters in the electorate by emphasising their Anglicanism(l15) 
Sir John Hibbert, a sitting liberal and member of Rosebery's government, was 
the most unpopular of the four candidates, paying for his failure to 
denounce the Indian tariffs by receiving the lowest vote in the pOll.(l16) 
The pattern of Conservative supremacy was repeated in all the other 
constituencies of south east Lancashire except Prestwich, where there were 
fewer cotton workers. The Liberal party also lost Rochdale, its strongest 
seat in the district; here G N Barnes of the Engineers polled 1231 votes 
as an "avowed socialist" candidate for the Independent Labour Party, but 
the effect of his candidature was not as detrimental to the Liberal as might 
appear at first sight. The Conservative majority was ~22, partly brought 
about by the party's opposition to the Indian tariffs;(117) on the other 
hand the Liberal Association has chosen to put forward as its candidate 
W L Bright, son of John Bright, to replace T B Potter, another famous 
radical of many years standing who had retired from politics in 1895.(118) 
. (119) Despite warnings that the contest would not be won on reputatlon, the 
Liberal caucus continued to back Bright, who fell ill during the campaign 
and had to leave Rochdale. The presence of Barnes attracted the votes of 
discontented Liberals, whose views were expressed by the radical Rochdale 
~ 's comment: 
"we require something more from a man than the fact that 
he is the son of his father." (120) 
1895 therefore represented one of the worst years for the Liberal 
party during the entire period from 1885 to 1906. Compared with previous 
elections, when relatively small swings in voting had produced an exaggerated 
imbalance in terms of seats, 1895 represented an absolute decline of 
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considerable magnitude in terms of both votes and seats. 
The period from 1895 to 1900 was a confusing one for both major 
parties. National and local issues coincided to a great extent, producing 
signs of conflict between and within the parties. The Conservatives were 
the first to exper~ence adversity; when the cotton duties question was 
(121) 
cleared up they were seen to be no more reliable protectors of industry 
than the Liberals and lost a bye-election in the extensive county division 
of Middleton in 1897. 
Foreign policy created an important national issue with special 
relevance in the North West. In 1898 the Conservative Government was faced 
with the problem of Russian and German expansion in China, and, later in 
the year, with a confrontation at Fashoda with France. Salisbury's lack 
of assertion over the China question may have been the principal cause of 
the Government's loss of southport in a bye-election that year; the middle 
class residents, whose interest lay in the cotton trade through Manchester 
and Liverpool, no doubt felt that one of the country's leading export 
(122) 
markets was threatened. The problem was equally disruptive for the 
Liberal party; Rosebery and Grey, as directors of foreign policy in the 
previous Government, had taken a strong line with the French in Africa(123) 
but the Manchester-Guardian supported a "Little England" policy (124) which 
aroused some doubts in Lancashire. There were many Liberals in the region 
who felt that weakness on foreign policy could cause another Liberal 
disaster; thus Kay-Shuttleworth) the Member for Clitheroe, was writing 
to Campbell-Bannerman in 1898 that: 
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"In Lancashire there seems to be a good deal of division 
among the rank and file, as well as among leading men and 
M.P.s on these subjects. I doubt, however, whether the 
peculiar line taken of late by the Manchester Guardian 
represents many people's views. Indeed there are many 
influential and active men in Lancashire who thoroughly, 
or else to a great extent, approve of recent utterances 
of Rosebery, E Grey etc. on foreign affairs." (125) 
The problem was to beset the party at the 1900 General Eelection. 
Probably of greater importance than foreign affairs in the period 
before the outbreak of war in South Africa was the Ritualist or Church 
Discipline issue. Its influence was illustrated in another bye-election at 
Southport in May 1899. The church of England had recently been displaying 
a tendency towards popish ritual which sh~cked low churchmen; a demand for 
"Church Discipline" was expressed through such bodies as the Layman's 
League and the Southport election was the first to take place after the 
issue had been brought into politics.(126) The Liberal candidate was 
Sir George Pilkington, a former Mayor of the Borough and the division's 
first Member of Parliament, who "had the advantage of being universally 
popular in the neighbourhood.,,(127) Southport itself was predominantly 
Nonconformist and though the Conservative candidate drew support from the 
Catholics and from some outlying rural areas such as Banks and Formby, he 
lost many votes among Anglicans in the borough through his prevarication 
on the church discipline question.(128) The more extreme Protestants were 
so dismayed by his attitude that they took the advice of the Liverpool Tory 
leader Salvidge and refused to vote Conservative; Pilkington's ultimate 
victory was cheered by the crowd assembled outside the Liverpool Conservative 
Club on polling night.(l29) 
----
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In the very different constituency of Oldham, a cotton town which 
also had a mining interest, the Liberal party again reversed the 1895 position. 
In May 1899 a bye-election was caused by the death of the senior member, 
Robert Ascroft, and the retirement of his Tory colleague J F Oswald. In an 
attempt to retain the seats for the party the local Conservatives ran two 
strong candidates - Winston Churchill, the younger son of the former "Tory 
Democrat" Lord Randolph Churchill, and James Mawdsley, the veteran secretary 
of the Spinners' Amalgamation. Both candidates had sound connections with 
working class Toryism, Churchill because of his fathers' political stance 
during the 1880's in favour of giving working men a greater voice in 
Conservative party councils, and Mawdsley because of his many years service 
in the cause of trade unionism. Although Mawdsley was sponsored by the 
local Conservative Association, not by his union(130), it was clearly hoped 
that he would attract a substantial working class vote, sufficient even to 
secure the return of the less well-known Churchill on a double ticket vote. 
Taking all things into consideration this was not an unreasonable hope, 
especially since the two Conservatives offered the kind of programme which 
had produced a winning formula in 1895 - "something for Oldham" was the key-
note of their campaign.(13l) Mawdsley and Churchill proved very accommodating 
in their attitudes towards old age pensions, an eight hour day and an 
employers' liability bill(132), all trade unionists' demands, whilst in 
their replies to the local Protestant pressure groups on the Church Discipline 
issue they probably picked up a sizeable Anglican vote. (133) It may have 
seemed for a time during the campaign that the Conservatives could not fail 
to win. And yet they did. Although the Liberal candidates were less reforming 
--------_. 
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in character, one of them, Emmott, was a local industrialist whose influence 
may have proved a counter attraction to Mawdsley. Moreover, religious 
antagonism was not especially marked in Oldham and at the turn of the 
century it was one of the few Lancashire towns to have more of its children 
educated in Board Schools than in voluntary institutions.(134) 1899 may 
therefore be regarded as a more normal contest than that of 1895, when Tory 
influence was inflated by the cotton duties controversy, and the Liberals 
were able to attract their real following in the constituency.(135) Perhaps 
a surprising outcome was Mawdsley's inability to secure more votes in a 
predominantly working class constituency; his low number of "plumpers"(96) 
and the insufficient number of "split" votes between him and Emmott (257) 
suggest that the electorate did not take very seriously the "Con-Lab" nature 
f h · . ( 136 ) b··· L h· o 1S cand1dature. By 1899 la our pol1t1CS 1n ancas lre were 
beginning to move in an independent direction and those electors interested 
enough to want working class candidates probably now demanded their being 
more representative of a working class organisation than Mawdsley appeared 
to be in this campaign. In the final analysis, therefore, the result was 
decided by traditional political loyalties. 
The swing back to liberalism in some areas during the late 
nineties suggested a possible recovery for the party in Lancashire by the 
time of the next General Election. But this was not to be. None of the bye-
elections reflected the growing concern over the political situation in 
South Africa which had been intensifying since February 1899 and which 
in October developed into war between Britain and the Boer Republics. 
In September and October 1900, after a series of British military successes, 
._--------_ .... - .......... -
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the Goverrunent sprang a "Khaki" election. 
The Liberal party was not prepared for a campaign fought along 
Chauvinist lines. For one thing the party was disunited over the war and 
unable to lay down any clear policy for or against it, whist the existence 
of "pro-Boers" as Liberal candidates in constituencies where the electorate 
was affected by imperialist feelings hardly bade fair for the polls. Another 
factor that seemed likely to inhibit the Liberals was the effect of the 
South African war on trade and the stimulus it gave particularly to the coal 
industry, whose prices soared. As a result, in 1900, there was none of the 
"backlash", compounded of economic depression and unemployment, against 
the incumbent goverrunent such as had hit the Liberal party in 1895. It 
appeared, therefore, that the Liberals were in a difficult position and yet 
in Lancashire their performance in 1900 was slightly better than that of 
five years before and the General Election was not an unmitigated disaster 
for them compared with previous efforts. 
Of course it was not to be expected that the Liberal party would 
do well in traditionally hostile areas. Hence in Liverpool the Conservatives 
took six of the nine divisions without a contest whilst in the shipbuilding 
towns of Barrow-in-Furness and Birkenhead, where a strong foreign policy 
was usually an attractive issue, the Liberals likewise found it hopeless 
to put up candidates. Bury too, a town which supported an army barracks, 
saw the Conservatives strengthen their position. But in general the most 
marked characteristic of the campaign was the difference in the voting 
beh · f th b h d t· t . (137) I th b h h aV10ur 0 e oroug an county cons 1 uenC1es. n e oroug s t e 
Liberal position was with few exceptions always down on 
that of 1895 
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whilst in the county seats the party invariably made gains. The cause would 
seem to be in the degree of publicity over the war, there being generally 
far more propaganda put out by the newspapers and by the military authorities, 
in the form of parades, in the bigger towns than in the smaller manufacturing 
d" t" (138) 1S r1cts. At Preston, for example, the I.L.P. candidate Keir Hardie 
was advised by a colleague that "it would be a sound political strategy from 
the outset not to speak too strongly against the war since there have been 
hundreds of casualties from Preston", and accordingly Hardie, an anti-war 
candidate, toned down his speeches, talking of the "bravery of our troops" 
and the "useless sacrifice of dozens and dozens of brave lads" through the 
mismanagement of the War Office.(139) Other socialist candidates also found 
the atmosphere of the bigger towns uncongenial.(140) The county seats were 
less affected by the war, although even here there were exceptions, and the 
most notable one was Leigh, the only seat in Lancashire always to return a 
Liberal in the thirty years before 1914. In 1900 the Conservatives came 
close to winning. Caleb Wright had been succeeded in 1895 as M.P. by C.P. Scott, 
a strong social reformer but weak on foreign policy as his position as editor 
of the Manchester Guardian revealed. In 1900 Scott was singled out as the 
leading pro-Boer in Lancashire and at Leigh there was exhibited much antipathy 
towards him, his critical attacks on the Government's policy being sharply 
denounced by a good proportion of the electorate.(14l) 
-
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The war issue did therefore assist the Conservative cause and help 
to check the signs of Liberal resurgence that had been manifested during 
the later 'nineties. It was perhaps to be expected that once the war was 
over the Liberal party would revive again in Lancashire. But could frhope 
to secure a majority of votes in the immediate future? The odds seemed to 
be against this happening since for almost a decade the party had been 
drifting without a set plan, not being able to decide between whether to 
offer a workers' programme of social reform or to concentrate on the old 
issues of popular radicalism such as Disestablishment, reform of the House 
6f Lords and Home Rule. At the tUrn of the century some Lancashire Liberals 
were no doubt aware that their party needed to think deeply about its 
political future; Kay-Shuttleworth of Clitheroe, for example, expressed such 
feelings to one of the party chiefs, Campbell-Bann'~rman, in 1898: "whilst 
we do not want another Newcastle Programme we do seem to need two or three 
big objects besides the H(ouse) of Lords".(142) Clearly the "big objects" 
were required for electoral success and the most significant development 
in the Liberal party during the next few years was the manner in which its 
"big objects" were found - not by a solution of the Liberal party's real 
problems but because of Conservative policy in the few years before 1905. 
The Government's measures presented the Liberal with a series of issues that 
allowed them to stage a political revival based on working class support 
with once more all radical and Liberal forces united under one flag. The 
coincidence of such issues as free trade, Chinese lab~ur, trade union 
legislation and education absolved the Liberals of the need to devise their 
own policy for working class support. 
Between 1900 and 1905 the sample of bye-elections in Lancashire 
is rather meagre, but two contests, at Bury and Preston, serve to illustrate 
how the political situation was swinging in favour of the Liberals.(143) 
The Bury bye-election came in May 1902 on the retirement of James Kenyon, 
the Conservative M.P. The contest was dominated by the Corn Registration 
Duty which had recently been introduced by the Conservatives. This 
protectionist measure was commonly called "the Bread Tax" by Liberals and 
George Toulmin, their candidate at Bury used the symbols of the Big and 
Little Loaf, to show how interference with the principles of Free Trade 
increased the cost of living for workers. (144) All other issues in the 
election were of secondary importance against the clash over Free Trade; 
the Conservative candidate(145) attempted to introduce the question of the 
Government's education policy, since in Bury there was no School Board and 
the .local residents might have been thought strongly in line with the 
Government's voluntary principle.(l46) On the other hand the question of 
a reform of the ~cketing laws was particularly important for trade unionists 
and Toulmin received the support of David Holmes of the Weavers' Amalgamation 
after promising to champion this cause.(147) The Irish voters in Bury also 
backed the Liberal because of his attitude towards Home Rule.(l48) Toulmin, 
a Preston newspaper proprietor who had been defeated at Bury in 1900, was 
victorious by 414 votes; the election displayed in embryonic form all 
the issues which were to dominate politics in the next few years. Free trade 
however was shown to be of paramount importance in a working class 
constituency and as defenders of economic orthodoxy the Liberals reaped 
the benefits. 
-
The importance of the newly formed Labour Representation Committee 
was revealed in the Preston bye-election of May 1903(149). The Liberals had 
never been strong in the town, whose Catholic population was now attracted 
to Conservative educational policy, with its support for voluntary schools. 
Yet the intervention of a Labour candidate clearly drew working class voters 
to the radical cause; John Hodge of the L.R.C. polled over 6,000 votes and 
though the seat was won with a majority of over 2,000 by John Kerr, an 
owner of the local engineering works, the L.R.C. vote was a significant 
improvement on previous Liberal campaigns in this two member constituency.(150) 
At the 1906 General Election the Liberal party made unprecedented 
gains in the Lancashire industrial region, falling from its 1900 position 
in only one borough, Wigan, where an unofficial Labour candidate split the 
radical vote. The Liberal appeal to the working man's vote was further 
strengthened by the presence of 16 L.R.C. candidates who stood against 
Conservatives without Liberal opposition, in areas where working class 
Toryism had been traditionally strong. In these areas the swings against 
Conservatism were often massive.(Table 17). 
In the face of such obvious radical advantages the Conservatives 
had little chance of winning the working class vote. The Salisbury and 
Balfour Governments had failed to promise legislative immunity for trade 
unions against actions for tort concerning union officials. Moreover they 
had upheld the use of indentured Chinese labourers in the South African 
mines and British workers felt that the Boer War had therefore been fought 
to secure cheap labour for capitalists rather than ensure employment for 
British emigrants. Most important, Joseph Chamberlain's decision to campaign 
for protection brought even the free traders in the Conservative party under 
the critical eye of the working class electorate. 
The Conservatives were thus strictly limited in issues on which they 
could win votes; the middle class constituencies, notably Manchester South 
and Southport, were inclined to vote Liberal over Free Trade. In Merseyside, 
working class Conservatism proved more durable than that of the middle class 
for the relatively affluent Abercrombie division returned a Liberal, for 
the first time. The workers were still torn by the religious issue, in spite 
of the presence of two Labour candidates at Kirkdale and West Toxteth. 
Although Home Rule was not a prominent point in Liberal manifestoes the 
Conservatives stressed its possibility under a Liberal Government in order 
to whip up anti-Irish feeling and create enmity against the priests.(15l) 
So strong was this antagonism that at Birkenhead an Independent Protestant 
candidate secured over 2,000 votes which otherwise would probably have 
guaranteed a Conservative victory. 
In other places where Conservative candidates were fighting for 
their political lives they tried to rally electors with cries of "the 
Church in danger". This was especially noticeable at Blackburn where Philip 
Snowden was elected with W H Hornby, a Tory Member since 1886, who charged 
his socialist opponent with atheism.(152) Only where the Irish immigrant 
m· . t h h . d . d th· b· t ( 153 ) Inorl y ad reac ed sizeable proportIons 1 IS rIng many vo es. 
There was also a possibility that Catholic voters might forsake 
their Liberal allegiance in 1906 over the education question. Leading 
Catholic' clergy had denounced any intentions the Liberal Government might 
---------------------.-... 
have of reversing the Act of 1902(154) and it was thought that this matter 
should lay more heavily on Catholic minds than the hope of Home Rule for 
Ireland. The polls, however, revealed a gulf between clergy and flock. 
The Irish voters seemed to have had little difficulty in choosing to support 
Home Rule, and therefore the Liberal party. There were two main reasons 
for this; firstly the advice of the Irish National League that Iris~~en 
should vote Liberal or Labour,(l56) and secondly the strong working class 
element in the Irish population which would have been drawn towards Liberal 
support for trade unions and, more especially, the policy of cheap food. 
As Michael Davitt, the Irish Nationalist speaker, pointed out, working class 
Irishmen should not be influenced by the actions of middle class English 
Catholics who were ingrained Tories. (157); thus an element of class conflict 
probably entered'into the decision. Manchester Irishmen, for instance, 
were solidly Liberal in 1906(158) as were those in most other towns where 
an organised Irish party existed.(159) The English Catholics at Preston 
may have given some support to theConservatives, as may their co-religionists 
at St. Helens where the influence of the clergy was on the Tory side.(160) 
At Salford South Hilaire Belloc fought an interesting campaign; although 
the Conservatives warned "Don't Vote for a Frenchman and a Catholic".(16l) 
Belloc won many votes on his programme of social reform; he was, of course, 
a staunch Catholic: 
"My religion is ••••• of greater moment to me by far than 
my politics, or than any other interest could be, and if I 
had to choose between two policies, one of which would 
certainly injure my religion and the other as certainly 
advance it, I would not for a moment hesitate between the two".(l62) 
Strangely, however, Belloc chose to oppose the ~02 Education Act but 
supported Home Rule, "as dependent on elementary democratic principles" 
being a national and religious problem.(lG3) He won comfortably. 
Tariff Reform, however, accounted for the loss of most Conservative 
votes and significantly many of the party's candidates in the region 
renounced Chamberlain's proposals. (164) 
In accounting for party fortunes during this period it can be seen 
that the Liberal party was at a greater disadvantage than the Conservatives 
for most of the time, being in danger more frequently of losing its natural 
support over controversial issues likely to divide its ranks. Such situations 
occurred regularly for the Liberals between 1885 and 1900; on the questions 
of Home Rule, Indian tariffs and the South African war the party became 
entangled with problems that had particular relevance to Lancashire, and 
liberalism slumped accordingly at the General Elections of 1886, 1895 and 1900 
when these issues each predominated. From 1902 to 1906 the situation was to 
some extent reversed, as it was during these years that the Conservative 
party suffered the same kind of problem over the tariff reform issue, which 
had very little to commend it' in Lancashire. Yet, whilst in the 1906 General 
Election the Conservative share of the vote dropped significantly in the 
region the Liberal share did not rise by the same degree. This was because 
the victory of that year was won in conjunction with the new Labour party, 
whose development during these years had been most noticeable in the 
industrial centres. The fact that in 1906 Labour candidates were successful 
in many of the individual towns previously held by the Conservatives pointed 
· ---, 
-----------------------
to the most interesting development in Lancashire politics since 1885 -
namely the ability of a party to win votes on a class basis. 
Such a development may be rightly regarded as striking when it 
comes to summing up the characteristics of parliamentary politics in the 
region in the 'eighties and 'nineties. The most marked feature of the 
region is the complete absence of any correlation between social class 
and party loyalty; only in l~06 could one side in the political contest be 
regarded as the working man's party. At other times both the Conservative 
and Liberal parties had proved capable of winning working men's and 
middle class votes, though within fairly well defined geographical districts. 
In fact, geographical location appeared to be of more importance in 
deciding the political character of a constituency than did social and 
economic composition. An explanation of this tendency, discussed at 
greater length in the following chapter, lies in the paramount importance 
in Lancashire politics of the Irish immigrant, whose significance emerges 
repeatedly in the preceding survey of election campaigns. There was a 
noticeable increase in Conservative strength where Irish immigrant minorities 
reached sizeable proportions in the community, the process being most 
pronounced in the Liverpool area. On the other hand, as the Irish factor 
declined in importance towards the eastern side of the region the relative 
strength of nonconformity assumed greater influence and Conservative voting 
became less marked. 
We may conclude, therefore, that both the issues involved in the 
election campaigns and the social and religious features of the region 
made for the most striking aspect in Lancashire politics during this period _ 
IS-I 
the failure of what was generally reckoned by contemporaries to be the 
working man's party to win greater support in a most heavily industrialised 
region. It may be seen that when Ireland was an important issue at elections, 
as it was during the 1880's and early 'nineties, the Liberal chances 
of polling a majority of the votes were very remote. But after the General 
Election of 1892 there can be no doubt that Home Rule began to decline in 
significance as an electoral programme. How did this situation affect the 
Liberal party? It may be suggested that during the 1890's the Liberals 
had an opportunity to recover but that they were never really able to grasp 
it. That an opportunity was there can be seen by the nature of the issues 
discussed; practically all were of material importance and might have been 
thought of as affecting the voter's everyday life in some way. Issues of 
more remote importance rarely predominated; foreign affairs, for example, 
were only of significance during the late 1890's and of course, during 
the 1900 campaign, but in both cases their relevance was largely decided 
because of their connection with the export trade. Further, an abstract 
principle such as socialism was rarely attractive to the electorate, as may 
be seen from the disappointing performances of the I.L.P. candidates in 
1895, and was only accepted later when its doctrines were tacked on to trade 
union programmes. If, therefore, practical issues were the most likely to 
bring success there was ample opportunity for the Liberal party to build a 
programme along these lines, especially concentrating on elements of social 
and economic reform such as an eight hour day, employers' liability, factory 
reform and liquor control. The evidence of bye-elections in the latter 1830's 
and early 1890's would point to the relevance of such issues. 
Another factor was beginning to suggest some attention to the 
problem of re-grouping the basis of Liberal support. This was the noticeable ~) 
tendency of the Irish Catholic voters to become less reliable Liberals as 
the prospect of a Home Rule bill faded. By the late 1890's the questions 
of an Irish Catholic university and voluntary schools were being espoused 
by the Conservative and the result was that both in 1900 and 1906 some Irish 
Catholic groups appear to have been influenced by Toryism. It would be un-
wise to overstress this point since the most solidly Irish Catholic 
constituency in the region, Liverpool Scotland, remained steadfastly Nationalist 
throughout the period, yet the party could not afford to lose any support 
in Lancashire and it may therefore appear surprising that Liberals did not 
exert themselves to stem the leakage. Some Liberal candidates, especially 
in 1892, did attempt to move in this direction by adopting programmes of 
radical social reform, but the party as a whole was divided over the 
"Newcastle Programme", many Liberals not wishing to consign the party to a 
socialistic stance; these people preferred Kay-Shuttleworth's "big issues" 
whic h would win elections without the need for trans forming the party. But 
such issues could not easily be planned for; it was really not because 
of any Liberal designs that they arose in 1906. It therefore seemed that 
in the long term the Liberal party could hope for little success unless it 
resolved the problem of a middle class leadership bidding for working class 
support. 
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6. 
Politics, Religion and Social Change 
In the last chapter we looked at the response of electors to the 
immediate issues of politics and attempted to account for the variations 
in party support at the six General Elections between 1885 and 1906. It is 
now time to tUrn to the question of enduring political loyalty and the 
prospect of changes in voting behaviour. 
The stability of political alignment over long periods of time has 
been the subject of several analyses of voting. One of the first studies 
to examine this feature was Andre Siegfried's survey of attitudes in western 
France during the time of the Third Republic. Siegfried was able to show 
that party preferences were shaped by broad environmental factors, such as 
social class, religion or occupation, as much as by political manifestoes; 
that,in fact, the social and economic background of a community goes far 
towards explaining its politics.(l) As a result of Siegfried's pioneer work 
the relationship between the electorate and its environment is now generally 
regarded as being a crucial factor in the forming of political attitudes. 
Recent historical studies of British politics in the years before the First 
World War have shown, for example, the marked connection between social 
class and party choice, especially in London,(2) whilst the whole range of 
influences which make up political alignment have been investigated recently 
by Butler and Stokes.(3) If some of these techniques are applied to the 
Lancashire industrial region at the end of the nineteenth century we may 
understand what accounted for its major political features. 
1. The Bases of Politics 
It has already been pointed out that variations in party support 
coincided less withdass divisions than with geographical areas, the 
greatest strengths of Conservatism clearly being in the west of the region 
whilst the Liberal party drew its more reliable support from the 
constituencies on the eastern side of Lancashire. The absence of any 
strong tendency for voting along class lines is confirmed by the fact that 
in the four predominantly middle class constituencies of the region (4) 
the average Liberal vote between 1885 and 1900 was 46.5 per cent whilst, 
during the same period, in the 38 mainly working class divisions it was 
also under 50 per cent. In the 1906 General Election the Liberal share of 
the vote in both these categories rose to 58 and 56.3 per cent respectively. 
Nor does occupation appear to have been a significant influence on 
voting. In areas with a high concentration of workers in a single industry, 
as for example closely knit communities of miners and cottcnworkers, there 
was no greater uniformity of behaviour than among a labour force of less 
homogeneous character.(5) 
On the other hand, a clear pattern emerges when the religious 
environment is analysed. There is a marked association between the 
influence of Roman Catholicism in Lancashire and the strength of the 
Conservative vote, the western districts of the region being precisely those 
where Catholic support was strongest. Conversely, the more eastern parts of 
the region were less influenced by Catholicism and were consequently less 
prone to Conservative voting, the Liberal party being able here to poll 
more favourably.(6) In order to understand this relationship it is 
necessary to examine the development of the various religious denominations 
during the later half of the nineteenth century. 
2. The Irish and Catholicism 
In the third quarter of the century the support for the Catholic 
Church among working people in Lancashire was swelling. Catholicsm 
received its initial boost from the Irish immigrants who flooded into 
Lancashire after the Great Famine in Ireland during the 1840's ~7) Their 
main port of entry was Liverpool and its hinterland provided a ready market 
for unskilled labour in the cotton mills, coalmines, chemical works, docks, 
labouring trades and, for the women, in domestic service. The Irish were 
not completely new to Lancashire for in pre-famine days there had been a 
steady flow across the Irish Sea; in 1825 there was said to be close on 
100,000 Irishmen in Lancashire, concentrated mainly in Manchester and 
Liverpool.(8) But in spite of their familiarity and their easy absorption by 
industry the Irish remained racially and religiously distinct. For many 
years they lived in ghettoes such as the one in Manchester known as "Little 
Ireland" - a slum district just to the south of the city centre. (9) Their 
religion set them apart also and was responsible for evoking strong dislike 
on ·.the part of the indigenous population, who were competing with the 
Irish for jobs. In 1868, for example, extensive "no Popery" rioting took 
place throughout south-east Lancashire, though one suspects its causes 
h ' 1" (10) A ' t th' k' d f h t '1' t th were as muc econom1C as re 1910US. ga1ns 1S 1n 0 os 1 1 Y e 
Irish people united; Catholic trade unions, possibly Irish organisations, 
1ft 
2) 
were not unknown in later years(ll) and the Irish Nationalist movement, 
vigorous in Liverpool and Manchester, thrived on the sense of a separate race.(12) 
It seems clear that the influx of the Irish began to level out 
during the 1880's and thereafter the proportion of Irish people in the 
Lancashire population was probably falling. Estimates of the Irish population 
can be no more than rough guides, since the official censal returns deal 
only with those people born in Ireland; nevertheless by the turn of the century 
there were still over 108,000 Irish born people living in the principal 
manufacturing towns of the region. (13) During the 1890's men and women of 
Irish stock probably numbered about half a million, with about a third of 
these at Liverpool. The two neighbouring towns of Bootle and Widnes also had 
a high concentration of Irish, probably accounting for half the population. 
At Manchester there was a sizeable community in the north of the city, 
especially in St. Michael's Ward, whilst Iris~ people were also prominent 
in the new industrial centres of st Helens, Barrow and Horwich.(14) 
Two qualifications should be made about the connection between 
Irish and Catholic at this time. Firstly, not all the Irishmen in Lancashire 
were Catholics; undoubtedly some would have been Ulstermen and therefore 
Protestants. It is extremely difficult to estimate the number and location 
of these people but it may be assumed that they constituted a minority in the 
shipbuilding towns of Barrow and Birkenhead where skills learnt in the 
Belfast shipyards could be applied. Most of the major towns had their Gran~e 
lodges, though exactly how much support they enjoyed it is difficult to 
say, whilst at Liverpool there was a noisy minority of Ulstermen in local 
politics.(15) Secondly, not all the Catholics in Lancashire were Irishmen. 
It must be remembered that Lancashire was a region of comparatively strong 
native Catholicism, and for centuries it had been markedly more Roman 
Catholic than the rest of England. In the 1770's, for example, there was 
said to be 14,000 communicants in the county, as against 1,500 in 
By the late 1780's the figure for Lancashire had apparently risen 
. (16) Yorkshue. 
to 23,000. (17) 
The principal area of English Catholicism was Preston and its neighbourhood 
and the concentration of Catholics in the town may be judged from a note sent 
out by an Independent congregation in 1828 to solicit help in the building 
of a chapel: 
"Preston, in the county of Lancaster, is a corporate town 
containing, by the census of 1821, about 25,000 inhabitants; 
since that period the population has increased to upwards of 
30,000. Of this number about one third consists of Roman 
Catholics." (18) 
The Irish writer John Denvir estimated that in the early 1890's most of 
Preston's 30,000 Catholics were Englishmen.(19) 
By the end of the nineteenth century, th~n, the Catholic population 
of Lancashire had reached greater proportions and covered a wider social 
range than in any other region of the country.(20) The result was a 
significant strengthening in the influence of the Catholic Church. In 
general, church-going among the Catholic working class was far more marked 
than among indigenous Protestant workers. Irish had, in all likelihood, been 
accuston.cd to atten~ing church services in their native land and If the 
habit could be encouraged in England, and If more accommodation in Catholic 
churches could be provided, it was reasonable to suppose that attendance 
at worship would be good. When the Roman Catholic hierarchy was re-established 
in England in 1850, two bishops were assigned tothe industrial population of 
Lancashire - one at Liverpool (21) and one at Salford. They soon discovered, 
in fact, that attendance was by no means automatic; that one of the most serious 
problems for the Catholic Church was "leakage" or loss of followers. There 
was a variety of reasons for this, but three stand out: the poor distribution 
of churches, which meant that attendance at mass often meant a long walk: 
the fact that female domestic servants were sometimes unable to secure release 
from their employers to make the morning journey to church(22): and, a more 
profound problem, the uneven sex ratio among the immigrants, there being 
initially far more single men than women and this caused a mixing of the 
Catholic and Protestant religions by marriage, normally diluting the ardour 
of the Catholic faith and often eradicating it altogether.(23) 
The response of the clergy was to create more facilities for worship 
and for education. This was especially so in the poorer districts; Mannin~, 
the second Arch~ishop of Westminster, was convinced of the need for more 
Catholic schools and spent a great deal of money in attempting to provide 
them in order to maintain the allegiance of the poorer children.(24) This 
process was established in the diocese of Sal ford by Bishop Turner: "there 
is perhaps no diocese in England better provided in respect to its parochial 
schools", recorded Turner's successor, Herbert Vaughan.(25) Nonetheless, 
when Vaughan became Bishop in 1872 the problem of leakage was still acute 
and his most pressing need was money, for the"Salford diocese was not so 
well endowed with wealthy middle class patrons as was the more affluent 
diocese of Liverpool. By appealing for donations, however, Vaughan was able 
to open a seminary for the training of secular clergy (26) and this 
enabled him to tackle the problem of providing teachers. As a result of 
a census, conducted in 1885, it was calculated that almost 10,000 children 
were in danger of losing their faith, mainly because of parental neglect and 
consequently a Catholic Protection and Rescue Society was set up to 
investigate individual cases.(27) Demands on the clergy were increased in 
order to realise Vaughan's maxim that "a house-going priest makes a church-
going people". (28) By the end of his episcopacy in 1892 Vaughan had more 
than doubled the number of teachers in his area and, though faced with a 
continual debt, created many new parishes with new churches in the industrial 
districts of east Lancashire.(29) In the diocese of Liverpool the same 
process was taking place under the direction of Bishop O'Reilly and, later, 
Bishop Whileside (30) By the end of the century the Catholics in Lancashire 
were a vigorous minority religious movement and their efforts to maintain 
a following had produced an important reaction from the Protestant churches. 
3. The Protestant Response 
The influence of the Protestant denominations among the population 
at large was by no means extensive.(3l) Both the Established Church and 
Nonconformity were making attempts after the 1851 religious census to 
increase their support and in comparative terms, as Map 7 shows, the combined 
nonconformist sects were clearly enjoying the better of the struggle, 
especially in the eastern parts of the region. 
Yet the Church of England was not reduced to insignificance. Not 
only did its leaders respond to the 1851 census vigorously, by attempting 
to provide more church accom~odation, but the Church was able to draw on a 
latent nationalist, Protestant feeling among the working class in districts 
where the Catholic Church W3S influential. To some extent, therefore, the 
Church was blessed with favourable conditions in which to operate because 
of the Irish immigration and it came to acquire a genuinely popular, 
evangelical character in Lancashire. The tone of the Church of England in 
the region was set by Bishop Fraser during his epi~pacy at Manchester 
from 1870 to 1885, during which time he took the lead in making the Anglican 
faith attractive to working people. He not only reduced the emphasis on 
ritual with the aim of making services intelligible to the working man(32) 
but adopted a sympathetic attitude towards trade unionism and labour 
politics whilst at the same time stressing the social side of the Church's 
role in working class communities.(33) In addition, by means of voluntary 
contributions and endowments, Fraser was able to accomplish an astonishing 
programme of church building: during his fifteen years in office 105 new 
churches were built by the Anglicans in Lancashire at a cost of £650,000 and 
!le 
a further £214,000 was channelled into the re-building of older churches.(34) 
"A broad ecclesiasticism had a mighty revival under the reign of Dr Fraser~(35) 
Like their Catholic counterparts the Anglican bishops devoted much 
of their energy to education. Fraser was a keen edu:ationa1ist and determined 
to prevent too many schoolchildren from falling under the influence of the 
School Boards that had been established following the 1870 Education Act. 
Believing that "parents prefer education (to be) religious,,(36) Fraser 
established a Board of Education in his diocese and the Anglicans made 
impressive strides in the provision of schools. By the turn of the 
century, when E A Knox became Bishop of Manchester, he was able to observe 
in Lancashire "a love of elementary schools something analogous to the 
patriotism of Public Schools, the force of which only residence in 
Lancashire could reveaL,,(37) There had developed, in effect, something 
of a denominational race during the later years of the century in the 
provision of school places. In general the leadership of the dissenting sects 
had, in the mid-century, opposed the idea of denominational education and 
made no attempts to compete with the state-aided Anglican schools, 
conceding the formula that the best grounds for co-operation in national 
education were the doctrines of the Established Church. By 1870, Nonconformity 
had come to favour a more undenominatianal approach, however, and its 
leaders were consequently angered by the 1870 Education Act~ continuance 
of Church schools. They therefore set to work, through the School Boards 
and through their own schools, to extend their own precepts in education. (38) 
The resulting rivalry, intensified by the presence of the Catholics, meant 
that the voluntary principle in education became very strong; by 1900, 
for example, there were more towns in the Lancashire region than in any other 
part of the country which did not possess a School Board, and there were 
only three major towns in the region where attendances at Board schools 
exceeded those at voluntary establishments.(39) The influence of these 
schools in providing an education that determined social and political 
attitudes was probably equally as important a factor in the political scene 
as the more direct religious influence derived from regular attendance 
"2. 
at worship. 
4. The Politics of Religion 
Lancashire's Toryism in the later nineteenth century was compounded 
of immigration and religion. It was a nationalistic response by indigenous 
workers to the presence of easily identifiable groups of Irish i~~igrants, 
competing for employment and set apart by their Catholic faith. The most 
convenient expressions of anti-Irish feeling were the Conservative party 
and the Anglican Church and hence both enjoyed a degree of popular support 
in Lancashire that had little to do with their intrinsic value for the 
working man. Toryism did not necessarily rely upon an active religious involve-
ment and the strength of Conservative voting was always greater than the figures 
for Anglican worship would suggest. (40) The working class Tory ethos was, 
so to speak, based more on "anti-religion" than on "pro-religion". For 
example, this feature was observed by Bishop Fraser in Blackburn, a town 
of strong Toryism: " •••• the alliance between Conservatism and the Church, 
religion not having much to do with the compact, is closer than in almost 
any other Lancashire town.,,(4l) 
The reasons why Conservatism should have been regarded as the 
haven for the nationalist vote are varied but not difficult to appreciate. 
For one thing, the Conservative party has always placed itself in the 
mainstream of British social and political life, defending the established 
order of things against radicals and socialists but accepting change if, 
after careful consideration, it has been shown to be necessary.(42) This 
attitude was especially noticeable among Tory M.P.s in Lancashire during 
the later nineteenth century; the Liberal party might be referred to as a 
bunch of "wirepuUers", or as a sectarian band of "atheists, secularists, 
Unitarians, communists and Charterists,,(43) whilst the Conservative party 
was portrayed
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1the guardian of national interests.(44) In one respect the 
Conservatives benefited in Lancashire by these attitudes; this was because 
they defended the Established Church against the Liberal party, which during 
the nineteenth century had been associated with a disestab1ishment campaign 
though by the 1890's this had been toned down to Welsh Disestab1ishment 
on1y.(45) But defence of the Established Church meant defending Ang1icanism 
against Catholicism and it brought the Tories much popular support. In 
Liverpool, for example, where these issues were stretched almost to the point 
of exaggeration, the backbone of Archiba1d Sa1vidge's Conservative Working 
Men's Association was the defence of Church and State(46); when in the later 
1890's, during the time of the Church Discipline controversy, the Tory 
party appeared not to be defending established values, but to be conniving 
at Ang1o-Catho1icism, the Liverpool working class Tories evinced considerable 
pleasure at the defeat of Conservative candidates in bye-elections.(47) 
In general, however, Conservative election manifestoes did stress their 
concern for the Church and for religious education.(48) 
The Tory position as the Anglican party was clarified because of 
the obvious association of the Liberals with nonconformity. But more 
significant still, probably, was the fact that during the late 'eighties 
and the early 'nineties, when the Home Rule question was being discussed, 
the Irish voters came to be linked in the popular imagination with the 
Liberal party. As we have seen, this was a fair assumption to make; without 
analysis in depth of particular constituencies it is very difficult to say 
with any certainty which way the Irish vote went and whether it was changing. 
As we saw in Chapter 5 there are numerous references to its being mainly 
Liberal, and the constituency with the highest proportion of Irish votes -
the only one where they constituted a majority - remained Nationalist 
right through this period, thereby remaining closer in spirit to Liberalism 
than to Toryism. In reality, however, it is quite likely that the Irish 
voter was subjected to complex social pressures. For one thing the Catholic 
bishops of Liverpool were inclined to Conservatism over the question of 
religious education and as the Education Act of 1902 showed the Tory 
party was a firmer supporter of the voluntary principle.(49) It is possible 
that in the early twentieth century, when the question of education was more 
prominent in politics, some Catholic influences may have been at work to 
produce Tory voting. (50) Similarly the Irish were striving for acceptance 
by English society, few of them fostering the hope of returning to Ireland(51) 
and a vote for Conservatism may have implied a belief in cautious progress. 
Moreover, the Irish came under the direct influence of the public house, 
which often acted as social centre and money-lending place for the new 
immigrant; landlords were hardly likely to be anything but Tory whilst the 
Liberal party championed local veto. Finally, it should be pointed out that 
the Irish vote was probably difficult to organise and that the proportion 
of Irishmen qualified to vote was never as high as that of the population 
in general(52), the result being that Irish votes were not polled very 
consistently for either party. But most of the evidence suggests that 
overall the Irish communities were more Liberal than Tory and that this 
loyalty was not changing very much during our period. 
The relationship between religion and politics took on a different 
character as far as the Liberal party was concerned. Whereas Toryism thrived 
on the sense of social conflict Liberalism relied far more on active 
religious commitment; it needed "pro-religion" and the marked lack of support 
for the churches among the working class was clearly to weigh heavily on 
the party's electoral prospects. 
Although in relation to other denominations the combined strength 
of the nonconformist sects was everywhere predominant(53) it may be 
questioned whether this support sprang from the working class. The danger 
of nonconformity's becoming a middle class religion may be seen in 
London, for example, where the process of class segregation by residence 
was becoming quite marked towards the end of the nineteenth century; 
the breaking of the social bond meant that in working class districts non-
conformity was at a discount without the leadership of middle class 
people and consequently the liberal party began to lose political 
influence in such areas~54) The same process was discernable in the 
conurbation of Manchester and in 1900 a Methodist writer was connecting 
the decline of Liberalism in the city to the migration of the middle 
classes to more pleasant suburbs, leaving the chapels in the working class 
areas without financial support.(55) By 1895 the Methodist Times had noted 
that the city seemed "to be completely under the thumb of liquor and 
clericalism". (56) 
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In the smaller cotton manufacturing towns north of Manchester the 
nonconformist sects were closer to the mass of the people and the religious 
influence often played an important part in shaping the political life of 
the community.(57) An observer at Bacup in 1883 noted, for example, that 
"Each chapel is a self-governing community regulating 
not only chapel matters but overlooking the private 
life of its members", (58) 
whilst there were two purely working class religious groups in this area -
the Independent Methodists, a strongly evangelical body with its centre at 
Nelson and Colne, and the Methodist Unitarian movement at Todmorden on the 
Yorkshire border.(59) The concern of such sects for "the drink" question, 
and their natural animus against the Established Church, gave them a 
strong affinity for Liberalism. It was in the constituencies of Clitheroe 
and Rossendale that the Liberal party drew some of its most consistent and 
loyal support during this period, and even when the Labour Representation 
Committee took the Clitheroe seat in 1902 it did so by falling into line 
with the traditional values of the district and by adopting as parliamentary 
candidate a man with pronounced nonconformist and radical sympathies. (60) 
Nevertheless, north east Lancashire was probably exceptional in having such 
a strong nonconformist character and it is most unlikely that in any 
other area of the region the connection between an active religion and 
Liberal politics could have been so marked. 
In the absence of reliable statistics of religious worship it is, 
of course, unwise to make dogmatic claims. It may be suggested, however, 
that nonconformity had become very much a middle class religion in many 
parts of Lancashire. This was especially noticeable where there was a keen 
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Protestant and Catholic struggle in places like Blackburn, Preston, 
Wigan and Liverpool the dominant nonconformist sect was not a working 
class one but Congregationalism, a typically middle class church whose 
wealthy patrons provided the money for the chapel building that helped 
nonconformity keep pace with the Anglicans and Catholics.(6l) A fUrther 
point, linked to this, is the lack of attention given by leading 
nonconformist ministers to questions of economic and social importance 
that touched on working class life. The Baptists, for example, were 
especially quietist; their most prominent pastors during the later years 
of the century - Charles Williams of Accrington, Overend of Bacup and 
McLaren of Manchester - were all keen evangelicals and often brilliant 
orators but seemed to be little interested in politics or social questions. 
Charles Williams, for example, made the theme of his address to the 
Baptist Union in 1886 "Love not the world, neither the things that are 
in the world,,(62) yet it was probably a colleague of his at Bacup who had 
reported in 1883 that there was "a growing desire among the congregation 
to have political and social subjects treated in the pulpit", adding that 
1• t " d' f f • t 1 ,,( 63) 0 1 . t' 1 was very 1 lcult for a minister ••••• 0 pease. n a po 1 lca 
level the Liberal party still carried its old nonconformist causes of 
Disestablishment and Liquor Control into the 1890's though, as was seen, 
they had little appeal to a working class electorate. 
On the other hand it would be misleading to suggest that the gap 
between nonconformity and the working class implied serious dangers for 
the Liberals in the short term. Three factors probably helped to keep 
matters in proportion. Firstly, the middle class was in any case better 
represented at the polls than working men and therefore nonconformity was 
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probably disproportionately influential when it came to voting for Liberal 
candidates.(64) Secondly, the challenge to nonconformist and Liberal 
loyalties from specifically working class organisations such as trade 
unions was developing only slowly and was limited in its effect. In the 
third place, as long as the traditional social fabric remained intact 
working people would be well disposed to accept the leadership, in religion 
and in politics, of middle class people. It was only when these developments 
had reached a significant stage - when a wider franchise had been adopted, 
when Labour politics was capable of creating its own loyalties and when 
economic depression caused a break up of the Victorian social structure -
that the political future of Liberalism seemed uncertain, and none of these 
influences were at all strong at the end of the nineteenth century. 
5. Social Leadership and Social Change 
In addition to the religious factor in Lancashire politics at 
this time another element must be taken into consideration for its importance 
in shaping the political make-up of the region. It is now time to pay some 
attention to the relationship between the region's social structure and 
the style of politics at the close of the nineteenth century; to examine 
the markedly paternalist character of politics. 
Given the particular economic and social features of Lancashire, 
. 
outlinedin Chapter One, it was natural that exponential roles should fall 
to a certain group of people. The natural leaders of society came to be the 
eminent industrialists, and to a lesser extent, the landlords to whom 
working people looked for employment and economic prosperity. In an economy 
that depended on individual enterprise these were the people who had risen 
to the very top of the social pyramid by virtue of their skill and expertise 
in business and who were generally reckoned to be responsible for the 
economic strength of the region. Almost every town had its influential 
entrepreneurs, resident in the district and with long standing local roots. 
In the manufacturing towns they were the owners of mills, collieries, 
chemical factories or ironworks: the Pilkingtons of St Helens, for example, 
or the Dugdales and H~pys of Blackburn; William Mather of Salford and 
W H Lever of Birkenheadj Wade Deacon and the Hutchinsons of Widnes; the 
Grant Brothers of Ramsbottomj Colonel Blundell of Ince. The list is almost 
endless. In the rural districts that were still basically agricultural local 
landowners occupied much the same position, either as solid country gentle-
men like the Feildens of Feniscowles, near Blackburn, or as mighty 
territorial magnates such as the Lindsay family, lords of Crawford and 
(65) Balcarres, and the Stanleys, Earls of Derby. 
These local families were true social leaders, recognising clearly 
defined obligations which caused them to put as much back into their 
communities in the form of churches, schools, libraries and clubs as they 
took out through business profits. It was commonly said of the local 
entrepreneurs of Glossop in Derbyshire that "each of them built a mill, 
a church and a school.,,(66) In Lancashire the munif(cence of this class 
was everywhere evident; it ranged from the provision of model housing 
estates for workers such as that laid down at Port Sunlight by Lever Brothers, 
to the building of libraries and the sponsoring of festivities such as 
cricket and football matches.(67) The local entrepreneurs in fact performed 
~-~------.~--- ----
the function of welfare institutions, cushioning their communities against 
adversity in the days before such services were provided by the state. 
Although this form of paternalism was attacked by the emergent socialist 
groups during the 'eighties and 'nineties as part of their general assault 
on the economic bases of society, there is no reason to believe that it 
incurred any widespread hostility from the vast majority of working people. 
In fact it has been said of H W Schneider, the Barrow-in-Furness 
industrialist, that he was "the subject of not a little hero-worship", 
whilst his colleague and rival James Ramsden was "lionised almost 
inordinately" in the same town.(68) In Blackburn W H Hornby of the local 
t . (69) co ton family was "th' owd gam cock" to the town's working people. 
Paternalism clearly played an important role in the region's politics. 
It was a short step for the industrialist to make from social to political 
leadership. By far the majority of the MPs of both political parties in 
Lancashire was drawn from this group.(70) Paternalism was not the special 
preserve of anyone party and the suggestion that Lancashire's working 
class Toryism was a manifestation of class conflict - the workers voting 
against the party of their employers - would not seem to be borne out.(71) 
For both Conservative and Liberal organisations the social leader made 
an ideal parliamentary candidate. For one thing he was in a position to 
subsidise the local party by digging deeply into his own pockets to provide 
electoral expenses.(72) At Blackburn, for example, it was reckoned that 
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the Hornbys had spent more than £30,000 for the local Tory party durin~ 
the early l880s.(73) During the 1885 parliamentary election at Wig an one 
of the town's newspapers credited the Tory victory to "the strength of 
capitalists •••• available.,,(74) Moreovar, it was suggested that an 
'industrialist MP was in the best position to ga Uge an industrial 
constituency's best interests and this was why local entrepreneurs were 
much better placed for winning votes in Lancashire than outsiders who 
knew little of fue region's problems. For instance, the ability to keep 
a local economy b~oyant by providing orders and therefore employment often 
played a significant part in elections; an I.L.P. report on Barrow-in-
Furness concluded that 
"no candidate who disavowed a war policy or who could 
not hold hopes of influencing Admiralty or other orders 
to the shipyards could have a shadow of a chance" (75) 
Hence the seat was held by the Liverpool shipowner Cayzer between 1892 
(76) 
and 1906. Electoral propaganda also tended to define an outsider as a 
person who was not resident in the town, sometimes with strange consequences. 
At St Helens in 1885, for example, both candidates were really local men -
Seton Karr the Conservative, who was connected with the Pilkington glass 
firm and was also a director of a local brewery, and David Gamble, an 
industrialist who actually lived in St Helens and was a well known local 
Liberal. But since Seton Karr originated from Scotland the Liberal party 
posters emphatically pressed the point: 
" •••••••• David is our townsman good 
And has employed the many; 
Karr loves us, as he hates the devil 
And never employed any •.••• 
Sir Seton we'll 'sen bock' to Scotland 
To hunt up a fresh policy." (77) 
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During the later nineteenth century most Lancashire MPs were in fact men 
with some local connections; "carpet-baggers" were definitely at a dis-
advantage when it came to electioneering.(78) Hence the deference accorded 
to a social elite in politics strictly limited active involvement to a 
small social group who exerted a strong influence over party policy and 
atti tudes. 
However, changing economic patterns were beginning to change the 
style of politics. Paternalism was a feature of a prosperous economy in 
which industrial and territorial magnates could justifiably be regarded as 
the bringers of prosperity. Yet towards the end of the nineteenth century 
there were signs that the days of the local entrepreneur were numbered. 
In the first place the re-organisation of businesses meant that the boss who 
owned his factory and controlled his capital was being replaced by the 
professional manager who was less likely to conceive of his role in terms 
of old-style social leadership. The amalgamation of businesses might bring 
what had hitherto been a purely local enterprise within the framework of a 
company with a much wider interest. It should not be suggested that such 
changes were very widespread in Lancashire before the First World War, but 
in places affected by economic adversity these developments were clear. 
In the coalfield, for example, most of the production was in the hand90f 
large scale combines by 1900 and the colliery owners were no longer local 
persons.(79) Widnes and Barrow-in-Furness were two other places where the 
the later nineteenth century was a time of adversity when locally established 
firms had to accept the loss of their identity in larger combines in order 
to keep going. The biggest employer of labour in Widnes during the 'nineties 
was the United Alkali Company, whilst at Barrow the shipyards were taken over 
-------------
.- ~ -----.----~----- -- ------ -----.--~ 
i 
_' 
in the mid 18905 by the national company of Vickers.(80) Economic 
rationalisation was therefore bound to have a profound effect on social 
leadership since workers could not take their cue in politics from an 
employer who did not participate directly in local social or political life. 
In addition to amalgamation was the effect of migration. The old 
practice of building one's house near the factory or mill was gradually 
dying out as the attractions of pleasanter suburbs loomed larger. This 
was less true of the cotton manufacturing towns, which were surrounded by 
Pennine countryside, than of south Lancashire and north Cheshire; here the 
entrepreneurs had begun to move to the pleasanter districts of Cheshire as 
the conurbations of Manchester and Liverpool expanded,(81) improved transport 
rendering the journey more practicable. It was unlikely that anybody who 
could afford to travel would choose to reside in the chemical towns of 
south Lancashire, for example; as T C Edwards-Moss, the first MP for Widnes, 
noted of the town: " •••• those who have business there take care to reside 
elsewhere. There are Stygian streams everywhere and there is no doubt that 
the smoke from the chimneys of Widnes kills all the country round about.,,(82) 
To be sure, the loss of social leaders was not felt on a widespread 
scale until the depression of the Inter-War years when it was seen that 
individual entrepreneurs were quite unable to provide solutions to the 
economic problems of the day. But even before 1914 the signs were evidenc· 
that the style of political life was changing. Against the slow decline of 
social leadership was set the challenge of new movements - trade unionism, 
socialism and the independent labour ethos - designed to capture the loyalties 
of working class people • 
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6. Summary 
Lancashire politics at the end of the nineteenth century were 
very different from those of today; religious conflict rather than economic 
questions determined party alignment, whilst the tone of politics was set 
by "social leaders" rather than "public persons,,(83) and this gave rise 
to an atmosphere of deference. For working people politics was not a question 
of principles but rather an opportunity for confirming their faith in the 
established economic and social order. 
But how far had the nature of politics changed by 1906? On the 
surface things appeared to have changed little since the 1880'~. The 
religious element was not significantly less and, despite one or two 
exceptions, the social leaders were still pre-eminent in politics. In 
truth it would be an overstatement to say that the 1906 General Election 
marked a profound change in the politics of Lancashire. And yet, beneath 
the surface, it is possible to discern subtle modifications. Firstly, so 
far as the party balance is concerned, there are signs that the grip of 
Toryism, if not fatally weakened, was weakening. It is clear that the 
Conservative party could not have established its superiority since 1885 
" 
simply on the religious issue. There were too few constituencies in which the 
antagonism between Catholic and Protestant could produce a reactionary 
Toryism sufficient to carry the region for the Conservatives over a 20 
year period. The balance was tipped in the Conservatives' favour by the 
poor challenge offered from the Liberal party; Liberal difficulties allowed 
their rivals to hold their own in a working class electorate until issues 
favourable to a working class party arose. This happened in 1906 when, 
\ 
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it must be stressed, there was a vastly increased electorate - more people 
voting than ever before, many of them for the first time(84) - with voters 
provided with adequate reasons for casting their vote against the Tories.(85) 
Another feature of 1906 was the presence of the Labour party, with its 
avowed support for a working class cause, which was challenging not only 
the Tories but also the Liberals for the right to represent working men in 
industrial constituencies. Moreover, the whole concept of an independent 
Labour party was a direct rejection of old-style politics: the emphasis 
was now on political leadership by employees, not by employers. If the 
conditions of the 1906 could be maintained in the future there was a 
possibility that the nature of politics in Lancashire would change profoundly. 
Economic and social change did seem to favour Labour's progress. 
Irish immigration had been on the decline since the 1880's and sooner or 
later Catholic and Protestant antagonism would lose its force as the 
immigrant communities were assimilated into the working class community as 
a whole. If the mid-Victorian economy continued to undergo re-adjustment 
because of foreign competition the demise of the traditional family firms was 
very likely and with them the disappearance of the local paternalist 
entrepreneur. But in 1906 much of this seemed very much in the distance. 
Even if it did happen it could not be assumed that Labour was assured of 
automatic growth through working class electors quitting their old 
allegiances and gravitating towards their "natural" ground; the onus would 
be on the Labour party to convert by vigorous propaganda and hard working 
in the localities.(86) Significant political change does not reveal 
itself overnight. 
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BEGINNINGS: TllE ORIGINS OF INDEPENDENCE. 
Between the General Elections of 1885 and 1895 there were 
three significant spheres, in Lancashire working class politics: 
i) the various moves to attain political influence at local level 
through the support by Trades Councils of candidates in elections 
to local authorities, such as town councils, school boards and 
boards of Poor Law Guardians; ii) the endeavours of the big trade 
unions of miners and cotton operatives in the pursuit of a 
political programme designed to supplement their industrial 
activity; and iii) the attemp~s of the two socialist parties 
the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party -
to foster a working class politicalconsciousness and create an 
independent party based either on socialist or labour lines. 
During these years, then, there were three different levels 
of activity of a disparate nature, with little attempt to unite 
forces. Labour representation of the kind sponsored by Trades 
Councils took its cue from local moti~~~ and therefore tended to 
be very parochial in outlook, lacking in general direction; it 
could not become the basis of a cohesive movement that would change 
the British political scene in any significant way. (Chapter 7) 
Trade Union volitical action was more broadly based and succeeeded 
. in bringing about a fair degree of unity among the workers in the 
cotton and mining areas, who were able to give it a solid backing. 
Yet it was not guided by any general political philosophy and was 
certainly not designed,to create an independent working class partyo 
(Chapter 8) This left the soci~lists a~ the only group interested in 
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the formation of a political organisation that would bring together 
all working class activity, both local and regional, and have an 
impact on the national political structure. The socialists 
appreciated the value of using the trade unions as institutional 
bases toibuild a working class movement around whilst at the same 
time equipping it with a socialist philosophy. But since the 
socialist parties were small and initially received little support, 
their task was an uphill one (Chapter 9) 
In all, therefore, the period under discussion exhibits a 
considerable amount of energy in working class politics, but 
because of the difficulty in bringing together resources among 
grouV s with different aims and methods it proved almost impossible 
to work towards a common goal; in the creation of a strong, 
independent tradition the period is disappointing yet the seeds 
of independence are nevertheless discernable. 
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LOCAL LABOUR REPRESENTATION 
At the beginning of this period there were few signs that 
Lancashire would become a stronghold for the Labour party at the 
turn of the century. Quite simply, none of the political groups 
operating in the region at the time of the Third Reform Act 
entertained the idea of creating an independent party based on 
working class votes. Nor do the few years following show many signs 
that progress was being made in this direction. Two reasons may be 
advanced for the laggardly pace of working class political development 
in Lancashire at this time; firstly, the influence of socialism 
was very weak in the mid 'eighties and secondly the political 
divisions among trade unionists were so intense that political 
action on the part of the unions became very difficult. The only 
socialist party in existence in Lancashire during this time was the 
S.D.F. and most of its work was concerned with keeping its own 
branches buoyant; not until around 1890 did the S.D.F. begin to 
exercise some influence on other sections of the labour movement. 
In any case, in the 1880's, the S.D.F. was not so much interested 
in developing a workers' parliamentary party as in spreading the 
gospel of socialism among the masses. Political divisions among the 
workers were probably a more decisive factor in ~reventing labour 
representation; the situation might have been substantially different 
without this conflict between Tory and Liberal. In other regions 
there was no such cleavage, for radicalism was the workers' creed and 
the trade unions were able to achieve labour representation under 
the wing of the Liberal party. Such a liaison was already perfected 
in the Northumberland and Durham coalfield and, to a lesser extent, 
among the miners of Yorkshire and the Rhondda Valley. Lancashire 
possessed trade unions equally as strong as those in other regions 
but in the later 'eighties both cotton and mining unions in 
Lancashire were beginning to make valuable industrial gains which 
no union leader wanted to jeopardise by arousing political dissensions 
in the rank and file. 
It would therefore be true to say that before the increased 
labour activity of the early 1890's Lancashire contributed nothing 
very significant to the independent labour movement. Yet the 
period was not without some signs of an awakening spirit. A few 
attempts were made at local level to secure labour representation, 
first in Varliament, through the General Election of 1885, and then 
in local authorities. Without claiming too much for these 
movements, almost all of which failed to achieve their own limited 
objectives, it is worth investigating them more closely in order to 
appreciate the feelings and opinions current in working class political 
attitudes at this time. 
1. The General Election of 1885 
Two campaigns to place working men in Parliament come to light 
during the course of electioneering in 1885. The first involved a 
genuine workers' candidate, Thomas Birtwistle, secretary of the 
Weavers'Analgamation, running for the Conservative nomination at 
Burnley. Birtwistle's campaign is interesting because it 
represents one of the very few attempts to promote a Conservative 
Labour candidate, an animal rarely seen even in Lancashire, with its 
preponderance of working class Toryism. Because the Tory ethos 
precluded the idea of labour representation Birtwistle found it 
difficult to have his scheme accepted by the Burnley Conservatives 
and his campaign failed to get off the ground even though in many 
respects he was an ideal candidate - prominent Tory, well respected 
union official who had served the Weavers since the 1860's and a 
member of the Royal Commission on Trade Depression. Birtwistle 
also enhanced his position by receiving support from his radical 
colleague David Holmes (1) although this action in itself prov.ked 
a reaction among some sections of the local workforce. The campaign 
was attacked by Liberal workers for Birtwistle's having appeared on 
Tory platforms with alleged enemies of ' trade unionism and some 
societies affiliated to the Weavers' Amalgamation threatened to 
withold their financial subscriptions unless Birtwistle renounced 
his position; (2) clearly his trade union fame was insufficient to 
break down political partisanship and Dirtwistle did withdraw from 
the list of Conservative nominees. It seemed that trade unionists' 
fears about political activity were not without foundation. 
The other parliamentary campaign also outlined sharply the 
difficulties attending labour representation. This was the 
Blackburn contest, where J. N. Boothman stood as Labour candidate. 
The impetus here came from working class radicalism but the Blackburn 
campaign illustrated the extent to which this creed, once active in 
Lancashire, had declined. In the later 1860's the National Reform 
League, a working class radical organisation, had a strong network of 
branches in the region (3) and at Manchester in the General Election 
of 1868 the old Chartist, Ernest Jones, had polled ten thousand votes. 
I?' 
Much of this fervour had evaporated during the 1810's, however, and 
the Liberal party came to rely excessively on national issues to 
bring working people to the polls, neglecting ward and constituency 
work; 1885 found the party badly organised in the working class 
districts of the larger towns. Nor did the Liberals capitalise on 
the support they did receive; for instance, one of the strongest 
centres of working class radicalism was the Manchester and Salford 
Trades Council which was dominated by skilled unionists in the 
workshop trades such as book binding, printing and tailoring. Their 
position had been established in the years between the exodus of the 
cotton trade from the city in the 1850's and the rise of the new unions, 
I 
whose influence in the Trades Council was not fully felt before the 
turn of the century. (4) During these yeaIS radical workers like 
G. D. Kelley of the Lithograph. Printers controlled the Council and 
under the inspiration of another such man, Henry Slatter of the 
Typographical Association, 8 Representation Association was established 
to promote "the election of Labour candidates to the various elective 
offices local and imperial" and to secure industrial reform. (5) 
In the later 1880's this body developed into a branch of the Labour 
Electoral Association whose aim was to work for the election of 
labour candidates in national and local contests through "their 
adherence to one or the other of the great political parties." (6) 
Yet the Liberal Union of Manchester madeno use of this centre of 
working class opinion; the more wealthy, middle class Liberals 
dominated the party and it was extremely difficult for working men 
to become official Liberal candidates; Kelley did not .:sgain a seat 
as a Liberal City Councillor until the early 1890's by which time, 
I~ 
there was no sign of a "Labour bench" at the Manchester Town Hall. 
By this time also it was more than likely that a vroportion of working 
men had followed the course taken by James Mawdsley of the Spinners' 
Amalgamation, an unsuccessful Liberal candidate in the Manchester 
municipal elections of 1885, and passed over to the ~onserv8tive 
side during the Home Rule controversy of 1886 (7), thus thinning 
out the radical ranks even more. 
The weakness of working class radicalism during the 1880's in 
the cotton towns was exposed at the Blackburn parliamentary election 
of 1885. The town itself had a strong Tory tradition, largely 
maintained in recent years through the influence of three families -
the Hornbys and the Feildens, gentry and millowners, and the 
Thwaites brewing family _ who were responsible for much of Blackburn's 
employment and prosperity and who usually ~rovided at least one Tory 
candidate. (8) The disparity in the relative strength of working 
class Conservative and Liberal feeling was illustrated in the 
working men's clubs, six Tory against only two radical at the 
beginning of the 1880's. (9) Blackburn was the kind of constituency 
that the Liberal party found difficult to win, unless it could come 
up with a candidate who might challenge the Conservatives on their 
own ground; this did in fact ~rove possible in 1874 and 1880 with 
W. E. Briggs, a local cotton magnate and prominent Nonconformist. (10) 
W.E.Briggs stood again in 1885 but at this election the choice 
of a second Liberal candidate in the two member constituency ~roved 
difficult. The contest therefore took on a special character when 
a Labour candidate appeared, sponsored by a local organisation calling 
itself the Labour Representation League. (11) Its candidate was 
J. N. Boothman, a sailor's son who had worked his way to being a 
mill manager and then successfully floated his own enterprise in 
Blackburn which employed about three hundred people. Boothman was 
a well known local figure by the mid eighties, popular with the 
cotton workers because of his contributions to their strike fund 
during the weaving stoppage of 1884 and respected for his vigorous 
work as a Liberal councillor during the previous seven years. (12) 
The motivation for Boothman's candidature arose out of the 
resentment felt by the town's cotton operatives to many of their 
employers after the weaving strike, from which there sprang a desire 
to send a labour representative to Parliament to speak for 
Blackburn's working people. Boothman claimed to be "sinking party 
politics in order to champion the working man" (13) and received 
support from leading local trade unionists (14) for this stance, 
but his position was open to criticism; for instance, the Tory 
Blackburn Standard commented that he was no more a working man's 
representative than either of the two Conservatives. inferring that 
the candidature was sim~ly a radical dodge to get another Liberal 
elected by duping the working class voters. (15) Nor was sus~icion 
absent from the minds of some trade unionists and rows were frequent 
in union meetings because of support given to Boothman by some 
officials. (16) Although the Blackburn Liberals gave Boothman no 
official support during his campaign this did not pre~ent the local 
branch of the Irish League from branding him a Liberal and treating 
him as they did Briggs. (17) The upshot was that at the polls 
Boothman received only 18 per cent of the vote, (18) many staunch 
Liberals probably "plumping" for Briggs on the assumption that at 
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least one TorY"was bound to win; it was no doubt safe to 
conclude that Boothman received few middle class votes and failed 
to win over a substantial proportion of working class Tories. (19) 
The ambivalence of his position was aptly summed up by one of the 
Conservative candidates who termed Boothman "a capitalist in the morning 
and a labour candidate at night." (20) 
It must be admitted that the sample of labour campaigns in 
1885 is far too small to produce a clear picture of the aims of 
working class groups in politics. Clearly the most significant 
factor is the very lack of a greater interest, revealing that mastery 
still held in working class politics by the two established parties. 
In fact there had been little change since the late 1860's. Neither 
Birtwistle's nor Boothman's efforts manifest any desire to create 
an independent working class platform, for both fail to envisage 
a labour movement existing outside either of the two parties. 
Although Boothman offered an extensive programme of social reforms 
he was an orthodox radical (21) who was able to hold out little hope 
to working men that the Liberal party was willing to give the lead 
to their candidates. (22) The only issue of protest associated with 
either campaign _ and it was not pressed with any force nor taken 
up with any interest by the electorate - was that labour 
representation would help to give working people a voice in party 
counsels and in Parliament. Yet all the eleven working men elected 
to Parliament in 1885 had these thoughts in their minds and their 
presence did not mark a profound change in national politics. 
There is no reason, therefore, to believe that the existence of 
such thoughts among a small section of Lancashire workers was in any 
,--_ .. _------_ .. _-_._--- .. --._--. 
way very significant. It remained to be seen however, whether 
resentment at middle class dominance in politics might develop 
into an important political issue. 
2 Trades Councils and Local Politics 
In the following couple of years, to be sure, an attitude of 
revolt against the two established parties did make itself felt in 
local politics, albeit to a not very significant degree. However, 
demands for more labour representation were heard, voiced now by 
organised groups of working men through their Trades Councils, mainly, 
so far as reports in the press show, in the cotton districts. 
One factor that probably bulked large in the creation of this 
attitude was the propaganda of the Cotton Factory Times, a weekly 
newspaper for workers in the cotton trade which appeared first on 
New Year's Day, 1885. The direction of the paper was in the hands 
of John Andrew, who ran a radical weekly in the Ashton under Lyne 
district, but ~n its :early days,especially,the Cotton Factory Times 
received substantial ,financial assistance from the three big cotton 
unions. Much of its copy in these formative years was provided by 
local union secretaries who saw in the newspaper a useful means of 
circulating details about the state of trade union activity in the 
cotton towns, and there can be little doubt that it acted as a 
valuable agency for recruiting. It would, however, be misleading to 
regard the Cotton Factory Times as a trade union broadsheet since it 
also carried stories andtales of working class life, often written by 
the renowned dialect humourist Ben Brieraey. Another member of its 
staff in the 'eighties was Joseph Burgess, who had edited his own 
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satirical journal, the Oldham Operative, and who later became a 
leading figure in the Independent Labour Party. (23) It seems 
likely that the paper soon proved both popular and influential. (24) 
On the question of labour representation it was clear from the 
outset that the Cotton Factory Times preferred to take a balanced, 
middle of the road stance: hence one ef its early editorials, written 
by James Mawdsley, included the comment: 
"There is ample room for our efforts in regard to 
legitimate social reform and in the improvement of 
the conditions under which we live and work, without 
troubling our minds with the unworkable theories of 
Mr. Hyndman and the communistic ideas which occasionally 
dribble over from the continent." (25) 
The emphasis was on the practical side of labour representation, 
supporting the principle of working class participation in politics 
to secure just representation of the workers' interests against 
M.P.s who "hoodwinked those who confided in them." (26) For this 
reason Doothman's campaign at Dlackburn was given extensive 
coverage and encouragement as an indication that "the people are 
in earnest upon the question of direct representation in Parliament, 
irrespective of parties." (21) To underline its message the 
Cotton Factory Times illustrated the case of the cotton operatives: 
"There are no less that 1 ,053,648 persons engaged 
in the textile industries. These men and women o •••• 
are wholly unrepresented in Parliament whilst their 
employers are re~resented by not less than 50 
manufacturers." l28) 
Here was a clear indi4bment of middle class predominance in 
politics, yet the Cotton Factory Times raised no criticisms of the 
two party system. It did not attempt to formulate a labour 
programme or urge a labour party. The answer to the problem at this 
stage seemed to be - bring out more trade union and workers' 
candidates at elections and byi.electing them increase the working 
man's influence in party counsels, Only as the years passed did it 
become apparent that the solution was not quite so simple, 
During the next few years there were a few attempts to realise 
the Cotton Factory Times' suggestions. The response had been 
particularly quick at local level where the Conservatives and 
Liberals had stamped their influence on borough councils and 
school boards. Councillors were usually drawn from the business and 
commercial classes but seldom from the working class. ~29) The 
Cotton Factory Times appreciated the fact that national political 
sympathies often determined voting behaviour in local elections and 
tried to direct the attention of the worker to the pressing problems 
of social reform: 
"The worker takes his side and too often cannot be 
convinced that there is no possible connection 
between some leading stateman's views as to whether 
it is to our advantage to take possession of the 
North Pole, and the manner in which our ~eets should 
be paved and our cottages put up." (30) 
I t was not ina.ppos i te to s tre ss the impor tance of local government 
as an agent of social reform, since municipal authorities were 
invested. with'-wide administrative powers, the efficient exercise 
of which might go far to determine the quality of social life in 
a community. All the large centres of population had their own 
borough or city council whilst the smaller industrial towns were 
grouped under the governance of local boards, and, after the 
Local Government Act of 1888, the county councils came into existence 
to adminster the more rural areas. Thus in a comparatively well_ 
governed town or city the local corporation could use its powers 
to improve social conditions. Manchester is a good example: in 
the early l840's it possessed very few amenities: no public parks 
or baths, no libraries or art galleries open to the public, no 
piped water. But during the next 50 years, by a judicious 
application of statutory powers, the City Council was able to take 
over and improve the city's water supply, produce its own gas, control 
the markets, provide cheap transport, set up a municipal electricity 
plant, open hospitals, create free libraries and lay down public 
parks. (31) Most other towns followed the same progress, though 
not always at the same pace. 
Such reforms benefited all sections of the community and, 
of course, chimed well with sentiments of civic pride. Yet very often 
they threw up problems of a particular importance for organised 
labour. Many local councils, for example, enthrusted private 
companies with the execution of municipal undertakings and such 
contractors frequently paid their employees at less than trade union 
wage rates. Consequently it became the aim of Trades Councils in 
many towns to enforce "fair contracts" on the local authorities to 
ensure that work done on behalf of the municipality by private employers 
carried with it a guarantee of adequate remuneration for the workmen. 
"Fair contacts" therefore became a sphere in which the trade union 
ethos clashed with employer influence in local politics. Two other 
sensitive subjects were Poor Law relief and education. For workers 
without strong trade union protection the Poor Law was an important 
seurce of sustenance, especially during periods of trade depression 
when poverty was most keenly felt; the Boards of Guardians, elected 
by the ratepayers, were responsible for administering "outdoor" 
and workhouse relief, an obligation which introduced into local 
government the problem of providing adequate assistance for the 
destitute whilst at the same time curbing the contributions paid 
by middle class people to the Poor Rate. (32) E duca tion, a fter the 
Act of 1870, was in many towns under the democratic control of the 
School Boards, elected triennially; in school board elections it 
was very common for the cQnflicting parties to adopt a religious 
attitude, with groups representing the Anglican Church, the 
NoncOllformists and Catholicism, all struggling to secure control 
of the bo~~d's policies. 
Thus there were at least three areas in which working class 
influence was needed in local politics, but before the mid 1880's 
there is little evidence of organised labour pressure groups.(33) 
Outside the two main parties political activity was not well 
established, whilst inside the weighty decisions came from middle 
class people. The lack of working men representatives in local 
authorities may partly be explained by the comparatively late removal 
of one of the main obstacles to political activity at local level, 
the existe nce of property qualifications for candidates. This was 
not swept away until the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 and 
thereafter the only barrier, a not insignificant one, it is true, 
was expense. Yet Trades Counci~s could generally find sufficient 
cash to mount a campaign and it is therefore not surprising to find 
some movements getting under weigh by the mid 'eighties. 
But initial attempts to create labour groups in local politics 
lacked experience and expertise and were all very disappointing. In 
1885 the Trades Councils of Oldham, Rochdale and Hyde promoted 
labour candidates with minimal success. The Oldham School Board 
elections of that year attracted four labour candidates who 
fought to reduce the cost of school books, an important matter for 
local cotton workers who had experienced a thirteen weeks strike 
and wage reductions during that autumn. (34) There was no contest 
and the Trades Council was able to place two of its nominees upon the 
new School Board by a process of negotiation with the other parties; 
the 
one, in fact, joined the Church party and the otherANonconformist, so 
there was no independent labour group established, but the Trades 
Council had illustrated its value as a negotiating force. (35) 
At Hyde the secretaries of the local Spinners' and Weavers' unions 
were nominated as Trades Council candidates in the municipal elections. 
lleginbotham of the Spinners declared that the workers wanted "direct 
representation" and their campaign was centred upon free education. 
and free public bathing facilities. (36) The Weavers' secretary, 
Dancroft, later withdrew and Ueginbotham was harshly beaten by a 
Liberal in a strongly radical ward. (37) The Rochdale Trades 
Council sponsored four candidates in the 1885 School Board elections 
to oppose the previous Board's decision to raise the standard for 
half-time exemption, a move which caused a delay in the time when 
a child could abandon full-time education to start working. (38) 
The Labour candidates also proposed a reduction in 8chool fees and 
a revision of the teaching system (39), but before the election took 
place dissension became evident in the ranks of the Trades Council 
because of the body's political activity; th~ number of candidates 
was halved and the remaining contestants both 
came at the bottom of 
of the poll. (40) 
Each of these three movements displayed the weaknesses inherent 
in local labour politics. Without an attempt to challenge for 
power local labour candidates could be quite easily swallowed up by 
the two dominant parties, as happened at Oldham. Moreover, as yet 
the faith of the few who were convinced of the need for labour 
representation was insufficient to move the many electors who saw 
no reason for voting Labour. In 1887 the Cotton Factory Times was 
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speaking of the ":imumerable di ff icul tie s" that attended local labour 
politics. (41) 
Yet there were still chances to be taken by working class 
groups that could take charge of spontaneous local discontent. 
A situation arose at Bolton in 1887 which again illustrated the need 
for labour representation in municipal government. 
Bolton was a large industrial town with most of its workers in 
the fine spinning trade, of which it was the centre. It also had 
an extensive engineering interest, producing textile machinery for 
the mills and for export. During a bout of poor trade in 1886 wage 
reductions had been made in Bolton's engineering workshops and in 
1887 attempts were made, mainly by the Steam Engine Makers' Society, 
to improve wages and bring them up to the Manchester standard. (42) 
The union secretary, James Swift, received the support of Robert 
Austin of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in the campaign for 
improved wages and began in addition to demand the abolition of 
systematic overtime. (43) In April 1887 the engineering workers gave 
notice to stop working ~nless a wage increase of two shillings a week 
was made. The employers countered with a r 1 '. 
eso ve to dIsmISS all men 
, l) , 
who refused to work overtime. On May 2nd the Bolton Iron Strike 
began, involving members of four engineering unions. (44) 
The strike was conducted peacefully, though without success, 
until June, when the employers began to import substitute labour; 
their intentions were to keep the found:rH>s5 running at all costs 
and the result was that police protection for imported workers began 
to be generally applied against the taunts and attacks of trade union 
pickets. (45) Battles between strikers and police developed and grew 
into serious rioting in the vicinity of the large workshops where 
substitute labour had been most successfully introduced. By the end 
of June the Bolton Watch Committee, which had already received 
support from the County Constabulary, requested and was granted the 
services of a detachment of Lancashire IIussars to quell disturbances 
in the town. These repressive measures seriously weakened the strikers' 
position, allowing the unimpeded imp~ation of non-union workmen; 
they also gave Bolton the appearance of an occupied town. (46) 
A political reaction to the attitude of the municipal authorities 
was quiCk to develop. It sprang from two sources: the workers, who 
read the situation in terms of class oppression and were determined 
to restore justice, and the radical ratepayers, angered by the 
lavish use of public money for the protection of certain employers' 
interests. Since 1867, it may be noted, Bolton had been in the 
political grip of the Conservative party, supported by many leading 
industrialists, and the events of 1887 provided the radicals with an 
opportunity to strike out against their adversaries. A Ratepayers' 
Association was formed. It was soon acting with the Bolton Trades 
Council when that body decided to contest all the vacant wards in the 
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November municipal elections with labour candidates and pledged 
itself to assist any movement that aimed to "protect the rights of 
the people." (47) After the withdrawal of the troops and extra 
police in early August the Ratepayers' Association held several 
'13 
"indigna tion mee tings" through which a group of mi 1i tant, se If-employed 
tradesmen led by a tea dealer called James Kirkham assumed control 
of the movement. It claimed about 300 active members by October 
and had formulated an election schedule which aimed at cutting down 
on public expenditure and called for evening council meetings so as to 
enable working men to attend. 
The passions kindled by the strike had in fact thrown together 
strange bedfellows; there was little in common between the 
Ratepayers' Association, whose municipal candidates included three 
. 
grocers, a newsagent, three insurance agents and three licensed 
victuallers, and the Trades Council, led by its staunch Tory 
secretary, John Fielding. Nonetheless, the two factions agreed to 
co-operate, using "their own whips and their own judgement," (48) 
if their candidates were elected. Yet there was no attempt to 
include in this alliance the Bolton S.D.F. which had sought, but been 
refused, support and which therefore campaigned in the elections as a 
separate group. (49) 
Eight Labour candidates were successful. Two factors probably 
influenced the result; firstly, the strike in the engineering trade 
had been concluded in a matter which satisfied no one, least of all 
the workers who were left disgruntled and penniless, willing to 
register their disapproval of the capitalist element in the borough 
council; secondly, there had been an honourable agreement between the 
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Ratepayers' Association and the Liberal Party whereby six Ratepayer 
candidates of radical sympathies had been unopposed by Liberals. When 
the new council became known, therefore, nine labour representatives were 
1'n 't (50) 1 • This was the largest single group of working class councillors 
in any Lancashire town and the first attempt to establish a separate labour 
group in local politics. It was a signal achievement, yet its subsequent 
history was very disappointing. Why was this so? 
In the first place the Ratepayers' representatives had no real link 
with the Trades Council, thus rendering unity of purpose difficult to 
achieve. Secondly, each of the Labour councillors had very defi~;te party 
views, mostly radical, and with no significant independent labour ideology 
to sustain them on questions not directly concerned with the working class 
they were inclined to side with the party of their choice, more often than 
not appearing as supernumerary Liberals or Conservatives. A further factor 
of importance was the group's inability to maintain the militancy of 1887 
once the events that had provoked its election had passed. 
But for a short while the labour group prospered and in 1888 numbers 
were increased to eleven. By displaying increasingly radical sympathies, 
however, the Ratepayers' Association councillors soon found their support 
from the Trades Council waning. As group spirit began to decline the 
Trades Council withdrew from its role in the movement and, thought not 
rejecting the principle of labour representation outrig~tly, decided to 
abandon further political plans, "considering the diversity of political 
opinion existing amongst us." (51) By 1890 the labour group was destroyed. 
"The experience of Bolton ••••••• would seem to point to the 
conclusion that the working classes are not yet as a 
body open to accept the movement apart from political bias," 
was the judgement of the Cotton Factory Times on labour representation 
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at this time. (52) 
Bolton's experience was not without significance, however. It proved 
that to elect labour councillors with substantial working class support at 
the polls was a possibility. But was the effort worthwhile? The Bolton 
labour movement was clearly a special case, having the impetus of an 
extraordinary strike to provide spontaneous canbustion for an expression of 
working class discontent; yet even under such conditions as these the 
movement disintegrated. In normal circumstances the pressures exerted on 
working class politicalitrlependence by the middle class dominated 
Conservative and Liberal parties were all the more evident; the timidity of 
trades councils in the face of the political controversy aroused between 
Tory and radical workers on the subject of labour representation made it 
seem reasonably certain that no significant changes in working class politics 
would proceed in this manner and at this level. 
3 Trades Unions and Local Politics 
The tempo of labour politics did not appreciably quicken until the 
new unionist growth of the late 'eighties and early nineties, with its 
consequent Spur to socialist agitation. The intermittent election of trades 
council candidates to local representative authorities continued, but no 
sign of change came from local Liberal and Conservative parties which 
evinced as much keeness in taking votes from labour candidates as from each 
other. Some trades councils were beginning to eschew compromise with 
either of the parties because of their general hostility, (53) but there 
was little uniformity in this behaviour. (54) In two areas, however, 
changes were taking place, which though not staggering, do reveal an 
important difference in outlook. It is worth looking at the municipal 
elections in st Helens and Nelson in 1890 to gauge their significance for 
labour representation. 
The two towns were industrially very different, St. Helens a mining 
and chemical centre, Nelson a weaving district. Both, however, shared 
a history of rapid and confusing industrial development during the last 
twenty years of the nineteenth century. By 1890 both could be considered 
"boom towns". 
At st. Helens technological changes in the chemical works had led to 
a deterior'ation in working conditions (55) which ultimately stimulated the 
growth of trade unionism. In 1890, as a result of a strike at Pilkingtons', 
a Trades Council was established representing initially 24 trades. (26) 
In the course of the agitation to strengthen unionism among the chemical 
workers P. J. King of the Chemical and Copper Workers' Union announced 
his society's intention of sponsoring labour candidates in local elections 
against councillors who were also prominent employers, to see, as he put 
it, "whether the working men were stronger than these so-called aristocrats." (5~ 
Three candidates were eventually put forward,two of whom, 
including Thomas Glover of the Miners, were defeated; in North Eccleston 
ward, however, Robert Hunter of the Glass Bottle Makers, achieved a 
remarkable vi~tory by beating a representative of the Pilkington glass 
family thus striking a great blow" as it seemed, for the working people. (58) 
On the surface this single gain looked no more impressive than many 
previous ventures at local level, but at least the st. Helens movement 
showed a willingness on the part of a new union to promote political 
action directly, on a class basis, using the solidarity and funds of the 
union to strengthen chances at the polls. 
This method showed with even greater clarity in the same year at 
Nelson. The local Weavers' Association had been established in 1870 and 
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by the late 'eighties its membership had reached almost 3,000 having been 
swelled over the previous ten years by many uprooted textile workers from 
the West Riding !Jof Yorkshire who had poured into Nelson seeking jobs in 
the mills. (59) Nelson, quite unlike the Tory and Catholic town of St. Helens, 
was markedly nonconformist and radical. Its political ethos flourished 
among the town's workers, who in 1889 had achieved industrial unity by 
setting up a Trades Council, linking the massed ranks of the Weavers' 
Association with their fellows in the warp dressing, plumbing, clogging and 
tailoring trades. (60) William Ward of the Weavers became the Council's 
first secretary in 1890 and when Nelson received a borough charter in that 
year he took the lead in suggesting that a trade union party should be 
among the groups contesting the first municipal election. (61) 
When the Weavers' Association went ahead with a scheme to sponsor two 
candidates, including Ward, their action was unprecedented in cotton 
union history. Undoubtedly the reason for this was the remarkable degree 
of unity among working class radicals, obviating the divisions of political 
opinion that often developed in other towns when it came to trade union 
politics. Ward and Tattersall, the two candidates, w.Nere both radicals 
and there was some speculation in Nelson that they might be adopted by 
Liberal Ward committees (62) though in the event both were opposed by 
LiQeral candidates. By standing firm to a trade union party they made a 
significant gesture of independence. A mild programme was devised to 
catch the working class vote: economy in borough expenditure, fair trade union 
contracts, cheaper school books and the abolition of gas meter rents. (63) 
In spite of the Liberal opposition both Ward and Tattersall were successful. 
The Cotton Factory Times claimed to see in the Nelson result "a 
determination on the part of industrial classes to put 
an end to the 
st~_t~ __ of_class monoPOlyl~(_~~): itmiohth~"Q h""'n present unsatisfactory 
added also that the result was important because it pointed towards trade 
union politics, with the possibility of achieving county wide working class 
action based on the strength of the trade unions. If Nelson methods could 
be extended to the federated structure of the cotton unions there was a 
chance that trade union representatives might be sent to parliament. But 
it was a long step fromruectioneering in Nelson to seats at Westminster. 
4 Summary 
The period between 1885 and 1890 is a disappointing one viewed in 
terms of labour representation in industrial Lancashire. Certainly, by 
1890, no profound changes had taken place in the politics of the region. 
Most working class men still continued to vote Liberal or Conservative 
according to well established traditions of electoral behaviour; as yet no 
independent working class loyalties had been created. Those who advocated 
labour representation were only a handful of politically conscious men and 
even they had hit upon no clear sighted formula to achieve their aim. 
Nevertheless, there was a general, if sometimes submerged,feeling among 
le-viers 
working ~,C\.ss J,. that middle class dominance in politics created a basic 
injustice requiring redress. Yet if this situation was to be exploited it 
seemed certain that the initiative would not come from the action of trades 
councils at local level. To be sure, the future development of labour politics 
in 1890 was still uncertain, but it appeared more likely that two other 
courses offered the prospect of a successful breakthrough: either the 
conversion of a substantial number to the socialist philosophy, or the 
creation of a trade union programme of labour representation. Both could 
provide the centralised direction of energies from which an independe~t 
tradition in working class politics might issue. 
8 
TOWARDS TRADE UNION POLITICS 
The slow progress of working class politics in Lancashire 
during the ten years after 1885 was determined largely by the 
attitudes of the region's two most powerful groups of trade 
unionists - the miners and the cotton workers. Whilst SOI'le new 
unions turned quickly towards the politics of an independent 
labour party the main activity of the miners and cotton workers 
was concentrated in their industrial battle with the employers. 
By the mid 1890's both groups had made substantial gains in wage 
negotiations and, to an extent, this obviated the need for political 
activity. Economic security tended to breed political quietism. 
Yet new problems gradually became evident, particularly in regard 
to working conditions in the mines and weaving mills, which the 
unions could not solve satisfactorily by industrial action; these 
were eventually to ·turn trade union attention to the task of 
re-inforcing traditional weapons with a programme demanding 
parliamentary reformS. It was this change of emphasis, coming as 
a realisation of the inadequacy of a straightforward industrial 
policy, that brought the miners' and cotton workers' unions into 
contact with the political implications of their role as working 
class institutions. 
A TIlE MINERS 
Until 1903, when it affiliated to the Labour Representation 
Committee, the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation was the 
--__ .J 
least diligent and least successful of the county miners' unions 
in political activity. Under the leadership of Ashton and Woods 
the Federation concentrated on building up its industrial strength 
and many of the problems by which it was beset in this sphere 
proved equally obstructive for political policy. The radical 
tendencies always evident in some districts were dampened by the 
apathy of Tory colliers and, moreover, the union leadership had 
no unifying influence in the press such as the Cotton Factorl-!!~. 
Experience in the political field was thus severely limited. 
1. Politics, 1885 - 1892 
Between the establishment of the Federation in 1881 and the 
General Election of 1885 there had been no attempt to consider 
schemes for Labour representation, despite the example set by 
Thomas Burt's Miners' National Union. The Lancashire Federation's 
policy of co-operation with other coalfields nevertheless brought 
it into the wider sphere of mining politics, during the middle 
years of the 1880's when the radical elements among the Lancashire 
colliers were attempting to ass~rt their political views. They 
shared the outlook of the Miners' National Union's leading 
north-eastern representatives, Burt, Crawford, Fenwick and Wilson, 
all Gladstonian Liberals who represented mining constituencies in 
Parliament after 1885. The considerable Tory element among the 
Lancashire miners, however, was headed by the influential Thomas 
Ashton who did not always agree with Woods on polit~cal matters; but 
even Ashton could not disagree with the radical local secretaries 
-------.---., 
who supported Woods in calling for miners' reforms through 
legislative action. 
In 1883 the miners of Ashton and IIaydock district, where 
Sam Woods was the local agent, had declared themselves "in favour 
of a national organisation being esttblished that would consider 
all matters relating to trade and wages and legislation both 
legally and politically".(l) Woods seized the opportunity in 
1885 of advancing the programme decided upon by a miners' 
national conference held at Birmingham in 1884 as the means of 
implementing his district's intentions, and secured the programme's 
adoption by the Lancashire Miners' Federation as its official 
programme for the 1885 General Election. Despite their radical 
overtones the policies were issued in all Lancashire mining 
constituencies in the form of a questionnaire for parliamentary 
candidates. (2) 
The miners' demands were received coolly by the Conservative 
candidates, (3) who in general represented the colliery proprietors. 
Sam Woods was denounced as the mouthpiece of the Liberal caucus, 
and accused of attempting to decttve the workers by masking the 
poor record of the Liberal government in foreign affairs by making 
appeals for socialistic reform.(4) 
In reality Woods' relations with the local Liberals were not 
so close. To support their demands the miners had decided at a 
special pit set conference in April 1885 to contest the Ince 
parliamentary division with a labour candidate from among their 
ranks. (5) 
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Ince had been carved out of the old two member borough of Wigan 
at the Redistribution and contained a high proportion of miner 
vo~, newly enfranchised by the Third Reform Act. I t seemed 
an ideal constituency for such a candidate but the co-operation 
of the local Liberal association was needed to put the plan into 
practice. It also seemed that the best chance of Liberal 
success in this area, in the face of hostile Tory criticism, was 
to sponsor a Liberal Labour candidate. The local party, however, 
failed to respond. The official Liberal candidates at Ince and 
Wigan were both middle class men who had much sympathy for the 
miners' grievances(6) and when it became clear that they had no 
intention of standing aside Woods refrained from pressing the labour 
candidature for fear of splitting the radical vote. 
The election results did not vindicate the Liberal party's 
attitude; in spite of economic distress in the coal towns, 
which might have been turned to good effect against the employers, 
the Liberals won only one seat, Leigh, in the centre of the 
mining region and in the other mining constituencies the 
bl "t' (7) Conservative candidates came through with comforta e maJorl les. 
The Liberal defeat of 1885, and the decisions wrought in the 
party the following year by the llome Rule issue, scotched the 
hopes of the radical miners in Lancashire; the Conservatives 
offered no chance of legislative reform whilst their victory 
boosted the influence of their supporters amongst the miners, 
who were able to strike back against radical programmes derived 
from other regions. When T.R. Threlfall raised the question of 
\ 
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a national Labour Electoral Committee in 1886, the Lancashire 
Miners' resolved that their delegates should not support the 
scheme at the forthcoming Trades Union Congress. (8) Whilst 
the measure received the encouragement of mining unions in the 
north east, South Wales and Yorkshire, Lancashire stood apart. (9) 
A further attempt was made by the Ashton and IIaydock district to 
goad the Federation into political activity in 1887; its 
representatives introduced the question of a miners' Member of 
Parliament for Lancashire to the conference of September 1887, 
held at Wigan. So slight was the interest displayed in the 
motion, however, that the business was adjourned and soon passed 
into oblivion. (10) 
For a time, during the bad industrial situation of 1887 and 
early 1888, radicalism thus disappeared among the Lancashire 
Miners. The Federation played only a minor role in 
parliamentary lobbying, wielding little influence in the 
negotiations to amend the Employer's Liability Act, or in those 
1 , 1 t' Act. (11) which secured the passage of the Coa Mlnes Regu a lon 
Moreover the Lancashire Federation was drifting out of its slender 
association~th the Miners' National Union, which supported the 
sliding scale system, after disagreements over the handling of the 
Mines Regulation Bill. By June 1889, after all prospects of a 
Lancashire sliding scale had vanished, the federation severed 
its connection completely. (12) 
More positive political action did not manifest itself until 
the joint wages movement had gathered momentum towards the close 
of the 1880's With wage advances and increasl'ng b h' 
mem ers Ip the 
----------- -------.- ----- - -- -- --
Lancashire Federation was in a position to test the Eight llours 
Day. In national counsels the miners were drawn into two 
conflicting groups over this question; the sliding scale areas, 
particularly Northumberland, Durham and South Wales opposed Eight 
llours, whilst the unions of the Central Coalfields were convinced 
of the need to restriot output. (13) 
The struggle over Eight Hours continued to be waged through 
a web of sectional interests. Already laid was a scheme of the 
socialist Keir Hardie; he had introduced the concept of a general 
law on Eight Hours at the 1887 Trades Union Congress. IIardie's 
plan had close links with the miners' demands. His political 
associate of this period, R.~ Cunningham Graham, Liberal M P 
for North Lanark, had drawn up a parliamentary bill which would 
limit shifts in collieries to eight hours each day. Graham's 
move had been prompted mainly by the Scotllsh miners, to be presented 
to the Commons during 1889. It received the support of radical 
coalminers who, though sustaining the Liberal secretary of the 
Trades Union Congress, Henry Droadhurst, in his conflict with the 
socialist IIardie, accepted the latter's views on legislation for 
Eight hours, especially if they applied to mines. In fact it was 
Thomas Aspinwall, the Wigan Miners' agent,who placed before the 
1889 Trades Union 60ngress a motion demanding an Eight Hours Dill 
for the coal indsutry.(14) Aspinwallts suggestion was accepted 
by a large majority of the delegates, though progress towards the 
presentation in the Commons of a bill was baulked by Charles Fenwick 
", 
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a Northumberland Miners' official and opponent of Eight Hours 
who in 1890 became secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the 
Trades Union Congress. (15) 
There was also the possibility of obtaining an Eight Hour 
Day by strike action. This course too had its favourties (16) , 
altqough Lancashire had opted for legislation, and ultimately 
the legislation plan prevailed; it would ensure a strict and universal 
application. By January 1890 the Miners' Federation of Great 
Britain had decided to press for a law; because of the influence of 
its opponents in the Trades Union Congress, however, the Federation 
required sympathetic Members to support them and if possible 
two of its own officials in Parliament. Pickard, the President 
and Sam Woods, the Vice-President, were the chosen men, although 
Lancashire remained vague on the question of Labour representation. 
The Lancashire Federation, in its new rules of 1891, had conunitted 
itself to no more than an obligation "to assist in returning 
labour representatives to seats in the House of Commons". (17) 
But with the new inter-county federation, which Lancashire had 
helped to create, already decided upon political action, it seemed 
that the Lancashire men could no longer hold back. 
In April 1890 a meeting of miners in the Bolton district had 
taken the bold step of putting forward Sam Woods as a Labour 
candidate for the forthcoming General Election; an electoral 
committee was appointed and the following month it was decided that 
he should contest Ince. Woods agreed to fight there against 
Colonel Blundell, a colliery owner who had conSistently voted 
against the miners' demands. (IS) In addition Woods promised 
that he would attempt to negotiate for support from the two 
political parties in order to establish a safe Labour8:!at for 
the Miners. (19) 
The political action now decided upon differed fundamentally 
from that contemplated in the mid 'eighties. In the first place 
the Miners Federation of Great Briatin resolved to make an Eight 
Hours Bill the criterion for support of candidates in mining 
constituencies. (20) There was thus a more direct labour appeal 
in the programme than there had been in the strongly partisan 
policies of lS85 and this was likely to win support from both 
radical and tory colliers. The effect of this was to give the 
miners' leaders a more independent posture, whereas before they 
had been regarded as political allies of the Liberal party. 
Secondly the Liberal attitude assisted this development; 
Gladstone's conception of social reform, or 'construction' as he 
called it, was rather reluctantly offered to his party at 
Newcastle-upon~Tyne in lS91 and whilst it offered several reforms 
f 1 d ' t" was Ilome Rule for Ireland.(21) or the working class its "stap e- 1e 
On the coalminers' grievances Gladstone revealed himself to be 
at variance with organised Labour: of Eight llours~ he said: 
"It will require more than a mere majority in certain 
trades that are highly organised - it will require 
more even than a majority in all trades all over the 
country - so to bind the majority that they shall be 
the subjects of coercive proceedings if they are 
unwilling, or if they find themselves unable~in justice 
to those dependent upon them, to conform to the new standard. 
I give no absolute judgement upon a question which has 
not yet I believe by an appeal to the country, been 
examined." (22) 
The Liberal party's standpoint had important consequences 
for the miners of Lancashire. Liberal candidates seemed vague on 
Eight Hours whilst the Conservatives, alarmed by the prominence 
of the Irish question, retreated into a shell of reaction. The 
Tory Members for Newton-le-Willows, Ince and Wigan all opposed 
the idea of an Eight llour day by law, although pne or two were 
willing to concede its achievement by industrial bargaining, a 
step which the colliers had already rejected. (23) When the 
Mines (Eight Hours) Bill was scheduled for its second reading in 
the Commons on March 23rd, 1892 most of the Conservative Members 
for the Lancashire coalfield opposed it (24) and by'(\ vote of 272 
to 160 the reading was postponed and the Lancashire Miners' 
Federation was made to realise the strength of it~opposition; 
lC7 
the coalminers' lobby had been represented by four Lancashire M.P.s. 
It seemed that the General Election of 1892 in Lancashire mining 
towns would be a direct confrontation bQtween the Conservatives 
and the coalminer voters~ in short, between capital and labour. 
At least this gave the miners a chance to fight the perennial 
industrial battle at the political level and they were resolute 
in battle. (26) Besides bringing more unity to the colliers' 
cause, these factors helped to adumbrate the position ~f the Miners' 
Federation as a potential anti - capitalist and hence radical 
political force in the coalfield. 
The Labour campaigns of 1892 are more important as an 
e illustration of how Miners were able to outman~uvre the Liberal 
party, rather than as a sign of the progress in their political 
education. At Wigan and Ince the Liberals gave way to Miners' 
candidates; Woods (Ince) was allowed a clear run against the 
Conservative. There was no official pact with the Liberal party, 
nor would the L C.M F have dared to make one; Thomas Ashton 
summed the situation up in 1893: 
"Let it be clearly understood that the Federation does 
not recognise any politics except Labour ••••• certainly 
we paid the election ex~enses of Mr. Woods, who received 
the support of the Liberal party in Ince but it is well 
lmown that up to the present it has been utterl,'y impossible 
to return a 'tabour candidate' without the assistance of 
one of the great political parties". (27) 
Woods himself claimed that .pis election and parlillmentary 
expenses were paid by the Miners Federation.(28) The secmd 
Labour candidate was Thomas Aspinwall at Wigan; here the Liberal 
party had amply approached Aspinwall to be its canruuate,(29) and 
though a leading official of the Miners' Federation he did not 
stand as an official L C M F candidate; all colliers knew, however, 
that if elected he ~ould be able to perform the same job. 
in addition :.' 
Both men campaigned with radical policiesAto their demands 
for the Eight Hours Bill. Woods,officially designated a "Liberal 
and Labour candidate", attacked the aristocracy with the Newcastle 
Programme and particularly denounced the coal owning ardstocracy 
by demanding an end to mining royalties and appealing for 
improvements in working conditions in the mines.(30) Aspinwall 
was happy to support Home Rule ("a question of Irish Labour"),. 
Welsh ~hurch disestablishment and liquor control, questions with little 
meaning for the English working class. (31) The electorate in 
both constituencies had a fairly high proportion of miner 
vot~, but even though both Conservative candidates opposed the 
a 
Eight Hour Bill the lack of}really binding Labour programme left 
lcq 
Woods and Aspinwall open to effective and hostile Tory propaganda.(32) 
In addition the Conservative party had more money, experience and 
voluntary election workers. Aspinwall was defeated at Wigan (33) 
and blamed his organisation. (34) Ince polled later on and the 
matus between the elections seemed to produce a labour swing, for 
Woods won a narrow victory. (35) But clearly, in spite of the 
psychological effect of a pre-election Labour meeting sponsored 
by the MinersiFederation, (36) the Conservative party ha4 been 
able to win a si~eable share of the colliers' votes in both 
constituencies. 
There were two principal lessons to be learnt from the 
campaigns. Firstly, the Lancashire Miners had in part been able 
to profit by the weakness of the Liberal Party in the mining 
towns; in other mining regions of England, which were generally 
Liberal strongholds, local Liberalr parties were not obliged to 
support trade union canddates since wealthy industrialisu could 
qliLe easily be elected. (31) Consequently, though its gains were 
slight, the Lancashire Miners' Federation was still better 
represented at the polls in 1892 than any of the other unions in 
the M.F.G·~ network, whilst the future held better opportunities 
for the Lancashire Miners to embark on Labour representation plans. 
Secondly there were several obstacles to face; a systematic 
Labour platform would have to be established instead of relying 
· . 
upon ed hoc issues such as the Eight liours Day; less overt 
reliance on Liberal organisation and policies would have to be 
displayed in case a Liberal recovery became evident which would 
rob ~abour progress of its momentum; the Miners' Federation, a 
loosely knit, centralised body required to gain more influence 
in the localties Lf its political leadership was to be accepted 
at constituency level. The inter-dependance of trade union growth 
and the development of Labour politics was crucial. 
2. The Campaign of 1995 
Some of these lessons were given point by the disappointments 
of the years 1892 to 1895. Political divisions among the colliers 
still proved a disruptive influence. Early in 1894 the question 
of Aspinwall's position as Labour candidate at Wigan was raised; 
though the Federation agreed that he should stand at the next 
General Eelction(38 ) : I'L the experiences of 1892 and Aspinwall's 
close association with Liberalism led the delegates to urge 
that, 
"Any candidate whose election expenses may be paid from 
the funds of the Federation must not lend his services 
to either political party unless an advantage is to be 
gained thereby affecting the workers generally". (39) 
Further proof of the desire to arrest Liberal influence came during 
1894; in April T. R. Threlfall appeared before the Lancashire 
Miners' Conference requesting the Federation to support his Labour 
Electoral Association. The question was referred to the districts 
and the proposal consequently was decisively rejected.(4~) 
Though the L.E.A. did claim some influence in the Central 
Coalfields (W. E. llarvey of the Derbyshire Miners was 
vice-president of the body in 1894) its pronounced Liberal 
proclivities were too much for the Tory element in the Lancashire 
Fe dera tion. I f the L.C.M.F., was to <command a left wingl vote in 
the coalfield it would have to be in a guise other than that of 
Liberal pressure group. 
At the same time political feeling was beginning to 
evaporate as a result of the 1893 lock-out and the disappointing 
progress of the miners' Eight Hours Dill. (41) When a General 
Election was fixed for 1895 Woods and Apinwall were again 
promoted as Labour candidates, though the intense feeling which 
had supported them three years earlier could by now no lon~er be 
counted upon. Moreover the Liberal party at Wigan began to 
reassert itself after the Miners'had attempted to consolidate 
their candidate in the borough. In order to establish a more 
independent position Aspinwall had set up a campaign cooonittee 
at Wigan, directed by the L.C.M.F. Treasurer, Robert Isherwood; 
perhaps because they feared a loss of their influence and also 
probably to placate the middle class Liberal votes,(42)the local 
fpr 
Liberals decided in 1895 to remove Aspinwall and substituteAhim 
William Woods, a former Conservative Mayor of Wigan and a radical 
sympathiser, who had quarrelled with his own party in 1892 over 
its handling on the Eight Hours question. (43) The Wigan Liberals 
therefore informed Aspinwall that by a vote of 39 to 9 they had 
)12. . 
decided to sponsor William Woods. The Miners' Federation 
was predictably indignant at this denial of its position and 
resolved to contest the seat no matter what the opposition 
might be.(44) It seemed that the radical vote would be split 
and the Conservative party accorded a comfortable victory in what 
ought to have been a close contest. Only after the informal counsel 
of the Prime Minister, Rosebery, did the Wigan Liberal Association 
reverse its decision and support Aspinwall;(45) but it cannot 
be said that the outcome was a real triumph for the Miners' 
Federation, for it had clearly not as yet laid a pre-emptive 
claim to the seat. 
The campaigns of Woods and Aspinwall in 1895 were a disaster. 
Both offered the same policies as in 1892 - radical reform and 
specific demands for the coal industry. Both, however, were 
affected by the reaction to the Liberal government and its 
failure to deal with the Eight Hours Bill and unemployment.(46) 
Furthermore the Liberal party was split nationally and the two 
Labour candidates exacerbated their positions by following the 
lead of Lord Rosebery, emphasising the radical question of the 
day, "Who Shall Rule, The Peers or The people".(41) Working class 
questions were therefore reduced in prominence; Woods and 
Aspinwall were both easily defeated;(48) although Liberal and 
Labour enthusiasm had been high before the poll(49) the position 
had slipped back to that of 1885-86. The cumulative effects 
of two years' political disappointment and the consequent bad 
\ 
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temper of the miners operated against Woods and Aspinwall, 
whilst deficient registration completed the picture. Woods 
recalled Wigan's corrupt past in blaming for the defeats 
"the screw and intimidation and other base influences" 
manipulated by the Conservatives,(50) though Aspinwall probably 
was more perceptive when he admitted simply "there seemed to be 
a desire for a change of Government".(51) 
3. Summary 
Although 1895 marked a lull in the attempts of the 
Lancashire Miners to secure labour representation there was 
clearly a desire on the part of the colliers to pursue political 
activity as a means of articulating reform. Since 1889 
Lancashire had gained strength through its association with the 
national wages movement and if the Federation was to continue 
to benefit from solidarity it must make political running on 
the Eight Hours question. But in Lancashire it was plain that 
trade union politics would have to be carried out under colours 
different from those of the Liberal party. A workers' party 
was neede d. Moreover, the form that such an organisation 
might take was fairly obvious: because of the weakness of 
socialism in the Lancashire coalfield the odds were very much 
on a reformist trade union party's replacing radicalism as 
the instrument for bringing improvements in working class 
conditions. With tighter organisation and increased membership 
the miners' trade union was becoming an important institution 
in coalfield life by the mid 1890's and this provided the basis 
for securing the miners' loyalty to an independent labour 
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position in politics, winning them away from their traditional 
political allegiances. Of course, such developments were 
only in their infancy in 1895 but in the light of these 
conditions and attitudes the history of the Miners' Federation 
in the early years of the next century is more meaningful. 
B TIlE COTTON WORKERS 
The trade unions in the cotton industry were less 
politically inclined than the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners. 
Official policy eschewed political partisanship and the trade 
union was not regarded as an agent of political action. 
The Cotton Factory Times realised that the trade unionist's 
point of view was not represented sufficiently in Parliament 
but feared the divisions which materialised among the rank 
and file when political issues were raised: "it is this 
division of our ranks which is at present standing in the way of 
d t d ' f 't t" l' t re ma r ke d l' n 188"'. ( 5 2 ) a proper un ers an 1ng 0 our 1n eres s , v 
Trade union solidarity was valued more highly than political power. 
On the other hand, workers' demands for factory reform could 
not be secured without some recourse to Parliament; experience 
had shown that organised lobbying could be a productive tool; 
for instance, it was the "short-time" agitation of the early 
1870's that had secured the 56! hour week in the 1878 Factory and 
Workshop Act.(53) During the next few years the cotton unions 
had established ad hoc parliamentary committees to discuss 
questions of legislative importance whenever they arose.(54) 
These bodies often consulted with similar employers' 
committees 
llU 
and provided strong pressure groups at elections, forcing 
candidates to consider the workers' point of view. Moreover 
this type of political behaviour had the advantage of neutrality, 
since it operated in the same way whatever party happened to be 
in power. Yet it was not pursued with any consistency, being 
employed only in emergencies when industrial action failed. 
1. Factory Reform 
After the franchise reforms of 1884 the value of such 
methods clearly increased whilst industrial changes showed that 
they were needed. With the increase in membership of the Weavers' 
Amalgamation and the appearance of newly organised cardroom 
workers, a group of workers emerged who were less wall paid 
than the spinners and also less well organised and who therefore 
looked to Parliament for laws to regulate working conditions, 
e,specially since there were many female and juvenile workers 
in their ranks.(55) 
In the mid 1880's these objections were dealt with by the 
Northern Counties Factory Acts Reform Association, which worked 
within fixed terms of reference: "the securing of a better 
observance of the Factory and Workshops Act and an amendment 
of the Limited Liability Act", the latter aim representing the 
policy of the Spinners' Amalgamation. The Association provided 
a common meeting ground for the three major unions in the industry, 
with James Mawdsley as chairman and Thomas Birtwistle secretary. 
It worked independently of the Trades Union Congress. In 1886 
the Association decided to concentrate its work in three main 
spheres of action; i) to demand more factory inspectors, 
ii) to secure remedial reforms in factory working conditions 
and iii) to press for five amendments to the Limited Liability 
Act.(56) The Cotton Fact~Times spoke of "the determination 
of the operatives to carry on the agitation until the law became 
something more than a dead letter". (57) 
During the next few years the cotton unions carried on the 
agitation over these subjects, acquiring the character of a 
highly organised, apolitical pressure group. Ini tially the 
Spinners' Amalgamation controlled the organisation and much of 
the early work was concerned with working the five amendments 
on limited liability into a new bill.(58) Mawdsley was not 
sanguine(59) and negotiations, including interviews with 
Lancashire Members and deputations'to Whitehall, proved both 
tedious and unproductive. The Cotton Factory Times admitted 
tha t much of the labour had be en "more fe I t than seen" but was 
clearly over optimistic in asserting that "the change that has 
Come across the powers that be is little short of a revolution".(60) 
In fact the Limited Liability Bill was dropped in 1888, 
Birtwistle later reporting that it had been abandoned because 
of opposition from Members of parliament.(61) 
In other respects lobbying proved more successful; the 
existence of the Factory Acts Association provided a means of 
meeting employers and asserting trade union views and 
consequently helped to strengthen union control in the industry. 
The Weavers' Amalgamation, moreover, 
hoped to profit by its 
agitation on the steaming question. The question of steaming, 
and the attendant problem of over-sizing, had been brought about 
by the development of vroduction techniques in the cotton industry 
during the later nineteenth century. Since the 1870's the 
increase in foreign competition had wrought important changes 
in manufacturing and marketing cotton and these in turn were felt 
by the weaver. Working conditions in the weaving sheds were 
growing worse rather than better; greater attention was being 
paid to the reduction of output costs in cloths susceptible to 
market fluctuation and there was a noticeable movement away from 
the production of coarse goods to finer counts. In the areas 
where coarse goods were produced, especially Blackburn, weavers 
found themselves working with inferior quality yarns; in addition 
the looms were undergoing improvisations to maximise their 
efficiency.(62) The technique of steaming was introduced to 
speed up the weaving of poor quality yarns. They were impregnated 
with a strengthening substance (si7ing) and then woven in sheds 
where a high proportion of steam had been infused into the 
atmosphere to extend their breaking point. The resultant 
working conditions, with dust and intense humidity, rendered 
weaving an unpleasant and often unhealthy trade. By the 1880's 
these two practices had assumed the proportions of abuses; 
the Weavers' Amalgamation hoped to remedy them through the 
intervention of the Factory Acts Association in Parliament. 
Blackburn became the centre for the steaming agitation 
during 1888 and 1889. The local Corporation was persuaded to 
..., 
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set up a committee of enquiry in 1888 which concluded from its 
evidence that in the Blackburn district steaming had been 
"largely and excessively used and that weavers had suffered 
in health as a consequence".(63) During the same year the 
agitation was extended to all the weaving towns and there were 
frequent mass meetings calling for action;(61) by October it 
was understood that policy would be directed towards steaming's 
total abolition, now the most important single issue in the 
cotton industry, whilst David ilolmes, the Weavers' president, 
was speaking almost every night to local meetings and p-omising 
an end to steaming.(65) 
From these beginnings the agitation developed into a 
situation which drastically affected cotton union policy and, 
in the long run, labour politics in Lancashire. In the first 
place the employers opposed the workers' demands. When IIolmes and 
Mawdsley introduced the idea of total prohibition to a meeting of 
employers and M.P.s in 1889 W.E.M. Tomlinson, the Conservative 
Member for Preston, declared that "absolute prohibition of any 
kind of moisture might destroy a great deal of trade".(06) 
The manufacturers proposed a full scale enquiry into the practice 
but the idea was rejected outright by the cotton workers in May 1889; 
they would settle for nothingkss than "to proceed at once with 
h t bl'11".(67) Th' 1 d the question in a practical way in a s or IS pace 
the union leadership in a difficult position, for it had always 
been their policy to secure for their member.. a position as 
responsible and equal partners in the management of the cotton 
industry. An option in this situation would involve loss of 
prestige on either front, with the workers or with the employers 
Furthermore the Home Office, which would take charge of any bill, 
would undertake no action unless both sides of industry were in 
agreement. Since the chances of securing the passage of an 
opposed bill in the current 1889 session were very remote the 
union leaders decided upon a compromise course; 
would reduce steaming though not abolish it.(68) 
a bill which 
Such a measure 
received the consent of the employers and a bill was introduced 
on June 27th 1889; the Royal Assent was given on August 30th, 
the provisions to take effect from March 1st 1890. 
humidity in weaving sheds was thus created.(69) 
A scale of 
Dirtwistle and Holmes, who had carried out the main 
negotiations on behalf of the United Textile Factory workers 
Association (as the Factory Acts Reform Association was by now 
called), admitted to their members that they hadlwt gained all 
that was required although the new Act was called "a capital 
instalment" by the Cotton Factory Tirnes.(70) There was no 
guarantee, however, that the regulations could be enforced since 
the factory inspectorate was inadequate. The rank and file ot 
the Weavers' Amalgamation was, of course, bitterly disappointed. 
Discontent was evident throughout the summer and winter of 1889 
and was not placated by Birtwistle's assurance that the new Act 
would prove to be "an excellent piece of1egislation". Great 
IIarwood Weavers' ,Association threatened strike action but the 
Amalgamation said it would lend no support.(71) The Textile 
llO 
Factory Workers' Conference of 1890 produced heated discussions 
on the administration of the Act, several delegates complaining 
that weavers were worse off than before. Some thought that too 
high a degree of humiditywas permitted. A motion, sponsored by 
Blackburn Weavers, attacked the "wholesale violation of the Act".(12) 
Complaints continued to be heard for many months afterwards; 
weavers establishing a new society at Kirkham were told by 
Luke Park of Preston Weavers' Society in September 1890 that the 
Act was "not worth the paper it was printed upon" and were urged 
not to work in sheds where steaming was carried out.(13) Even 
the loyalist Cotton Fact~Times attacked the employers' 
"deliberate intention ••• not to comply with the law".(71) Over 
two years after the passing of the original Act a meeting at 
Blackburn was demanding that total abolition of steaming be 
sought afresh.(75) It is therefore not wholly correct to say 
that "criticism died down once the new regulations came into force.,,(76) 
Discontent over steaming was in part the cause of Great IIarwood 
Am .. 189'>. (77) Weavers' secession from the Weavers' algamatlon 1n ~, 
in fact criticism never died down, but carried on throughout the 
next twenty years. (78) 
The steaming agitation and its consequences raised serious 
problems about the continuation of cotton union lobbying and the 
acceptance of leadership policy by the rank and file. In 1890 
the political machinery of the cotton unions had been placed on 
a permanent basis, the United Textile Factory Workers' Association. 
with a democratic United Council, elected according to membership 
from the three major unions, and an executive Legislative 
Council. (79) Its objects were: 
" ••• the removal of any grievance from which its members 
may be suffering for which Parliamentary or Governmental 
influence is required." (80) 
During the 1890's this body attempted to secure reforms and 
regulations in the working conditions of millhands, including 
greater working space, more ventilation in mills, better 
sanitation, fencing in of machinery, an increase in annual 
holidays and the ceasing of all work in mills at noon on 
Saturdays. Some success was achieved, notably in the Factory Act 
of 1891 which included a "particulars clause", a regulation that 
employers must give specific details of work required from 
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weavers in order to guarantee the correct payment of their wages. (81) 
Over many issues, however, the employers proved obstructive; their 
fear was that factory reform would place Lancashire at a 
disadvantage against India and other producers, whose labour 
force was under-paid and over-worked. (82) At the same time there 
was little that deputations from the cotton unions could do in 
face of a majority in the Ilouse even if most Lancashire members 
agreed to support them; when the "particulars clause" was won, 
for instance, the cotton unions had to accept, in the same bill, 
a signal rebuttal of their claims over the half time labour 
question, since a majority of members voted for an increase in 
the school leaving age which would delay the time when juveniles 
could commence half-time work in factories.(83) 
In general the lobbying tactics employed by the Textile 
Factory Workers in the l890's involved a great deal of work for 
a small amount of success. At the end of the 1891 conference 
- ... --~ 
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Dirtwistle read a letter to the delegates; it was from llenry James, 
Liberal Unionist M.P. for Bury and one of the cotton workers' 
foremost supporters in the Commons: 
"The proceedings of the Session •••.• brought 
prominently to my attention the great difficulty 
existing under present circumstances for fully 
placing the views of the Textile Factory 
Operatives before the House of Commons. I do 
not wish to refer more than I can avoid to the poor 
services I have endeavoured to render to the 
Operatives. Still, I must state that whilst I 
have done my best, I frequently felt the drawback 
under which I labour in consequence of having no 
technical knowledge of the incidents attaching 
to labour in a textile factory". 
"I need not dwell on the great advantage derived 
by those who are engaged in certain industrial 
occupations by being directly represented in the 
House of Commons". 
"Everyone knows, for instance, how the miners have 
benefited from the presence in parliament of the 
able men who have sprung from their ranks and that 
benefit is shared by the public with the classes 
directly represented". 
"But it seems strange that the textile factory 
operatives (numbering I believe some 125,000 persons) 
whose interests you and Mr. Mawdsley, in conjunction 
with others, have so ably represented in Conference, 
have no direct representation and I feel strongly that 
thef~would do well for their own interests if they 
endeavoured to secure the Ipresence of one of their own 
body in the House of Commons". (81) 
Sir Henry James was clearly thinking in terms of labour 
representation by the cotton unions and three factors suggested 
that this might b, the logical outcome of their work. Fir~tly, 
the unions had been led irrevocably to an acceptance of 
Parliament's importance in the working class struggle, and as 
James had pointed out their policies would be the better 
implemented by work from the inside, by cotton union experts in 
the House. In the second place, lobbying had shown the immense 
superiority of the employer in Parliament; whilst the unions 
were striving for equality between worker and master at local 
level they were forced to submit to a legislative imbalance which 
blocked progress at Westminster. The seemingly reasonable demands 
made over the steaming question, backed by public opinion, had 
been rejected by middle class Members who were not prepared to 
consider the vast majority of their constituents when economic 
interest was at stake. Thirdly, and in consequence, the same 
sort of anti-employer reaction as found a political outlet in the 
mining towns in 1892 had no outlet in the cotton towns. The union 
leadership continued to inhibit political expression but there 
were many workers in the districts who were ready to listen to, 
and accept the lead of, socialists. 
2. The E..!ght Hours Day 
The tensions which were growing evident among the cotton 
workers in the early 1890's were further aroused by the Eight 
Hours Day issue. The principles involved in the restriction of 
working hours had some basis in socialist philosophy, although, 
as has been pointed out, they were readily accepted by some non-
socialist mining unions because they accorded with industrial 
conditions. The cotton union leaders, however, would not agree 
so easily to the idea; there was very little pressure in the 
cotton towns before the early 1800's for an Eight Hour Day, partly 
.h.JI. 
because socialist infiltration before then had been slight but, 
more important, because of the position of the cotton trade. 
Like many established unions those of the cotton industry were 
prepared to give the question of reduced hours some thought during 
periods of bad trade; Luke Park of Preston Weavers, for instance, 
had supported a shorter working day at the Trades Union Congress 
in 1885 (85) but in general there was a fear of curtailing 
hours lest it place Lancashire in an unfavourable position in 
the foreign market. (86) If the price of goods did not rise then 
wages would have to fall, since the operatives worked on a 
piecework system. 
The union leadership was vitally interested in maintaining 
the world supremacy of the Lancashire cotton industry and felt 
that by supporting economic reformism of this nature it might be 
jeopardising its position with the employers. Consequently the 
Textile Factory Workers were unwilling to consider Eight Hours 
outside an international framework: "If all the workmen in the 
world were united in one grand union the business could be settled 
at once~ (87) This attitude immediately set the cotton unions 
at variance with the more advanced sections of the Labour 
movement. 
At the 1887 Trades Union Congress at Swansea it had been 
decided to put the Eight Hours question before trade unionists in 
the form of a plebiscite; the basic questions to be answered 
were whether a universal law should be supported or whether each 
union should choose to negotiate independently for restriction. (88) \ 
\ 
By chance, Mawdsley and Birtwistle, as members of the Parliamentary 
Commi ttee, were in charge of the ballot procedure; both were 
antipathetic towards its general aims and made nothing more 
than informal approaches to the unions; Mawdsley advised 
the Congress of 1888 that the matter should be dropped or 
steps taken to "obtain more information".(89) The Spinners' 
Amalgamation had flatly refused to put the question to a vote.(90) 
Nonetheless, on the motion of Keir I1ardie the 1888 Congress 
decided that the plebiscite must be carried out(91) and Mawdsley 
was unable to avoid an awkward situation. 
At this time.relations between the cotton unions and the 
Trades Union Congress were strained. The parliamentary 
Committee had been a disappointing ally in the Weavers' 
Amalgamation's demands for factory reform and though David Holmcs 
had made many speeches at Congress on factory inspectors, steaming 
and the adulteration of yarns, the qoostions of Labour 
representation and Eight Hours were taking up much of the 
delegates' time and attention, rendering the Congress immobile 
in the matter of the Weavers' grievances. The Cotton Factory 
Times was prompted to raise doubts about the worth of the 
Congress: "its chief object now seems to be the personal 
advance of a few at the expense of the many'; complained a 
leader of 1887, adding that the time spent on "extraneous 
subjects not applicable to trade unions" raised the question of 
whether "it would not be prudent that these yearly Congresses 
should be discontinued".(92) 
The pattern of events was clearly leading to a 
confrontation, which came in 1890 at the Liverpool Congress. 
At the previous Congress in Dundee Mawdsley had presented a 
simplified report on the Eight llours ballot which gave an impres-
sion of general hostility to the idea of restriction. (93) 
Bailey, of the Nottingham Miners, accused Mawdsley of being 
obviously prejudiced and of "muddling" the whole affair, 
since he had not reported the decisions of Bailey's own 
union. Even James Billington,the Tory Secretary of Preston 
Spinners, supported Eight llours against Mawdsley and the 
Lancashire Miners secured support for a Miners Eight Hours 
Bill. (94) 
At Liverpool the socialist trade unions made a concerted 
effort to change the policy of Congress and succeeded in 
securing the acceptance of a motion which called for an 
Eight Hours Day by law. David IIolmes had vigorously defended 
Lancashire's position, conceding the idea of trade option but 
flatly rejecting a universal law. In spite of the upswing 
in trade at this time the cotton union leaders took the 
decision badly; Birtwistle resigned his seat on the 
Parliamentary Committee after consultation with other cotton 
union officials.(95) Even bef~re the Congress met the 
executive committee of the Spinners' Amalgamation, sensing 
what was in the wind, had demanded Mawdsley's withdrawal from 
the Parliamentary Commi ttee be cause of "the illegal and fool ish 
action of the Trades Union Congress".(96) Following a further 
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request in September 1890 Mawdsley followed Birtwistle. Both 
actions were supported by the General Council of the Weavers' 
Amalgamation.(97) 
At the end of 1890, therefore, the cotton unions were 
completely isolated from the rest of the labour movement. 
Although both Birtwistle and Mawdsley returned to the Parliamentary 
Committee the next year relations between the cotton unions and the 
Congress continued to be of a fractious nature; cotton union 
delegates were increasingly attacked on new fronts, principally 
over the half time labour question. An additional source of conflict 
was to arise within the Textile Factory Workers' Association itself, 
especially with the decline in trade after 1892. Birtwistle affirmed 
that "no thinking cotton operative would dream of supporting the 
Eight Hours Bill"(98) but the question had not been raised with the 
rank and file, whilst the action of the leadership had been plainly 
autocratic. 
The next two years brought a significant change of position. 
Foreign competition had been the barrier to the progress of Eight 
Hours in the eyes of Holmes, Birtwistle and Mawds1ey, who calculated 
that wages would fall by 15 per cent if hours were reduced(99). 
The campaign over steaming had created conflict with the employers 
which the union leaders were unwilling to escalate. "Go to the 
Government and ask the Government to pass a Factory Act for India 
somewhere near what ours is at home" David 1I0lmes had advised in 
1890~100) On the other hand these arguments were beginning to be 
questioned by socialists; Sidney Webb, the Fabian lecturer, claimed 
to have dismissed them; it was in areas where hours were short, 
such as Massachusetts, said Webb, that Lancashire should fear 
competition most, since these were the most dangerous rivals 
for markets. (101) 11 11 d th t d b th . e ca e e argumen s use y e unlon 
leaders "a mere pretext". ( 102) Nonetheless the question remained 
undebated by the Amalgamations during 1891 whilst the campaign 
for Eight Hours grew stronger among the local societies of north 
east Lancashire, led by the socialists who were now beginning to 
win considerable support. 
During 1891 and 1892 industrial relations in the cotton 
industry deteriorated; there was a general lock out in south 
east Lancashire in 1892 following a "bad spinning" dispute at the 
Stalybridge Spinning Company; most of the mill workers in the 
area were locked out and almost sixteen million spindles stopped.(103) 
The situation was not improved when a settlement was negotiated 
in Stalybridge, for although the Spinners' Amalgamation had 
allowed the employers to "re-employ all the old hands they can find 
work for" many non-unionists were taken on and clashes took place 
between workers at Hyde and Dukinfield whilst many local societies 
passed resolutions conde~ng the action of the Spinners' executive 
committee.(104) Following almost immediately afterwards came 
the general spinning lock-out of 1892-93, longer in duration 
though not involving so many workers. 
3. Summary 
The poor trade of these years was leading towards a 
crucial period in the development of working class politics 
in the cotton towns. The work of the Social Democratic 
Federation at Burnley was beginning to provide an alternative policy to 
that of the union leadership and the acceptance of socialist policies 
by trade unionis~seemed a complete possibility. With this situation 
might come drastic change in the extent of the cotton union 
par~icipation in politics. 
Yet even before the socialists began to exploit trade union 
discontent in the cotton towns it is certain that a change was taking 
place in cotton union attitudes. The experiences of factory reform 
were ~eginning to show the value of having Labour representatives to 
press the unions' case; at the same time the disputes over Eight Hours 
not only prepared the ground for the socialists in the cotton towns by 
revealing the extent to which the union leadership was out of step with 
the rest of the labour movement, but they also showed how important 
political representation was to achieve working class demands. 
It should now be possible to contrast the positions of these two 
groups of workers, as they stood by the mid 'nineties. Clearly, both 
were moving in the same general direction, but by significantly 
different routes. Whilst both were now accepting the need for a 
political commitment on the part of their unions, the cotton workers 
were really only at the stage the unions had passed through during the 
mid 1880's: they were making the breakthrough into parliamentary 
politics. There was still no suggestion by the cotton unions that they 
regarded political action as anything more than opportunist and it is 
hardly surprising that contemporaries found it difficult to conceive 
of the cotton unions as the organisational basis for a working class 
political movement. On the other hand, the miners were by now 
--- ---- --------~-----
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operating within a national pressure group - the MFGB - which had 
become a more or less regular feature of working class politics. 
Moreover, in Lancashire the miners were beginning to realise the need 
for an independent political position. A sagacious observer of 1895 would 
have known which group was the more likely to make the running in 
independent working class politics. 
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THE SOCIALIST SYNTHESIS 
It is now time to consider the part played by the two socialist 
societies - the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent 
Labour Party - in the beginnings of working class political 
independence. Compared with the narrow aims of local labour 
representation and the sectional interests of the big trade 
unions the S.D.F. and the I.L.P. provided a universal theory for 
working class action. Both parties saw the working class in 
social, as well as political, terms; they hoped ultimately to 
proceed to a new social order in which the state would be 
organised for the workers' benefit. Socialism therefore 
provided a synthesis that would bring together all forms of 
working class energy and aim them at the social goal. Of 
course, the S.D.F. and the I.L.P. had to convince the working 
class of the value of this approach and for this reason their 
intention was always to convert as many people as possible to 
the cause - to make socialists. They soon discovered, however, 
that this was a slowIl'ocess:~ working class political and 
industrial behaviour was too well established for it to be 
rejected in favour of socialist leadership. As a re sui t both 
parties had to attempt some form of compromise with existing 
working class institutions, especially the trade unions, and 
guide them in new directions. 
A TIlE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION 
English socialism in the early 1880's was well below the 
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political hori~on, being confined chiefly to cosmopolitan 
centres which had links with the continent through emigr{ 
socialists. London was the focal point of the most important activity 
and was the birthplace of the Social Democratic Federation.(l) 
The introduction of socialism to Lancashire took place in 1884 
when the S.D.F. opened a branch at Blackburn. Social 
democracy was therefore not a spontaneous growth within the 
region, but rather a grafted political limb. And because the 
S.D.F. was not a product of Lancashire's social background it 
was consequently slow to develop as an integral part of the 
working class movement. Yet growth and influence were not 
beyond the capabilities of the S.D.F. and it proved resilient 
enough to survive its initial disadvantages. 
1~~ _Early Days 
The S.D.F. was attracted to Blackburn by a weavers' strike 
in the winter of 1883-84; in the hope of exploiting working class 
discontent, and establishing provincial branches, the S.D.F. 
Executive Council sent three of its ablest propagandists, 
Jack Williams, James MacDonald and J.L. Joynes, to distribute 
socialist literature and give lectures in the town. The work 
seemed so promising that in February 1884 H.M. Hyndman, under 
whose inspiration the S.D.F. had been established~2) and 
William Morris, the socialist artist and craftsman, visited 
Blackburn to supervise the setting up of a permanent branch.(3) 
By August the branch was reporting a healthy position and a 
growing demand for the S.D.F.'s weekly journal, Justice. 
The movement spread promisingly; at the beginning of 1885 
there were agencies for Justice in about five Lancashire towns 
and besides the Blackburn social democrats, who were meeting 
each week in a local temperance hotel, a vigorous group had been 
organised among the gas stokers and railwaymen of Salford. The 
latters' missionary ~eal carried them to Oldham and neighbouring 
districts where they regularly held outdoor meetings. (4) But 
this was the fullest extent of early growth; the failure to 
develop more rapidly and extensively may be accounted for by 
two principal factors. 
----~""' 
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~n the first place Lancashire branches were very much dependent 
at this stage on assistance from London for experienced lecturers 
and propagandists. But in London the S.D.F. was experiencing 
quarrels among its leadership which eventually resulted in the 
secession of a discontented group led by William Morris and the 
establishment of a new Tival party, the Socialist League, in 
December 1884. In addition the problems encountered by the S.D.F 
in contesting three parliamentary elections in 1885 with "Tory 
Gold" had brought the movement into disrepute, causing a decline 
in membership. (5) Whilst Lancashire was not directly involved 
in these events the lack of attention was clearly felt in the 
region. (6) 
Secondly, and more important, the S.D.F.'s attitude towards 
trade unions raised serious problems about its future in the 
region. The extensive support enjoyed by trade unions in 
Lancashire ensured that a substantial proportion of the working 
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class was already organised on an industrial basis before the 
advent of socialism; unlike some of its continental counterparts 
the S.D.F. was not in a position to take over the sole leadership 
in working class politics (although in London the comparative 
weakness of trade unionism probably enhanced the S.D.F.'s position). 
In Lancashire social democrats had either to co-operate with trade 
unionists and face a possible weakening of their socialist 
principles, or attempt to convert the unions to socialism. In 
fact the problem was not fully dealt with either way in early 
years mainly because of Hyndman's influence. lIis brand of 
Marxism was in general opposed to the trade union structure, which 
permitted only a section of the more affluent workers, the "Labour 
aristocracy", to improve its economic position in society through 
combination. Trade unionism had little to offer the great mass 
of economically depressed people before the new unionist boom of 
the late 1880's, and it was therefore with some justification 
that Hyndman wrote in the mid 'eighties: "never in my memory was 
the misery among the very poor so serious as it is today".(7) 
Most of the early encounters between social democrats and 
trade unionists in Lancashire took place with this kind of 
attitude dominating S.D.F. thinking. Among the earliest reports 
of propagandists from Blackburn were vituperative attacks on the 
unions in the spinning and weaving trades. (8) Justice's first 
full statement on trade unionism was argued by 11, 11. Champion, 
a former regular soldier; (9) he spoke of the unions'incapacity 
to deal with the problem of trade depression and unemployment; 
he attacked their sectionalism and rivalry; he suggested a grand, 
universal union which reflected his aims for working class 
unity, urging the organised artisans to join hands with "the men 
and women who suffer". (10) 
In their desire to sweep all the internal divisions within 
the working class the social democrats therefore chose to 
igRore trade unionism, hoping that a massive appeal to class 
consciousness would render such organisations useless. It was 
only in the later 'eighties, when the S.D.F. actually began to 
recruit members who were trade unionists,that attitudes in 
Lancashire changed. 
During the poor trade of the middle 1880's the S.D.F.'s main 
emph~is was placed on unemployed agitation. A great deal of 
energy was expended in this work. Again, the London outlook 
shaped S.D.F. tactics in Lancashire. For the General Election of 
1885 a reformist programme had been devised to win votes (11) 
but with the discredit brought upon the movement by parliamentary 
methods the S.D.F. shifted its stress to direct actiont to win 
support by~outdoor propaganda. During the winter of 1885-86 
demonstrations of the unemployed had been held in London ending 
with the riots of February 1886 when leading S.D.F. figures 
were arraigned before the Bow Street magistrates. (12) Exactly 
a wek later the S.D.F. produced a manifesto calling attention 
to the need for unemployment remedies, the basic arguments of 
which were a curtailment in the hours of labour to eight a day and 
l3~ 
the provision of public works to absorb the unemployed; the result, 
it was alleged, would then make the proletariat a viable economic 
force able to spend rather than merely subsist. (13) 
Lancashire branches seized the opportunity to exploit these 
arguments by means of outdoor propaganda. Since the initial 
outburts of 1884 little had happened in the region; an unsuccessful 
attempt had been made to work among the miners during the period 
of wage reductions in 1884, (14) and William Morris had made 
equally fruitless forays for the Socialist League during the Oldham 
strike of 1885, speaking to the workers on trade depression and the 
(15) 
capitalise economy. Not until well into 1887 did the Salford 
S.D.F. achieve some influence by organising big demonstrations of 
the unemployed in Manchester, urging the City Council to "organise 
the Labour of the unemployed upon useful and productive work at fair 
rates of wages by carrying our necessary local improvements". They 
went on to demand the demolition of bad housing, the building of sound 
workers' rottages, a more generous poor relief and an eight hours 
(16) day. 
During 1886 and 1887 this was the character of Salford S.D.F's 
work; it met with some success because trade was generally bad'land 
the alleged evils of capitalism readily apparent; moreover, Manchester 
and Salford were not areas of very strong trade unionism and some 
workers were willing to seize on the obvious attractions of socialism. 
Consequently the S.D.F. was able to pursue constant agitation and 
managed to establish branches at Rochdale and Bolton. Speakers would 
travel from Salford on Sundays to impress their often large audiences 
with the need for 
the nationalisation of the means of production and for short 
term reforms, or "p~lliatives", which Hyndmanlnd termed "stepping 
stones to a happier period" .(17) Nevertheless there seemed 
little immediate chance of achieving remedies, still less of 
social revolution, in this way; for although audiences were often 
encouraging in working class districts there were few prepared to 
commit themselves to the movement. Branch membership remained 
very low and the S.D.F. needed active militants. Jack Williams, 
a small round-shouldered Cockney who was one of the S.D.F.'s 
dougHiest speakers, soon found that in Lancashire large audiences 
were often made up of many casual onlookers; at Rochdale in 1887 
he addressed a gathering of almost two thousand but found only 
twenty prepared to come forward afterwards to join the S.D.F. (18) 
Clearly, new methods were required. Hyndman had suggested 
that political electioneering might again be attempted as a 
useful means of propaganda (19) and the first Lancashire branch 
to contest a municipal election was that at Bolton, which had 
received some support from local workers during the Iron Strike 
of 1287. The Executive Council sent the S.D.F. Treasurer, John 
Hunter-Watts, to Bolton in mid 1887 to improve organisation; 
Watts was a colourful figure and a keen worker, though "rather 
anarchistic in temperament" (20) and certainly not as influential 
a leader as Tom Mann, who arrived at Bolton about the same time. 
Mann was an unemployed engineer who had written a pamphlet the 
previous year on the Eight Hours Day; he opposed his union's 
leaders but retained a strong conviction in trade union methods, 
perhaps the most steadfast conviction he held throughout a long 
and active life in many different working class causes. (21) 
Mann spoke warmly in 1887 of the Bolton socialists' enthusiasm 
in his reports to Justice and it was most likely Mann who 
persuaded the branch to put forward six S.D.F. candidates in 
the 1887 municipal elections and ask for the support of the local 
Trades Council. (22) This was an enlightened move to bring 
together labour forces and it was not the S.D.F.'s fault that the 
proposition was rejected, for it was the Trades Council which 
seemed suspicious of the new socialist group. (23) In the event 
all the socialist candidates, campaigning in strong working class 
Tory wards, were defeated. 
The branch was also weakened by internal divisions which" 
were at work below a placid surface; in 1888 a member wrote to 
Justice: "it iscpite plain that our movement in Bolton is safe"; 
1 1 t ' d" (21) c asses were being held in economics, e ocu lon an slnglng 
but this was far from a true reflection of the party's condition. 
Mann's reports reveal that it was in a parlous condition. lIe 
himself was in complete disagreement with certain "impossibilist" 
elements in the London S.D.F. and was equally critical of 
Lancashire tactics, especially as directed by Hunter-Watts. 
Mann diverted his attention for a time to the branches at 
Blackburn and Darwen, whose satisfactory progress he reported. (25) 
But in a detailed letter to John Burns, his socialist colleague 
from Battersea, Mann outlined the Bolton disputes and gave his 
-----------~-~~.--~-~~ 
reasons for leaving Lancashire at the end of 1888. As a valued 
propagandist he had been installed in a tobacconist's shop 
which, with an income of twenty five shillings a week subscribed 
by other S~D.F. branches in Lancashire, was to provide an income 
for himself and his family of five. For this arrangement Mann 
had largely to thank a local socialist shoemaker, Joe Shuttle botham. 
Difficulties arose when a section of the Bolton branch decided to 
start a socialist workshop, calling it the "Co-operative 
Commonwealth". Mann wrote: 
" ••.•• This proved to be a very great hindrance to the 
progress of the branch and in a short time partly owing 
to a less vigorous propaganda resulting from members 
devoting time to what they thought was the practical 
side of Socialism, the membership soon began to decrease, 
considerable dissensions arose in the branch and at 
nearly every meeting quarrels took place. I took no 
part in them, but turned my attention to other branches 
and did my best to develop Blackburn and Darwen branches. 
The Blackburn men will testify that as a result they 
became respected where they had formerly had to be 
constantly ready for f:isticuff work and Darwen developed 
even better. Being asked in October to go to Northwich 
for the Labour Party (26) I at once consented subject to 
agreeing with the committee at Bolton and made several 
visits there. I also went to Bradford during the Trades 
Congress week. At this time I was using up to the 25/-
a week and the shop was not paying its way partly because 
J. Hunter Watts had promised Shufflebotham of Bolton, 
when asked by him, to stand good if need be to the extent 
of £20 for stock; on the strength of this the place was 
taken, and when the time arrived, no money save £2 was 
forthcoming from Watts, so the men at Bolton and one or 
two others made sufficient to get a small stock which had 
tpv be continually laid out again as soon as brought in -
no rent was savedaQoordingly and when the first quarter 
rent was due I had to get two £5 loans and commence to 
pay them back by weekly instalments. I was still doing 
this when the next became due, ditto the next, and of 
course had to borrow as I continued to spend the full 25/-
i 
I_ 
weekly on the family. When thecald weather set in the 
25/- was not forthcoming - only a part of it; and we were \ 
put to great straits. I had had complete control of I 
-------------
Justice during this period and I increased the sale considerably' \' 
when they were profits, I had them as part of the shop , 
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takings, when losses I bore them. The 
dissensions previously alluded developing caused 
a proportionate falling off of sale and for several 
weeks running I had the bother of the papers and 
considerable monetary loss also. Ultimately I 
told the Commi ttee defint te ly that thfY must take 
charge of the paper so that they would. realise 
the necessity of either purchasing it or ordering 
less; this had been used on the Council as a sign 
of my animosity to the S.D.F. - the only reason of 
my refusal to sell being the one I have given. 
Now with respect to Darwen I was always on the most 
cordial terms of friendship with them and they asked 
me to be present on Christmas Eve and make a speech 
at a supper they intended having. I had occasion to 
go to Stockton-on-Tees during the election there, and 
while there received two very earnest requests from 
the Newcastle men to go over on the Sunday Dec. 23 
and lecture for them: I should v~ much have liked to 
have done this but although only 40 miles from there 
as I had already proposed Darwen to speak for them on 
this Sunday and the following evening I refused 
Newcastle and wentto Darwen as arranged. My 
relationships were of the most friendly nature but as 
I had been to..J)tockton for the N.L.E.A. (27) some of 
the friends asked me concerning the pilicy of the same 
and of course I chatted upon it and one of them named 
Farren asked that he should be supplied with a few 
papers. This is the great offence of which I have been 
.' guilty. The Darwen Sec., a young energetic fellow with 
the best of intentions, I suppose became incensed that 
any other paper than Justice should be read and wrote to 
Bridge saying that I had weaned some of the1 to members 
&.C. 
The net result of my being in Lancashire is that for the 
first time in my life I now owe a money debt of £15, which 
I am trying to pay at 2/6 per week - but stand a real 
risk of having my goods sie~ed. This then is ~lat I have 
gained monetarily, though as for gaining a little 
experience, it may be worth it ••••••• "(28) 
Bolton S.D.F. might have taken a lead in Lancashire ~ocialism 
but differences over tactics and a chronic shortage of money 
prevented efficient organisation. After Mann's departure the 
branch collapsed; it was re-organised by Joe Shufflebotham in 
August 1890 and in fue following year Shufflebotham himself 
, I 
secured election as a social democrat to the Bolton School 
Board (29). , this was an isolated success and the S.D.F~ was 
never a~ain active in the town. Yet in two important ways the 
Bolton S.D.F. branch under Tom Mann had poin te d oat '. a 
realistic course for social democrats: municipal electioneering 
and a trade union alliance. 
2. Into Trade Union Work 
Early in 1888 Lancashire was created a separate district 
of the Federation, incorporating about eight branches. llunter-
Watts was more or less in charge of propaganda but, though William 
Morris was full of praise for his efforts, (30) progress was very 
slow. The bulk of the work comprised outdoor meetings, the 
highlight of which was a mass rally at Blackstone Edge on Spa 
Sunday, 1888, addressed by Hyndman and several social democrats 
from Lancashire towns. (31) Such meeti~ were repeated in 
following years (32) but brought little more than fiery 
speeches denouncing society. In 1888 in seemed that five years 
of propaganda had brought no tangi·.ble gains. 
Events began to change with the new unionism of 1889. 
Unskilled workers were willing to accept socialist help in the 
establishing of unions and in turn the S.D.F~ began to find willing 
audiences among the new unionists, and so there developed a 
closer tie between social democrats and trade unionists. At 
Darwen Wi11iam Atkinson, a veteran of the original branch at 
Blackburn, helped to organise. a Carters' and Lorrymen1s union 
in the late 'eighties; in 1890 he was appointed preaident of the 
lA.' 
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Paper Stainers' Union and also became Secretary of the local 
Trades Council in 1893. (33) The Salford socialists proved more 
active; they were at the centre of the gasworkers' agitation in 
1889 and it was upon the new union that the South Salford S.D.F. 
built its support. In 1888 a socialist gas stoker, liorrocks, 
had come within fifteen votes of winning Ordsall ward, a 
working class district in the industrial centre of Salford; 
the following spring saw a Salford social democrat elected to 
the post of County Council auditor.(34) South Sal ford branch 
became an active centre in Labour politics with an able 
propagandist in W.K. Hall, a miner with an ascetic appearance 
and a cool, argumentative speaking style.(35) A new branch wus 
opened in the more socially mixed area of north Salford, while the 
older branch moved into larger premises to accommodate the 
growing following. In other towns S.D.F. branches were moving 
gradually into municipal politics, formulating progra~l~s of 
social reform which supplemented rather than replaced trude 
union aims.(36) It was noticeable that progress was more 
rapid in areas where the S.D.F. could influence trade union 
development: at Barrow, for instance, the local social democrats 
gained a seat on the school board in 1890, although in the quite 
different industrial town of Rochdale three S.D .F.Candidates 
for municipal honour were disastrously defeated.(37) 
With the move towards more conventional political 
practices it was evident that some kind of alliance of Labour 
forces was needed. By itself the S.D.F. was too weak an 
organisation to profit from the increased interest in Labour 
representation; lack of money was still a major barrier to 
the establishment of branches and it proved much easier to 
set up new ones than to sustain existing ones. Yet there was 
still one high card to play. The S.D.F 's most original 
contribution to working class politics lay in its ideology, 
which provided for the first time in Lancashire a distinct 
policy for Labour action at both ~arliamentary and municipal 
levels. Many of the S D.F.'s ideas derived from n.M. Ilyndman's 
book England For All (1881), which ~laced emphasis on decentral-
isation in English government.(38) The localised work of the 
trades councils in the 1880's had not exploited the field of 
municipal reform sufficiently and the S.D.F. plainly had the 
opportunity to shape attitudes if it could exert political 
pressure. 
The early 1890's was a time of greatly increased interest 
in labour politics. During 1891 the S.D.F. broke out ofiits 
hitherto predominantly south east Lancashire base by winning 
support in the quickly growing weaving towns of the north east, 
whose workers supplied the backbone of Lancashire radicalism. 
Herbert Burrows, a London Socialist who had helped to organise 
the matchgirls' strike at Bryant and May's in 1888-9, had a hand 
in starting an S.D.F. branch at Nelson during a speaking tour 
of 1891. (39) In the following summer lIyndma n followed a 
similar route, speaking at Salford, Burnley and Nelson. At the 
same time independent Labour parties were springing up in the 
region and prospects of a united Labour movement in the Manchester 
region seemed good. (40) The socialist synthesis was beginning to 
develop alternatives. - the orthodoxy of the S.D.F. against the less 
socialist politics of the "independent labour" platform. 
This was a crucial time in the development of the S.D.F. Was 
it to join with the I.LP. or maintain an independent course? In 1890 
the Federation had laid plans to contest the forthcoming General 
Election but the number of candidates intended was reduced when 
(41 ) Hyndman lost money as a result of dealings on the Stock Exchange. 
One of the three parliamentary candidates eventually sponsored was 
w. K Hall at South Salford. The growth of Labour groups in the 
area has been discussed in Chapter ·~O~~, where it was seen that 
by 1892 there were three distinct movements: the Liberal 
Labourites, supported mainly by the Trades Council and some new 
unions such as John Kelly's Carters; the I.L.P. centred on the 
Clarion group; and the S.D.F. When the Salford Labour Union was 
constituted late in 1891 many of the local social democrats 
expressed a keen interest in its work and Hall was in turn given 
encouraging support by some of its members in his campaign. M3ny 
of the social democrats in Salford conceived of their party's future 
within the new I.L.P. and Hall toured neighbouring towns as part of his 
. (42) 
election campaign speaking in support of I.L.P. actlon. The 
value of this course seemed to be strengthened by the outcome of 
Hall's campaign. 
South Sal ford division, with a high working class population, 
was a marginally Conservative seat, though the Liberals had won 
there in 1885. It hadlconsiderable, though badly organised, 
Irish votes; its population lad been composed of workers in the 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway workshops and stokers in the 
Municipal gasworks, although the construction of the Manchester 
Ship canal, whose terminus was to be in the area, had brought 
many casual labourers into the division. It was a constituency 
which required diligent and assidous registration work. Hall 
expounded a moderate, radical programme, supporting Home Rule for 
Ireland, old age pensions and the payment of M.P.s, but this was 
largely duplicated by the Liberal candidate. (43) Hall's defeat 
was a humiliating one (44) which was not entirely occasioned, as 
Justice believed ,(45) by Liberal opposition. Poor organisation 
was the main cause. The effect of the defeat was also important, 
for it completed the secession of many social democrats, who went 
over to the I.L.P. and left the South Salford branch seriously 
depleted, with only two figures of any consequences in the local 
Labour movement _ Tabbron of the Drassfounders and Tom Purves, who 
was later to organise a branch of the Dockers in Salford. This 
marked the end of the S.D.F. as an effective force in Manchester 
politics for with the subsequent success of the I.L.P. there was 
little incentive to join a narrowly based socialist party and by 
the turn of the century the branch had faded into obscurity. In 
changing its tactics to promote the Labour Alliance the S.D.F. 
appeared thereby to be losing its separate identity. 
3. Progress in North East Lancashire 
The S.D.F. still had some influence in north east Lancashire, 
however, and events here were to prove the party's continued 
vitality. Depression and discontent in the cotton towns during 
the two years following the 1892 General Election provided the 
conditions for growth; these were exploited by able organisation. 
The initial success of the Burnley branch in winning a School 
b 
Board election soon after its foundation (4&) prompted the 
Executive Council to send Joe Terrett to the area in order to 
encourage the development of new branches. Terrett (who used the 
name "A.G. Wolfe" when working in Lancashire) was a young man from 
the Forest of Dean. When his parents moved to London he had worked 
in Smithfield Market and became a socialist at the age of seventeen 
after witnessing the strikes of dockers and gasworkers in 1889. 
Terrett was a keen trade unionist and joined Will Thorne's Gasworkrrs, 
but always felt more at home lecturing for the S.D.F. and Fabian 
Society, organising new branches and tramping the countryside from 
(47) 
town to town, often walking miles to avoid the cost of rail fares. 
He had taken to the provinces about 1892 and arrived in Durnley in 
January 1893. Terrett was soon assisted there by a full time branch 
secretary, Dan Irving. Almost 20 years older that Terrett, Irving 
was in his forties when he came to Burnley and already had 
experienced a colourful life; he had been a railwayman at Dristol 
but lost a leg in an accident; he had organised a branch of the 
Gasworkers' Union in the city and had been a prominent working class 
radical who originally opposed the socialists but later joined 
them. After helping to run a socialist colony at Starnthwaite 
he was invited to join the S.D.F. in Burnley;(48) thus he 
began a long connection with the town whose M.P. he was to become 
at the end of his long life. 
By the middle of 1893 the S.D.F. had 600members at Burnley. 
Efficient organisation was the keynote of the branch: 
"A committee of 36 members was appointed and this 
committee was divided into twelve 3's; three for each 
ward of the town. The duty of these three members is to 
go to private addresses of each member of the Party in 
the ward to collect his weekly subscription and to leave 
his copy of Justice. Incidentally, a deal of information 
is obtained. Each collector is provided with a book in 
which he notes whether the subscribing member is a member 
of the Weavers' Association or the Co-operative Society. 
By means of this information, and industriously whipping 
up the members, the S.D.F. has been able to. place Socialists 
upon the Committee of the Weavers' Association and also 
upon the commi ttee od the Co_operative Socie ty". (49) 
Another vital factor in creating support was the Burnley Socialist 
and North East Lancashire Labour News, a weekly journal edited 
by J.R. Widdup, a local man and a founder member of the branch. 
The Burnley Socialist was an open challenge to the established 
press, being devoted completely to socialist propaganda; it claimed 
a circulation among an estimated two thousand socialists in the 
Burnley and Nelson area, and at the same time helped to keep the 
exploits of the S.D.F. before the public. 
The political influence of the S.D.F. in the district came 
from its relations with trade unionists. Socialist members of the 
Weavers' societies were beginning to shape cotton union policy in 
an important direction. The leaders of the three major amalgamations 
opposed the Eight Hour Day in the debates of 1890 and 1891 (50) but 
Burnley S.D.F. made its position on restriction of hours plain. (51) 
David Holmes, whose stature as a radical in his own town of Burnley 
was immense, remained as one of the most vigorous opponents of 
socialist policy, upholding the arguments he had presented with 
other leading cotton trade unionists when giving evidence to the 
Royal Commission on Labour in 1891. (52) Yet the effects of 
declining trade and the Stalybridge lock-out of 1892 prompted even 
the Cotton Factory Times to consider means of putting "the 
overstocked market right" (53) and whilst Nelson Weavers had in 
1891 been urging an international effort on Eight Hours (54) the 
journal of. the cotton trade finally decided that "what cotton 
operatives do in other countries will have to be abandoned from 
all consideration, and what is requisite in this country.ll have 
to take its place". (55) 
By the summer of 1892, though Holmes continued to speak 
against ix (56), the Burnley and Nelson Weavers' Associations 
had mandates for the Eight Hour Day, the original motions having 
been put by socialists. (57) In August the U.T.F.W.A. decided 
by a majority of 132 to 21 to support a legal Eight Hour Day; 
the plan had received support from the major societies in the 
spinning trade. (58) The issue had undoubtedly been forced by 
the poor trade and by the employers' intentions of pressing for a 
wage reduction, but the agitation had been stimulated by the 
S.D.F. 
As a result socialist credit in the weaving towns rose, 
assisting the development of the S.D.F. at Burnley and bringing 
--... 
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political gains; in 1893 John Markham of the S.D.F. became the 
Weavers' Vice-President, displacing the radical Robert Pollard; 
among the Burnley Miners' Association John Sparling became a 
prominent socialist official and in the same year the social 
democrat James Roberts was chosen secretary 01 the Trades Council. (59) 
It was trade union support that brought political success; at 
the Burnley municipal elections in 1893 two socialL t democrats 
were returned, John Sparling and John Tempest, the batter of the 
Twisters' and Drawers' union. (60) Five candidates had been 
sponsored with an extensive programme of mu~ipal reform designed 
to catch the working class vote. (61) "TIlE TWO POLITICAL PARTIES 
HAVE COMBINED to prevent the return of Labour candidates", 
claimed the Burnley Socialist, adding "we hope that you will at 
once become alive to this fact and AS WORKERS ALSO COMDINE to 
further YOUR interests, and seICmen pledged to a definite Labour 
programme". (62) There had been no formal agreement with the 
Trades Council and in one contest candidates of the two groups 
clashed, but it was clear that the S.D.F. had an important role 
to play in working class politics; in 1893 it was possible that a 
socialist led Labour Party might be engineered. For one thing 
the coalmining lock-out which had started in the last week of 
July (63) bad unified feelings; the cotton workers shared the 
distress of the miners as many local mills were closed through 
shortage of fuel. (64) The Workman's Times commented: 
"Comrade A. G. Wolfe took advantage of the miners' 
holidays by holding afternoon meetings and so popular 
and effective has he permeated socialism (sic) in the 
m~nthers thathth~y not only voted for us, but worked 
Wl an ent USlasm and determinati 
-_._-------
on never excelled". (65) 
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The S.D.F. had shown itself capable of agitating for and of 
securing labour representation, but if this progress was not 
maintained it was largely because of disunity in the Labour 
movement. In spite of socialist influence in the local unions 
radicalism had not been displaced .• Whilst the S.D.F. had been 
~ble to carry through its industrial policy on the Eight llour Day, 
stimulating political action was a different matter. The Weavers' 
Association had twice refused to entertain the question of Labour 
candidates in 1892, once following a move by Nelson S.D.F. to 
bring out a parliamentary candidate for the Clitheroe division.(66) 
A more impressive radical reaction caue in 1894 after the S.D.F., 
by astute packing of audiences, had managed to pass a motion in 
the Weavers for having labour candidates at municipal elections, 
and for removing from the control of the Commi ttee the choice oC 
delegates to attend the Trades Union Congress. (67) Two Liberal 
members of the Weavers' commi ttee _ pollard and Riddiough -
complained that the union was being used to enact "aCfairs 
emanating from St. James Hall" (the S.D.F. office in Durnley). 
Through concerted radical intervention the desired effect oC the 
S.D.F. resolutions was not achieved; though the Weavers could not 
withdraw from their committed course of political action the 
two candidates eventually selected were both radicals and received 
Trades Council support. The rift between what might be termed the 
right and left wings of the Burnley Labour movement consequently 
hardened and unity 'for the 1894 municipal elections became an 
impossibility. Ten Labour candidates went to the polls and all 
were defeated, though Robert Pollard, standing as a 
straightforward Liberal in Stoneyholme ward, was successful. (68) 
Thus a broadly based Labour party with a sound ide~llogy 
was not created through all the ingredients for it existed. 
Conflict between the social democrats and the radical trade 
unionists continued to be a feature of Burnley Labour politics 
over the next decade; its effect was to strengthen the Conservativ&s 
in municipal elections. 
Development in nearby Nelson followed a different pattern. 
Since 1890 the WeaVers' Association has sustained a small Liberal 
Labour group in the town council whilst the Trades Council, 
largely influenced by the Weavers, displayed an equally sturdy 
spirit and was considering schemes to run a Labour newspaper in 
the surrounding district. (69) The Labour movement was given 
added enthusiasm from a growing disillusion with the Liberal 
party. In 1892 the Weavers complained that the M.P. for Clitheroe, 
U. J. Kay Shuttleworth, had been neglecting his duties in the COllunons, 
having been absent from several important divisions, and it was 
doubted whether a landowner could really represent the interests 
of working men. (70) Criticism reached the form of an attempt by 
Nelson Weavers, supported by the S.D.F., to run a Labour candidate 
a Clitheroe at the next General Election; , ,.! the scheme was 
scotched by lack of support from neighbouring trade societies. (71 ) 
This expression of independence nonetheless irked the local Liberals 
Who made no attempt to co-operate with Labour candidates in the 
1892: municipal elections. It was this attitude wbicb led to the 
----------------------
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formation in Nelson of an Independent Labour Party, comprising 
socialists and trade unionists, in December 1892. (72) 
The position of the S.D.F. in Nelson had been quite strong; 
now its vigour was infused into the Labour alliance. The socialists 
were able to work with the Trades Council in 1893 to send three 
representatives to the School Board. (73) One of them was Ernest 
Johnson of whom the radical Nelson Chronicle observed: "Comrade 
Johnson is where he is because the socialist is well organised and 
therefore instead of wasting their strength in vain and useless 
rivalry they kept together, and what is more to the purpose, worked 
together". (74) At the municipal elections of the following 
November there was an arrangement between the Trades Council, the 
J.L.P. and the S,D.F. (which maintained its separate organisation) 
to support five Labour candidates; they campaigned for fair 
contracts, an improvement in local facilities for baths and 
gymnasia, better workers' houses built by the municipality and 
direct m~nicipal control of hospitals and public houses. (75) 
Two labour candidates, Ward and Thomas Lord of the Weavers' 
ASSOCiation, were elected. ~76) 
The liaison between the socialists and the trade unions in 
Nelson continued until 1896, when the Weavers' Association decided 
to withdraw from municipal politics. By the turn of the century 
they were back on their old.course, forming the basis of a Nelson 
Labour party in which socialism played an important role. In the 
mid 'nineties, however, it remained to be seen how far social 
democrats would be willing to co-operate with non-socialist Labour 
men • 
. _-----------
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4. AChievements by 1895. 
By 1895 the S.D.F. had well over twenty branches in Lancashire 
although little new ground had been broke~. (77) Joe Terrett had 
visited the Wigan area in the spring of 1893 lecturing in the mining 
villages and gaining a few converts, but the prevailing radicalism 
of the Miners' Federation proved to be a barrier to further 
progre ss. (78) There were only two social democratic candidates 
at the lS95 General Election i~ancashire; I1yndman had been 
campaigning at Burnley, whilst at South Salford 11. W. Hobart, a 
compositor from London who had worked for the S.D.F. at Rochdale 
in lS92, was attempting to improve on W. K. Hall's performance. 
More money would have solved many problems at this stage. The 
~ancashire District Federation of the S.D.F. had piously 
led d "t If """ t" (79) b t tl P ge 1 se to perfect soclallst organlsa lon, u le 
movement was well behi~d other political parties in terms of 
newspapers and professional registration agents. Dan Irving worked 
tirelessly at Burnley, arranging outdoor meetings and devising wall 
posters which proclaimed "Hyndman's programme covers all and more 
than all the Liberals and Radicals are liriving for". The 
earnestness of his campaign was praised even by the Liberal press. 
Hyndman himself delivered fifty speeches in the fortnight before 
the election. (SI) At Salford Hobart faced the handicap ot a 
weo.kene:i S.D.F movement whilst Arrandale and Watters of the local 
(HO) 
Tradws Council declared their support for the radical candidate. (82) 
He worked assidupusly among the Irish electors, promising to 
demand legislative independence for Ireland if returned, but 
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received only ten per cent. of the votes against the same two 
opponents that Hall had fought three years previously.(83) 
Hyndman acquired twelve per cent of the votes at Burnley, where the 
radical Philip Stanhope was returned. The Irish votes probably 
went against the S.D.F. and Hyndman later blamed the other 
parties for corrupt electioneering. (84) Initially the S.D.F. had 
hoped to win the seat (85) but following the antagonisms in the local 
Labour move!ment Hyndman revised his aims, admi tting "we had no 
expectation of carrying the seat outright". (86) 
Dr. Tsusuki hag seen 1895 as the climax of the growth of 
organised socialism in England during the nineteenth century, with 
another ten years to pass before the socialist parties were to 
regain the same influence. (87) What had the S.D.F. achieved in 
Lancashire by 1895? Electorally its record was poor, with no more 
than a dozen representatives in local councils; its prospect oC 
winning parliamentary seats was very remote. On the other hand the 
Lancashire social democrats had come to terms with the region' 8 
social and economic structure, accepting the fact of trade unionism 
and attempting to synthesise. a policy out of the ballot box and the 
union card. The movement of the mid 1890's in north east Lancashire 
was completely different from that of ten years before, when 
Hunter-Watts, "idealist, yet business like and perhaps most 
revolutionary of all", (88) was in charge. Whilst the S.D.F. 
continued often to use revolutionary language its local leaders 
were men who knew no tradition of social revolution; they aimed 
towards municipal socialism, striving for concerted Labour action. 
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Although the movement possessed no brilliant theorists, able to 
modify and deve lop Marxism to rui t co ndi tions, S.D.F. programme s 
were always coherent and often far-sighted demands for working class 
reforms. It was this cautious approach, without the ardent 
"impossibilism" which later developed within the S .D.F. in Scotland 
and London, that lends credence to the belief that Lancashire 
social democracy was "right wing". (89) 
At the same time S.D.F. propaganda was keen and enthusiastic. 
The Federation introduced perennial political campaigning and was 
first among socialist societies to speak of provisions, such as free 
meals for needy children and adequate education until the age of 15 , 
which were later to be recognised as essentials in a civilised 
society. Socialist speakers were not afraid, either, to attack 
comfortable beliefs and cherished institutions; Dan Irving, for 
instance, questioned the existence of the Royal Family, which "did 
not do anything f.r the enormous sums of money it took from the 
country< (90) Class consciousness was fostered inthe S.D.F. clubs, 
which were miniatures of a socialist society; here, great emphasis 
was laid on education and members would be encouraged to plough 
through their Marx and to study history, politics and economics, the 
groundwork for any militant socialist. The visit of a notable, 
William Morris or perhaps George Lansbury, ensured an evening's 
intellectual satisfaction. 
5. Summary 
In an important way S.D.F. propaganda made a positive contribution 
to working class politics;. because of their limited nature Labour 
questions h.d previously been regarded as a sideshow in national 
--.---
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politics with no relevance to the problems of how the state 
should be governed. The S.D.F., with its arguments for 
nationalisation to give the state to the producers, elevated 
the content of working class politics to make them a subject 
about power, and not merely about remedial social legislation. 
But it still remained for the social democrats to have their ideas 
accepted as the dominant theory for working class action. Dy 
1895 the S.D.F. was a little nearer to this goal: since 1881 
it had changed its course in Lancashire and was now exhibiting 
a more accommodating attitude towards trade unionism. Although 
the party was still primarily interested in making socialists 
it was now thinking more consciously of having a foot in the 
trade union camp and of influencing the unions towards more direct 
political action - with, of course, the implied aim of creating 
municipal and parliamentary groups with distinctive socialist 
programmes. One point of principle had still to be resolved, 
however; could the S.D.F. sink its conscience and work with 
avowed non-socialists in a Labour Alliance? As the example 
of Burnley showed, the attempts of the S.D.F. to force the pace 
of working class politics aroused tension with the radical trade 
unionists who themselves were not inclined towards socialist 
tactics. The atmosphere of conflict was not congenial for 
persuading the S.D.F. to work with non-socialists and while social 
democrats made up their mind about future development the I.L.P. 
was stepping into the political arena with its ideas for creating 
).50 
an independent labour movement at local and parliamentary levels. 
Without doubt the I.L.P.ls approach represented a serious 
rivalry to the S.D.F. but providing it could maintain its 
regional independence within the Federation - that necessary self 
determination which had allowed social democrats in Lancashire 
to adapt to conditions - the S.D.F. could still influence the 
growth of independent working class politics in the region. 
--.-~~.-------------------------
APPENDIX 
An S.D.F. Municipal Charter, 1893 
1. Proper treatment of Labour 
(a) The Council should do as much as possible of its own 
wGrk itself, and in any case not less than the trade union rate 
of wages should be paid to its workmen. 
(b) An Eight Hour Day. 
(c) Full Liberty of Combination. 
( d) 
(e) 
Prohibition of Overtime except in cases of emergency. 
Reconsideration of duties and salaries of Higher Officials 
and a prevention of the sweating of unskilled corporation labourers. 
2. Housing of the Poor, etc. 
(a) To prevent jerry building the erection by the Corporation 
of healthy artisans' dwellings to be let at the cost of constructing 
and maintenance. 
(b) Abolition of all insanitary dwellings. 
(c) Abolition of the smoke nuisance. 
(d) Proper ventilation in factories to be enforced, compulsory 
maintenance of ~operty in good, clean condition. 
(e) Necessity of enforcement of Food and Drugs Act. 
3. Local Taxation and Local Institutions. 
(a) Taxation of ground rent and ground values, part of which 
taxation be used to!.defnay expenses of Free Libraries, Daths etc. 
(b) Abolition of Local House of Lords (£ldermanic Dench). 
(c) Council meetings to be held in the evening to facilitate 
Labour Representation. 
..) 
4. Municipalisation of Monopolies. 
(a) Drink Traffic. 
(b) Tramways. 
(c) Public Wash llouses. 
(d) Municipal sale of coal. 
5. Miscellaneous 
(a) Labour Bureau for the registration of Unemployed. 
(b) Municipal Relief Works during depression and distress. 
(nurnley SocialiRt, 11.10.1H03) 
.----_._---._---- -- _. 
B THE INDEPENDENT LABOUR PARTY 
The purpose of the Independent Labour Party was to create 
a workers' party in Parliament which would be independent of 
the Conservative and Liberal parties and which would have a 
socialist programme. To this end it was vital for the I.L.P. 
to co-operate with non-socialist working class organisations 
and for this reason the party always avoided the doctrinaire 
socialist approach that was sometimes seen in the S.D.F. and 
also eschewed the inclusion of the word "socialist" in its 
title. During the early 1890's, with the increased interest 
in social reform and labour representation, it seemed that the 
I.L.P. was well placed to take the lead in working class politics 
since it had developed as an expression of the political 
interests of those workers who had turned away from the Liberal 
party but had not been influenced by the S.D.F. In this atmosphere 
the capacity of the party to expand was highly estimated: "it 
will spread out its roots over the country", predicted Blatchford 
in 1892.(91) First impressions seemed to vindicate this 
optimism for I.L.P. branches in Lancashire quickly proliferated 
and the party soon reached parity on this basis with the S.D.F.(92) 
But the number of branches did not necessarily represent solid 
political gains: the I.L.P. needed to bring about an alliance of 
working class groups, which meant initially extending its 
influence from the Manchester region and meeting the challenge of 
the S.D.F. Moreover, the big cotton unions would have to be 
infiltrated in order to secure a substantial base for an 
2,"0 
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independent working class party. The I.L.P. would also have to 
overcome inadequacies of leadership and organisation. The se, 
then, were the problems that the Lancashire I.L.P. faced between its 
foundation at Manchester in 1892 and the General Election of 1895. 
1. A Manchester Party 
At the outset the party was nothing more than a pressure 
group in Manchester politics. It was a humble organisation, 
despite the national appeal of Blatchford1s journal the 
Clarion, meeting "in a poorly lit, evil smelling room over 
a stable, in a side street off Oxford Road".(93) Its trade 
union members represented only the Manchester new unions which 
had no influence in the radical controlled Trades Council of 
Manchester and Salford. The party was dominated at first by 
a group of intellectuals - Blatchford, John Trevor and 
Fred Brocklehurst _ whose value lay in propaganda rather than in 
the drafting of labour alliances. 
Robert Blatchford became the partyts first president and 
the LL.P. quickly became known as -Blatchfordts party". (94) 
The man himself, however, was too unreliable to lead a 
political organisation; he was always more interested in 
journalism than every day political wranglings and his gay, 
opiniated writings frequently brought him into conflict with 
other Labour leaders. He was never on good terms wi th Ke ir 
Hardie; the two differed essentially in character, their 
relative temperaments characterised in the styles of the 
Clarion and Hardiets weighty but dull Labour Leader. Wi th G.B. 
Shaw of the Fabian Society, a person of similar megalomania, 
Blatchford's exchanges were strained and often insulting; for 
instance, he replied to a Shavian slur on his socialism by 
commenting: "(I) consider the 
(95) 
Fabian policy a policy only fit 
for a lot of big lasses". Blatchford undoubtedly 
considered himself, not always with reason, to be at once the 
inspiration and saviour of Northern socialism and his influence 
sometimes proved to be a divisive one in the movement. 
Nevertheless,despite Manchester's disadvantages, none of 
the early Lancashire I.L.P. branches were able to emulate the 
vitality of the region's parent body. It was the Manchester 
I.L.P. which initiated a scheme to federate the branches throughout the 
county under the direction of Ben Bilcliffe, the Manchester 
secretary.(96) Yet even at Manchester political gains were-
negligible during the first three years of the party's existence. 
Its progress was improved in the summer of 1893 when Blatchford 
resigned as president through his own aversion to the principle 
of leadership and because he wanted to devote more time to the 
-.fIar ion. Leonard Hall replaced him,with J.ames Heaviside as 
vice-president,and immediately the trade union influence in the 
party was increased.(97) Work with a pronounced emphasis on labour 
and trade union questions could therefore begin with active 
encouragement and direction from above. 
By the mid 1890's the I.L.P. was able to move towards a 
closer understanding with the Trades Council and consequently 
with the older established trade unions. Since its brush with 
the Progressive Party at the 1891 school Board elections the 
Manchester and Salford Trades Council had shown more convincing 
signs of political independence than in the 'eighties'. In 1892 
it had issued an advanced parliamentary programme which demanded 
a legal Eight Hours Day, the nationalisation of land and railways 
and a strong measure of electoral reform to give more political 
power to the working man.(98) But in spite of the local boom in 
trade union membership which helped the Trades Council to attain 
the second largest membership in England, there had been no 
commensurate increase in labour representation at local level; 
nor did the Liberal party offer any chance of improving this 
position. 
For a variety of reasons I.L.P. policy helped greatly during 
the following few years to bring about a change in the a tti tude of 
both the Trades Council and the local Liberals. Fir s tly, the 
I.L.P. presented an example of stern independence in 1893 by 
supporting 12 candidates on a distinct platform in the Manchester 
I 
and Salford municipal elections; though none of the candidates 
were elected it was an inspiring gesture which did not pass 
unnoticed. (99) Secondly, the I.L.P. began to champion the cause 
of th'e unemployed. As the trade boom of the early 1890's gave 
way to depression about 1892, the I.L.P. revived the old S.D.F. 
tactic, familiar in Salford during the mid 'eighties, of 
organising demonstrations for unemployed workmen; moreover some 
attempt was made to afford relief by setting up food kitchens to 
Od (100) provl e a frugal meal for the needy. A third factor in 
both the strength of the I.L.P. itself and in its ability to 
influence trade unionists was the conversion to active Labour 
politics o£ a tightly knit group of miners in the pit districts 
of east Manchester. During the industrial troubles of 1893 in 
the coal trade R.M. Pankhurst, a well-known Manchester radical who 
had joined the I.L.P., visited the collieries of Bradford and 
Clayton expounding the principles of public ownership in the mincs.(101) 
In September of the same year Joseph Burgess, with the help of 
three local LL.P. men, Bilcliffe, IIeaviside and John lIarker had 
started the Colliery Workman's Times as a weekly journal to advocate 
"the nationalisation of the Mines by and through the independent 
representation of Labour in Parliament". (102) This work won the 
I.L.P. two important converts in Jesse Butler, the miners' agent 
at Openshaw, and J.E. Sutton, the secretary of the miners' union 
at Bradford.(103) 
The fourth and most important contribution by the I.L.P. 
to Labour politics in Manchester was a comprehensive canon of 
social reform, the Municipal Programme, published in 1893. It 
followed but expanded similar S.D.F. programmes demanding improved 
living conditions for working~ople by the demolition of slums and 
the building of municipal housing schemes, free baths and washing 
places, all to be supervised by the creation of works cOD~ittees. 
The programme placed the responsibility for these reforms on the 
local municipal authorities, many of whose duties, it was alleged,;~ 
were executed by contractors and middlemen who made profits out of 
inferior work completed with cheap labour. To allow the 
municipality more scope for administering this work itself 
the I.L.P. urged the creation of a new administrative network 
which would facilitate the direct employment of municipal 
workers at fair wages, in addition to placing all public works 
under democratic control. It was hoped also that unemployment 
would be relieved by the greater demand for labour. The 
ultimate aim was to bring 8 bout a more pleasant and healthy social 
environment as well as a community administered according to 
S . 1· t . . 1 (104) OCla lS prlnclp es. 
As a result of these combined factors the I.L.P. and Trades 
Council began to share a common outlook on many labour questions. 
In 1894 there were three socialists on the executive committee of 
the Trades Council, whose title had now been changed to the 
"Manchester and Salford Trades and Labour Council".(105) It began 
. (106) to share in the work on unemployment rellef and also co-oIlerated 
in the electoral policy; at the municipal elections of 1891 
7 1.L .P. candidates were given support by the Trades Council in 
Manchester and Sal ford wards, the miners Sutton and Dutler securing 
election whilst ironically the Trades Council president, Richard 
Watters, was defeated as a Liberal candidate in Salford.(107) 
At the same time a United Labour Party, sustained mainly by ihe 
I.L.P., contested the local School Board elections, taking votes 
from the progressives.(108) 
~his growing tendency for working class groups to act in 
concert posed a serious threat to the position of the local 
Liberal party. The weakness of working class radicalism in 
(109) 
Manchester had meant that the Liberals were as poorly 
represented in the City Council as in the parliamentary divisions. 
Since 1885, moreover, the Manchester Liberal Union had made little 
headway in augmenting its working class support; Liberal 
organisation in the city was based upon local committees in each 
of the constituencies, a system which worked tolerably well in 
the wealthier divisions such as Manchester South, a ~iddle class 
area where the party could count on sound financial support. But 
ward organisation, registration work and canvassing were totally 
inadequate in the working class districts.(110) At Manchester 
East, for example, organisation practically stood still in the late 
1880's because the local Liberals, mostly working class people, 
were so few and so short of moneY.that their accounts showed 
continued deficits of over £150, which caused them frequently to 
b ' 1 " (111) orrow from the meagre resources of the Llbera Unlon. 
Clearly the high degree of local autonomy produced an uneven 
distribution of wealth and strength but the middle class districts 
treasured their independence and resisted change. They also 
dictated policies and were able to call the tune on Home Rule(112); 
before the mid 1890's Manchester liberalism took no account of 
social reform and conspouently working class voters became 
increasingly attracted to the I.L.P. and the idea of labour 
representation. The radically inspired Labour Electoral 
ASSOCiation, which the Trades Council had supported, produced no 
-~ 
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effective results and with the advent of the I.L.P. it clearly 
began to break up.(113) 
These were alarming signs for the future of liberalism; 
nonetheless the Liberal Union probably overestimated the early 
influence of the I.L.P. in working class politics. The Liberals 
were alarmed by the 12 I.L.P. candidates of 1893 and the image 
of the new party's power was fortified by Blatchford's fierce 
language in the Clarion, where he promised the Liberal party 
"a crushing defeat".(114) It was rumoured among local Liberal 
committees in 1893 that the I.L.P. intended to promote six 
parliamentary candidates at the next General Election,(115) 
though such a campaign was ce~inly beyond the capabilities of 
the socialists. 
In November 1893 the Liberal Union decided to open 
negotiations with labour groups in the city, with the aim of 
avoiding direct clashes between Liberal and Labour candidates 
in local elections.(116) But when T.G. Ashton, a former 
Liberal M.P. for Hyde, suggested that local Liberal Committees 
"care fully consider the advi sabil i ty of 
recommending certain wards in their 
division to adopt representatives of 
labour, as candidates in the next 
municipal vacancies" 
his advice was rejected; some members felt that it would be a 
mistake to go "cap in hand" to the I.L.P.(l17) It remained 
to find some gesture of sympathy which a middle class party might 
show to politically active working men. In short, the Liberals 
decided to seal the socialists' clothes by adopting "so much of 
UT 
the Labour Party's programme as is possible" and presenting a 
new radical POlicy.(118) C.P. Scott, the editor of the 
Manchester Guardian, was wholly in favour of this tactic; 
it had the encouraging precedent of the radical victory achieved in 
1889 by the Progressive Party in the first London County Council 
elections,(119) and eventually Scott persuaded the Manchester 
Liberals to adopt a programme based on the London prototype.(120) 
The "Progressive Municipal Programme", as it became known, included 
many points from the I.L.P. charter of the previous year, though was 
less specific on the Eight Hours question.(121) 
The programme failed to rally working class votes for two 
principal reasons. In the first place the situation in London 
in 1889 differed considerably from that of Manchester in 1894. 
The London Progressives experienced no opposition from groups such as 
the I.L.P. wishing to establish a political party based on the 
working class.(122) Consequently, revitalised policy proved 
sufficient to win them significant political gains. For the 
Manchester Liberals, on the other hand, it was clearly insufficient 
merely to offer a duplication of socialist policy; such an action 
did nothing to remove the existence of potentially independent 
labour groups. The other important factor was labour representation; 
even the L.C.C. had its "labour bench" but the Manchester Liberal 
Union, in spite of renewed efforts, was unable to carry through a 
plan to incorporate labour representatives into its list of 
cnadidates. Although discussions were held with Trades Council 
leaders to arrive at an agreement many Liberals remained hostile 
to the idea of working class influence within the party, an attitude 
supported by the National Liberal Federation which claimed to see 
difficulties, "both financial and of other kinds"(123) in this 
scheme. 
The City Council therefore remained beyond the control of 
Manchester Liberalism throughout the 1890's and in consequence 
its policies had little chance of being implemented. Liberalism 
offered no greater possibilities for working class reform than did 
socialism and an independent labour party, and whilst the Liberal 
Union lost its hold on the working class vote the idea of a 
socialist led Labour party in Manchester politics began to seem 
a distinct possibility in the near future. 
2. Relations with the S.D.F. 
In other Lanc; ashire towns the I.L.P.t s passage was not so 
smooth as in Manchester, with a friendly Trades Council and no 
serious S.D.F. opposition. Some areas presented considerable 
barriers to progress by the nature of the local political climate. 
Liverpool, with its vital working class Toryism, provided such an 
example. Although the Liverpool I.L P. had new unionist 
influence in the Trades Council(124) and an active local Fabian 
Society to support it the ground proved hostile to socialism, a 
fact which had been emphasised by the collapse of the Liverpool 
S.D.F. in 1887.(125) An I.L.P. branch was established in 1893 
and quickly took the lead in uniting trade unionists behind it in 
a Labour Representation Committee. Liaison between the trade 
union and socialist wings was {l'ovided by a group of socialist 
new unionists .led by Sexton of the Dockers. At the 1895 City 
Council elections the L.R.C. sponsored 13 candidates, almost 
half of them in Everton _ the I.L.P. stronghold.(126) None was 
elected and soon afterwards the L.R.C. was disbanded as disagreements 
broke out between the socialists and the more moderate trade 
unionists.(127) Nonetheless the lesson of labour unity had been 
learnt for in following years the Trades Council continued to 
display a more independent line than it had during its Liberal 
days of the late 1880 l s.(128) 
In a hostile atmosphere, similar to that of Liverpool, the 
I.L.P. had accepted the need to speak amicably to non-socialist 
trade unionists for the purpose of uniting all sections of the 
labour movement in the interests of creating 001 independent 
workers' party. This, however, proved to be a point of conflict 
with the S.D.F., which in turn had important consequences on the 
I.L.P.'s development. At the beginning of the 1890's the S.D.F. 
was the pre-eminent socialist party in the region. It possessed a 
manifestly more intellectual Marxist philosophy and in consequence 
displayed a wider appreciation of socialism than did the I.L.P., 
which in comparison seemed rather unprincipled. In 1893 Burgess 
of the Workman's Times claimedwith some justification that "the 
I.L.P. has many things to learn from the S.D.F.,,(129) In some 
instances the I.L.P. was willing to accept social democratic 
leadership in working class politics; such an example can be found 
at Rochdale, where an early policy of socialist unity was adopted(130) 
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and it is this type of liaison which l~,ds support to Dr. Tsuz.uki's 
assertion tha t the two partie s were "complemen tary rather than 
directly competitive in their appeal". (131) 
Unfortunately this conduct was not universally accepted. 
In the first place, social democrats felt that if the I.L.P. 
could only imitate, then it had no justification for a separate 
existence. Hyndman refused to entertain the idea of a party 
based on the working class(132) whilst Quelch, editor of Justice, 
argued that "an independent labour party ••••••• must be a social 
democratic party".(133) The S.D.F.'s unwillingness to compromise 
its socialist position for the ideologically less profound position of 
the I.L.P. would easily have prevailed but for a second, important 
source of dispute: the undeniable ability of the I.L.P.ls formula 
to win support in areas where the S.D.F. was established. The 
experiences of the Salford and Nelson social democrats proved this; 
in both cases social democracy had been diluted by the advent of 
the I.L.P. which had then proceeded to take charge of the socialist 
movement in those areas. The I.L.P. was therefore looked upon as 
a dangerous rival to the S.D.F., whose attitude changed from Darw9n l s 
"benevolent neutrality" of 1892(134) to the embittered behaviour in 
1894 of the Ne Ison and Wigan branche s which wanted to prohibit 
S.D.F. speakers t supporting I.L.P. platforms in towns where the two 
groups had rival branche s. (135) This trend explains the plea 
by Joe Terrett (A.G. WOlfe) in 1893 for the I.L.P. to include the 
acknowledgemen t "social democratic" in its ti tIe. (136) 
It must be emphasised that Nelson and Salford were the only 
areas in Lancashire where the I L P s d d 
• • • uperse e the S.D.F. in the 
early 1890's. The problem of rivalry was intensified, however, 
by Robert Blatchford's advocacy of socialist unity. There was 
something of value in Blatchford's idea since in many areas the two 
socialist parties were equally weak and would undoubtedly have 
benefited from co-operation. In 1894 Blatchford spoke of the 
,. 
"teal body and soul of socialism" in the North which was expressed 
by neither of the factious parties.(137) He thought a divided 
movement "doomed to be beaten in detail,"(138) a warning not 
altogether unfounded. Blatchford's editorials in the clarion 
were increasingly turned towards the need for socialist unity in 
1894 but h is ideas collided with the aumbling block of doctrinaire 
s6ctionalism, even though Blatchford was prepared to base his 
National Socialist party on the principles of social democracy.(139) 
His promptings had some influence within the I.L.P. but the overtures 
made by the National Administrative Council received no encouragement 
r 
from the S.D.F.,(140) whose prevailing attitude was against the 
(141) 
creation of a "cross breed, a mongrel". 
The problems of the relationship between the LL.P. and the 
S.D.F. were never satisfactorily solved and it was left for local 
branches to sort out working arrangements; but the real barrier 
was that the ideals of the two parties did not coincide and each 
was unwilling to sacrifice its plans for the benefit of the other, 
an attitude which is under standa ble but vb ich rendered the socia lis t 
synthesis the more difficult of realisation. 
3. The I.L.P. and The Cetton Unions 
Any party which, like the I.L.P., sought to establish an 
2.7t 
independent; institutionalised basis for labour politics in 
Lancashire was forced at some stage in its development to attempt 
infiltration of the cotton trade unions. Because the cotton 
unions were amalgamated it was necessary to secure influence in 
local branches, as the S.D.F. had done at Burnley. Initially the 
I.L.P. had no following in the cotton towns since the cotton 
unions had not been affected by the trade union. boom of 1889-90 
and the I.L.P. was essentially a party for the new unions. The 
I.L.P.'s principal foothold for working its way into the cotton 
unions was at Oldham, among the gas workers and labourers in the 
Trades Council, of which J.R. Clynes was elected President in 
November 1892. This influence did not extend initially to the 
cotton unions, which, with those of the engineering trade, 
effectively controlled the executive committee of the Council.(142) 
Clynes had attempted, during the inllustrial dispu~es of 1892-93, 
to extend socialist thinking among the cotton unionists, stumping 
neighbouring towns during the "twenty grim weeks of hunger, tears 
and hitter cold" (143), organising subscriptions on behalf of the 
d t 11 D ( 114 ) d . car room workers, advocating an Eigh our ay an urgIng 
the cotton workers to become politically active in their own 
cause: 
"That we do not take political action as unionists 
is not true at all. The evil is that we are half-hearted 
and inconsistent; and at one and the same time we complain 
to Parliament and continue to send to Parliament the men 
who make our complaints possible and necessary."(145) 
Clynes' work produced a mixed reception in Oldham. Though 
he gained in stature among the new unionists, his political 
opponents, notably Thomas Ashton of the local Spinners' Union, 
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became more intransigent. A movement was set afoot to reduce the 
influence of Clynes in the Trades Council and in 1893 he was 
opposed in the presidential election by Schofield, the Engineers' 
secretary, a supporter of "no politics" in trade unionism; 
Clynes was defeated by one vote but was unanimouslye lected to the 
position of vice-president. (146) He was still in a position to 
influence events but it was another year before any substantial 
progress was made by the I.L.P. at Oldham. 
Fortunately, events were beginning to take a turn for the 
better in another town. The I.L.P. managed to revitalise the 
political labour movement at Nelson, which, since its breakthrough 
of 1890,had slumped; at the municipal elections of 1891 the S.D.F. 
had supported one candidate against the two established parties and 
it seemed that the principle of independence might subside through 
lack of effort and guidance, as it had done at Bolton from 1887-9 • 
The revival came in December 1892 after a municipal bye...election had 
produced the defeat of a Trades Council nominee by an official 
Liberal candidate. It was decided to fight official liberalism 
with a coalition of socialists and trade unionists and in the same 
month a party was formed, called the Independent Labour Party, 
comprising social democrats, radicals and more moderate trade 
unionists. (147) The group contested the 1893 municipal elections 
with 5 candidates: all those with socialist backgrounds were 
defeated but two trade unionists, one of them the radical William 
Ward of the Weavers, were successful. (148) Furthermore in the 
following School Board contest the socialists lent support to the 
Trades Council candidates in another joint effort, with the 
result that three labour councillors were installed. (149) 
In comparative terms this was a striking achievement 
although, as was seen, it did not improve general relations 
between the S.D.F. and the I.L.P. On the other hand no Lancashire 
borough elections produced better results for the socialists. (150) 
At Preston, where Keir Hardie had been delivering speeches, the 
(151) Weavers' Secretary Luke Park polled well but elsewhere 
I.L.P. candidatures were verymscouraging. Moreover, with trade 
beginning to improve early in 1894 the possibility of extending 
socialist influence in the cotton towns through the Eight Hours 
issue appeared to have faded. 
Far 'from revertin~ to their old industrial stance, however, 
the cotton unionists began to show increased interest in political 
questions during 1894. The reasons were partly internal ones; the 
Weaver,a' Amalgamation was still engaged in see king an amendmen t 
through Parliament to the Cotton Cloth Factories Act, whilst the 
spinning trade was working through the Textile Factory Workers' 
Association for a reform of the limited liability laws. The Card-
room Amalgamation was also beginning to stir after the lock out 
of 1892-93, which had drastically halted the union's growth, to 
(l5ry) press for a particulars clause for card room operatives. w 
All sections of the cotton industry were dismayed by the House of 
Lords' rejection of the Employer's Liability Dill in 1893, an 
event which prompted William Mullin of the Card-room Amalgamation 
to warn of "united action at the polling booth," by the cotton 
(153) 
workers. The Eight Hours question was still a part of the 
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U.T.F.W.A. policy although its form had by now taken that of a 
permissive bill which would allow trade option. 
The cotton unions' need for legislation against the 
indifference of Parliament was admitted by the Cotton Factory Times 
as early as 1892, (154) but at the Textile Workers' conference of 
1893 labour representation was not discussed. Bye-elections at 
Stockport, Burnley and Accrington during 1893 revealed little 
interest on the part of cotton worker votffa in these issues, a 
point which did not escape the&tention of James Mawdsley, who 
took the opportunity to remark 
"If the operatives of Lancashire •••• do not, 
at the next general election, send a fair proportion 
of men pledged to their programme, it will be a fair 
assumption to make that they themselves care precious 
little for it." (155) 
The Cotton Factory Times endorsed this view: 
the 
"If the workers are to secure~legislation they are 
asking for they will sooner or later have to make 
the adoption of their programme the point on which 
elections must turn." (156) 
How far was the I.L.P. able to provide a directing influence? 
At Burnley and Nelson the inspiration of the I.L.P. and the 
S.D.F. caused the local unions to stand firm on the Eight Hours 
issue; the interest shown in union affairs at Nelson had been 
greatly increased by the recent co-operation of Labour and 
Socialist forces (157) Dnd in 1894 the Weavers' Associations of 
Burnley, Colne and Nelson strongly condemned the suggestion that 
the U.T.F.W.A. should compromise on Eight Hours. (158) It was 
largely through the insistence of the local unions at Burnley and 
Nelson that the Northern Weavers' Amalgamatio~ decided in March 
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1894 to bring the question of Labour representation also before the 
U.T.F.W.A. (159) 
The matter was discussed at the Textile Workers' conference of 
August 1894; the general tone was favourable but since interest in 
Eight Hours had been slackening (160). it was decided to hold a 
ballot on both questions. (161) Against the limited influence of 
the Socialists was ~anged the confused mind of the Union l~adership. 
The encouraging results of an experiment at Mather and Platt's 
Salford Ironworks with a 48 hour week (162) may have convinced 
some officials that a shorter working day was worth attempting, 
and James Mawdsley had signed the Minority Report of the Royal 
Commission on Labour in 1894, specifically noting the cotton unions' 
desire to secure a curtailment of working hours. (163) IIyndman, 
before a meeting of the International Congress of Textile workers 
at Manchester in July, had told foreign socialists that Mawdsley 
was "rapidly becoming a Socialist" (164) himself; David IIolmes, on 
the other hand, remained sceptical of socialism and wary of 
associating with its po~ics. (165) On the labour re~resentation 
issue Mawdsley showed signs of favour towards independence (166) 
but at the same time was firmly ensconced as a member of the Ashton 
under Lyne Conservruive Association. (167) 
The ba~lot was held at the end of October 1894; trade was 
not good but it had been worse in recent years. Each section of 
the industry polled separately on the two issues so that individual 
branches of the Card room, Spinners, Weavers' and Overlookers' 
Amalgamations'Tall made returns. In the spinning trade Eight Hours 
received a more favourable response generally than labour 
representation, although the reverse was t~e in the weaving 
manufacturing districts. Since many smaller areas probably 
followed the lead of the ,larger, more active centres it was on~ 
the latters' decisions that the outcome turned. The lack of 
unanimity in Bolton and Oldham decided Labour representation 
policy: both had majorities against the idea. The spinning trade 
was probably keener on Eight Hours because the memories of the 
lock out were still fresh; but a particulars clause for spinning, 
eventually worked into the Factory Act of 1895, was the trade's 
only immediate legislative aim and full scale labour representation 
seemed a big price to pay for it. Conversely, the Eight IIours Day 
was rejected by the big weaving centres where the prospect of 
increased earnings was threatened by a shorter working day when 
operatives were paid by the piece. (168) Labour r~presentation 
received its main support from the local societies favourable 
also to Eight Hours: Burnley, PadJham, Nelson and Colne (169) 
where the socialists were strongest. 
The ballot was a good indication of socialist influence 
among the cotton unionists but the main point to emerge was that this 
influence was clearly too limited for the socialists to be able to 
take the lead in establishing an independent labour movement based 
on the unions. When the Textile Factory Workers decided to 
implement the verdict of the ballot it became evident that labour 
representation would follow the traditional party lines. (170) 
Holmes and Mawdsley were chosen as cotton union candidates 
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representing each political party but the result of the ballot 
in the spinn'.ng towns showed that the spinners themselves were 
apathetic; Mawdsley and the Spinners' Amalgamation refused to 
co-operate in the scheme and so it was dropped. (171) 
Apart from the cost of labour representation, the scheme 
proved unacceptable to the Spinners for 'other reasons. In the 
first place Mawdsley and Holmes had been prominent in the veiled 
attempt made by old trade unionists to excluae socialists from 
the Trades Union,. Congress. Mawdsley and the Textile Factory 
Workers had given strong support to new standing orders for the 
Trades Union Congress in 1895 which had been forced through the 
Parliamentary Commlltee by the casting vote of its chairman, 
David Holmes. (172) These actions provided local cotton unions 
with an example of stern resistance ~ the socialists. Friction 
was well illustrated in the Oldham Trades Council, which for 
almost two years bad been moving towardsla clash between its 
socialist and moderate elements. In November 1894 Thomas Ash ton 
of the Spinners' resigned aa secretary of the Trades Council and 
Clynes was elected in his place. The socialists had been pressing 
for labour representation at a local level butthe Spinners, 
following the example of their Amalgamation, objected to the idea 
because of party divisions among their members and the heavy 
burden on union finances. (173) As secretary Clynes continued to 
press the scheme, arguing that labour representation would 
strengthen the influence of the Trades Council in the municipality. (174) 
In June 1895 the Oldham Spinners withdrew from the Trades Council (175) 
, 
an action which drastically reduced the Council's membership; (176) 
Its more serious consequence;. was a breach between the small, 
socialist unions, led by the Gas-workers, and the large group 
of politically uncommitted workers, numbering some 11,000 members 
and including the card room operatives. (177) Clynes' 
opportunity to manoeuvre the labour movement in Oldham under a 
socialist leadership was therefore lost. 
By 1895 therefore, the I.L.P. had failed sufficiently to 
establish itself in the cotton towns as .the guardian of the 
workers' best interests to hope for support from this source in 
the General Election. The progress of socialism in the mining 
districts was even less noticeable; with the exception of S.D.F. 
influence at Burnley and I.LP. footholds in east Manchester, the 
main centres of coal mining preserved a balance between the Tory 
and Liberal colliers by pursuing an independent brand of working 
class radicalism. There were very few active socialist clubs in 
any of the pit villages; moreover, none of the miners' leaders, 
except Jesse Butler, had any formal connection with the two 
socialist parties; Aspinwall was said to be sympathetic towards 
the I.LP. (178) but he never joined it, whilst Sam Woods refused 
to believe thatsocialism offered more to the worker than 
straightforward trade unionism. (179) Consequently the I.L.P. 
played no part in working class politics among the miners at this 
stage. 
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4. Internal Problems 
Policy differences and personal rivalries have been. shown to 
have been a serious threat to the early development of the I.L.P.(180) 
The party had no dominating central influence such as London 
exercised in the S.D.F: the geographical distribution of the I.L.P. 
in the 1890's was concentrated almost entirely in Lancashire, the 
West Riding and i-Scotland and each of these elements attempted to 
assert its views on how the I.L.P. should develop. 
The most important issue in debate between Lancashire and the 
other regions in these years was the Fourth Clause. Blatchford 
heartily approved of it, and though occasional complaints were made 
that it inhibited membership, (181) Lancashire branches clung to 
its principles. The Fourth Clause in the constitution of the 
Manchester and Salford I.L.P. simply required a pledge of members 
that in an election they would not vote for a candidate of the 
Liberal, Liberal Unionist or Conservative parties. The object of 
this clause was to prove to the workers of Lancashire that the new 
party was not a political trap, but that it was genuinely independent 
of both the Liberals and the Tories. (182) The Manchester people 
were not convinced that the I.L.P. in other regions had 
successfully established its independence from radicalism, and their 
fears received support from the events in the Halifax bye-election 
of 1893 when John Lister, the I.L.P. nominee, took care to emphasise 
that he was a labour, not a socialist candidate. (183) At the 
Bradford conference of the I.L.P. in 1893 William Johnson of 
Manchester tried to persuade the delegates to adopt the Fourth 
Clause as national party policy but the move was rejected, largely 
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at the insistence of Bradford I.L.P. (184) This reversal was 
not an end to the matter, however, for at the following year's 
conference the Fourth Clause principle received a bigger share 
of the votes and was defeated by a compromising motion which 
allowed local parties to decide their own policy in this matter 
at bye-elections. (185) 
In b~oad terms the clause was important because it questioned 
the very nature of the I.L.P. Its main opponent was Keir lIardie 
who wanted the I.L.P. vote to be free, to be used in mass if 
necessary against one of the political pariles; a disfranchised 
socialist, he thought, would be unable to adopt such taetics. (186) 
I1ardie re pre sente d the general I.L.P. de sire to e limina te the Liberal 
party; he saw it as the main enemy of the I.L.P. and thought that 
any radical group of the left must crush the Liberal movement 
before it could secure working class votes. llardie's was a 
perfectly reasonable aSBumption for a man of his background; he 
had himself experienced the shackling effect of the Liberals on 
working class politics during the Mid-Lanark bye-election of 1888;(187) 
as a Scotti~ miner he had grown up on an atmosphere of working class 
radicalism hut knew practically nothing about working class 
conservatism. llardie's reasoning had therefore little relevance 
to Lancashire and his assertion, made at Bolton in 1895, that "the 
choice (for the worker) lies 'twixt the I.L.P. and the Tory" made 
(188) 
no sense. 
Blatchford, on the other hand, was thoroughly acquainted with 
Lancashire conditions; he had no quarrel with the idea of recruiting 
supporters from the Liberal party but saw no point in 
perpetuating Toryism: 
"I do not see any 'moral' effect to be 
gained by selling our vote to the 
highest bidder, or by making anyally 
of an enemy".(189) 
He added the crucial point that: 
"Both parties are our enemies and 
our object is to defeat both".(190) 
To counteract the division in working class politics Blatchford 
therefore saw the need for the Fourth Clause in Lancashire 
to build an independent socialist movement. His call for a 
united socialistaarty(191) was a logical step from this belief. 
Mingled with Blatchford's hostility to Hardie over the 
Fourth clause was his personal dislike of the Scot who was 
beginning to assume the role of leader of the I.L.P. Blatchford 
had always possessed a strong aversion to the concept of 
leadership; for this reason he had resigned the presidency of 
the Manchester party and though briefly in 1892 he had considered 
John Burns as "the head of front of the Great Labour Movement in 
England"(192) he was soon telling his readers, "I don't see any 
parnell in the Labour movement •••• we want no leaders and should 
be ill-advised to tolerate any". ( 193) It cane as a great 
personal blow, therefore, when Blatchford saw llardie elected 
the 
President of the I.L.P. atA1894 conference. 
Blatchford could always submerge his disappointments, 
however, by concentrating more deeply on improving the Clarion, 
and the journal began to take up more of his time in the mid-nineties; 
l~J. 
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but whilst he moved to Fleet Street he left confusion behind in 
Manchester. His influence on other I.L.P. personalities had been 
unsettling for the party. The fourth clause had been defeated but 
the Lancashire I.L.P. men still had to seek some kind of co-operation 
with the party in general, especially since in 1894 Leonard Hall and 
Fred Brocklehurst, both important officials at Manchester (194) , 
had been elected to the National Administrative Council. They faced 
the dilemma of standing by the policy of the National I.L.P. or 
of remaining loyal to Blatchford; moreover, both were I.L.P. parliamentary 
candida te 8. 
Hall had subscribed to Blatchford's views on Socialist unity (195) 
but the two men gradually drifted apart in 1894 as Blatchford continued 
to make critical attacks on "Leadership", much to Hall's discomfort; 
in November Hall resigned as president of the Manchester party, 
having feared~at he was regarded as a figurehead. (196) There 
followed a journalistic duel in the Clarion (197) between the two 
which did nothing to improve relations in the party nor to build 
up socialist morale for the anticipated General Election. The sordid 
affair was completed by Hall's renunciation of the Fourth Clause 
and his withdrawal as I.L.P. candidate at North East Manchester on 
the eve of the poll, ostensibly through shortage of campaign 
funds. ( 198) 
At about this time Blatchford revealed his utter despondency 
to A.M. Thompson ("Dangle" of the Clarion.): 
"I feel very sick of the British WorkJUan and his leaders; 
and also of the dirty lies, tricks and intrigues of the 
lousy political crew ••••• I rather like a good honest fight 
with a good honest man. But this is a dirty mob of 
political blackguards we are fighting with. They make me 
sick. I ask myself is it worth it? Will anything come of 
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it? Read the speech of (J.H.) Wilson's (199). It is 
such insolent dishonesty. It is such unscrupulous falsehood; 
Then think of LeonardHall's case; of the shameful mess in' 
the Manchester I.L.P; of the envy and stupidity of (Joseph) 
Burgess; of the slipperiness of Hardie; of the blather and 
humbug of Hyndman; of the wriggling and twisting of (T.R.) 
Threlfall; of the blind ignorance and miserable toadyism 
of Pickard & Co., of the bumptious arrogance and endless 
~l:fishness of (John) Burns; of the meart~ss, the folly, the 
weakness, cowardice and ignorance of the great mass of the 
workers; of the vanity, spite and envy of the little S.D. 
effersl" (200) 
Rivalry and bad feeling among the I.L.P. leadership created 
confusion among the rank and file, preventing full attention being 
paid to the parliamentary campaigns of 1895. Financial problems 
also bedevilled election work since few branches had succeeeded in 
attaining a high enough membership and sound organisation during the 
previous few years,Of the areas selected for parliamentary campaigns 
Bolton had the most vigorous branch; it ran a monthly labour journal 
and supported a lively Labour Church. (201) Rochdale I.L.P. 
members were also active and had a fine parliamentary candidate in 
G. N. Barnes of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. At the other 
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extreme James Sexton was selected as I.L.P. candidate for Ashton under 
Lyne before even a club had been set up on the town. (202) Much 
depended on the drive pf candidates and the ability to recruit 
voluntary workers and financial aid. 
There were 8 I.L.P. candidates at the Gener~l Election in 
Lancashire; only where the Liberal party failed to find a candidate 
did the I.L.P. secure a respectable poll, and at Gorton, Wh~re 
Dr. pankhurst stood for the I.L.P.,a straightforward deal was 
negotiated with the Liberals to avoid splitting the radical vote. (203) 
All the cand~es presented socialist programmes of varying detail 
and all attempted to convince the electorate of their 
independence; but these man~vres brought no meaningful results 
for it was clear that the I.L~P. lacked the ability to challenge 
either Liberals or Conservatives. Half of the campaigns produced 
humiliating results. (204) The Liberal party also polled badly 
in the region but seemed in no danger of being replaced by the 
I.L.P. as the party on the left; though the Labour Leader noted the 
Liberal defeat and spoke of the I.L.P.'s "converts by the thouSand"(205) 
the Clarion, which had given little spac. to the campaigns in its 
columns, expressed by its allence what must have been the prevailing 
mood ef the party. 
5. Social Bases of the I.L.P. 
In spite of these failures the I.L.P. remained 8n active force 
in Lancashire working class politics, even increasing the number 
of r!s branches in the later 1890's. The party proved sufficiently 
resilient to survive its political defeats because of the 
intellectual and social bases of the movement. 
Firstly, the Clarion had achieved a resounding success in 
preaching socialism: "the policy the TIlE CLARION is a policy of 
humanity" declared Blatchford in the first issue,(206) ~nd ttie 
journal stimulated a remarkable interest in what might be called 
"socialism of the heart". 
contemporary socialist in 
J;larty populalfiand though he has 
thought (207) he was able 
B1atchford succeeeded more than any 
creating an intellectual basis for a 
been accused of adding nothing to Socialist 
to exploit a mass readership in the 
Clarion, by presenting political discussion alongside literary and 
sporting news, in a wby which the purely propagandist weeklies were 
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never able to do. 
Blatchford also succeded in presenting the socialism of the 
I.L.P. in a readable form. lIe synthe sised his views in Merrie 
England, a penny edition of Some Clarion articles, which he 
published in 1894. In the bGok he examined industrial society, 
pointing out the injustices of wealth which arose from laisser 
faire economics, and said that by means of socialism society should 
be changed in order to create economic equality. Blatchford confessed 
that he kmlw little about the technical details required to 
establish a"socialist state", but saw his mission as that of a 
socialist "recruiting sergeant". (208) The book was completely 
different in character from the Marxis~scientific socialism which 
social democrats were encouraged to master. It hadllively style 8nd 
was written as an informal address to a typical English worker, 
John Smith of Oldham, with the author himself playing Devil's 
Advocate to his own arguments and then attempting to defend himself. 
Blatchford intended the reader to arrive at socialism through a 
sense of moral indignation, and in fact his book proved exceptionally 
popular as a polemical tract, selling three quarters of a million 
copies during its first year. (209) 
Unlike Marxian socialism that of the I.L.P. required no deep 
intellectual effort to comprehend; it was simply a means of showing 
the majority of those who suffered under capitalism how t6 improve 
their position. The I.L.P. concentrated on stimulating interest 
in socialism: once interest had been aroused it was kept active by 
par ticipa tion in the soc ialist communi ty, pr ovided by"local branch 
activities in the I.L.P. clubs where socialist men and women sought 
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comradeship and an escape from the drudgery of factory life. 
Through the inspiration of the Clarion,cycling clubs were established 
to provide an opportunity for week-ends out in the countryside. 
In 1896 Clarion Vans appeared, bringing intinerant lecturers to hold 
impromptu political meetings in town centres. (210) There were also 
Clarion clubs for singing, rambling and scouting. The Clarion 
clubs became"firmly and unequivocally socialist and, though 
affiliated to the Labour party and supporting its candidates at 
elections the Clarion members regarded themselves as the elite of 
(the Labour) movement, at once more go ahead and less corrupted 
by office" (211) These activities were especially popular in the 
industrial towns, where socialism offered not merely a philosophy for 
a better future but a completely new involvement in the present. 
In addition to the social aspects of the I.L.P's ethos 
was an equally important ingredient helping the party to mould 
itself to Lancashire conditions; this was its religious overtone. 
Such an assertion might at first seem strange since few of the 
prominent Lancashire figures, with the exception of Trevor and 
Drocklehur.t, were men of a religious outlook. Clynes, Settle and 
Sexton, for example, were of Irish Catholic upbringing; Clynes had 
made h'is revolt against the priesthood complete by the age of ten,' 
it appears (212), whilst the other two seem to have left religion 
behind when they reached adult years. The Clarion circle, moreover, 
was composed of irreverent agnostics, at least so it would seem 
judging by Blatchford's hostile articles on leading churchmen (213) 
and by his renunciation of religious faith in the early twentieth 
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century. Alex Thompson too felt little sympathy with the more 
sober, chapel-going I.L.P. leaders and was quite prepared to parody 
Keir I1ardie in mocking terms as "the man or sorrows, with .. crown 
of thorns on his brow, staggering up Galvary under the weight of 
his cross'~ (214) Had it been left to Blatchford the I.L ,P. would 
have appeared as anti-religious as the S.D.F., promoting the 
obvious popularity of the Clarion fellowship with its Sunday 
outings and secular emphasis that did so much to arouse the 
condemnation of IIardie. Dut, on the other hand, it is possible 
to see why the I,L.P. appealed to many people of a religious 
baokground, for some aspects of its work bore an unmistakable 
resemblance to the missionary ~e~l of the more evangelical churches; 
these were, for~in8tance the Clarion Vans, bringing the word to the 
people and the emotive biblical phrases in the speeches of Philip 
Snowden. These were characteristics of a party that had developed 
in a working cluss society where religion played a part, to a greater 
or lesser exten~, in social life. Yet there was a more fundamental 
link between the socialism of the I.L.P. and religion, and this 
was expressed in the existence of the Labour Church. 
It is worth remembering that the ethical appeal in the I.L.P.'s 
socialism coincided sharply with what were considered to be the basic 
ideals of the Christian faith. Capitalism, it could be claimed, 
was antipathetic to both and it is not surprising to find an agnostic 
like Clynes arguing that the great extremes of wealth and poverty 
that existed were sufficient to condemn society according to the 
Will of God. (215) Keir Hardie asserted that the principles of 
Christianity were consistent with the policies of the I.L.P. 
and this reasoning might be concluded thus: 
"Christian men and women, you say harmony prevails in 
Heaven. Harmony cannot result in any society from the 
operation of the competitive principles of capitalism. 
Therefore Heaven must be a social state." (217) 
(216) 
So it was that for a time the I.L.P. was able to cement its 
social foundations by drawing upon its religious appeal. 
, 
Where the I.L.P. was an attack on the class system in society, 
the Labour Church expressed the working man's discontent with the 
class system in religion. It sprang from such attitudes as those 
revealed by an anonymous working man from Darnoldswick who wrote 
to the Northern Daily Telegraph in 1889 about the sanctimonious 
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people who attended church "because it pays to be thought religious", 
who kept the mills open on Good Friday but closed the public houses, 
who regarded the irreligious with "cold indifference" and who 
behaved "as if they were afraid of a poor working man coming into 
contact with their cloth." (218) There were nh exclusively working 
class religious groups in Lancashire comparable to the Secular and 
Ethical movements in London (219) and the Labour Church attempted to 
fulfil the need. 
It was not entirely successful, always contributing more to the 
I.L.P. than to religion, though at first its founder, John Trevor, 
had made a conscientious attempt to bring religion to the masses. 
Trevor had arrived at Manchester in 1890 to take I'UP the appointment 
as Unitarian Minister for Upper Brook Street Chapel. Until then his 
life had been a chequered one; he had tra'\flled to Australia, 
practised as an architect and experienced both the rejection and 
re-acceptance of religious faith. (220) The turning point came in 
1888 when he was appointed assistant to Philip Wicksteed 
at the Little Portland Street Unitarian Chapel in London. 
"Wicksteed was immediately drawn to Trevor, and Trevor to him". (221) 
At Manchester Trevor quickly became dissatisfied with the 
established churches: "I wanted a religion that would place a man 
and a church side by side with God," he explained later (222); 
"it beca;ie plain to me that I must go outside and throw 
myself wholly into the midst of self-conscious Labour 
movemen t." (223) 
It was to Wicksteed, the scholar and social worker,that Trevor 
turned: "the Labour Church rested on Wicksteed's broad shoulders 
as long as I was connected with it" (224) 
What sort of religion did Trevor create for the working man? 
The basis of the Labour church was woven into Trevor's five 
. . 1 (225) h' h t d t' 11 . d' . d l' t prlnc1p es, w 1C crea e an essen la y 1n 1V1 ua 1S 
creed. He saw God in the Labour movement, "working through it as 
once he had moved through Christianity;" (226) it therefore remained 
to develop the theme, 
"making freedom and religion &ynonymous terms to the 
extent that the two be understood to be indissolubly 
un i te d ." ( 227 ) 
In order to achieve this the historic religious elements were.pared 
down, leaving a vague concept of God as the "Power" that brought men 
into being. (228) In consequence much religious significance was 
lost through Trevor's willingness to sever connections with the 
established churches; many people cannot have been absolutely clear 
about the Labour Church's standpoint, especially after its secretary 
had declared "it has no clear policy - no distnct mission. It has 
a tendency rather than an aim." (229) 
It services were very secular; at the initial meeting of the 
Manchester and Sal ford Church proceedings were opened by an 
overture,played by a string band, a prayer and a song. The service 
was held, appropriately, in Chorlton Town Hall. The Labour Church 
had its own Hymn books and rites for baptism, marriage and burial. (230 ) 
With this secular atmosphere the Church quickly became associated with 
the iI.L.P. as a propaganda wing of the party. The connection is 
revealed by the location of Labour Churches; Lancashire was 
comparatively rich in them but their growth was tied to the 
development of the I.L.P. The earliest foundations were at 
Manchester, Bolton and Oldham; by September 1892 the Manchester 
Churcn had organised five meeting places in the different 
parliamentary divisions of the city. At the Labour Church conference 
of 1893 five Lancashire churches sent delegates - Accrington, Barrow 
(281) Bolton, Manchester and Salford and Otlham. In other places 
where Churches existed attendances were poor. By 1899 there were only 
five Labour Churches active, at Bolton, Farnworth, Hyde, Rochdale and 
Manchester and Salford. (232) Two of the Lancashire establishments 
were to enjoy long histories, those of Hyde and Stockport maintaining 
an existence until just after the Second World War. 
Local I.L.P. branches often accounted for successful Labour 
Churches. In 1894 the party decided to encourage its branches "to 
run a Sunday meeting on Labour Church lines" (233) and as a result 
re ligion and politics be came inextricably mixed. "The tone of the 
movement is markedly secularist", noted the Labour Prophet, the 
organisation's journal, of the Rochdale Labour Church: "several 
of the Rochdale men objected strongly to the Labour Church as 
confounding religion with economics." (234) The most active Church 
during the 1890's was at Bolton, where B.J. Harker had converted 
his Congregational Chapel into a Labour Church in 1892. Its 
impetus was derived mainly from ~red. Brocklehurst's campaign as 
I.L.P. parliamentary candidate for the constituency in the 1895 
General Election. Brocklehurst visited Bolton on many occasions 
between 1892 and 1895 and established a monthly journal, the Bolton 
and District I.L.P. Pioneer. He had graduated from Queen's College 
).q~ 
.. (235) Cambridge in 1892 having worked 1n a Macclesf1eld factory as a boy. 
His first thought was of becoming an Anglican clergyman but instead 
he decided to become a political agitator; nontheless his editorials 
in the Pioneer were heavily laced with religious subjects; like 
many others he related socialism to the teachings of Jesus. (236) 
He organiSed welfare services for children in Bolton and in 1894 
arranged for over two thousand free meals to be given to the needy 
as well as collecting a fund to send sick infants for a rest cure 
to the seaside. (237) Allen~larke, the socialist writen and 
popular journalist, claimed that the Labour church would be the 
"most potent in that moral and social elevation 
of humanity known as Socialism, that Bolton has yet 
seen."(238) 
By the late 1890's however, the movement was in obvious 
decline; H.C. Ro~ writing in the Labour Annual in 1895, ascribed 
three functions - propaganda, education and social welfare - to 
the Labour Church. Allfuree could be performed by other bodies. 
Trevor had suggested Labour Church Sunday Schools, but few appeared 
and the established churches maintained their most important 
influence through education. They were even able to challenge the 
social functions of the Labour Church once the Pleasant Sunday 
Afternoon movement had grown.m ~he last analysis, however, it was 
the aim of the Labour Church to keep alive the class struggle (240) 
and the danger was that this function could be better performed by 
the I.L.P. Trevor himself was partly to blame for the use of Labour 
Churches as political meeting places; he had originally admitted 
that 
"the Labour £hurch platform should be accepted as an 
Independent Labour Party platform."(241) 
.. 
His intention had been to keep the two organisations separate with 
his movement attempting to maintain "the supremacy of humanity" (242) 
in the political movement as a whole but many Labour Churches found 
themselves housed, financed and officered by the I.L.P. (243) 
When it became apparent that Labour Churches were merely convenient 
meeting places for socialists on Sundays (244) Trevor denounced the 
trend as "a rotten foundation to build upon" (245) but the individual 
religious sustenance he had intended to provide for the worker 
became instead an agentfor political change. When John Trevor fell 
ill in 1896 and went abroad for a time the movement lost what 
dynamism it had; most of the Lancashire branches had come to ani 
end by the turn of the century and there were no significant 
founda tions after then. (246) Dr .E. J. Hobsbawm's epitaph for the 
Labour Church ~ "its chief function was to lubricate the passage of 
Northern workers from Liberal Radicalism to an Independent Labour Party 
and having done this is disappeared ••••• " (247) certainly seems to be 
borne out by events in Lancashire. 
6 . Summary 
As a party devoted to establishing an independent workers' platform 
in municipal and parliamentary politics the I.L.P. must be judged by its 
own aims. What had it achieved after the first three years of its life? 
Mainly, some useful propaganda which outlined a new course in politics from 
M'911 t; b~""fit j 1"'- ;lA.UI\;";pAI pol'-t.(:! -n~ 11.(> 
which working peoPleihad so~e good ideas, but could it hope to become the 
executor of its own ideology? The experience of these first three years, 
culminating in the disappointments of the 1895 General Election, 
suggested that it ~ould not, at least in the conditions of the time. It 
was recklessly optimistic to imagine that the I.L.P. (or the S.D.F.) could 
. 
become the party of the working people in the near future; working class 
political divisions went far too deep to allow for any such complete 
conversion. The party's 40 odd Lancashire branches of the mid 1890's cannot 
have represented more than 2,000 active members and its showing at the 
parliamentary polls in 1895 confirmed its lack of appeal as a parliamentarYI 
force. The whole character of the movement suggested an 61it~c group that 
would require solid bases upon which to build. The trade unions could 
provide these bases. They offered the best hope for an independent working 
class party and if this was to be at all socialist in outlook then the 
I.L.P. would have an important role to play in it, as an exponent of 
ideology. But the future did not seem so clear in 1895. The disappointments 
of the socialist campaigns of the early 1890's had caused confusion in both 
the I.L.P. and the S.D.F. Was it better t~ pursue the Labour Alliance, and 
face a possible further rebuff by th' t 't th e unIons, or 0 unl e e two parties 
~ 
I 
and thus strengthen the socialist camp? The problem of strategy was to I 
bulk large in the history of both parties during the next ten years. 
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PART III 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CHARACTER OF LABOUR 
The years from 1900 to 1906 were the formative ones in the 
establishment of a Labour party in the Lancashire industrial region. 
It was during this time that the trade unions, particularly the 
Lancashire Miners and the cotton workers, came to adopt an independent 
political line, neither Conservative nor Liberal, and to bring their 
influence to near in working class voting. 
The Labour Party in Lancashire was never a united organisation: 
that is to say, it was a collection of local parties that had developed 
in the towns throughout the region. As such, its political characteristics 
varied considerably from town to town. Nor was it simply a trade union 
body: the socialists played their part also and though in terms of sheer 
numbers they were very much junior partners they had in certain areas 
established a primacy in ideas and methods that other more purely trade 
union parties could never match. In assessing the development of the 
Labour party, therefore, the role of the socialist cannot be discounted. 
In the three following chapters the interaction between socialism 
and trade unionism during the period 1895 to 1906 is surveyed. The 
problems examined are these; (i) the extent to which socialism had been 
established as a permanent feature of working class politics by 1900 
and the subsequent effect on the socialist parties of the trade union 
revival: (ii) why the trade unions sharply sWJng round to independence 
at the tUrn of the century and how this affected the development of 
local labour parties and (iii) how a radical recovery was made possible 
in the years 1900 to 1906 and how the incipient Labour party benefited 
from this in parliamentary politics. 
• Chapter 10 
S.D.F., I.L.P. AND WORKING CLASS UNITY. 
The sudden activity in working class politics of the early 1890'5 
came to an end after the General Election of 1895, with its setbacks 
for all three major sections of the working class movement. The cotton 
and mining unions, which had provided the best hope for parliamentary 
success, now faced the prospect of a long interval before the next General 
Election. Any immediate political ventures on the part of the cotton 
unions were in any case out of the question because of the disbandment 
in 1896 of the United Textile Factory Workers' Association, following 
disagreements between the Spinners' and Weavers' unions over the legislative 
programme. (1) The disappointing situation in the cotton towns was 
represented in microcosm by the decision of the Nelson Weavers to dis-
continue intervention in municipal politics: the trade unions were with-
drawing from their participation in embryonic labour alliances. In 
consequence, hopes for the continued vitality of independent working 
class politics devolved to the socialist parties. 
1. The Socialists: Unity or Labour Alliance. 
The future looked bleak. The S.D.F. retained some influence in the 
weaving towns but the Federation's failure to reconcile the two wings 
of the labour movement at Burnley led to a slump in its hitherto most 
promising area. Moreover, the loss of the Weavers' support at Nelson, 
caused by developing antagonism between socialist and radical workers, 
was a serious blow to the progress of a trade union based socialist 
movement in north east Lancashire. In the conurbations of Manchester 
and Merseyside the S.D.F. had become an obscure sect; Manchester and 
Salford were almost completely taken over by the I.L.P. whilst the 
course of labour politics in Liverpool, where the S.D.F. had never been 
strong(2) led to a decision by the Trades Council in 1896 to reject 
labour representation with socialists. (3) 
For the remainder of the 1890's the S.D.F.'s network in Lancashire 
was fairly stagnant. The reasons for this were both psychological and 
physical. As a means of securing support the S.D.F. had relied to a 
great extent on its ability to exploit working class policies such as 
the Eight Hours Day and labour representation; on these issues the social 
democrats could find a fairly common meeting ground with trade unionists. 
The 1895 General Election effectively sealed the fate of these issues, 
for it demoralised working class groups and brought into power a 
Conservative government which offered no hope of dealing with advanced 
economic reforms. Without a receptive audience for its emotional appeals 
the S.D.F. was left equally demoralised and apathetic. The Election had 
opened up a political void necessitating a hard climb back to political 
prestige and this required renewed organisation at constituency level 
with success in municipal elections. 
It seemed, however, that the social democrats had lost their 
appetite for hard work. George Lansbury made a tour of Lancashire for 
the S.D.F. in 1896 but found little evidence of active propaganda being 
carried out: "I am a social man", he claimed, "and have no objection 
to clubs as clubs, but it should always be remembered that the first 
duty of a branch of the S.D.F. is to make socialists and not to provide 
cheap clubs". (4) The general attitude was reflected in the lack of 
speakers; Abrahams, the Lancashire organising secretary, could call upon 
only fourteen lecturers to cover almost a hundred proposed meetings at 
the end of 1896: four years previously there had been fifty lecturers 
available, but no new ones had been enrolled since 1894. (5) The number 
of active branches was never more than about ten during the late 'nineties. 
Support from London to help in municipal electioneering was sparse, for 
the same malaise was being felt nationally. In 1896 the Executive Council 
of the S.D.F. issued a model programme to concert the policies of local 
candidates, emphasising chiefly the need for the municipalisation of 
local services, such as coal, meat, milk, bread and drug supplies and 
calling attention to housing reform(6); although candidates were sponsored 
by local branches in Lancashire their appearances were intermittent and 
SUccesses isolated. (7) 
The I.L.P. suffered the same fate as the S.D.F. during this period 
through lack of real political gains. Because of the party's social 
infrastructure, branch foundations were maintained but political interest 
declined. The I.L.P. claimed an impressive list of branches in Lancashire 
and Cheshire(8) but a more significant sign of political activity was 
the number of these branches represented at the party's annual conference, 
and on this basis the proportion was never more than a quarter before 
the tUrn of the century. Moreover the bulk of these branches continued 
to be those in the Manchester region. Isolated examples of local 
electioneering are to be found and usually in greater numbe~than those 
for the S.D.F. but, once more, little success came the I.L.P.'s way. 
In 1897 the party polled just over 10,000 votes in municipal elections, 
with eighteen candidates, but in most instances the I.L.P. men came 
at the bottom of the poll in a three cornered contest. (9) By 1900 there 
were a few representatives on school boards and borough councils but they 
were the sole socialists, in most instances, alongside a phalanx of 
Conservatives and Liberals and consequently had no chance of forcing 
th h th · 1·· (10) roug elr po lCles. 
The local Lancashire parties were in much the same position as the 
National I.L.P.: poor organisation had resulted in low finances.(ll) 
Initiative at branch level was sagging and too many trivial problems 
were being referred to the National Administrative Council, a situation 
which led J. R. MacDonald to despair of the branches' readiness to be 
"bossed". (12) By the late 1890' s the I.L.P. News, which MacDonald had 
made into a monthly party circular out of the former Annual Report, was 
calling attention to the problems created by the proliferation of branches 
a few years earlier - laxity in the payment of capitation fees, neglect 
f b S • d t· d h . ff·· (13) o a lC u les an seer lne lClency. Whilst these were not 
grounds upon which to build a successful political movement some branches 
continued to cherish the wildest hopes; Barrow-in-Furness I.L.P., 
for instance, wanted to sponsor an I.L.P. candidate in a General 
Election, even though it had made no moves in local elections since 
1893 and had no prospects of finding a reliable person to stage a 
. (14) 
campalgn. 
The position in Lancashire was not improved by the discord developing 
between many branches and the National Administrative Council on questions 
of general policy. Through common experiences some local party groups 
were discovering the congeniality of Robert Blatchford's views on 
socialist unity; although Blatchford was now operating in London his 
influence among Lancashire socialists had not diminished and he was 
continually pressing the schemes for socialist unity which had first 
appeared in the Clarion during 1894. His personal animosity towards 
J. K. Hardie was as strong as ever, (15) thus proving an additional 
strain in the relations between Lancashire and the party's National 
executive. 
In 1896 the N.A.C. re-opened negotiations with the S.D.F. on the 
question of a fusion of the two parties.(l6) Lancashire pressure for 
the scheme was strong and at the annual I.L.P. conference of 1896 Fred 
Brocklehurst of Manchester. introduced a motion to change the party's 
name to that of "National Socialist party,,(17); since at this stage nothing 
had been decided with the S.D.F. delegates appeared willing to await 
the outcome of negotiations and consequently Brocklehurst's proposal 
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was rejected. When it became known, however, that the N.A.C. had 
f (18) the reaction re used the S.D.F.'s terms for straight forward fusion 
of Lancashire branches was instant. Although some of the more moderate 
I.L.P. members from the comparatively successful branches in the 
Manchester area proved to be supporters of a gradual move towards fusion(19) 
there were many who felt that the National Administrative Council was 
cheating the party by insisting on an overwhelming vote in favour of 
fusion from the branches. Moreover the N.A.C. now began to recommend 
the idea of federation with the S.D.F., and this scheme did receive a 
majority of supporters in a ballot of I.L.P. members in 1898. (20) But 
since the S.D.F. in turn rejected this idea, it was dropped. The N.A.C. 
had pointed out that "in Blackburn, Nelson, Rochdale, Ashton and several 
other places the local branches of the I.L.P. and S.D.F. already work 
cordially side by side and for elections and many propaganda purposes 
are already virtually federated together.,,(2~) There was much truth 
in this assertion, to be sure, but the effect of co-operation on the 
lines pointed out was to make a policy of fusion all the more desirable. 
Littleborough I.L.P. called for "one militant Socialist party"; the parties 
at Droylsden and Preston refused to enter the I.L.P.'s second ballot 
because they had already voted firmly in favour of fusion; Bolton West, 
Everton and Blackburn opposed the N.A.C. and Stockport announced its 
withdrawal from the I.L.P. "as a protest against the undemocratic action 
of the N.A.C.,,(22) The Lancashire arguments were clarified by 
Charles Higham of Blackburn at the 1899 conference of the I.L.P. at Leeds. 
-~----------
He spoke of the "excellent working arrangement" between the S.D.F. and 
I.L.P. in his own town, an arrangement which, he claimed, illustrated 
the ridiculous position of the N.A.C. in keeping the two parties separate 
and he went on to accuse the Council Members of self interest for 
choosing the course they took. Higham's speech gained some support 
from London delegates but the debate ended with the N.A.C.'s position 
affirmed. (23) 
What exactly was the situation in Lancashire which caused so many 
branches to engage in a spirited attack on party policy? By examining 
in detail some of the more active groups in the region a closer under-
standing of the problems facing socialists may be gained. 
During 1896 and 1897 the N.A.C. had been attempting to foster co-
3c~ 
t · b . . . f' l' t cl t cl .• t (24) opera lon y proposlng a JOlnt congress 0 SOCla lS s an ra e unlonlS s. 
In Lancashire such a move seemed too ambitious, for the socialists were 
still a long way from holding influence in any of the major trade unions 
or trades councils. The limits of socialist infiltration were narrow; 
at Burn1ey the Trades Council had two socialist leaders in John Markham 
and John Sparling in 1898. Both were S.D.F. veterans, active in early 
years, though Markham was no longer a Weavers' official whilst Sparling, 
who was becoming more and more involved in the local Miners' Association, 
had act 11 1 f . (25) ua yet the S.D.F. ln 1896. In any case the local Weavers, 
who made up the bulk of the Trades Council's membership, were still 
dominated by the Liberal Labourite, David Holmes, who was assisted by 
a new secretary, Fred Thomas, himself a Liberal town councillor by the 
tUrn of the century. At Manchester the I.L.P. was beginning to see some 
of its trade union members secure seats on the Trades Council executive 
committee; notable among them was J. E. Sutton of the Bradford Miners, 
a socialist city councillor, and John Harker of the Shirt and Jacket 
Cutters. Nuttall, of the Block Roller and Stamp Cutters, joined them 
in 1897 when George Tabbron, the social democrat, became the Trades 
Council's vice-president. (26) During that year the Council had worked 
with the local I.L.P. to secure labour representation on the School 
Board with the result that Nuttall and Brocklehurst were elected, to 
support a progressive education policy. (27) In another trades council 
where the socialists had some influence, that of Oldham, the results 
were not so encouraging. J. R. Clynes remained secretary and though 
nominally an I.L.P. member his connections with the party were becoming 
increasingly tenuous as his trade union responsibilities increased; in· 
1897 he took on the job of Lancashire District Secretary of the Gasworkers' 
Union, with whom he had formerly been a district organiser.(28) He had 
been the Oldham delegate to I.L.P. conferences in 1894 and 1895 but in 
following years handed this position over to an Oldham colleague, James 
Smith, in order to concentrate on union work, especially in building 
up the Trades Council membership after the Spinners' cecession of 1895.(29) 
The loss of Clynes' dynamic intervention had a startling effect on the 
Oldham I.L.P.; without easy gains in the trade union field the branch 
became ineffective and had ultimately to appeal to theN.A.C. for help 
------------------ --_ .. -
in reorganisation. Ke'ir Hardie and J. B. Glasier visited the town in 
1898 to address a large meeting at which, significantly, Clynes occupied 
the chair.(30) Thereafter a more resolute approach to propaganda and 
organisation was adopted with Clynes once more appearing for Oldham at 
National conferences. 
Clearly, therefore, the conversion of trade unionists to socialism 
was not easily realised; whilst most trad$ councils were fairly progressive 
in policy it was a different matter when it came to making them the 
backbone of an independent, socialist led, labour party. In the minds 
of many socialists it was an equally practicable and certainly more 
praiseworthy effort to concentrate on the mass conversion of the working 
class. For this aim, it was thought, socialist unity was needed. 
The histories of some of the more active socialist movements in 
Lancashire in the years immediatelypreceeding the foundation of the 
Labour Representation Committee show that socialist unity also offered 
the more important short-term hope of survival. The two most vigorous 
groups outside Manchester were those at Blackburn and Rochdale. Blackburn 
had a strong tradition of Conservatism but no socialist movement worth 
speaking of before 1897(31), when Joseph Burgess of the I.L.P. proposed 
to contest a bye-election in the town. The local Trades Council had been 
established in 1889 and by the early 'nineties had been successful in 
achieving the abolition of gas meter rents. There was usually a trade 
union representative in the borough council but this was insufficient 
pressure to affect questions of major importance such as the Fair 
Contracts clause, which the Corporation rejected outright in 1897. 
The decision was a telling one and led the Trades Council secretary, 
Maguire, to remark that "when it is anything affecting the working man 
that has to be considered both of the orthodox parties combine to 
crush him.,,(32) In spite of this, the Trades Council refused to co-
operate with the incipient socialist party in municipal elections and 
refrained from giving official support to Burgess, clinging to its 
established policy of prosecuting purely trade union work.(33) 
The socialist group was kept active through the co-operation of 
the I.L.P. and S.D.F., which produced a body of leaders of exceptional 
vigour and ability. Prominent among them were Hurley of the Gasworkers, 
a social democrat who became vice-president of the Trades Council in 
1899, and Fleming Eccles, later to become a national official of the 
trade unions in the chemical industry. This foothold in the local trade 
unions meant that the socialists were not completely hostile to, or 
divorced from, the union mentality. Additional factors helping them 
were in the first place the absence of a local radical party which could 
claim working class support and secondly an excellent socialist newspaper, 
the Blackburn Labour Journal. It first appeared in September 1897 and 
by 1900 claimed a circulation of six and a half thousand in the district; 
the journal was a monthly, produced by a group of socialists under the 
. direction of Charles Higham of the I.L.P. Its catholic views included 
support for the idea of trade union federation, prompted by the 
Engineers' lock-out of 1897-8, (34) and municipal social reform; "only 
by the collective control and ownership of the means 'of life can poverty 
be abolished". (35) All work on the paper, which was technically 
independent of the S.D.F. and I.L.P., was conducted voluntarily but 
it raised money by public subscriptions, advertising charges and its 
selling price of a penny. It fulfilled admirably the socialists' need 
for communication. 
In electoral policy the socialists were rewarded with regular 
small Successes; in 1897 the I.L.P. had secured a representative on the 
borough council but the first attempt at co-operation with the S.D.F. 
appears to have been in 1898 in the election of a borough auditor. 
Hurley won the contest and the stimulus encouraged 8 socialist candidates 
(36) in the Board of Guardians contest of the same year: two were returned. 
With two further victories in the November municipal elections the 
socialist group now had three councillors, and since the Trades Council 
had also increased its representation to three the Liberal party, with 
ten representatives, was seriously threatened as the left-wing opposition 
to the Conservatives in the borough council. But lack of harmony between 
the socialist and trade union councillors inhibited a coalition, and 
with the socialists steadfastly refusing to join a progessive alliance 
with the Liberals(37) their "Glasgow style,,(38) policies of municipal 
reform at first achieved little. 
An important development took place in 1899. As a result of its 
disappointing ventures into the work of lobbying for a Fair Contracts 
clause, the Trades Council decided to prosecute political action with 
increased earnestness(39); at the 1899 municipal elections the socialists, 
with six candidates, took the unprecedented step of supporting a non-
socialist trade union candidate.(40) This action brought about a freer 
relationship with the Trades Council and although only Hurley was 
successful among the candidates of the new alliance at least the Labour 
party could find solace in the fact that with eight councillors it had 
achieved parity with the Liberals. "Poor dwindling Liberal party", 
announced the Labour Journal, "every year witnesses another damaging 
defeat for it.,,(41) 
By 1900, therefore, the B~ckburn socialists had created a labour 
alliance in which they retained a major voice. The prospects for a 
socialist led Labour party, once the initial difficulties between 
(42) 
socialist and non-socialist councillors could be overcome, appeared 
to be greatly improved. The crucial event which affirmed the Labour 
advance in Blackburn and assisted its future development was the 
appearance of Phi1ip Snowden. 
Snowden was born at Cowling, just inside Yorkshire, in 1864. As 
a youth he had lived at Nelson with his family but after the death of his 
father he returned to Yorkshire, where he was at first attracted to 
Liberalism through the pressure of the weaving community in which he 
lived. In the mid-nineties he became a socialist and made his mark as 
~/O 
a local politician of note by sitting on both the Cowling Parish Council 
and School Board. In 1899 he was elected to the Keighley Town Council. (43) 
Snowden's principal political assets were a keen intellect and an 
incomparable oratica1 prowess; though not a practising Christian he had 
experienced a Wes1eyan upbringing and knew how to infuse his speeches 
with a religious fervour; sometime during 1895 he had joined the I.L.P., 
for which his first major address was on the subject of "religion and 
socialism" and was a resounding success; he ~arried on the Labour Church 
tradition of the Christianity of socialism and perfected it into a power-
fu1 platform technique. His brilliantly incisive oratory, especially on 
economic questions, brought him into national prominence so quickly that 
he was co-opted on to the N.A.C. of the I.L.P. in 1899 following the 
resignation of Pete Curran. In 1900 he accepted the invitation of the 
Blackburn socialists to be their parliamentary candidate(44), and as a 
convinced parliamentarian who believed in evolutionary socialism he won 
the support of the Trades Council. Most of the money to finance his 
campaign seems to have come from I.L.P. sources, though there was a 
local parliamentary election fund which helped to support the cost.(45) 
Snowden fought against the chauvinism of the Boer War in a town 
depressed by a temporary slump in the cotton trade. He spoke against 
reductions in wages - "an insane· process" - which involved the reduction 
also in the working man's purchasing power, already too 10w.(46) In 
addition he argued for the public ownership of industry, an eight hour 
day and complete adult suffrage. He rejected revolutionary shibboleths, 
such as the abolition of the Royal Family, and concentrated upon 
measures which would materially improve the social and economic 
condition of the working people.(47) The campaign was assisted by the 
absence of a Liberal candidate so that Snowden faced the two Tories 
alone; he was given the moral support of the radical Northern Daily 
Telegraph and some local Libral clubs sent volunteers to help his 
campaign workers. (48) By his close association with the socialist 
Hurley, a Catholic, Snowden managed to secure a substantial Catholic 
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vote; he won over 7,000 votes and his campaign~~ new era in electioneering IL(49) 
showed that with better organisation and more favourable circumstances 
. . . (50) Blackburn could be won by a socialist labour candidate. 
Few other Lancashire towns could match the progress made in Blackburn 
by Socialist unity. But even here success turned on the tacit acceptance 
by the socialist of the need for trade union support: "We uphold trade 
unionism because it has been, and is, the bulwark of the workers against 
capitalist aggression.,,(5l) 
The Rochdale socialists had initially promised at least as much: 
in 1895 the I.L~P. parliamentary candidate had been the socialist trade 
union official G. N. Barnes, who had fought a creditable campaign, and 
shortly afterwards the S.D.F. had begun to co-operate extensively with 
the I.L.P. A monthly paper, th~ Rochdale Labour News, was circulated 
and encouragement was given to Clarion cycling clubs, field classes and 
educational groups. By these means it was hoped to attract women members. 
Efforts were made to engage nationally known speakers, such as Ramsay 
MacDonald. In addition to the comradeship provided in the separate clubs 
of the two socialist parties, joint political meetings were held at 
the Labour Hall. The Labour News became the focal point for the move-
mentIs political work: "It is a medium whereby all municipal jobbery, 
extravagance and incapacity will be exposed.,,(52) The socialists, 
or Progressive Movement as they preferred to be called, concentrated 
on pressing the municipal council to grant as many social reforms as its 
powers allowed: in its first programme the party demanded greater en-
deavour on the part of the Corporation in public works, including the 
conferring of an eight hour day and standard wage rates on all municipal 
employees; public purchase of the tramways and markets was suggested as 
well as control over housing and the provision of public parks. (53) The 
object was to improve living conditions; "We want", stated the Labour 
News," to take possession of our Town Council in order to control the 
affairs of our town for the improvement of the lives of its "inhabitants -
destruction of slums and the erection of better houses; improved sanitation 
and c.,,(54) 
The failure to achieve a solid socialist front for the realisation 
of these aims was due to the lack of working class unity. Firstly, 
Rochdale was a town of strong working class radicalism; the cotton unions 
and the Trades Council were nominally independent of politics but many of 
their members owed allegiance to the Liberals. At the same time the 
socialists found no other union on which they could base a labour alliance, 
for their only representative in the Trades Council was Hacking, a member 
""3 ), 
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of the relatively minor Bakers' union. (55) The Labour News began to 
attack trade unionism, which it regarded as a reactionary movement unable 
to grapple with the real problems of the working class(56), whilst 
supporting a weak policy of compromise which advised socialists, prior 
to the political breakthrough of their own party, to give their votes to 
the candidates of other parties who would champion measures of reform. (57) 
Inevitably the socialist cause suffered and electioneering brought 
nothing; before 1899, when the Progressives returned their nominee for 
the minor post of borough auditor, there was only one I.L.P. representative 
in an elected body - the School Board. Severe defeats were regularly 
experienced at the polls by a handful of candidates(58). 
1900 represented no advance for working class forces at Rochdale 
from the position of 1895. The socialist candidate was C. Allen Clarke, 
a former student teacher who had become a well know journalist during the 
'nineties for his work with the Cotton Factory Times and later as the free-
lance humourist "Teddy Ashton". Clarke was a Bolton man and had been 
associated with the socialist movement in that town, but though he was 
a well respected dialect writer he did not possess the personal qualities 
needed to rouse the Rochdale electorate. His 900 votes was a poor 
performance. (59) Yet even this was an improvement on the type of socialist 
campaign which attempted to live on thin air; Accrington represented such 
an instance, where John Hempsall secured only 433 votes in a fight against 
the Liberals and Conservatives. (60) 
By the turn of the century, therefore, events were beginning to show 
that socialist unity by itself was a less successful formula for electoral 
progress than was the labour alliance. The example of Blackburn displayed 
the vitality in local politics of co-operation between trade unionists 
and socialist parties, whilst the narrow policy of socialist unity pursued 
at Rochdale seemed to have no future. 
2. Towards the Labour Alliance 
Two more examples may be taken to demonstrate the opportunities 
offered by a broadly based socialist labour party. At Pendlebury, in the 
Eccles parliamentary division, the I.L.P. began to contest municipal 
elections in the late 1890's; Pendlebury and Swinton were two towns in a 
thoroughly working class mining district where housing conditions were 
bad and public amenities, such as baths and libraries, non-existent. 
Social reform, especially in the fields of housing and health, became the 
foremost policy of the I.L.P., matched against the District Council's 
insistence on keeping down the rates.(6l) The I.L.P. newspaper, the 
Pioneer, carried articles in the summer of 1899 revealing the insanitary 
conditions of working men's houses and informing occupiers of their rights 
. (62) 1n respect of the public health laws. It was suggested that the local 
authorities take over control of house building in order to ensure decent 
standards and when the argument was raised that municipal housing schemes 
were uneconomic the I.L.P. prepared a comprehensive survey to point out 
that the Council could compete successfully with the private builder. (63) 
Thereafter the I.L.P. concentrated upon returning men to the Council who 
could perform the task. In 1899 the Pendlebury Miners, led by Thomas 
Greenall, and the local engineering union combined with the I.L.P. in the 
District Council elections to sponsor two successful Labour candidates. (64) 
I h f "11 (65) n t e ollowing year they were joined by a thIrd Labour counCl or, 
and the small but vigorous party was giving priority in its pressure for 
1 f t b h ' , f t l't t (66) we are measures 0 corn at t e hIgh death and In ant mor a 1 y ra es. 
With experience and drive these results had every chance of being 
improved upon. Manchester supplied a good example for the Pendlebury men. 
The Manchester and Sal ford I.L.P. was the biggest party in Lancashire and 
possessed an unusual concentration of talent; in addition to its early 
leaders - Brocklehurst, Hall, Harker and Bilcliffe - there had risen to 
prominence by the late 90's a number of trade unionists, of which 
J. E. Sutton was the most influential. He had been elected I.L.P. City 
Councillor in 1894 by the miners' vote in Bradford Ward and during three 
continuous terms of office he campaigned for better working class housing, 
the municipalisation of the local tramways and an eight hour day for 
municipal workmen.(67) The party itself had achieved some notoriety in 
1896 from the Boggart Hole Clough incidents, when Brocklehurst and Hall were 
imprisoned for defying a City Council ban on political meetin~s in a public 
park.(68) Whilst this gave the I.L.P. some free publicity it was never-
theless an old style of socialist propaganda and less important for the 
party's development than the political bargains made during the next few 
years. 
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The Manchester I.L.P., with a large body of trade unionists within 
its ranks, did not share the same hostility towards trade unions as the 
socialists of, for example, Rochdale. Since the early 'nineties the 
party had been co-operating with the Trades Council and was even beginning 
to see the value of combining with radical Progressive parties; although 
the I.L.P. reaffirmed its belief in the Fourth Clause(69) it was no longer 
used as a tool of extremism; at the 1897 School Board election the I.L.P. 
could willingly work with the Progressive Alliance to return two candidates.(70) 
In municipal elections a modified version of the 1893 I.L.P. programme 
provided the basis of socialist policy(71) and continued to threaten the 
Liberal party, which before its reorganisation of 1903 was still facing 
the dilemma of how to capture the working class vote without ad~itting 
more labour candidates.(72) The mutual hostility between the Liberals 
and the combined forces of the I.L.P. and Trades Council was intensified 
in 1899 when the labour candidates at Harpurhey and St. Marks wards were 
directly opposed by Liberal candidates.(73) In the School Board election 
of the next year, however, there were signs that a closer understanding 
was developing since the Progressive party, a left-wing alliance which 
was less directly under the control of the Liberal caucus, was able to 
gain the support of the I.L.P. and the Trades Council in its attempt to 
"free the School Boards" of Manchester and Salford.(74) The United 
Education Party, as it was called, failed to achieve its object(75) 
and this event, coupled with the growing self-assurance of the Labour 
alliance, proved the decisive break between Liberal and Labour in the two 
cities. 
· .. _----_._ ... _------_. 
Further progress in the Manchester I.L.P. would have been impossible 
without efficient organisation. Financial shortages were a problem as well 
as the obvious hazards of co-ordinating work over a large area. In 1898 
financial membership had dropped to the low figure of 268; by the spring 
of 1899 this number had been doubled but the party was still struggling 
to start a campaign for "1,000 new members.,,(76) The problem of recruiting 
activists was exacerbated by the extra burden of Brocklehurst's parliamentary 
campaign at South West Manchester which required constant attention. 
Furthermore most I.L.P. local branches were in the working class districts 
of the city and operated independently for municipal electioneering; they 
were generally short of money, as a result of which their organising work 
suffered. For instance the unsuccessful Harpurhey campaign of 1899 cost 
£45 but the party executive committee had to raise two thirds of this 
amount, with the surplus collected by means of an additional levy of one 
h Ol (77) s 1 ling from each party member. 
The work of the party secretary, Joe Nuttall, became overwhelming, 
especially since he was also involved in Brocklehurst's election campaign 
as agent. The candidate himself shared the work at the head office for 
a time and sub-committees were appointed to supervise arrangements for 
finance, propaganda and literature. (78) Nuttall had relied upon a system 
of "district captains", copied from the Liberal party(79) to keep the· 
districts functioning, but the scheme had not met with a great deal of 
Success; when Nuttall retired from his position as secretary temporarily 
in 1900 to take more complete charge of the parliamentary campaign his 
._._- ---~.~- - .. ~~.-.---- -
place was taken by Thomas Gunning, a shoemaker, who set about to increase 
the efficiency of organisation. Gunning realised that the party was 
losing vigour; it was not merely a question of enthusiasm: "no set of 
men and women can remain always at a white heat pitch of enthusiasm.,,(80) 
He concentrated therefore on reducing the burden on voluntary workers, 
aiming at more efficient canvassing and a more thorough collection of 
individuals' subscriptions. To achieve this Gunning cut down the size of 
the areas covered by teams of canvassers and registration workers, sub-
dividing NuttaU's "districts" and creating "sub-captains" for neighbourhoods, 
each captain to be personally acquainted with individual voters. This 
system also enabled permanent communications to be maintained with the 
central office, which was consequently kept well informed of problems in 
the wards. 
The effect of Gunning's reforms was to help the Manchester I.L.P. 
retain its vitality as a partner in the labour alliance and created a 
sound system of organisation for the increased membership which was to 
come with the establishment of a local Labour Representation Committee 
in Manchester and Salford. 
By 1900 the socialist movement in Lancashire had arrived at a cross-
roads in its development. No common policy had emerged in the years since 
1895. For some local parties socialist unity offered the main hope of 
future growth, but those which had been most forward in condemning the 
retreat from fusion in 1898 - Littleborough, Preston, Bolton, Everton, 
Stockport, and Blackburn - had been those which, with the exception of 
Blackburn, had experienced least success with trade union infiltration; 
socialist unity, on the other hand, merely prevented significant develop-
ment. Yet the socialist parties committed to the labour alliance -
Manchester, Pendlebury, Blackburn and, after the renewal of political 
activity by the Weavers' Association in 1901, Nelson - had established 
a sound foothold in a movement which was to grow after the formation of 
the national Labour Representation Committee in 1900 and the trade union 
revival in the early 1900's. 
The socialist parliamentary candidatures of 1900 underlined this 
trend. At Rochdale and Ashton-under-Lyne the candidates of local 
socialist alliances received shattering defeats.(81) At Preston and 
South West Manchester Keir Hardie and Fred Brocklehurst polled adequately, 
though in both the contests there was no Liberal opposition. Hardie, 
who also stood at Merthyr Tydvil, had high hopes of winning Preston and 
concentrated his main energies there; but he made no headway against his 
two Tory opponents and was even attacked by the Liberal Lancashire Daily 
Post.(82) With Hardie's 4834 votes socialism in Preston had made no 
progress since the campaign of Tattersall, of the I.L.P., in 1895. 
Brocklehurst had to contend not only with radical attacks but with 
criticism from within his own party; Russell Smart, editor of the I.L.P. 
~, sharply rebuked Brocklehurst for his apparent support of the War 
whilst the Tory press nonetheless chastised him for being a pro-Boer. The 
antagonism caused some dissension within the Manchester I.L.P.(83) 
Brocklehurst secured 2398 votes, but might have fared better with greater 
f · . 1· (84) lnanCla resources. Only Philip Snowden's campaign gave cause to 
boast. 
None of the socialist candidates were trade unionists and it is 
significant that the only trade union sponsored candidate in Lancashire 
at the 1900 General Election came within 500 votes of success. He was 
William Ward, a Gorton schoolmaster who had connections with the Manchester 
I.L.P. His candidature at Gorton was sponsored by the local Trades 
Council with the support of the Liberal party, and whilst he united 
radical forces under one flag there was not overt socialist influence 
involved. (85) The national L.R.C., which would have been willing to 
give Ward itsofficial support, was unable to since neither the Gorton 
Trades Council nor Ward's union were affiliated.(86) 
During the next few years labour and liberal politics experienceda 
sharp upswing in Lancashire; political and industrial circumstances once 
more forced the big trade unions back on to a labour path whilst the 
Liberal party was able to benefit from the mistakes and divisions of the 
Conservatives. But was it too late for a general socialist revival? 
3. The S.D.F. and the L.R.C. 
The foundation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900, with 
its avowed intent of creating a national network of labour alliances, 
created immediate problems for both socialist parties in Lancashire. 
The I.L.P. had worked to bring about such an organisation so that it 
could act "in all that concerned the welfare of the workers in a manner 
free and unhampered by entanglements with other parties.,,(87) Now it 
blanched at the prospect of being unable to influence its creature because 
of its own weakness in the trade union world. For the S.D.F. the problems 
were more serious because even more fundamental. The S.D.F. leadership 
was not so eager to work with trade unions which were blatantly non-
socialists and Quelch, the editor of Justice, was the most strongly opposed 
of all social democrats to an alliance with men who had "no conception 
of the class war.,,(88) He was able to lead the S.D.F. out of the L.R.C. 
in 1901 after only a years membership. This decision was reached at the 
Birmingham conference of the S.D.F. in August and received fairly general 
support from delegates. It was later affirmed that "logic at the time 
appeared all on the side of withdrawal from the L.R.C.,,(89); but in fact 
the issue was not so clearly drawn. 
The S.D.F. lacked political power in most parts of the country and 
Lancashire was no exception. Progress here had been minimal since the mid 
'nineties and even the old established branches were meeting with scant 
success in local elections.(90) Moreover, a debate on strategy had 
developed within the ranks of the Federation with some' ·of the more extreme 
branches in London and Scotland advocating ~n "intelligent prosecution of 
the class war" and repudiating all connection with those who did not endorse 
this view. Quelch, in spite of his hostility to the L.R.C., proved equally 
intransigent towards the "impossibilists", asserting that the S.D.F. was 
"possibilist and opportunist.,,(9l) Lancashire was unaffected by the new 
heterodoxy(92) but failed to give a clear lead; many branches were at 
loggerheads over tactics and the overall position in the country was 
ambiguous. Blackburn, for instance, supported Quelch on the question of 
socialist unity even though the branch was itself engaged in a Labour 
alliance; Accrington S.D.F., on the other hand, advised the movement to 
" t (93) permea e and capture the trade unions." Dan Irving, who, as chairman 
of the 1901 conference and a representative of the respected Burnley branch, 
might have lent some influence to the discussions, failed to point one way 
or the other, merely calling for more socialist representatives on democratic 
bodies "to waken up people.,,(94) It is possible that the S.D.F. did not 
regard its withdrawal from the L.R.C. as a particularly decisive event at 
the time; the new body made slow progress during 1900 - 1901 and the next 
General Election seemed far in the distance; neither were social democrats 
excluded from participating with L.R.C.'s in local elections, only in 
parliamentary ones, so it seemed that the Federation still had plenty of 
time and scope to manoeuvre. 
Consequently S.D.F. tactics continued to be much the same as before. 
At Blackburn, in spite of occasional friction, the local party worked well 
with the I.L.P. and the Labour Journal continued to bear strong signs of 
(95) 
social democratic influence in its advocacy of the class war. A 
Socialist Labour party sat in the borough council, generally supporting the 
L1' beral . t th C . .. t (96) . 1904 f' e labou cand1' dates s aga1ns e onservat1ve maJor1 Y ; 1n 1V r , 
four of whom were socialists, were successful in the Board of Guardians 
election. (97) At Burnley the social democrats remained opponents of the 
radical elements in the Weavers' Association and the Trades Council, but in 
1904 the S.D.F. at last persuaded the Trades Council to experiment with a 
labour alliance; fourteen candidates were sponsored in the 1901 Board of 
Guardians election, but the results were alarmingly poor, with only one 
success. The 1905 municipal elections did not see much improvement~98) 
Although the new alliance was not altogether harmonious, the Weavers' 
Association being recalcitrant, a significant reaction to the working class 
coalition was seen when Irving was defeated in his 1905 campaign by an anti-
socialist party of the more extreme Liberals and Conservatives. A dimly 
perceptible polarisation seemed to be taking place. 
In other towns the S.D.F. was not so active. Where there was no branch, 
or only an incipient one, it was becoming increasingly difficult to establish 
political work if an L.R.C. had been planted. At Nelson the S.D.F. rump, 
which had remained since 1892, was nurturing its. aim of contesting the 
Clitheroe division with a social democratic candidate; the intention proved 
difficult of realisation, however, for the L.R.C. was at the same time 
negotiating with the cotton unions to run David Shackleton for the seat. 
Shackleton, a trade unionist with a Liberal background, was unacceptable to 
the S.D.F.(99) but was adopted by the L.R.C., and this fact prevented any 
further action on the part of the S.D.F., who admitted their failure.(lOO) 
It was a particularly disappointing situation for them since only three 
months previously, at the 1902 S.D.F. Conference, they had suffered the 
rejection of their proposal that the Federation should re-join the L.R.C.(lOl) 
Furthermore, as a result of a personal quarrel between Philip Snowden of the 
I.L.P. and an S.D.F. speaker relations between the two parties seriously 
weakened and a correspondent in Justice claimed to perceive a "decided 
rupture between the ranks of the I.L.P. and the S.D.F." in Nelson. (102) 
Equally, it was becoming more difficult to swell social democratic 
influence within the trade unions once the L.R.C. had started to grow. 
After 1901 S.D.F. representation from Lancashire was severely reduced at 
L.R.C. conferences; Atkinson of the Paper Stainers' continued to attend 
as his union's delegate, often accompanied by Hacking of the Rochdale Trades 
Council. Atkinson was a firm supporter of the Labour Alliance and owed his 
political Success in Darwen, where he was a member of the School Board,(103) 
to co-operation with the I.L.P. and local trade unions, particularly those 
of the paper mill workers. At L.R.C. conferences he presented a reasoned 
(104) 
standpoint for a strong and independent socialist labour party, and the 
S.D.F. suffered greatly through not having more of his kind to exert their 
influence. As it was, the S.D.F. had no spokesman in any of the Lancashire 
unions which affiliated to the L.R.C. after 1903. 
Nevertheless the S.D.F. proved itself capable of growth. In 1900 
there had been less than ten active branches in Lancashire, and fewer were 
operating in the early months of 1903. The federation had seemed in danger 
of extinction but quite the reverse happened; by the summer of 1904 there 
were 26 branches and at the end of 1906 over 40, the most ever achieved in 
the region. Three developments accounted for this growth. 
Firstly, the anti-Conservative sentiments which took hold among the 
working class during the closing years of Balfour's government provided a 
stimulus as much to the S.D.F. as to other socialist and radical groups. New 
members were brought into the movement and former ones drawn back by the 
feelings raised over Tariff Reform, Taff Vale and Chinese Slavery. Second, 
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the S.D.F. was able to present original policies to meet these circumstances. 
In the face of Tariff Reform the S.D.F. displayed its independence by 
attacking both free trade and protection, as Hyndman did at the Free Trade 
Hall in 1903(105). The S.D.F. Election manifesto for 1906 was a more 
strident article of progressive socialist reform than that provided by the 
L.R.C.(106), which clung to the coat tails of the Liberal party by resisting 
change. One field in which the S.D.F. made an important contribution was 
in the problems of unemployment; at a period of slump in the Lancashire 
textile trade the S.D.F. branches in the county took up their old rallying 
cry, organising demonstrations of jobless workers and forming a committee 
of City councillors and trade unionists in Manchester to press for a 
1 . t b' . ( 107) Th' d th S D F par lamen ary III to deal wlth unemployment. lS earne e ••• 
a victory in the Board of Guardians election, one of the few electoral 
successes gained by the party in that city for more than a decade. In 
connection with this agitation social democrats also began to urge the free 
maintenance of needy school children, an idea later embraced by the Trades 
Union Congress and the L.R.C.(108) 
A third reason for the S.D.F. revival was to be found in improved 
organisation. The Federat~on had at this time received considerable 
financial assistance from Lady Warwick, who had become associated politically 
with Hyndman during 1903, (109) but the greater degree of liquidity attained 
through her gi~ts would have been only marginally advantageous without 
the hard work cia provincial organiser. In London, for example. the S.D.F. 
"remained virtually stagnant,,(llO) in the years before 1906 and the same 
might have been true of Lancashire without the efforts of Dan Irving. 
Although busily occupied with his work in Burnley (Ill) Irving had agreed 
in 1901 to become the Lancashire District Secretary of the S.D.F.; he found 
the Lancashire District Federation to be "in a state of suspended animation." 
His diagnosis of the condition was: "it's not dead, 'tis but sleeping, only 
(112) the sleep seems too heavy to be healthy." Many branches had in fact 
grown deeply in debt to the Federation over lax payment of subscriptions and 
a fair reflection of interest was manifested in May 1902 when a meeting was 
convened at Burnley to discuss re-organisation; only six branches were 
represented. (113) It was nonetheless decided to disband the old District 
Federation, a relic of the 'eighties, and give Irving the responsibility of 
shaking the branches out of their inertia by collecting ~much money as he 
could from them directly.(l14) 
During the first two years little progress was made by this method, and 
it was only after the political issues of the day had begun to stir people's 
imagination that S.D.F. branches started to pay their dues promptly and 
arrange regular meetings, a situation which enabled Irving to organise a 
programme of speakers. An additional factor which helped considerably was 
the arrival in Lancashire of Bill Gee, the social democratic lecturer who 
act d 1 t f 11 t · .. th reg1'on - I.L.P. stYle.(l15) e a mos as a u 1me organ1ser 1n e 
Gee had originally worked with the S.D.F. at Northampton and had later chosen 
to range the country as an itinerant speaker; he was frequently announced as 
• 
"the Socialist Dreadnought" and his animated style of speaking and his waxed 
moustache soon became a common sight in Lancashire towns. As a result of 
these efforts Irving was able to hand over his position to A. H. Watson in 
1905 with the number of S.D.F. branches still growing, so that by 1906 the 
S.D.F. was once more a lively left wing party with penty of room in which 
to work, as the success of Dick Greenwood's "Lancashire Red Van" showed in 
1908. (116) 
A sad postscript to this newly found vigour, however, was the dismal 
record of S.D.F. candidates in elections. With the opportunities for 
representation decreased by the abolition of School Boards in 1902 and the 
party shut out of the growing L.R.C. it was hardly surprising that although 
the S.D.F. increased its numbers of candidates few could find success. Of 
the 19 candidates sponsored in 1905 only 7 were returned, and of these 4 won 
in elections at Blackburn and Accrington, where socialist groups were 
operating within the Labour Alliance. In 1902 the S.D.F. branches at Nelson 
and Burnley had proposed reaffiliation with the LR.C. but their move was 
defeated. (117) Harry Quelch continued to defend his position, urging that 
it was "necessary to be free from an alliance by which the S.D.F. would be 
bound, willy nilly, to support men and measures with whom, and with which, 
it did not agree,,,(118) but the rank and file in Lancashire were in general 
convinced by 1905 that social democratic participation would be to the benefit 
( 119) 
of both the S.D.F. and the L.R.C. During that year Lancashire made its 
strongest bid to change the Federation's policy. Led by Dan Irving the 
Lancashire delegates at the S.D.F. Conference demanded both socialist unity, 
a course favoured by the Quelch group, and a rappr Q,chement with the L.R.C. 
In spite of Lancashire's unanimity, however, the delegates were swayed by 
the Londoners led by Hyndman, Quelch, Burrows, and Jack Jones and by the 
vociferous representatives of Stratford S.D.F. influenced by "impossibilist" 
doctrines. (l20) The S.D.F. thus remained intransigent and independent 
and began to show signs of setting its face in even grimmer extremism when 
H.W. Lee, the party secretary, started to speak of triennial parliaments, 
a second ballot and a referendum as being reforms of the electoral system 
immediately required - the vocabulary of political sulkiness.(12l) 
Lancashire shared in the antipathy felt by other political groups for 
the S.D.F. which was brought about largely by London's attitude. The three 
parliamentary campaigns fought by socialist candidates in Lancashire in 
1906 showed some signs of hope for the future,(122) but at the same time 
emphasised the S.D.F.'s isolation. The Social Democrat was still inclined 
to regret the L.R.C.'s reformism: "it is not, unfortunately, a socialist 
"(123 ) party. Yet the L.R.C. had room for and need of a socialist left wing, 
and in rejecting this position the S.D.F. rejected working class unity. 
4. The Growth of the I.L.P. 
The development of the I.L.P. during this period presents a quite 
different picture. In 1900 its Lancashire branches were in as depressed 
a condition as those of the S.D.F. Membership stood at about 1,000 with less 
than a dozen active branches. As its successes in local elections the I.L.P. 
could point to only three Poor Law Guardians, seven borough auditors, nine 
School Board representatives and nine town councillors: (124) a marginally 
greater achievement than that of the S.D.F. but not a striking political 
breakthrough. By 1905 there were 38 I.L.P. borough councillors in 
Lancashire, (125) a significant advance on the S.D.F.'s position although 
the two parties had about the same number of branches. How had this 
comparative leap forward come about? 
It is certain that the I.L.P. gained ground without any appreciable 
geographical extension of its support. The most successful branches were 
those of long standing: Blackburn, Nelson and Manchester. The other more 
active branches, Littleborough, Liverpool, Ashton and Pendlebury - were 
also well established by the turn of the century. Moreover, like the S.D.F. 
the I.L.P. took most of its members from the working class. There was a 
small proportion of middle class professional people within its ranks, 
particularly women and notably Mrs. Pankhurst, the widow to R.M. Pankhurst 
who had been a leading figure in the Manchester I.L.P. during the 'nineties, 
and Ethel Annakin, who as a student in Liverpool had attended the services 
of the Baptist minister C. F. Aked: she became a teacher at Nelson in 1904, 
joined the I.L.P. and married Philip Snowden in 1905. But there were few 
signs by 1906 that the I.L.P. had been able to infiltrate the middle class 
suburbs of the larger towns. Neither was its influence greatly extended 
among trade unionists; the newer converts to labour representation in 
Lancashire had arrived at their decisions independently, not as a result 
of a socialist grip on their unions. 
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The clue to the understanding of I.L.P. expansion lies in the 
development of the older branches within the L.R.C. The Blackburn, Manchester 
and Nelson branches were pre-eminent in the years before the 1906 General 
Election; in all three towns the I.L.P. shared in the growth of a strong 
and united labour alliance. 
In Blackburn the I.L.P. shared socialist representation in the Labour 
party with the S.D.F. This fact caused local I.L.P. members to doubt the 
policy of their own party and Charles Higham warned the annual conference in 
1900 that indrawing away from the S.D.F. the I.L.P. was "not doing a wise 
thing.,,(126) The benefit of socialist co-operation lay in its presenting a 
strong counter weightw the influence of trade unionists, whose narrow 
aims, based on short term reforms, were prone to collapse when either 
attained or thwarted. Through their close connection with Snowden the Black-
burn socialists strove towards greater perspective in their thinking. 
Snowden's concern with the contemporary fiscal controversy and his frequent 
writings on the subject in the Blackburn Labour Journal brought a more 
advanced note into the philosophy of the newspaper, which improved its 
quality and made the polemics and lampooning of former years seem rather crude. 
Deep analyses of the more serious issues of the day, including the free 
trade question, the problem of poverty and even the subtleties of foreign 
affairs, became a common contribution of the socialists to political debate; 
by 1904 the Labour Journal had increased its size, carried more articles and 
had established itself as a respected local paper. 
------------------------- -
The experience of joint labour action at Manchester had eased the 
Trades Council's path into the national L.R.C. to which' it became affiliated 
in January, 1901.(127) Trades Council members, angered by the Taff Vale 
decision of 1903, took the lead in proposing that Labour candidates should 
be returned to Parliament for constituencies in Manchester and Salford, and 
also set about increasing the number of local Labour councillors, hastily 
dismissing overtures from the Liberal party on the question of forming a 
Liberal-Labour Progressive alliance.(128) A local L.R.C. was set up during 
1903 for the specific purpose of fighting the forthcoming General Election 
in the labour interest; from the outset delegates of the I.L.P. were well 
represented on this body. Five branches of the Manchester and Sal ford 
I.L.P. attended the foundation conference along with delegates from S.D.F. 
~ rQr(fret-k .. 6,,£( (129) 
groups in Salford and south west Mancheste10f 55 local trade societies; 
J. E. Sutton, J. Johnstone and. Joe Nuttall - all I.L.P. members - were 
elected to the principal offices of the L.R.C.(130) 
The party's programme was a nice balance of I.L.P. socialism and trade 
union reformism; it called for the usual schemes for the nationalisation 
of land, minerals and railways and appealed for free and efficient education 
from elementary school to university level. Most of the other demands 
concerned trade union reforms and consequently there was much prominence given 
to the need for a definition of the trade union laws, a more favourable work-
man's compensation law and an eight hours. day. In addition references were 
made to issues which had at odd times been raised by the Liberal party; old 
age pensions, payments of M.P. 's and female suffrage. The other questions 
discussed were vague but tribute was paid to "housing reform" and, in the 
.. 
-----------------
economy, "national efficiency". The programme failed to deal suffiCiently 
with international affairs, an omission which emphasised that the Labour 
party had not yet moved from being a pressure group focsocial reform to being 
a party equipped to govern the country. Only a token statement was made 
on foreign policy which suggested that armaments should be reduced and that 
the legislature should command the decision to make war.(131) It was an 
eclectic programme and contrasted sharply with the criticisms of the local 
social democrats, who were dissatisfied with the provisions made for the in-
auguration of socialism by political means, based on a recognition of the 
class struggle. (132) 
Success blessed the Manchester and Sal ford L.R.C. from its inception. 
The interest in labour politics ensured a high trade union affiliation, and 
with it the funds necessary to prosecute efficient campaigning. By 1905 
there were 16 Labour councillors in the two cities, six of them I.L.P. 
members, and their initial work was devoted to the organising of a Fair 
Contracts lobby. (133) Originally the most intensive organisation was based 
on the two parliamentary divisons, North East and South West, where Labour 
candidates were to be run; R. C. Hall, the L.R.C. secretary, co-ordinated 
the work of two large, divisional committees. Local electoral success, 
however, encouraged the development of a new constitution which came into 
operation during 1906. Representation on the L.R.C. was to be in strict 
ratio to membership; trade unions and I.L.P. branches were allowed two 
delegates for every 200 members although the Trades Council was allowed 5 
delegates since it was the only local body affiliated directly to the 
• (134) 
natlonal L.R.C. Affiliation fees were worked out on the same basis; 
trade unions and branches of the I.L.P. paid two pence each year for every 
members, whilst the Trades Council contributed £5 annually. In addition to 
. 
the major constituent groups the L.R.C. extended membership to "all other 
Labour and Socialist organisations that are willing to work for the objects 
and conform to the rules of this Committee and the National Labour Party." 
The party had almost 14,000 affiliated members by July 1906 and efforts 
were being made to establish ward committees. (135) By 1911 there was a 
Labour group of 15 in the Manchester City Council; the L.R.C. already had 
the broad bottomed administration and support of a major opposition party. 
The other centre of I.L.P. strength was the Clitheroe parliamentary 
division, and at Nelson in particular. Here the backbone of the Labour 
movement was the local Weavers' Association, which, although it had 
dissociated itself from labour representation between 1896 and 1901 as a 
result of internal quarrels, remained steadfastly progressive during the 
later 1890's supporting measures which called for "the socialising of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange" and continuing to press 
f th E· ht H D 4n the cotton trade.(136) or e ~g ours ay L In 1899 its delegates 
were instr~cted to vote for the proposal at the Trades Union Congress which 
brought about the formation of the national L.R.C. in 1900~137) Members· 
of Nelson Weavers were represented at the foundation conference of· this 
bOdy(138) and the following year the Weavers followed up their policy by 
appointing a special sub-committee to organise the campaigns of Labour 
candidates at the municipal elections.(139) Similar developments, influenced 
by socialist opinion inside the trade unions, were evident at Colne. The 
Colne Weavers' Association had also been represented at the L.R.C. Conference 
of 1900 and Labour candidates had been successful in small numbers at the 
local elections in the town. A. B. Newall, the Colne Weavers' secretary, 
was one of these Labour councillors and an active supporter of the independent 
Labour principle; it was Newall who had suggested to Ramsay MacDonald in 
1900 that the L.R.C. might seek cotton union support. (140) 
The decisive event which forged the formal alliance of labour groups 
at Nelson and Colne was the Clitheroe bye-election of August 190~(141) 
Relations between the trade unions and the I.L.P. were good, but as was 
seen, the S.D.F.'s more uncompromising posture prevented absolute harmony. 
Philip Snowden, who had done much of the early negotiating between the I.L.P. 
and the local Textile Trades Federation (representing the cotton unions of 
Nelson, Colne and Brierfield), persuaded the cotton unions to hold a meeting 
on labour representation in December 1901(142). At this conference a fUrther 
series of meetings were planned for discussions with representatives of the 
national L.R.C.(143) Only after these had been arranged would the Textile 
Trades Federation agree to consider the S.D.F. scheme for a socialist and 
labour candidate in Clitheroe.(144) In March 1902, however, a Clitheroe 
Labour Representation Association was established(l45) and the following 
July David Shackleton was chosen as its parliamentary candidate.(146) 
Shackleton's election illustrated the. cleavage between the r. L. P. and 
the S.D.F. Shackleton had a strongly Liberal background and was not a 
committed socialist; there is no doubt that the I.L.P. would have preferred 
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to see Philip Snowden as the candidate but his nomination would have brought 
r forward Liberal opposition, whereas that of the more moderate Shackleton 
was unopposed. (147) Snowden conceded this point, telling A. B. Newall: 
"1 think that Mr. Shackleton, as a trade union official and one so 
thoroughly acquainted with the staple trade and with the labour conditions 
of the district, has a far better claim and would make a more useful 
representative.,,(148) Shackleton styled himself "a Labour candidate pure 
and simple,,(149) and supported a reversal of the Taff Vale judgement, with 
(150) 
an array of various social reforms thrown in for good measure. The 
local S.D.F., however, decided that his attitude was "partly satisfactory 
d tl . f "d f d t t h· (151) an par y unsatlS actory an re use 0 suppor lm. 
By not demurring at the choice of Shackleton the I.L.P.'s stock rose, 
especially after the successful outcome of the bye-election. In September 
1902 the Nelson Weavers' Association agreed to join in the formation of a 
mUnicipal L.R.C. in the town, thus ensuring the continuity of parliamentary 
co-operation at local level.(152) Moreover, the local Labour parties 
which developed in the Clitheroe division during the next few years dis-
played a markedly more independent character than that of their Member of 
Parliament. The Labour parties at Nelson and Colne were well advanced by 
1906, when Nelson had achieved the distinction of having the first Labour 
controlled Town Council in Lancashire. How did this come about? 
The primary source of strength lay in the creation of an efficient 
political machine. Parliamentary and municipal work was prosecuted by 
different organisations. The Textile Trades Federation became the basis of 
the Clitheroe L.R.C., which conerned itself with parliamentary elections. 
The Association allowed individual membership at subscription rates 
not less than those paid by the members of its affiliated trade 
societies and this arrangement allowed individuals who were not trade 
unionists to be represented at conferences of the national L.R.C. The 
executive of the Clitheroe L.R.C. was elected from each of the different 
districts within the division, according to the number of voters, and 
these districts in tUrn elected their own committees for electoral work 
in the wards. (153) By the time of the 1906 General Election, therefore, 
Clitheroe had a Labour party built along the lines which were to become 
familiar for constituency Labour parties of the future. Its organising 
efficiency in the small industrial towns of Nelson, Colne, Brierfield 
and Padiham, where the Labour voters resided, was responsible for the 
signal victories of Labour candidates in the division during the decade 
before the First World War. 
Municipal politics were the special concern of the L.R.C.'s set 
up in each individual town. Nelson may serve as the model for these. 
The L.R.C. was simply an organisation for the liaison of trade union 
(154) 
and I.L.P. forces; the S.D.F. was not represented. The biggest 
group in the L.R.C. was the Weavers with six representatives, and whilst 
their members provided numbers for the movement the socialists provided 
a sound ideology and leading activists. As a result an independent 
spirit was maintained and the Nelson Labour party felt strong enough to 
resist Liberal suggestions for co-operation.(l55) The Weavers' 
Association now felt able to disseminate independent Labour ideas to 
its members and full details of Labour party work were given at each 
quarterly meeting. A newspaper, the Nelson Workers' Guide, was 
established, and so successfully was it able to promote the Labour 
party's image that in 1904 the Weavers' Association amended its rules 
to include among its objects "the return of Labour Representatives on 
all governing bodies." (156) 
The progress of the Nelson Labour party was manifested in municipal 
elections. By 1905, with 15 councillors, Labour had a working majority 
in the Council; the following year a Labour Mayor was elected. This 
represented a considerable advance on the position at Colne, where the 
local Liberals, led by the redoubtable Sam Catlow, had made a spirited 
fightback, combining with other anti-Labour forces to prevent further 
progress. (l57) The same process had occurred at Nelson, though on a 
less cohesive basis, and consequently it failed to affect Labour growth; 
in fact the realignment was greeted with joy by the Workers' Guide, 
which commented: 
"It would seem that municipal contests are not to be 
between Liberal and Conservative, but between Labour 
and anti-Labour, in other words, between the employer 
of labour and the labourer." (158) 
------- - -- -- ----------
Since approximately five sixths of the Nelson ratepayers were working 
class people it was clearly possible for the Labour party to tap the 
majority of electoral support provided it could maintain a balance in 
its policies. 
This was achieved by combining an independent appeal to the working 
man with the practical continuation of moderate policies such as 
Fair Contracts clauses and the municipalisation of tramways and public 
baths.(159) In 1905 the Labour party secured a popular success by 
reducing the gas rate. (160) Many of the Liberals' fears about Labour 
councillors failed to materialise; they did not prove to be ignorant, 
impractical revolutionaries, nor particularly spendthrift legislators. 
In fact the Labour party's socialist philosophy was rather weak; the 
difference, it was claimed, lay in the fact that, whereas the Liberals 
had been champions of political freedom, they had done nothing to ensure 
working men "free use of land and the means whereby they may earn their 
b d ,,(161) rea • The Labour party, so the implication ran, would achieve 
this aim; but its success among working people came from its advances 
in political democracy - by implementing "a just Democratic principle" 
and giving the working class a majority of the voting power on the Nelson 
Council. 
In the three towns analysed above the I.L.P. was able to maintain 
a vital influence in the Labour party by enlarging the scope of the 
party from that of a purely trade union group, and thus extending its 
political and intellectual appeal. But this type of Labour party was 
far from being typical of the many labour groups which developed in 
Lancashire during the early years of the twentieth century. As a 
result, when the Labour breakthrough occurred in 1906, it was based 
on the largely sectarian appeal of political trades unionism. 
5. Conclusion 
In the years between 1895 and 1906 the Socialist groups in 
Lancashire had experienced varying fortunes. It is clear that those 
parties which had exhibited most willingness to join with trade unions 
in the creation of local labour alliances profited most from the setting 
up of the L.R.C. So it was that the I.L.P. became a vigorous element 
in at least three local parties and was able to provide them with a 
distinct character. On the other hand those few S.D.F. groups that 
might have followed this course found their exclusion from the L.R.C. 
a grave disadvantage in the task of gaining newjmembers and winning more 
political influence. Thus, although the overall influence of the 
socialists in the Lancashire Labour movement just before 1906 was not 
very significant, at least the I.L.P. seemed to have found a fruitful 
role whilst the S.D.F. appeared to be more sectarian than ever. 
Chapter 11 
TRADE UNIONS AND THE LABOUR REVIVAL 
The Labour Representation Committee of 1900 seemed an unlikely 
challenge to either of the established parties. Its local structure 
was weak and gave it the appearance of nothing more than a parliamentary 
pressure group based on a coalition of trade unionists and socialists. 
Its initial strength in Lancashire was negligible; there was no 
substantial labour movement with roots in the constituencies which the 
L.R.C. could direct towards independence. In truth, the strength of 
the region's working class lay in the trade unions, but only twelve of 
them had sent delegates to the L.R.C. foundation conference - a dis-
appointing reflection of interest in independent labour representation. 
Yet during the next few years the position changed. Local L.R.C.'s were 
formed in many towns and became a basis for the future Labour party; 
a number of candidates were sponsored in the General Election of 1906, 
by which time Labour was beginning to make gains in local elections. 
This sudden upswing was caused primarily by the attitudes of trade unionists. 
1. The Position in 1900 
The changes of these years involved something more than the numerical 
increase of affiliated L.R.C. members. In 1900 the more active elements 
in Lancashire working class politics had been guided by socialists of 
the S.D.F. and I.L.P. Labour alliances drew heavily on their inspiration 
and on the support of trade union groups influenced by socialism, such 
as the Gas Workers at Blackburn or the miners at east Manchester. The 
extent of this was seen in the 1900 General Election, when no candidates 
were put directly in the field by trade unions. In the years im~ediately 
following, however, this socialist direction was lost as many non-
socialist trade unionists began to take up the question of independent 
Labour politics. 
Of the original twelve Lancashire unions which had displayed an 
interest in the LoR.C.(l), many had clearly sent delegates outof curiosity 
since only four - the Dock Labourers, the British Labour Amalgamation, 
the Musicians and Colne Weavers - remained affiliated in the following 
year, when only eight Lancashire Societies were represented. The significant 
affiliations at this time came from unions with strong socialist 
connections; the Dock Labourers, for instance, whose militant I.L.P. 
secretary, Sexton, had supported the motion at the Trades Union Congress 
in 1899 which resulted in the formation of the L.R.C.; the British Labour 
Amalgamation was another example of a socialist "new" union which 
affiliated in 1900 through the continuing socialist influence in its 
ranks, the social democrat Chatterton being its delegate. On the other 
hand the Lancashire Miners were merely inquisitive; they had sent two 
delegates, Aspinwall and Thomas Greenall, to observe; but Greenall was 
surprised, and no doubt pleased, to find himself elected to the Committee 
with the largest number of votes.(2) The subsequent decision of the 
Lancashire Miners not to affiliate was not only a disappointment for 
Greenall, who accordingly was obliged to withdraw as Vice-Chairman of 
the L.R.C. (3), b t t d . bl t th L RC' t u presen e a serlOUS ow 0 e • • • s pro spec s 
in Lancashire. With the cotton unions the Miners held the key to Labour 
development in the region. TheLr indifference to the L.R.C. in 1900 
seemed to suggest that they were unwilling to abandon their old 
industrial tactics of the 1890's for a new approach to politics. Yet 
during the next two years these two groups of unions came to recognise 
the need for concerted political action within the L.R.C. How did this 
change of heart come about? 
2. Change in the Cotton and Mining Unions. 
The movement of the cotton unions into the L.R.C. was the logical 
outcome of their political manoeuvres of 1895. Yet for a time after 
the General Election of that year the cotton unions had seemed temporarily 
to lose interest in cohesive political action. In 1896 the potentially 
powerful United Textile Factory Workers' Association was disbanded. 
When the decision was made to discontinue legislative work Mawdsley of 
the Spinners commented, by way of explanation: 
" ••••• we have better laws and administration 
than any other section of workers and it is not 
likely that we shall be able to get any further 
for some time." (4) 
But this answered nothing; in fact, it was far from the truth. There 
were still many questions of importance to be dealt with; for example, 
the Government was considering the possibilities of raising the half-
time exemption, whilst the unions were negotiating for favourable terms 
in a new Truck Bill(5). Both these questions were of some importance 
for the Weavers, though of less pressing significance for the Spinners. 
In consequence there developed between the Weavers and the other unions 
a difference over aims, particularly over the n~w Truck Bill, 
whose proposals did nothing to prevent the exaction of fines from 
workers, a practice common in weaving sheds and which the Weavers' 
Amalgamation was seeking to have abolished. No support was forthcoming 
from Mawdsley and the Spinners and in their attempt to secure exemption 
from the provisions of the Truck Bill the Weavers found themselves 
isolated. It is more than likely that Mawdsley, a Conservative, was 
unwilling to back the Weavers and risk embarrassing the Government, 
especially since his own union had no material interests at stake. (6) 
Such policy differences outline the basic industrial aims of the 
two unions at this stage: the Spinners had achieved their major 
objectives in legislative reforms and were now beginning to concentrate 
once more on industrial bargaining; on the other hand the Weavers still 
wanted to press for additional legislative safeguards in their trade, 
including amendments for the Factory Act, resistance to the pressures 
mounting up against half-time labour and checks on the "driving" of 
weavers. (7) So it was that the Weavers' Amalgamation made most of the 
running in political work dur1ng the later 1890's. 
Moreover, the tension between the Spinners and Weavers did not 
outlast the turn of the century. The unions began to experience fluctuating 
fortunes that contrasted sharply with their more steady progress in the 
early 'nineties, and served to point out the need for parliamentary as 
well as industrial action. The continuation of unilateral lobbying 
tactics brought the Weavers' Amalgamation the supplementary Cotton Cloth 
Factories Act of 1897, which guarded against excessive steaming in 
weaving sheds. (8) In 1899 the U.T.F.W.A. was revived, partly because 
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of the need to secure amendments in the Factory Act and also in 
response to an Employers' Parliamentary Council which had been established 
to represent the political interests of the cotton masters.(9) In the 
new Factory Act of 1901 the cotton w~rkers managed to obtain a reduction 
in mill hours(lO) - -t:re-'''twelve o'clock Saturday" - a provision opposed, 
incidentally, by most employers in the trade. (11) This helped to bring 
the unions together again, as did the position on the industrial front 
during these years. Although profit margins in the cotton industry were 
higher~ at this time than -at any stage during the previous twenty five 
years the unions still had to threaten strike action to secure wage 
advances in 1899 and 1900. (12) The Weavers, moreover, were still dis-
gruntled at their failure to gain satisfaction on the "driving" question 
and feelings among the rank and file in the districts were running high. (13) 
Discontent in the spinning trade was centred on the employers' slowness 
to discuss a re-negotiation of the 1893 Brooklands Agreement after a 
ra'sh of "bad spinning" disputes. (14) Industrial relations were not improved 
by the bad trade that hit Lancashire in 1901, causing depression until 
well into 1904 and short time working in the mills. For all these reasons, 
therefore, a feeling of uncertainty began to creep into the thoughts of 
the cotton unionists making them all the more receptive to new ideas and 
new methods of approach, to their perennial problems. 
The same was also true of the Lancashire Miners. Unlike the cotton 
workers, but in common with other districts of the Miners' Federation, 
they suffered reduced earnings when the boom brought on by the South 
African war ended with the coming of peace in 1902. Little progress was 
made with the evergreen question of an Eight Hour Day, whilst newer 
issues including workmen's compensation for injury, mines regulation 
and old age pensions were becoming prominent in legislative work. In 
1901 the Conservative government introduced a tax of one shilling on 
every ton of exported coal thus bringing a storm of protest from the 
mining regions at the "reckless interference with the principles of free 
trade to which we owe our commercial supremacy.,,(15) About this time, 
too, with problems mounting, the miners were beginning to display 
increased opposition to employers, especially over the question of old 
age pensions (16); the problem of nationalisation was also debated more 
frequently at miners' conferences.(17) 
Among both cotton workers and miners, therefore, a series of 
vexatious issues had arisen of a kind which seemed to demand redress by 
parliamentary action. To be sure, neither' of the political parties 
appeared to offer much to trade unionists in the way of social 
legislation - the Libera~because of their undoubted electoral failures 
and the Conservatives because of their unimpressive record in the field 
of reform. The L.R.C. might therefore have some attraction as an 
alternative pressure group but, as we have seen, its attraction was 
not sufficiently strong to draw the Lancashire cotton unionists and 
the miners into its ranks in 1900. Industrial gr~vances were not in 
themselves sufficiently strong to ca~se a change of attitude. 
By the end of the 1890's, however, a changed outlook on the part 
of certain pockets of opinion within the unions can be discerned. The 
Liberal leadership of the Lancashire Miners was beginning to pay closer 
attention to the question of Labour candidates; Sam Woods, who sat as 
Liberal-Labour member for Walthamstow from 1897 to 1900(18), was also 
secretary of the Trades Union Congress and had given his lead in 1900 
to labour representation by approaching J. R. MacDonald of the L.R.C. 
with. the aim of "opening up communication with the Liberal whip,,(l9) to 
bring out more labour candidates. In addition,there was a more advanced 
element in the Lancashire Miners' leadership. Although the Conservative 
Thomas Ashton was still Federation secretary some of the younger agents 
had acquired reputations as independent labourites and even socialists. 
Thomas Greenall was one of the most prominent; he sat as a socialist 
labour councillor at Pendlebury with I.L.P. support and his influence 
among the miners of that area had created a vigorous socialist pressure 
group at Pendlebury. It was the Pendlebury miners' branch which urged 
the Federation to affiliate to the L.R.C. in 1900(20), shortly after 
Greenall had returned from the foundation conference in February. 
Although Pendlebury was supported by the miners of Bamfurlong, another 
district where the principle of independent labour representation had 
made great strides, the Federation as a whole rejected the idea(21), 
possibly because Woods was in the process of attempting to retain his 
parliamentary seat at Walthamstow. (22) Nevertheless the socialists had 
served advanced notice of their intentions. 
In the cotton unions important changes had also taken place in the 
leadership. No socialists were represented on the Legislative Council 
of the U.T.F.W.A. but by the tUrn of the century a younger group of 
radicals who were disposed to look favourably on the L.R.C. were coming 
into positions of influence. The rising star amongst them was David 
Shackleton who had been elected to the Legislative Council in 1894 at the 
age of 31; two years later he had become a Liberal borough councillor 
at Darwen j where he was also secretary of the local Weavers' Association. 
In 1902, still under forty, he accepted the nomination of the L.R.C. 
at Clitheroe and became Lancashire's first independent Labour M.P. 
Though by no means a socialist Shackleton nonetheless represented an 
advance on the political views of the veteran cotton u~ion leaders -
Mawdsley, Holmes, Mullin , Ashton and Crinion - largely because of 
his stand on the independent labour position. But despite the rise of 
younger men like Shackleton, Joseph Cross of Blackburn and J. W. Ogden 
of Heywood, the older leaders still spoke with a powerful voice and in 
1900 they had viewed the L.R.C. with suspicion; Thomas Ashton of the 
Spinners had argued against the "impracticable character,,(23) of the 
proposal at the 1899 Trades Union Congress to form an independent labour 
group, and his attitude - that "not one trade unionist out of ten:' 
thousand" would take any notice of the L.R.C. (24) - was endorsed by 
the influential Cotton Factory Times. (25) 
Three years later the Textile Factory Workers' Association was in 
the L.R.C. This sudden change of course was in part brought about by 
the realisation that the old methods of piecemeal industrial reforms 
were seriously handicapped by a hostile House of Commons; the Cotton 
Factory Times was prepared to admit that progress was hindered by 
having no "direct representatives" to voice the opinions of the cotton 
workers on the floor of the House of Commons. (26) Yet, it is true, this 
inconvenience had been tolerated before and was not now the primary 
cause in pushing the cotton unions into the arms of the L.R.C. Two events 
of 1902, unrelated though equally powerful in their effect, probably 
proved more decisive in the change of attitude. 
The first was the legal attack on the Weavers' Amalgamation. In 
1900 the Weavers had look on with sympathy at the events which surrounded 
the Taff Vale dispute in South Wales involving the Railway servants,(27) 
though they exhibited little feeling for other unions whose positions 
. f· k t· (28) were being undermined by the law courts over quest10ns 0 P1C e 1ng. 
Late in 1901, however, events took place nearer the centre of the Weavers' 
own territory; a Blackburn cotton firm obtained an injunction at the 
Liverpool Chancery Court against some weavers who had been on strike as 
a result of a "bad materials" dispute. The Blackburn Picketing Case, as 
it became known, was settled out of court but the Weavers' Amalgamation 
was served with a fine of about £11,000 and some of its officials 
were also prosecuted for libel.(29) At this time, though the financial 
settlement of the Taff Vale case had not been made, the Cotton Factor~ 
Times began to speak with indignation of "Taff Vale Number Two,,(30) 
and the Weavers were already asking for a reversal of the decision 
in order to protect their funds "against misuse", and to demand "no 
power in a trade dispute which is not less than the power an employer 
is always free to use against either a trade union or its members.,,(3l) 
From this point the weaving section of the cotton trade developed an 
earnest interest in a new Trade Disputes Bill; as a necessary correlative 
the Weavers' Amalgamation, meeting in January 1902, instructed its 
Central Committee to take i~~ediate steps to secure the direct 
representation of Labour in Parliament.(32) 
Almost before the question could be taken up by the Legislative 
Council of the Textile Factory Workers' Association another important 
event occurred, which pointed the way towards the means by which the 
Weavers' demands might be met. In August 1902 David Shackleton became 
Labour member for Clitheroe. The timing of his election and the manner 
and ease in which it was accomplished, through the "sweet reasonableness" 
(33) of the I.L.P. ,could not have been more opportune. The Weavers' 
Amalgamation was particularly quick to respond to the situation and gave 
its Vice-President full support.(34) The Cotton Factory Times also saw 
his adoption as the remedy to the hostile "treatment of labour questions 
at the hands of Parliament,judge and municipal body" over the past few 
. (35) 
years; the paper was also pleased to see that Shackleton retained 
his essential character as a trade union official, though took a 
certain pride in noting that "he will not forget that he is the 
representative of the whole constituency.,,(36) Stimulated by the 
election and its prospects, the delegates to the 1902 U.T.F.W.A. 
conference, which was convened only a few days before Shackleton's 
victory, gave the question of labour representation very favourable 
consideration. The atmosphere was enlivened by the absence of the 
potentially obstructive Mawdsley; he had died the previous February 
and his long tradition of forthright, businesslike trade unionism, often 
a blunting edge to political adventures, passed away with him.(37) 
By the constitution of the U.T.F.W.A. a ballot of members had to 
be conducted before a final decision could be reached on labour 
representation; voting took place in November 1902 but already many 
union leaders were making their influence felt in favour of an affirmative 
vote. William Mullin of the Card room Amalgamation, who had previously 
kept well in the background on controversial issues such as this, now 
gave his weight to the advance; recalling the rivalries of 1896, he 
agreed: 
"The question of being directly represented in the House 
of Commons by representatives appointed as candidates for 
parliamentary honours by the Textile Workers' Association, 
is one that our members will shortly be asked to vote upon. 
It is a matter that many other societies have under 
consideration, and is worthy of careful thought. As textile 
workers we are happily blessed, inasmuch as our trade is 
confined to a limited area, and when our efforts and votes 
are cast for candidates who will support our measures, ~ 
can wield an influence that tends to our benefit. If our 
members decide to support the scheme of direct 
representation in Parliament then it will be necessary 
to remodel the Textile Workers' Association. There will 
have to be a closer union of the various branches of the 
Textile Workers. The interest of one section must be 
the interest of all. There will be no room for petty 
bickerings and jealousies: success to an object of this 
character can only be obtained by a determined unanimous 
effort being put forth and each branch entering with 
friendly rivalry to accomplish the best results." (38) 
The ballot gave hig majorities both for the principle of direct 
labour representation and for the proposal of a levy to finance 
candidates and elections~39~y the beginning of 1903 plans had been 
laid to contest the seats of Bolton and Oldham with cotton union 
representatives. The L.R.C. was approached and later in the year the 
V.T.F.W.A. became an affiliate, with 103,000 members. Contributions to 
the L.R.C.'s Parliamentary Fund began in 1904. Henceforward the cotton 
unions staked their political efforts on the creation of a national 
labour party. Although early in 1902 the Cotton Factory Times had been 
thinking in terms of sectional representation by individual unions(40) 
it now began to see that "no single branch of Labour in any constituency 
is numerical! y strong enough of itself to elect a Member of Parliament;" 
it added: "The aim of the National: :Commi ttee is to combine the whole 
of the Labour forces. This will add stre~ to candidates brought out 
under its auspices. It will also minimise the possibility of two 
Labour candidates opposing each other in any constituency." (41) After 
years as an isolated pressure group the cotton unions had become aware 
of their role in a national movement. 
~~----.--------
The Lancashire Miners were not such an independent force as the 
cotton unionists for they were 'already committed to action within the 
M.F.G.B. and consequently could not take decisions without possibly 
affecting other mining unions. Ben Pickard, the M.F.G.B. President 
and a leading Liberal trade unionist, had sought to preserve the 
Liberal proclivities of the Miners by devising his own scheme for 
labour representation, in competition to the L.R.C. It was based on 
representation by trade unions, "each cognate trade in each borough" 
to participate. Pickard clearly disliked the idea of paying for other 
unions' candidates, and particularly for socialist candidates, through 
the L.R.C. In 1900 he had pleaded to an M.F.G.B. conference: "I should 
like to ask why we, as a Federation, should be called upon to join an 
association to find money, time or intellect to focus the weakness of 
other trade unionists to do what you are doing for yourselves and have 
done for the last fourteen years.,,(42) The M.F.G.B. Labour Fund Scheme, 
as Pickard's creation was called, was accepted in October 1901 by the 
Executive Committee of the Federation. (43) 
In some cases, however, Pickard's scheme proved as autocratic as 
anything the L.R.C. were offering. If miners' unions failed to pay the 
levy they lost their franchise. But more important for the Lancashire 
Miners was its attempt to propagate the existing Liberalism of the 
Federation's area by confining itself to reasonably "safe" mining seats. 
The Lancashire people, however, could not afford to associate too 
closely with radical partisans; the previous decade had taught them that 
union politics needed to be fairly independent to accommodate the 
differences of opinion among the Lancashire membership. Although they 
had not affiliated to the L.R.C. in 1900 the Lancashire Miners 
exhibited more marked options for an independent political line in 
the next two years; they were disappointed by Woods' failure to be re-
elected at Walthamstow and in 1901 proposed that he should become the 
Miners' candidate at Newton-le-Willows under the Labour Fund Scheme, 
though it was stressed that his position should be strictly independent, 
unconnected with any political party. (44) Moreover, Lancashire was 
determined to wring as much from the Labour Fund Scheme as possible; 
the miners disliked the idea, as Pickard had felt towards the L.R.C., 
of paying for other unions' candidates; more important, they liked 
their own representatives to occupy seats in Lancashire: "whilst on 
the whole the miners of Lancashire were pleased that Mr. Woods was in 
the House of Commons," said Thomas Glover of Woods' occupancy of the 
Walthamstow seat," "(they) never relished the fact the same as when he 
represented a mining constituency in his own county.,,(45) Berry Field 
branch of the Lancashire Miners therefore proposed that Thomas Glover 
should be a candidate in the Eccles Division. At this, Thomas Ashton, 
the secretary issued a warning: 
"I am afraid we are moving too fast in Lancashire, we 
have already paid a 3d. levy from the Federation Funds, 
when the next levy will be called I cannot say at 
present. The scheme adopted by the M.F.G.B. is only 
just being sent out to the districts. It is not intended 
to put the scheme into operation until the next General 
Election, which is not likely to take place for many 
years ••••• I think we ought not to be too forward in 
adopting candidates, there is plenty of time; let the 
other districts in the M.F.G.B. have a little before we 
get ahead too far." (46) 
But Ashton found few willing to heed his cautionary advice; the 
miners' agents, especially Greenall, Glover and Walsh, had been active 
in sounding opinion and in November 1902 they held a meeting at which 
it was recommended that the Lancashire Federation should contest three 
seats, with Thomas Ashton at Ince and Greenall at Radcliffe-cum-Farnworth, 
as well as the original scheme for Woods. (47) 
The proposals were well received, although there was some dis-
agreement over the choice of candidates. The Park Lane branch wanted 
to replace Ashton, a Tory, with Stephen Walsh in the Ince division. 
Walsh had been elected agent in 1901 in succession to Thomas Aspinwall; 
he was an active politician who had been a radical in the early days, 
working on behalf of Liberal candidates in the coalfield and in 1892 
supporting Sam Woods in his Ince campaign. During the 1890's he had been 
the secretary of Ashton in Makerfield Miners' branch and in 1901 won 
the agents' election with the help of socialist votes. (48) Some delegates 
to the conference of December 1902, which discussed these proposals, also 
felt that he should work on "strictly independent lines irrespective 
of any political party.,,(49) 
For his own personal political reasons Ashton declined his 
invitation to be a candidate, and was replaced on the list by Walsh. (50» 
Greenall then announced that he would prefer to contest Accrington, 
where he had been assured of more willing support by local trade unionists 
than he had been able to secure at Radcliffe.(51) After these alterations 
it was decided that the Lancashire Miners' Federation should support four 
of its own candidates at the next General Election; Woods at Newton, 
Glover at St. Helens, Greenall at Accrington and Walsh at Ince.(52) 
It then seemed a mere formality when Bamfurlong branch, led by the rising 
socialist Harry Twist, proposed that the Lancashire Miners join the 
L.R.C.; it was agreed (53) and 37,000 members were affiliated in 1903, 
contributions to the Parliamentary Fund began the following year and 
the Lancashire candidates became the nominees of the L.R.C. 
There was, however, an interesting sequel to this decision. When 
the Lancashire Federation joined the L.R.C. it was already subscribing 
to the M.F.G.B. parliamentary scheme. Ashton therefore approached 
MacDonald, the L.R.C. secretary, to secure exemption from the L.R.C. 
Parliamentary Fund for Lancashire. MacDonald, not wishing to lose 
Lancashire's support,replied vaguely, but eventually allowed Ashton to 
pay the ordinary affiliation fee of ten shillings for every 1,000 
members, assuring him that "should it ever be necessary for us to 
tighten up our organisation a little it will be quite easy to come to 
some arrangement with societies affiliated to the M.F.G.B." In 1904, 
however, the L.R.C. conference made contributions to the Parliamentary 
Fund compulsory for all affiliates; the Lancashire Miners were told 
they would have to pay them. They did. Nonetheless they continued to 
receive their share of the M.F.G.B. scheme, which was being used to 
support blatant Liberal candidatures in other districts. Neither the 
L.R.C. nor the Lancashire Miners, with their insistence on absolute 
independence, nor the M.F.G.B.~ with its hostility towards the L.R.C., 
displayed the slightest misgivings over this situation, which served 
to illustrate the rather hazy political colouring of the Lancashire 
candidates. (54) 
3. Local Labour Parties 
With the incorporation of the Miners and Textile Workers in the 
L.R.C. the two strongest bases of Lancashire working class politics 
became committed to the Labour party principle. Labour politics in the 
region were intensified also by the interest displayed by other big 
trade unions with high Lancashire membership in political affairs, and 
in course of time the parliamentary candidates of these unions, the 
Steel Smelters, the Engineers, the Railway Servants and others, were 
directed to Lancashire towns. 
Between 1903 and the 1906 General Election, therefore,the in-
frastructure of the Labour party in Lancashire was built. It must be 
remembered that many of the local parties established at this time 
were little more than management committees for trade union candidates, 
for by 1905 the labour revival had dwarfed the influence of socialists!55) 
There were 19 local labour groups, not all of them affiliated to the 
L.R.C., making serious efforts to sponsor Labour candidates in parliament-
ary and municipal elections, and their character, form and organisation 
give a clear indication of the political groupings upon which the future 
Labour party in Lancashire was founded. They provide some clues to its 
ensuing successes and failures. 
The Textile Factory Workers' Association established local 
committees in the double member constituencies of Oldham and Bolton. 
These were considered to be the most suitable places for cotton union 
candidates(56) although both towns had sizeable groups of engineering 
workers whose co-operation would have to be sought. At Oldham the local 
labour movement had made few strides and the Trades Council's membership 
had dropped to about nine thousand at the tUrn of the century with the 
withdrawal of both the local Spinners and Card room unions. (57) 
J. R. Clynes continued as the Council's secretary; he had fought as a Labour 
candidate in three municipal contests by 1903 and had been defeated at each 
In that year, however, the local cotton unions renounced their 
political neutrality following the decision of the U.T.F.W.A. and an 
agreement was reached for the first time since 1894 which secured the support 
of all the affiliated groups in the Trades Council for the candidature 
. (59) 
of Thomas Ashton, the secretary of the local Splnners. Ashton, like 
many of the older cotton leaders, was a recent convert to labour 
representation; in 1899 he had denounced the idea ~rously but had come 
to believe that trade unions should extend their activities to Parliament: 
"recently he had noticed a coolness on the part of Members (of Parliament) 
to Lancashire affairs".(60) He promised to abide by the L.R.C. posture 
on independence and to ignore party politics by concentrating on Labour 
questioni.(61) 
The result was a fairly stagnant Labour group. Clynes, who was co-
secretary of the L.R.C. tried to work the I.L.P. into the movement(62) 
but the local branch had been fairly inactive over previous years and was 
unable to add any vigour. Clynes himself was the most distinct influence 
for socialism among a company of trade unionists who were attempting merely 
to extend the principles of industrial bargaining into politics. No 
progress was made in local elections. Doubts also began to be raised 
about Ashton's integrity as a Labour candidate; his previous incliniations 
had been towards Conservatism and he probably revolted inwardly at 
Labour's close association with the Liberal party. In 1905 he found an 
opportunity to sever his links with the Labour movement; the Oldham 
Spinners lost the services of their assistant secreta~y and additional 
union duties were thus placed upon Ashton, who renounced his candidature 
when the union refused to appoint a new assistant.(63) The episode had 
the appearance of a contrived plot, for the Spinners had never been the 
leading advocates of Labour representation and possibly feared the loss 
of Ashton to Westminster. The Legislative Council of the U.T.F.W.A. 
attempted to smooth matters over by inviting James Crinion, the president 
of the Cardroom Amalgamation, to stand in Ashton's place; but Crinion, who 
had appeared on many Labour platforms, surprisingly declined to take 
up the fight, claiming that there was "no hope of success" and that a 
contest would be a "waste of money".(64) The Trades Council refused to 
accept these judgements and would have been willing to sponsor Clynes had 
he not already accepted the L.R.C. nomination at North East Manchester, 
a move which seemed to weaken the organising drive at Oldham. Although 
several attempts were made to find a replacement candidate nobody came 
. (65) 
forward and the Labour group collapsed on the eve of the General Electlon. 
The Labour party at Bolton achieved greater unity among its 
personnel but its political standport was equally narrow. Since its 
origins in the late 1880's the Bolton labour movement had developed 
strong affinities with Liberalism. Robert Tootill, a veteran of the 
Iron Strike agitation in 1887 and a leading spirit in local "new" 
unionism, sat as a Liberal Labour councillor from 1890 onwards; in 1896 
he succeeded Fielding as the Trades Council Secretary, claiming to up-
hold in it an "untarnished, non-political character".(66) At the turn of 
the century the Council began to press for more Labour representation 
i n the town with Tootill supporting the move, denouncing the policies 
of the established parties as "distinctly injurious to the best interests 
of this community" and saying that he would have done more himself for the 
working people had he been "freer from the Liberal trammels", which had 
"kept him back". (67) In fact Tootill had been a loyal Progressive 
supporter but for his attacks upon the party found himself opposed by 
Liberal candidates in the 1902 municipal elections. In that year the 
Trades Council decided to form its own Labour group and supported four 
. d . 1" (68 ) Th t' d candldates, most of them "strongly ra lca • e movemen recelve 
encouraging support from two prominent local unions, the Spinners and the 
Carters and Lorrymen, both of which had become affiliated to the L.R.C. 
in 1902 when the Trades Council also joined. By 1905 there were eight 
councillors in the Labour group, most of the successes having occurred 
in wards which had previously exhibited Tory sympathies. 
---_. __ ._--_. __ .- ~-
There was little political variety in the group; the S.D.F. was no 
longer active in Bolton, whilst the I.L.P. had deteriorated since 1895. 
Consequently there was no hope of drawing in socialist militants to 
build up an active, individual membership. Liberal Labour figures 
dominated the group; besides Tootill, W. T. Wilson was one of the most 
influential; he was a carpenter who became Chairman in 1897 of his 
national union, the Carpenters and Joiners Amalgamation, and helped to 
establish a federation among the building: trades of Bolton. (69) Wilson's 
policies - costprice gas, public baths and improved tramway services(70)-
offered nothing not matched by the Liberals. The choice of an L.R.C. 
Parliamentary candidate emphasised the drabness of Bolton's political 
colouring; the cotton workers chose from the local secretaries of their 
three main unions and eventually nominated A. H. Gill of the Spinners. 
Gill had held his position since 1896 and had quickly made a mark as an 
efficient officer; he mostly steered clear of party politics but was a 
Bolton Town councillor and J.P. by 1900 and it was his local reputation 
upon which relied as a parliamentary candidate in 1906. (71) By the end 
of 1905, however, the prospects for Labour success seemed remote. Good 
polls had been expected in the municipal elections of that year but the 
defeat of three Labour candidates, one of them in the important working 
class Great Lever Ward,was an ominous sign for the General Election. (72) 
~~, 
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In the mining district four Labour parties had been set up to 
further the Miners' Federation scheme. Two of these, at St. Helens and 
Ince, were straightforward trade union groups. St. Helens possessed 
greater variety since it was based on the local trades council, which 
encompassed, besides miners, workers in the glass, chemical and bottle 
making trades. The miners nonetheless occupied the driving seat and 
secured the nomination of Thomas Glover as L.R.C. candidate.(73) No 
labour representative had been elected to the St. Helens Town Council 
in recent years but in 1904 two were successful and the following year a 
. (74) further three galns were made. In 1906 Glover was able to go to the 
polls with an efficient organisation and no problems of Liberal 
opposition. (75) The Ince Labour Registration Association was merely a 
branch of the Lancashire Miners, showing none of the political strength 
manifested by the far more vigorous divisional Labour party at Clitheroe. 
It was established in November 1903 to handle Stephen Walsh's candidature, 
concerning itself with organisational details rather than policy. 
Posters and pamphlets were circulated and public meetings held at which 
radical trade union leaders spoke. In December 1905 William Shaw, the 
agent, reported that "organisation and Register were in a good condition". 
The parliamentary campaign was managed efficiently but since the Labour 
candidate in this division simply relied upon loyalty to the Miners' 
Federation from the working class voters, there was in no sense a "Labour 
party spirit"; until after the First World War the miners' union remained 
for practical purposes the Labour party. (76) 
The two other Labour movements, at Accrington and Newton-le-Willows, 
had far more interesting histories. When Thomas Greenall had been 
originally designated Miners' candidate for Accrington in May 1903 the 
prospects for Labour success in the constituency had looked qUite good. 
Greenall had been promised the support of the local miners: whose ranks 
had been infiltrated by a small but active group of social democrats 
which had assisted John Hempsall in the parliamentary campaign of 1900. 
Greenall himself was a socialist and very acceptable to the Accrington 
miners; their strength in the division was much less than that of the 
. (77) 
miners around Wigan - certalnly less than 10 per cent - but other 
local trades began to look favourably on the Labour candidate after two 
leading cotton union officials, Wilkinson of the Weavers and Thomas 
(78) Ashton, had visited Accrington to speak on Greenall's behalf. He 
soon showed himself to be a sound independent, promising to uphold free 
trade if returned, and to work for social reform through "an entirely 
independent Labour party in the House of Commons". (79) During 1903 the 
local Trades Council became affiliated to the national L.R.C. which soon 
gave Greenall its official approval. (SO) 
The campaign was under way by the first half of 1904 but trouble 
began to arise through the opposition of the local Liberals. Accrington, 
with its basically non-conformist character, was a fairly safe Liberal 
seat which Sir J.F. Leese , a Wesleyan and veteran political fighter 
had won comfortably in 1900; during the next couple of years, however, 
Leese experienced acute financial difficulties which almost led him to 
resign his seat though he eventually agreed to stay on until the next 
General Election when he would stand down at Accrington in favour of a 
-. 
new Liberal candidate. In November 1902 the Accrington Liberal 
Association had reluctantly nominated a local man, Franklin Thomasson, 
to succeed Leese at the next Parliamentary election. (81) The appearance 
of Greenall therefore complicated matters. Although secret negotiations 
were being carried out at this time between Herbert Gladstone, the 
Liberal Chief Whip and J. R. MacDonald of the L.R.C. to prevent clashes 
between Liberal and Labour candidates in the same constituency,(82) 
Gladstone had made it clear that he was unable to secure the removal 
of a Liberal candidate if a local association was determined to support 
one. (83) He could only bring his moral authority to bear on local leaders 
but at Accrington this was insufficient to remove Thomasson; Gladstone 
therefore turned to MacDonald to secure the removal of Greenall. 
Greenall considered his candidature as a matter of principle among 
the miners; since many of them were Tories, 70 per cent. of them he claimed, 
hethought it was important to oppose a Liberal candidate and thereby make 
a display of independence when it looked as though the other Miners' 
candidates would be fighting only Conservatives. MacDonald's early attempts 
to remove Greenall were directed at finding the candidate another 
constituency, but failed. "He has seen Greenall and Greenall's friends", 
recorded Gladstone. "He has done his best to persuade Greenall to take 
South Sal ford, but G. is obstinate and nothing will move him from 
Accrington".(84) At this time the Accrington Labour people·· had sensed 
that something was afoot and MacDonald was obliged to make a formal, 
though false, denial of his manoeuvres;(85) during the winter of 1903-4, 
however, MacDonald used David Shackleton to keep up the pressure; 
------------ --
Shackleton, as well as being Lancashire's only Labour M.P. at this time, 
was also Chairman of the L.R.C., of which Greenall himself was~ elected 
member, and enjoyed great popular esteem; he refused to support Greenall's 
political meetings, a move backed by the L.R.C. (86), and in April 1904 
told Gladstone that if Thomasson's candidature was dropped and Leese 
remained Greenall might be willing to stand down. (87) Arthur Henderson 
and John Hodge, who had been involved in a Labour campaign at Preston in 
May 1903(88), were then sent by the L.R.C. to reason with Greena1l about 
moving to another constituency. (89) 
It was only in the autumn of 1904, however, that the Labour candidate 
began to weaken. The situation changed drastically with the promise by 
Leese to stay on as Liberal candidate and the subsequent withdrawal of 
Thomasson. Clearly Greena11 considered Leese to be a far tougher opponent 
for he estimated that it would cost an extra £1000 to fight him, admitting 
that even this expenditure might not guarantee success. (90) The ultimate 
decision to withdraw from the Accrington contest nonetheless lay with 
the conference of the Lancashire Miners' Federation and Greena1l put his 
views before a representative meeting at Manchester in November 1904; he 
was attacked by the Accrington Miners who agreed that the chances of 
success had been decre~ed but not so much by the intervention of Leese 
as by Greenal1's own timidity and tergiversation; he was accused by 
~''"' 
delegates from Great Harwood, Town Bent and Rishton of having lost interest. (91) 
At the Miners' conference in Wigan the following month Henderson and Hodge, 
sent by the L.R.C.(92), were allowed to state their reasons why Greenall 
should withdraw from Accrington; when they said he should go to Newton-1e-
Willows to replace J. A. Seddon(93) the Accrington delegates shouted their 
denunciation of these suggestions which,they claimed, smacked of 
double-dealing. (94) The conference therefore decided to appoint a Committee 
to investigate the entire affair. (95) 
The Report of the Committee of Enquiry, which included the 
socialis~Harry Twist and J. E. Sutton, concentrated on two main issues; 
it declared that Greenall had no reasonable grounds for believing his 
chances to have been reduced by the intervention of Leese, suggesting 
that he had acted precipitately upon unreliable information. On the 
other hand the Report's examination of the L.R.C.'s position in the 
affair concluded that there was no political dodge since evidence for 
this was totally lacking. Greenall, therefore, was made to bear the 
blame: 
" 'he has not displayed that energy and courage in 
his candidature which he ought to have done; he has been 
tooapprehensive of defeat and has allowed himself to be 
too easily and seriously influenced by people's capricious 
opinions". (96) 
Whereat the Miners voted to drop the Accrington candidature (97) and 
Greenall retired from the political race altogether. 
It was an ironic end to Greenall's efforts for the Committee of 
Enquiry had been compltely unable to fathom the L.R.C.'s political 
pressure~ though Thomas Ashton, the Miners' secretary, rightly claimed 
that the L.R.C. had been treated too leniently (98) and must have scorned, 
as a Tory, the extent to which it was prepared to co-operate with the 
Liberal party. This was not an el~ to the Labour movement in Accrington, 
however; the Trades Council was determined to carry on with its schemes 
---~-------, 
for a Labour candidate and adopted Dan Irving of the S.D.F. The extent 
of social democratic influence among the local workers was seen in 1905 
when four socialist labour candidates were elected to the Town Council (99) 
and Irving agreed to stand by a "Socialist Labour" platform. His campaign 
was seriously weakened when the local Weavers, Railway Servants and 
Miners, the last named possibly requiring a miner to replace Greenall, 
refused to co-operate with the S.D.F. (100) whose efforts had not been 
supported by the national L.R.C.(lOl) 
The Lancashire Miners also lost a candidate at Newton-le-Willows; 
It had been intended to promote Sam Woods at this division but a lingering 
illness, which prevented him from carrying out his union duties, forced 
Woods to retire from politics i-n the autumn of 1903.(102) The division 
(103) became vacant since there was no Liberal candidate. The Conservative 
nominee, however, was Colonel Pilkington, a representative of the Pilkington 
glass works and an arch enemy of trade unionism, whom the locruminers led 
by Harry Twist of Bamfurlong were very keen to· oppose. In December 1903 
Twist approached the Lancashire Miners with proposals for an L.R.C. 
candidate. MacDonald had already been in touch with Thomas Ashton on the 
same SUbject(l04) though nothing was resolved until the spring of 1904 
when a Newton L.R.C. had been established by the Earlestown Trades Council; 
Twist and Speakman, the Trades Council secretary, then appeared before 
the Lancashire Miners' conference to appeal for help. Speakman in 
particular painting a glowing picture of Labour prospectSj in the division(l05). 
The conference was generally sympathetic but when Ashton applied to the 
M.F.G.B. for money from the Labour Fund Scheme he was told that Lancashire 
--------.-~ 
had already received itsfull quota since there were at this time 
three candidates in the field. (106) Moreover under this scheme any 
candidate would have had to be a miner. The issue was resolved by 
the Newton L.R.C. itself, which elected James Seddon of the Shop 
Assistants as its candidate and wrote to the L.R.C. for support; the 
national body agreed to the scheme so long as Seddon promised to sign 
the constitution and have his name submitted by the affiliated Earlestown 
Trades Council. (107) 
The problem remaining was to find a sponsor for Seddon. The 
(108) Miners thought that the Shop Assistants union should pay his expenses, 
but it was a small organisation and had not even listed Seddon among 
its parliamentary candidates at this stage; moreover Seddon had lost 
his own job and was in poor health, seeming to be on the verge of 
renouncing his candidature;(109) in April 1905 the Lancashire Miners, 
despite ardent pleas from its members at Lea Green and Old Boston, 
. (110) 
refused to grant Seddon £200 for his campa1gn and though it was 
promised after Greenall's withdrawal from Accrington that a fresh 
approach would be made to the M.F.G.B. nothing had been solved in this 
. (lll) quarter on the eve, of the 1906 General ElectlOn. 
Seddon was a local man and a good candidate. He was born at 
Prescot, near St. Helens, in 1868 and had become a prominent trade 
unionist in the St. Helens district during the 1890's when he led the 
Early Closing movement among the shopworkers. By 1902 he was the 
national president of his union and also an official of the St. Helens 
-----_._-------.. __ . 
Trades Council. He was active in the I.L.P. and a keen member of the 
Congregationalis~ having helped to organise a local group of the 
Pleasant Sunday Afternoon movement. (112) His supporters in the Newton 
division were loathe to see Seddon stand down through lack of funds. 
During the summer of 1905 the local miners' branches organised a 
collection and issued circulars to publicise Seddon's plight; £500 was 
raised for the election campaign with the help of the Shop Assistants', 
who made a contribution. (113) This was nonetheless insufficient to 
maintain Seddon as an M.P. if he was elected and it was fortunate that 
the Lancashire Miners were able to give £100 to him after the election 
for this purpose.(114) The narrow margin of Seddon's victory in 1906 
reflected the Labour movement's money shortage in this division and its 
complete reliance on the efforts of the 4,500 miners. 
A small Labour party also sprang up in the main mining centre of 
Wigan. The Lancashire Miners had renounced their political claims in 
this town after the defeat of Thomas Aspinwall in 1895 and although the 
(115 ) 
mining vote was about half the electorate there was little chance 
of a strong Labour candidate being sponsored by another trade union. 
A small band of social democrats operated in local elections but were 
too insubstantial to aim at parliamentary contests; before 1906 only 
one Labour councillor opposed the established parties, Thorley Smith, 
a stonemason. Smith's political ambitions were to campaign for women's 
Suffrage on behalf of all the female Trade Unionists who paid 
Subscriptions but could take little part in union politics. He formed 
a small group with some trade union support and financed chiefly by 
-------.-._---
the Women's Political League, becoming a Labour candidate in the 
General Election of 1906. (116) But it was clear that without the 
active participation of the miners' unions or the L.R.C. no Labour 
party would be able to flourish. 
Trade union candidates were also sponsored in six other Lancashire 
towns; the movements which were organised to manage their campaigns 
differed from those already described only insofar as there was a more 
distinct unity of purpose between local and national groups. The cotton 
and mining unions, once decided upon a course of independent Labour 
action, merely selected their candidates and placed them in a 
constituency where their local membership could supply a strong body 
of electoral support. It was a domestic process: politics in one's 
own backyard. On the other hand, groups of workers with no such powerfUl 
organisation in the region were forced to adopt a different approach; 
united in a trades council they appealed to the national L.R.C. for 
assistance and were sometimes given a candidate from among the lists 
of its affiliated trade unions. This was the pattern which MacDonald 
hoped the L.R.C. could direct, the collecting of detailed information 
about local needs, the building up of a central treasury of candidates 
and th 0 dO 1 t h 1 lOt O (117) elr Ispersa 0 t e oca lIes. 
Four of the groups which developed in this way between 1903 and 
1905 went on to promote successful trade union candidates in 1906. 
All had strong radical connections. A meeting of trade unionists took 
place at Stockport in March 1903 under the auspious of the Trades 
Council, which had secured the election of two candidates to the 
Borough Council in that year. (118) G. J. Wardle of the Railway 
Servants was assigned as candidate for the L.R.C. and adopted by the 
local trades in May. (119) By 1905 the Labour agent, Fred Plant, had 
built up a sturdy local party which possessed a Women's League and a 
Labour Church. (120) An L.R.C. was established at Barrow in May 1903 
on the initiative of the local Painters and Decorators, a militant 
union that had been responsible for the town's first Labour councillor 
in 1892(121), and the Railway Servants. (122) The Trades Council, with 
over 5,000 members, formed the basis of the L.R.C. to which the local 
I.L.P. was affiliated. In August 1903 a Barrow member was elected to 
'371 
the national Executive Committee of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, 
an event which no doubt assisted the adoption of Charles Duncan,a 
former member of the Engineers a~d since 1900 secretary of the Workers' 
Union,as parliamentary candidate.(123) The Barrow party immediately 
set about building up its strength by fighting municipal elections 
with a programme combining trade unionist and socialist aims that 
included demands for a minimum wage in corporation departments, public 
(124) baths and the municipalisation of tramways. Four candidates in the 
1904 Council elections were defeated butthe L.R.C. had by this time 
secured a quick success by winning six seats on the Board of Poor Law 
Guardians(125) and by 1905 had established a reliable following of 
Labour supporters on Walney Island. (126) In May 1903 the trade unionists 
of Gorton persuaded in a similar manner the Steel Smelters' union to 
sponsor its national secretary John Hodge as L.R.C. candidate in the 
division. (127) The fourth party in this group, that of Westhoughton, 
was not formed until 1905. There was no political Labour movement in 
the division although the Horwich Trades Council had been discussing 
for some time the question of Labour representation; early in 1905 it 
was decided to approach the Bolton L.R.C. for advice and Robert Tootill 
visited Horwich shortly afterwards to lend his support. Tootill thought 
Westhoughton, with its variety of trades and small compact groups of 
workers, offered good prospects for a Labour candidate, who would be 
able to rely on the support of the local miners, spinners and brick-
layers' unions. W. T. Wilson of Bolton was asked to stand for the L.R.C. 
subject to the approval of the Carpenters and Joiners whose designated 
parliamentary candidate he was. This was secured and Wilson, a straight-
forward radical trade union man, went ahead with the creation of an 
independent labour organisation to combat the Conservative landowner 
Lord Stanley. (128) 
The two remaining Labour parties were more curious developments. 
Whereas the trade unions involved at Stockport, Barrow, Gorton and 
Westhoughton all combined to support prominent radicals of former days 
and thus emphasised their own political colouring, the workers at 
Preston and Liverpool had been formerly among the most firm Conservatives. 
The religious divisions at Preston had made the seat practically hopeless 
for the Liberals and since about 1892 the main opposition in 
------------- -- - .. ~ 
parliamentary elections had come from the I.L.P. which undoubtedly 
drew upon support from the radical fringe. (129) After the cotton 
unions' affiliation to the L.R.C. the position in Preston changed 
substantially; the local trade unionists were prepared to consider 
an independent position and as a result of interaction with the I.L.P. 
a meeting took place on March 30th 1903 with Woolley, the Weavers' 
president, in the chair. Delegates of the Trades Council, cotton 
unions and I.L.P. were present and the decision was taken to sponsor 
a Labour candidate at the next General Election. (130) Hardly had 
the L.R.C. been constituted when the senior member for Preston, 
R. W. Hanbury, died on April 27th, his demise causing a bye-election 
to be held in little over a fortnight's time. The Preston Labour 
party had not adopted a candidate but upon learning of the bye-election 
quickly intimated to J. R. MacDonald that John Hodge of the Steel 
Smelters would, if available, be its choice. MacDonald had no option 
but to respect the local party's wishes although the Textile Factory 
Workers had offered to sponsor A. H. Cottam of the Clitheroe Weavers, 
a well known trade union official who had for many years served the 
Blackburn Weavers. Cottam was also a Catholic and might reasonably 
have been expected to suit the conditions at Preston ideally. (131) 
Yet Hodge was the candidate chosen,much to the dismay of the Cotton 
Factory Times , which was pro-Cottam. (132) 
.. -...," 
.) ,'." 
Hodge, Chairman of the L.R.C. in 1903, was prominent as a trade 
unionist both locally and nationally; he administered his union from 
Manchester, where during the 1890's he had been a staunch Liberal, 
Chairman of the Cheetham Liberal Association and one of the party's 
city councillors. He became dissatisfied with Liberal social policy, 
his grievances increasing until in 1900, though by no means a socialist, 
he moved wholeheartedly into the independent labour position, fighting 
the parliamentary contest at Gower in that year against an official 
Liberal. (133) Hodge was also a strict Nonconformist and temperance 
advocate(134) and therefore hoped to draw on the votes of Liberal 
working~en, especially since Preston was the paternal home of the 
temperance movement. But the most decisive event in his campaign there 
was the SUpport he received from James Billington, secretary of the 
T (135) Preston Spinners and a lifelong ory. It was in order to rally 
the electoral support of working class Tories that Hodge made his campaign 
appear as completely as possible a battle between capital and labour, 
eschewing in the process any overt socialist or Liberal alliances. 
This posture was facilitated by the position of his Conservative 
opponent John Kerr, (136)a representative of the important, rapidly 
expanding local engineering works of Dick, Kerr and Company. Hodge 
proposed a programme which emphasised social and trade union reform and 
a local veto on the sale of alcohol; it was not an outstandingly radical 
manifesto but Hodge displayed a willingness to compromise by making 
favourable noises to the Catholics on the Coronation Oath question. 
By directing his speeches to large assemblies of trade unionists he 
made sure that his message reached the proper ears.(137) 
The Labour campaign was severely hindered through its hastily 
improvised nature since the Mayor of Preston had allowed only five 
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working days before the poll, a very short period which made a Conservative 
victory almost certain. Hodge used the time in working with Arthur 
Henderson, his agent, and MacDonald, who had rushed to Preston, in 
composing the broad organisational outlines of the campaign. Because 
of the limited time available MacDonald and Henderson produced a poster 
which had been used by Will Crooks, the L.R.C. victor at Woolwich 
earlier in the year,with only slight a~endments for Preston.(138) Hodge 
admitted that in all respects his organisation was weak(139) whilst he 
was also affected by the local Liberal party's announcement of moral 
. (140) 
support for the Labour candIdate. Hodge's performance, however, 
was surprisingly good(14l) - "a happy augury of what may be done even 
in places like Preston with active education work and good organisation.,,(142) 
In the years between 1903 and 1906 the Labour party improved its 
electoral machinery in Preston and eventually adopted J. T. MacPherson, 
also of the Steel Smelters, to fight in 1906.(143) 1903 had shown that 
a Labour platform might be more successful in winning working men's votes 
than Liberalism but the class issue needed to be constantly cultivated 
among the electorate if Conservatism was to be eclipsed. 
The Liverpool labour movement had developed slowly during the 
last dozen years of the nineteenth century mainly because internal 
disputes prevented the creation of a united front. In the late 1880's 
the radical trade unionists, led by William Matkin of the Joiners, 
encountered serious obstacles in persuading the Trades Council to 
endorse their political ambitions and no sooner had they achieved some 
success around 1890 than the socialist new unionists began to raise 
the question of independent labour representation. This proved a far 
more popular cause and with the encouragement of the local I.L.P. a 
Labour Representation Committee was established in 1894 to run Labour 
d "d t 1 1" 1 t" (144) I th COt can 1 a es at ocal and par lamentary e ec lons. n e 1 y 
Council elections of 1895, however, all the Labour and socialist 
candidates were disastrously defeated(145) and the following year saw 
the Trades Council's withdrawal from the labour alliance after a narrow 
(146) 
majority had been obtained in a vote of delegates; the move was 
undoubtedly assisted by the secession during 1894-95 from the Trades 
Council of the Dock Labourers under Sexton; they had been the Council's 
strongest body of support and the leading advocates of independent 
labour politics, their absence thus depriving the Trades Council of a 
militant core which might have succeeded in preserving a unifying 
balance' between the socialist I.L.P. and the trade union right wing.(147) 
During the later 1890's the Trades Council continued to show an 
interest in labour representation, stimulated by the increase of union 
membership on Merseyside and by the hostility of the City Council towards 
~ labour pressure for Fair Contracts clauses. In 1898 the City Council 
proved particularly obstructive over a request from the Trades Council 
to hold a jubilee meeting in a public park; the refusal to sanction 
this appeal led to an immediate demand in the Trades Council for labour 
representation. (148) At the same time trades unionism in the city was 
arming itself for independence by taking steps to secure control of 
the Liverpool Labour Chronicle, formerly directed by the Fabians and 
I.L.P.,as a trade unionist paper. (149) But it was not until 1902 
that the Trades Council was successful in sending a r~presentative to 
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a public body, when a candidate was elected to the Bootle Town Council. (150) 
This event proved the turning point in a marked swing back to the 
labour alliance of the mid 'nineties; in the background was the 
important effects of high unemployment in the Merseyside port industries 
after the South African War, a situation from which Chamberlain's tariff 
reform proposals seemed to offer no respite. "When Capitalism becomes 
aggressive", remarked the Trades Council Secretary in 1903, "the weapon 
f L b . . 1 t· ,,( 151) I . th o a our's defence should be polltlca ac lone n common Wl 
other Lancashire towns Liverpool was thus impelled towards the L.R.C. 
on the tide of a Labour revival; in May 1903 a conference of trade 
unionists took place. (152) 
The following month a Liverpool L.R.C. was organised at a meeting 
in the offices of the Typographical Association; most of the delegates 
who attended were also members of the Trades Council but .in October 
the L.R.C.'s independent status was asserted, with its own committees, 
funds and affiliates. Dues had been collected from members throughout 
the summer and by the Autumn £125 was available for fighting elections 
with 27 societies representing 10,000 workers committed to support 
the independent Labour principle. (153) Towards the end of the year 
attention was turned to the problem of a Labour candidate for Parliament. 
The Ways and Means Committee of the Liverpool L.R.C. decided to ask 
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James Conley, an organiser of the Boilermakers' society, to contest 
the Kirkdale division. (154) The Boilermakers were willing to support 
this plan although when D.C. Cumming, the union's secretary, visited 
Liverpool in November he explained that some local boilermakers in 
Kirkdale were opposed to the scheme, which they considered a "waste of 
" d l"k 1 t I" h " lOt" 11 (155) C 1 h" If money an 1 e y 0 sp lt t e unlon po 1 lca y. on ey lmse 
was undeterred by these objectors and pressed on; he was of Irish 
descent, a man who had made his way to national prominence by trade 
union work; Conley's political views were very narrow, owing nothing to 
socialism and he was typical of the union leaders who wanted to extend 
industrial bargaining into politics. 
In municipal politics the L.R.C. moved towards a rapprochement 
with the socialist societies, supporting the veteran Sam Reeves of the 
I.L.P. in 1903(156) and discussing with the I.L.P. over campaign 
tactics.(157) In October 1904, however, the L.R.C., hoping to build up 
financial resources, decided not to contest local elections before the 
Kirkdale parliamentary contest.(158) The decision inevitably robbed 
the I.L.P. of much support and caused a needless variance of opinion, 
leading the I.L.P. to convene in 1905 a Joint Socialist Committee with 
the S.D.F. to promote municipal candidatures. Although the L.R.C. 
reversed its policy in September 1905 in time to support Sexton of the 
D k d R t 1" ff f th "" t th C" "1 1 t" (159) oc ers an a c 1 e 0 e Muslclans a e lty Councl e ec lons 
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both candidates remained independent of the I.L.P. nominee, J~W.T. Morrisey, 
who was elected with Sexton. This comparative success prompted the 
L.R.C. to adopt Sexton as a second candidate at West Toxteth(160) in 1905, 
a decision which undoubtedly taxed resources. Popular enthusiasm might 
have __ carried ConleY_'?-r1d __ Sext0r:t_t~roug~in any tow~ __ ~tl~_~~'1_~!pool where 
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Labour successes would only come through pai~staking constituency 
work; the L.R.C. had not progressed to this stage during the first 
three years of its existence mainly because its co-operation with 
socialist allies, essential to provide militant propagandists, was 
less than complete. 
The contrast between the parties described above and those of 
Manchester, Blackburn and Nelson illustrates the importance which 
socialist influence was able to play ID creating a sound party organisation. 
Trade union parties pure and simple were unable to develop the same 
vitality of purpose and too often had to rely on specific issues to 
unite the trade union vote. They possessed no far sighted political 
ideal. 
A third type of labour movement, that which failed to produce united 
action between local trade union and socialist wings, had developed at 
Rochdale and Burnley. The Rochdale movement was a continuity of the 
socialist unity policy which had been evident during the late nineties. 
S. G. Hobson, the socialist parliamentary candidate, refused to 
countenance an alliance with non-socialist Labour groups, an attitude 
which simply served to prevent gro~th. (161) 
Burnley, a rapidly expanding weaving centre, was the more important 
example of this type of situation. The S.D.F. continued as a vigorous 
party in the town, drawing support from among the local Weavers' 
society and the miners branches, and adopting a moderate policy under 
the inspiration of Dan Irving. The Burnley S.D.F. looked favourably 
upon the Labour Alliance principle and opposed the decision of its 
Federation to stay outside the L.R.C. After 1901, however, it became 
impossible for the S.D.F. to co-operate with the L.R.C. at parliamentary 
level and the local branch went ahead with its own scheme to sponsor 
Hyndman as social democratic candidate for Burnley. It seemed for a 
while that Burnley might achieve the distinction of creating a socialist 
Labour party outside the L.R.C. network but in September 1903 these 
prospects were dimmed when the Burnley Liberal Association nominated 
. (162) 
the Liberal Labour man, Fred Maddison, as its parliamentary candIdate. 
Maddison provided a rallying point for the radical trade unionists 
and this polarisation in the politics of Burnley hardened in 1905 when 
the S.D.F. conference rejected Burnley's proposal that the Federation 
should rejoin the L.R.C. Thus, although the Trades Council and the 
Burnley Weavers became affiliated to the L.R.C. during 1903 at the same 
time as many other groups in the cotton towns, they had little ground 
in which to manoeuvre, no local branch was formed and no L.R.C. 
candidate put forward. 
In local affairs the picture was different. Although the S.D.F. 
had some influence within the Trades Council the union leadership was 
mostly of a Liberal Labour connection with David Holmes and Fred Thomas 
of the Weavers, strong supporters of a progressive radical alliance 
against the socialists, representing the Trades Council in the Town 
Hall. (163) Nonetheless the Trades Council had adopted an advanced 
municipal programme in 1902, similar to that of the labour parties at 
Nelson and Colne, which called for wide reforms in the municipality to 
improve conditions of labour, public services and education. (164) The 
programme received the S.D.F.'s full sympathy and in the 1902 municipal 
elections the Trades Council went to the extent of giving moral backing 
t . l' t d'd t . t L'b 1 at Burnley Wood ward.(165) o a SOC1a 1S can 1 a e aga1ns a 1 era 
Clearly there was sufficient common ground for liaison, which eventually 
came in 1904 after a year of serious depression in the local cotton 
trade, with rising unemployment. Attention was turned towards the 
control of Poor Law relief by the Board of Guardians and the Trades 
Council and S.D.F. combined to make an ambitious though disappointing 
assault in the Guardians election. (166) 
Instead of withdrawing Irving and the S.D.F. increased their efforts 
to consolidate a local L.R.C. which would include the Weavers' 
Association, the most decisive factor in Burnley working class politics. 
Early in 1905 the social democrats managed to bring all the local ~bour 
forces to a meeting which could discuss the formation of a Labour 
Representation Committee. The conference met at the Weavers' Institute 
in February; it was made up of delegates from the local Textile Trades 
Federation, representing the cotton unions, and officers of trades 
unions, co-operative societies, the S.D.F. and the I.L.P.(167) No 
decisions were arrived at, however, until later in the month when the 
Trades Council in its independent capacity had been consulted. Then 
it was declared that "the time is opportune for the formation of a 
local Labour Representation Committee on the same basis as the 
national Labour Representation Committee.,,(168) Arrangements were 
made to meet regularly in the Weavers' Institute and a constitution was 
drawn up which allowed socialists, as L.R.C. candidates, to declare 
themselves as such before the electorate. The Weavers' formally gave 
their blessings to the new alliance in June 1905. (169) 
The L.R.C.'s first political move was to organise a municipal 
election campaign for 1905. (170) Five candidates, at least two of them 
socialists, were nominated. The results were as discouraging as those 
of 1904, only one person, a social democrat) being elected. Moreover 
the problem of achieving coherent political action was exacerbated by 
the pressures of sectarian loyalties. Irving, for instance, was 
bitterly attacked by the Liberal press which suggested that the L.R.C. 
was a mere front for the socialists' schemes to lay hands on trade 
union money. (171) There were many radicals in the Weavers' Association 
willing to listen to these allegations; many also disagreed with the 
proviso that allowed socialists to announce their creed at elections 
whilst other candidates could not reveal their Liberal or Conservative 
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sympathies from within the L.R.C. (172) Policy also posed a stumbling 
block; some sections of the L.R.C. proposed to exclude religious 
teaching from schools, an idea that was vehemently opposed by the chapel-
(173\ goers. ) The disappointing results of 1905 therefore became the 
signal for expressions of dissent, principally from the Weavers; in 
February 1906 the Association held a members' ballot on its futUre 
connection with the L.R.C. and a motion for withdrawal was passed by 
6685 votes to 5647. (174) The rivalries of old were thus re-established 
and the Burnley L.R.C. lost its principal financial contributor. The 
alliance continued, though only Irving was elected in 1906, whilst 
within two years, infuriated by the mistrust of the Weavers, a group 
of the local S.D.F. set up an "impossibilist" cell that was later 
(175) 
converted into a short lived branch of the S.P.G.B. 
The fruitless hostility within Burnley's Labour movement was a 
marked contrast to the co-operation seen at Nelson. United the Weavers 
and the S.D.F could have formed a very strong party and it seems 
likely that within the L.R.C this unity might have been achieved. As 
it was the supporters of a traditional trade union line were apt to 
regard the social democrats as political pariahs and consequently a 
town rich in working class political vigour was unable to return a 
Labour candidate before the First World War. 
4. Conclusion 
The local labour groups described above cannot be said to have 
effected a radical change in the political representation of Lancashire 
by 1906. In only one town, Nelson, had a Labour party achieved 
control in the local Council. Yet they were themses upon which the 
future Labour party in the region was to be built; as such their 
character in 1906 was important since with the unfavourable conditions 
for growth in post -war years the Labour party was to rely very much 
on what it had created in the early years of the century. The really 
significant feature emerging from a study of local labour politics 
between 1900 and 1906 is the great strength of trades unionism in forging 
the character of the Lancashire Labour movement. In particular, the 
commitment of the miners and cotton workers to the L.R.C. can be seen 
as the logical outcome of their traditional policies for remedial 
legislation on industrial questions. This assured the L.R.C. in 
Lancashire of strong, institutional foundations but, with the exception 
of a few areas, deprived the movement of the wider, more comprehensive 
appeal of a mass political party. 
Chapter 12 
1906 AND AFTER 
The General Election of 1906 was a political turning-point. 
Besides demonstrating a remarkable revival in the fortunes of the 
Liberal party it verified the emergence of the Labour vote in British 
politics; time proved the Liberal revival to be temporary but the 
Labour vote developed into a permanent feature of the twentieth 
century political scene. Looking back on the 1906 election it is 
easy to assume that the Liberal victory was a certainty, though to 
contemporaries, it must be appreciated, the outcome of the campaign was 
far from predictable. The Conservatives overestimated their chances of 
success; the Liberals, who had known only politica·l disappointment for 
almost fifteen years, did not expect to win by a handsome margin and 
therefore worked hard to conciliate their new allies, the organised 
Labour parties,whose programme coincided sharply with their own. For 
the Labour groups 1906 represented a chance to achieve some short-term 
objectives and only a few of their followers hoped that it might bring 
about a sea change in political behaviour. 
1. Liberal Recovery, 1900 - 1906 
The Liberal recovery was startling. In 1900 the party had lost 
two successive General Elections by vast majorities and was seriously 
divided within itself over the South African War. Its position in 
Lancashire was so dishearteningly weak that it seemed as if the party 
might disintegrate, or enter into a long decline.(l) Even in 1902 the 
events at Clitheroe suggested that the traditionally Non-conformist 
Liberal voters were being undermined by Labour's appeal to the working 
class. Yet by 1906 Lancashire, previously one of the most Tory regions in 
England, had completely switched its political allegiance; 55.6 per cent 
of the total votes cast were captured by Liberal and L.R.C. candidates, 
as against only 43 per cent in 1900. The Liberal - L.R.C. coalition was 
able to secure four times as many M.P.s as the Conservatives. In the 
districts with the highest incidence ofCOXholics the change from the 
position of 1900 was equally startling; whilst in 1900 only 31 per cent 
of the vote had gone to the Liberals in these areas they now returned 
almost 49 per cent, Tory Liverpool showing a similar increase in the 
Liberal vote. Apparently the Liberal party had at last, with Labour help, 
managed to blanket the old Tory anti-catholic vote as well as to make 
itself the friend of all social classes; in 1900 the Liberals had failed 
in all except one seat in the middle class and socially mixed constituencies 
and taken only a quarter of the working class divisions; by 1906 all 
four middle class seats, seven out of eleven mixed and thirty out of 
thirty nine working class seats had gone Liberal. This was the most complete 
Liberal success that Lancashire had ever experienced: why was the party 
able to rise to such heights in a region long noted for its working class 
Toryism? 
Two principal developments accounted for the Liberal recrudescence 
in the years between 1900 and 1906. First and most important , a series 
of issues arose through the Conservative government's policy which forced 
the LiberaBto stand by their long established principles of economic and 
individual freedom and by so doing they found themselves closely in line 
with the aims of working class voters. The Conservatives had made a series 
of decisions that were not only controversial but which seemed near 
revolutionary at the time. The most important was the 
Tariff Reform issue for which Chamberlain declared his support in 
1903. (2) The party was not united on this question, it is true, but 
the mere existence of influential Tories who favoured a protectionist 
policy was sufficient to throw the weight of working class opinion 
behind the Liberals, who maintained their faith in Free Trade. Tariff 
Reform raised the prospect of dearer food and this was sufficient 
to condemn it in the eyes of working men and women with a low earning 
power. 
Another issue also aroused working class hostility; this was the 
problem of "Chinese Slavery" - the use by South African mineowners of 
cheap, indentured Chinese Labour. Balfour condoned this practice, 
appearing thereby to have scant regard for human dignity and seeming 
to ally himself with Capital against the interests of Labour. Self 
interest also played a part in working class indignation, for British 
workmen felt that their chances of emigrating to South Africa had 
b d t b f OOt 1 0 t (3) C 0 een es royed y the avarice of ore1gn cap1 a 1S s. om1ng, as 
it did, so soon after the Boer War, this issue made it appear that the 
military victory obtained was being used to strengthen a situation 
which was inadmissible to all trade unionists. 
Nearer to home trade unionists were also angered by the Government's 
attitude to the Taff Vale decision; it had refused to consider 
immediate legislation to provide legal protection over union funds 
and the election of a Liberal Government offered the only hope of a 
speedy and satisfactory conclusion to this problem. All these issues 
had a more pressing urgency for working people and might therefore have 
been expected to play an important part in Lancashire's electoral decisions. 
Finally, in Non-conformist areas all classes were united against 
the Government's Education Act of 1902; the school boards had been 
swept away and replaced by local education authorities, thus removing 
education from the direct control of democratically elected bodies. 
In the towns where the chapels predominated indignation meetings 
were frequent and Free Church Councils began to contest local 
elections in the hope of securing nominees on the new education 
authorities,(4) "for the Non-conformists had relied to a large extent 
on the school boards to exert their influence in education. The 
Education Act, however, was a less decisive source of antagonism 
against the Conservatives in Lancashire, since its effects had pleased 
Anglicans and Catholics, whose voluntary schools were now supported 
financially through the rates. In some towns education actually 
proved to be a point in the Conservatives' favour. 
In general, however, the Liberals profited from these issues 
since they were able to stand both as a popular party and as"the up-
holders of a "safety-first" policy, resisting Conservative changes 
and maintaining the established order. 
A second cause of Liberal improvement was seen in an attempt to 
increase the party's efficiency at constituency level. In contrast to 
the disillusionment of 1900 many traditional Liberal supporters, both 
middle and working class, were being brought back into the party by the 
enthusiasm aroused through the political situation. Their willingness 
to vote for and work on behalf of the Liberal candidates was reflected 
in the party's increased vote and the high poll generally. It became 
possible once more to find wealthy candidates in sufficient numbers to 
guarantee contests in stron3 Tory areas, a striking comparison with 1900 
when ten seats had been abandoned outright in Lancashire because of Liberal 
apathy, and hasty, incomplete arrangements made in many others.(5) 
By about 1905, therefore, a more confident attitude was becoming evident 
in the Liberal ranks as the party looked forward more optimistically to the 
forthcoming General Election. After twenty years of adversity events were 
at last beginning to favour the Liberals. Contemporary issues appeared to 
offer the most likely source of success and the Liberals decided to swim 
with the tide, fighting the Conservatives over policy matters. It is in any 
case doubtful whether at this time the Liberals could have converted popular 
enthusiasm into a buoyant and effective party machine in time for the 1906 
General Election, and they did not attempt to do so. Herbert Gladstone, the 
Liberal Chief Whip, decided instead to implement a partial re-organisation 
of party machinery whilst recruiting the support in an electoral pact of 
the new L.R.C.s, which had been capturing the loyalties of trade unionists 
and socialists, to be used "against a common enemy.,,(6) The alliance 
eventually negotiated(7) was beneficial to both parties since it relieved 
Labour candidates of Liberal opposition and took a heavy financial burden 
from Liberal shoulders in working class constituencies. Gladstone could 
therefore leave several such constituendes to be nursed by the L.R.C. and 
concentrate his own party's efforts on areas where organisation was in need 
of repair. 
After the 1900 General Election Gladstone had reorganised his party's 
structure in London and appointed three organisers to "perambulate the country" 
setting aside £3,000 for the aid of "hopelessly impecunious constituencies". (8) 
Some of the Liberal difficulties in improving constituency machinery can be 
seen by the problems faced in Lancashire. The cost of fighting some seats was 
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very high, especially if they were double member ones or county, divisions whin 
covered an extensive area.(9) Consequently many local associations 
found that to defray costs it was easier to nominate a wealthy middle 
class candidate pr&pared to dig deeply into his pocket than to attempt 
the creation of a mass party. Gladstone himself frequently advised such 
a course; of T. F. Byrne at Widnes in 1900, for instance, Gladstone 
"frankly doubted his power to be able to give enough if he wins". (10) 
Local associations were sometimes fortunate in securing a grant from 
Gladstone's central fund to run a candidate; Blackburn Liberals, for 
example, complained of possessing no "rich men" but wanted to contest 
one seat alongside Philip Snowden against the Conservatives; by 
persuading Gladstone of the chances for success (a misplaced optimism 
. (11) 
as it tUrned out) they were helped out wlth expenses. Such 
instances were rare, though, for as was seen at Accrington Sir J. F. 
Leese's financial problems almost led to his withdrawal, but there 
was little Gladstone could do to help him even though he knew the seat 
. h ft' (12) mlg t all to Labour should Leese re lre. Stockport Liberals, 
faced with a double member seat to contest admitted to needing "a man 
of influence" if they were to fight in both seats(13) and their subsequent 
inability to find one let to the unopposed second candidature of 
G. J. Wardle for the L.R.C. For the 1906 election Liberal selection 
committees in general chose a traditional type of candidate, either 
businessman, employer or successful lawyer, many of them being familiar 
figures from the 1890's and earlier. As middle class men they 
inevitably supported a middle class policy and would continue to do so 
as long as they controlled the purse strings. When middle and working 
class aims corresponded closely, as in 1906, this situation presented 
no problems but the objectives of the two classes could easily be 
estranged as they had been during the Home Rule issues of 1886; with 
Labour creating its own loyalties and party machinery this might prove 
dangerous for Li~alism. 
The Liberals did attempt to revitalise their party organisation 
at Manchester in the early 1900's but the effort did not produce 
immediately effective results mainly because it had come too late. 
Herbert Gladstone was negotiatin~ for unopposed L.R.C. candidatures 
as early as 1902 in the city, complaining that the Liberal Union had 
neglected constituency work in favour of ostentatious political meetings 
in the Free Trade Hall.(14) The inadequacies of Liberal organisation 
during the 1890's in the city have already been pointed out in Chapter 
Nine; by 1900 no improvements had been made. The continued exodus of 
middle class people from the city centre to the outskirts(15) led to a 
withering of Liberal organisation in the working class areas by the 
tUrn of the century. It was clear that without some degree of 
centralisation the poorer divisional associatiomwould be unable to 
continue but the jealously guarded autonomy of the wealthy constituencies 
. prevented change. The defeat of 1900 produced astringent self-
criticism, however, and the following year it was decided to re-organise 
3rt 
the party structure with the primary aim of creating a central treasury.(16) 
In 1903 these arrangements culminated when the Manchester Liberal 
Federation came into existence with a complex federated structure of 
councils and committees elected on a representative basis from the 
various divisions; a treasurer collected the Federation's finances and 
dispensed money according to need, whilst a secretary, who combined 
the duties of a professional registration agent, was appointed at a 
salary of £500 a year.(17) Even with this more practicable system the 
Federation was unable to clear its financial deficit during the next 
ten years,(18) and one or two divisional organisations still proved 
obdurate over co-operation with Labour candidates.(19) In 1906 two 
L.R.C. candidates were allowed straight fights with the Conservatives 
in Manchester constituencies and, as was seen, the Manchester Labour 
party began to develop into a serious rival to the Liberals as the 
opposition in the Conservative controlled City Council. The Manchester 
Liberal Federation was not able to resist the growth of a trade union 
based Labour party. 
If this was true of Manchester how far might it also be true of 
other towns? One of the strongest levers G1adstone had been able to use 
to persuade his local associations not to oppose Labour candidates had 
been the financial strength of the L.R.C. In 1903 its Newcastle 
conference had agreed to create a Parliamentary Fund to finance Labour 
candidates; it was resolved not to make any payments from the Fund until 
£2500 had been collected, except in the event of a General Election.(20) 
So successful was the response of affiliated societies that by the end 
of 1903 £2277 had been collected and levies to it were made compulsory 
in 1904. (21) This money was therefore used in 1906 to sponsor a Liberal 
Labour coalition but when it is claimed that the Labour victories in 
Lancashire were gained with "the tacit support of official Liberalism,,( 22) 
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this should not imply that there was any altruistic self-denial on the 
part of Liberal associations. They had already lost their pre-emptive 
claims to workin3 class constituencies and 'Were unable to challenge 
their occupation by Labour representation committees. 
The electoral arrangement therefore benefited the Labour 
Representation Committee in Lancashire. Double members seats offered 
the easiest chances for clear Labour runs: they were cheaper to contest 
with only one candidate which meant that a Labour man could be promoted 
without the Liberals losing entirely their parliamentary influence. 
Blackburn, Bolton, Stockport and Oldham therefore posed no problems. 
Some difficulties were encountered at Preston in 1904 when it seemed that 
the local Labour party was unable to find a candidate; for a time the 
Preston Liberal Association experienced some trouble in finding a second 
candidate itself(23) but the situation was eased early in 1905 by the 
nomination of J. T. MacPherson for the L.R.C., an event which greatly 
relieVed Liberal problems. Single member seats required more careful 
handling by Gladstone and MacDonald because if a Labour man was elected 
with Liberal support he had to be strictly acceptilileto the local Liberals 
before they would renounce their parliamentary claims. A difficulty on 
this level arose at Barrow; the local Liberals considered their 
nominee, Conybeare, to be a good candidate, especially since Duncan of 
the L.R.C. was an outsider and not thought to be very high in the 
electorate's estimation. (24) Nor was Duncan very acceptable to 
J. R. MacDonald and Keir Hardie, who attem?ted to remove him.(25) 
the Barrow L.R.C. stood firm, eventually winning over the Liberal 
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support. A reversal of this situatimwas seen at Accrington, however, 
the main difference being that Accrington was a far stronger area for 
Liberalism than Barrow and consequently the local Liberals had a just 
claim to contest the seat. In the single member constituencies of 
Clitheroe, St. Helens, Ince, Newton, Westhoughton, Kirkdale and West 
Toxteth, where Liberalism was at a discount, there was no opposition 
to Labour candidates. 
The Manchester area presented some of the most serious obstacles 
to electoral negotiation. In 1902 the Manchester Liberal Union had 
indicated to Gladstone that four working class constituencies -
Manchester North East, East and South West, as well as Salford South -
might be suitable for Labour candidates. Gladstone even suggested 
that Arthur Henderson might go to Salford South(26) whilst the 
Manchester-Liberals seemed keen to have G. N. Barnes(27) The Manchester 
L.R.C. had not at this stage decided upon its candidates, and not 
until September 1903 was J. R. MacDonald informed that three men -
G. D. Kelley, Tom Fox and John Harker - had been selected to run in 
Manchester South West, North East and Salford West respectively.(28) 
MacDonald at first accepted this list, apparently under the impression 
that Harker was to contest Sal ford South(29) where the local Liberals 
had recently made another urgent appeal for a candidate. (30) MacDonald, 
realising his mistake, learnt that Sal ford West was not vacant, but in 
fact very much Liberal. In the same month he tried to persuade Harker 
to move to Salford South(31) but the issue was resolved when Tom Fox 
withdrew from Manchester North East and Harker took his place. (32) 
This left two Labour candidates in constituencies which offered clear 
runs and in 1905 Harker himself resigned over policy differences, his 
place taken by J. R. Clynes. (33) There was some pressure from local 
I.L.P. members to contest both r~anchester East and Salford West with 
socialist candidates but the scheme received no encouragement from the 
Manchester Labour party. Gorton had originally been set aside for 
Labour (34) but during 1903 an independent Liberal emerged who had to 
be discouraged by neighbouring Liberal associations.(35) The least 
manageable constituency was Eccles, which was mentioned only once in 
Gladstone~s correspondence; in 1905, as an impending three cornered 
fight.(36) At the same time the Labour candidate, Ben Tillett, was 
apparently supported by the national L.R.C. (37) The seat had a fairly 
marginal history, though the Liberals had won only once, in 1892, 
since the Third Reform Act. The local Labour party was insistent upon 
promoting Tillett, who was nominated early in 1904, receiving support 
from Thomas Ashton of the Spinners, John Barker and Stephen Walsh.(38) 
Neither MacDonald nor Gladstone were able to make any impression on 
their followers in this division. 
When polling began on January 12th, 1906 there were 16 L.R.C. 
candidates in the Lancashire industrial region, as well as four 
independent labour or socialist candidates. Though all but one of the 
L.R.C. candidates had been relieved of Liberal opposition they could 
not afford to underestimate the task in front of them. With trade 
union support the financial problems for Labour candidates were not 
as pressing as they had been in previous~ections, yet the party 
lacked experienced, full-time agents and workers, few of its leaders 
were nationally known figures and local party roots had at best only 
recently taken hold, whilst in many places there were no real roots 
at all. Only where socialist groups had been energetic had constituency 
groups mustered their fighting strength by contesting municipal 
elections and only by local success could parliamentary ambitions of a 
lasting nature be realised. As events were to prove, however, these 
handicaps remained theoretical for the time being for the Labour party 
was able to profit from the special circumstances which swept the 
Liberals into power. Significantly, there was little to choose between 
Liberal and Labour at the polls. The constituency campaigns in which 
Labour figured therefore reveal much about the Labour movement as it 
was in 1906, about its organisation, the view of its candidates, and 
about the issues, both national and local, which it deemed important.(39) 
There were 7 L.R.C. candidates in the cotton towns; Free Trade 
was expected to be the main issue as the Cotton Factory Time~ had come 
out strongly against Protection and it was not thought that the cotton 
trade would be tempted to support Chamberlain's proposals, especially 
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since the economy had boomed considerably after 1904, and trade 
union secretaries were reporting "the brightest and most: ,prosperous 
year that has come to the Lancashire cotton trade within the memory 
of the present generation",(40) or "continued prosperous and 
profitable condition".(41) Not all the Conservative candidates were 
Tariff Reformers, however, and this caused some variation in the 
campaigns. At Bolton, for instance, there was only one Conservative 
candidate in a double member seat, and his espousal of Free Trade made 
it likely that he might be returned. A. H. Gill, the Labour candidate, 
stressed his interest in social and industrial reforms, speaking on 
old age pensions and legislation to improve the compensation paid to 
sick~and injured workmen. Both he and the Liberal, Harwood, gave 
assurances that they would uphold the principles of Free Trade, but 
this was not the important issue in the campaign; for some time there 
was speculation on the possibility of Harwood's losing votes because 
of his agreement with the 1902 Education Act but in fact he was elected 
with Gill by a comfortable margin, a high proportion of votes being 
split between them, sU9gesting that Labour supporters were radicals; 
there was little cross voting, on the other hand, between Labour and 
Conservative. One encouraging feature of the campaign was the Labour 
party's efficient organisation, providing election literature, motor 
cars and carriages in numbers equalling the other parties.(42) 
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Conservative Free Trades were also in evidence at Blackburn, 
but the campaign differed from that of Bolton in many respects. 
Philip Snowden was the L.R.C. candidate but unlike A. H. Gill showed 
little taste for overt co-operation with the Liberals. Because of 
the Conservative's position on Free Trade and their disavowal of the 
Chinese labour in South Africa the contest developed less along policy 
differences and became a keen, personal and sometimes bitter struggle 
between Snowden and the veteran Tory, W. H. Hornby - the "owd gam 
COCk",(43) who had been M.P. for Blackburn since 1886. The Conservatives 
based their campaign on the defence of the Church and the public house, 
the fundamentals of working class Toryism; Snowden consequently had to 
contend with many attacks upon his alleged irreligion. By election 
day the contest had degenerated into many petty squabbles, relieved only 
by Snowden's exhilarating speeches and his novel method of holding two 
meetings concurrently. Snowden's personal appeal and the support he 
received from Irish electors(44) was enough to place him in second 
position closely behind Hornby. (45) 
The strongest Labour prospects were at Clitheroe, held by the 
L.R.C. since 1902. The General Election proved to be an extremely 
one-sided affair since the local Conservatives had not ,entered a 
candidate and it had seemed until two weeks before the poll that David 
Shackleton would again be unopposed. A late rival appeared in 
B.J. Belton, an Independent Tariff Reformer and Catholic, from Surrey. 
Belton was a man of strongly expressed views on Protection, what he 
called "real free trade", and education but Shackleton's electoral 
organisation was vastly superior(46) and the man himself had proved 
an able Member of Parliament who had conducted himself well in the 
pressure for a Trades Disputes Bill. His election was certain and he 
secured a massive majority by gaining the working class votes in the 
small industrial centres of Nelson, Colne, Brierfield and Padiham. 
The contest helped the local Conservatives to pin-point some areas of 
anti-Labour voters, especially in the more rural villages of Chatburn and 
Trawden, and even in Clitheroe itself. (47) 
The Free Trade issue was of greatest consequence in the contest 
at Preston. The Liberal and Labour candidates were Free Traders whilst 
their two Conservative opponents supported Tariff Reform. Since the 
bye-election contest of John Hodge in 1903 the Preston Liberals had 
revived strongly under the inspiration of their agent, Fred Marchant, 
whose work was encouraged by many local Conservatives who had broken 
with their own party over Tariff Reform. Both Cox, the Liberal, and 
J. T. MacPherson, the L.R.C. candidate, appeared to the electors as 
members of the same party, so similar were their programmes; they often 
held joint meetings in which leading citizens from both parties 
assisted in defending the cause of Free Trade. The Conservative 
Sitting Members, Tomlinson and Kerr, were unable to make headway with 
their Tariff Reform proposals against the tide of popular enthusiasm, 
many of their early meetings actually being disturbed by demonstrations 
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of hostile opinion. Consequently they began to emphasise the 
religious issue, hoping for support from the Catholic electors, mostly 
English and reckoned to be about one third of the electorate; the 
Conservative education policy was popular among them and finally 
became the predominant issue in the Tory campaign. MacPherson, a 
fresh faced, eager candidate, showed little interest in social reform 
and dealt only briefly with the Chinese Slavery question; he preferred 
to rely on the Free Trade standpoint and with an efficient campaign 
committee which enlisted the help of many women volu~teers he gained 
a large amount of "plumpers" as well as many Tory and Liberal cross-
votes, all of which helped him to an easy victory.(48) 
The other three contests in the cotton towns involved socialist 
candidates. All three showed a much greater taste than the L.R.C. 
~candidates for discussing the state of society and proportionately 
less reverance for the popular issues of the day. H. M. Hyndman at 
~~ was opposed by a Conservative Free Trader but his main rival 
for the workin~ class vote was a Liberal Labour candidate, Fred Maddison. 
The Liberal manifesto was very comprehensive, and though mainly a 
defence of freedom in trade and education displayed a wide appreciatbn 
of social and industrial problems and of the legislative reforms 
required. Hyndman's reaction was to make a guarded gesture in support 
of Free Trade though he was careful to qualify this with the warning 
that he "did not believe that Free Trade would solve the difficulties 
of the country". It seemed certain that the working class vote would 
be split and the outcome depend on whichever side could secure a 
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marginal advantage; for a while it seemed that Hyndinan might win 
over the Irish voters, especially after a wholehearted appeal for 
him by Michael Davitt, the Nationalist; but the Irish League 
eventually recommended its members to vote Liberal on the Home 
Rule issue. The high poll - 95 per cent. - testified to the hard 
work of all three parties whilst the respectable S.D.F. poll, only 
33 votes behind the Conservative runner-up was a significant advance 
on the 1895 figure and proof of the social democrats continued vitality 
in the town.(49) 
The two remaining socialists, Dan Irvin3 at Accrington and 
S. G. Hobson at Rochdale, had little chance of winning and their main 
hope of success was in consolidating the socialist movement in their 
respective areas. Irving moved some way towards this aim. He offered 
the voters socialist measures of a visionary nature but declined to 
comment on Free Trade. Organisation, however, decided the outcome in 
this division; the Liberals directed their campaign from the numerous 
radical clubs throughout the district and therefore gained a 
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considerable vote from all the centres of population. Irving, handicapped 
by the time spent as Hyndman's agent at Burnley, was able to work 
effectively only at Clayton-le-Moors and among the miners at Altham 
and Hapton. His campaign failed to reach a sufficient number of 
electors to be a challenge to the Liberals but one or two pockets of 
support for future Labour candidates were established and Irving 
polled creditably, unaffected by the mere handful of votes taken by 
the independent Labour candidate, S. M. Holden.(50) The socialist 
campaign at Rochdale never got off the ground and though Hobson 
propou~ded some prescient social policies such as free meals for 
school children and old age pensions the lack of any significant 
support from local trade unions ensured the isolation of the 
socialists.(5l) 
There was also a heavy concentration of Labour candidates in 
the mining region of central Lancashire. In three constituencies 
the campaigns followed a corresponding pattern. At St. Helens, Ince 
and Westhoughton the Labour candidates were all trade unionists and 
prominent radicals of former days. All supported Free Trade whilst 
their Conservative opponents, though by no means dogmatic Protectionists, 
attempted to shift their ground to the Home Rule and Education issues. 
St. Helens offered the Tories some hopes, since there had been a 
serious slump in the local glass bottle trade during the early years 
f th t . t . ( 52) h o e century, allegedly caused by German compe 1 lon; t e 
situation appeared favourable for Tariff Reform whilst at the same 
time the Education issue prompted the Catholic clergy to urge their 
flock to support the Conservatives. Irish Nationalists, on the other 
hand, were more interested in a Home Rule Bill and had been told by 
Michael Davitt that the L.R.C. was the party for workingmen. Thomas 
Glover, the Labour candidate, concentrated on issues arising from 
social class, emphasising the importance of Free Trade and hence cheap 
food to the working men and women, and attacking his opponent, Seton 
Karr, for his antipathy towards the legal reform of trade union status. 
Glover also claimed that the L.R.C. intended to "get social reforms 
passed through the House of Commons which would lighten the burden of 
the workers and would improve their condition". So successful was he 
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in convincing people of this that Seton Karr found himself having 
to match Glover's promises, and by fighting on his opponent's terms 
Karr's campaign suffered. Glover's organisation proved excellent, 
for he won all but one (North Windle) of the wards in st. Helens; 
the campaign-was one of the most interesting Labour contests of 1906 
for the way in which it overcame initial adversity through the progressive 
outlook of the candidate. (53) Stephen Walsh's campaign at Ince 
lacked a dominant issue and the contest proceeded in an uneventful 
fashion. Walsh stressed Free Trade and Colonel Blundell, the Conservative 
colliery owner, attempted to arouse Tory passions by speaking of 
the dangers of Home Rule for Ireland. Probably the most decisive 
factor in the contest, however, was the effect of an anti-employer 
backlash, produced by a strike of some two thousand colliers, at 
Blundell's pits in the summer of 1905. The miners constituted the 
majority of the electorate and this was sufficient to secure a convincing 
win for Walsh.(54) The contest in the extensive division of 
Westhoughton was fairly short. Lord Stanley, the well-known local 
landowner, was defending his seat against W. T. Wilson, who offered 
mainly a programme of trade union reforms designed to capture the 
working class vote in the small industrial towns of Horwich and 
Blackrod, with their radical tradition. Wilson secured a good poll 
in the many scattered villages and the "swing" away from the 
Conservatives was much higher than the regional average. (55) 
At Newton-Ie-Willows a division of the votes on a class basis 
was very pronounced. The contest was between J. A. Seddon, a 
St. Helens trade unionist, and Colonel Pilkington of the glass 
manufacturing company. The constituency was a large one with varied 
social and occupational groups~ the Conservatives were strongly 
entrenched in the agricultural districts and among the middle class 
freeholder voters at Dentons Green. The Labour vote was expected to 
come from the miners at Ashton, Haydock and Golborne and from the 
workers in the railway shops at Earlestown. Because of the scattered 
nature of the industrial communities the L.R.C. organisation was faced 
with considerable difficulties in canvassing, especially since there 
was no strong Labour party to act as abase for operations in any of 
the towns. This, more than anything, probably accounted for the narrow 
Labour victory. Seddon's policies were aimed at the trade unionists, 
for whom he offered a reversal of the Taff Vale judgement, an Eight 
Hours Day and old age pensions. He claimed that the election was about 
domestic issues, promising that the Labour party would becorres a 
vehicle for social reforms "to make the homes of England a little bit 
brighter". He committed himself to a thorough investigation of the 
former Conservative government's record but his message failed to 
convert the middle classes.(56) 
Wigan withstood the swing to the left in 1906, remaining in 
Conservative hands. The reason for this was that the Labour candidate, 
Thorley Smith, a local counclllor, received no support from the L.R.C. 
and had to face Liberal opposition. He was, moreover, campaigning 
for Women's Suffrage, not an issue at this time which roused much 
enthusiasm. Since the Liberal duplicated most of Smith's other proposals 
there was a serious split in the working class vote, much of which 
went to the Conservative Free Trader, Sharp Powell, who won easily.(57) 
The first Lancashire constituencies to poll were the six divisions 
of Manchester. The Conservative clearly failed in their appeals for 
Tariff Reform and nowhere was their defeat more abject than at North 
West Manchester where Winston Churchill triumphed on a Free Trade 
policy, the issue on which he had left the Conservative party in 1904. 
The Manchester divisions varied considerably in social and industrial 
character but the election issues changed little: "from the first to 
the last", commented a jubilant Manchester Guardian, "the one supreme 
issue was Free Trade". (58) The two Labour candidates, J. R. Clynes 
at North East and G. D. Kelley at South West, stood in wholly working 
class districts, both densely populated and with serious housing 
problems. Not only were both campaigns covered by the Gladstone 
MacDonald entente, but the local Liberal associations in both divisions 
gave full support-with volunteer election workers - to the L.R.C. 
organisations, assistance which was particularly beneficial to Clynes, 
who had been adopted only in the mid summer of 1905. The two L.R.C. 
candidates issued identical manifestos which stated in principle their 
views on measures to improve the social condition of working people by 
eradicating the class monopoly of wealth; they then outlined their 
opinions on current issues. Kelley emphasised the Chinese Slavery 
problem more than Clynes and was required also to discuss education 
more fully because of the higher proportion of Catholics in his 
constituency; he was rewarded by seeing the Irish headquarters in the 
Stretford Road displaying posters which urged the workers to vote 
Labour. Neither of their Conservative opponents tackled the Free 
Trade question very comprehensively and Sir James Fergusson's campaign 
against Clynes was a rather inept affair, seeming to rely on the 
candidate's reputation as the division's M.P. over the pas~ twenty 
years. Clynes almost certainly gained votes from a large number of 
working men who had previously voted Tory. 
The same was true of John Hodge at Gorton, an industrial division 
where the electors were mainly engaged in engineering and in the hat 
making industry at Denton. The Labour canvass pointed to an over-
whelming victory for Hodge but the Tories, who had experienced outright 
hostility only at Lower Openshaw, worked enthusiastically. Hodge 
concentrated upon preaching Free Trade and was possibly assisted on his 
road to victory by Conservative attempts to slacken the socialist 
influence in the trade unions. (60) The pattern of Labour gains was 
followed at stockport, where G. J. Wardle of the Railway Servants stood 
in harness with a Liberal for the double member seat. Wardle received 
open Liberal support and in return asked his followers to cast their 
second vote for the Liberal candidate. (61) Eccles, where Ben Tillett 
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of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union was the 
L.R.C. candidate, had not been included in the Liberal - L.R.C. 
arrangements; Tillett was therefore opposed by a Liberal candidate 
but his chances d victory were even more seriously decreased when he 
fell ill during the campaign and went on a cruise to convalesce; the 
local I.L.P. carried on the fight but Eccles followed the example of 
neighbouring West Sal ford by choosing a Free Trader with connections 
in local industry. (62) 
In the isolated industrial town of Barrow-in-Furness the Free 
Trade question was of great importance to the local workers. The 
Conservatives had been strong in Barrow over pre00us years because of 
their more vigorous stand on foreign policy, through which Barrow's 
interest in naval shipbuilding might prosper. When, therefore, Charles 
Duncan of the L.R.C. told his shipyard workers in 1906 that the town 
had "sprung into being largely as a result of Free Trade policy" they 
were inclined to agree with him. His Conservative opponent was a 
shipbuilder himself, but also a Tariff Reformer and he realised that 
his wisest course would be to stress the continuation of "strong" 
foreign policy under a Conservative government. Duncan, a member of 
the I.L.P., scarcely needed to raise the complications of socialism 
"with the electors since he was able'to use the symbols of a "Big Loaf" 
and a "Little Loa f" to great effect. (63) 
The rise of Labour as a parliamentary force was not evident in 
Liverpool. The city was still en~eshed in its nineteenth century 
religious antagonism from which the Orangeist Conservatives had 
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~rore~ttin all but the most Catholics and Irish division - Scotland. 
There were two Labour candidates in 1906; James Sexton of the Liverpool 
Dockers at West Toxteth and James Conley,an official of the 
Boilermakers' Union, at Kirkdale. Sexton's Irish background was some-
thing of a disability in his campaign since the constituency had many 
Protestant voters who would not have taken very easily to a man, who 
in his youth, had been_a supporter of the Irish National League. Conley 
was also of Irish descent and Irishmen were equally sparsely 
distributed in Kirkdale. Both constituencies were working class areas 
and the Labour candidates had to attempt to make their policies overcome 
the traditional religious allegiances Sexton tried to answer the 
questions raised by poverty and unemployment with socialists argument 
and fought a good campaign by attacking with sincerity what he regarded 
to be the fraudulent behaviour of the Conservatives towards the working 
class. But he could make little headway against the emotive calumnies 
of the Tories, who castigated the "ignorant Home Rulers". The extent 
of the Labour appeal may be judged from the fact that Conley was no less 
successful than Sexton in terms of votes in spite of his failure to 
suggest what Labour policies might mean to working people. (64) Conley, 
however, had the more efficient organisation and he had been nUrsing 
the division since 1904 whereas Sexton's adoption was late in 1905. 
3. Aftermath. 
Liberalism's sweeping victory of 1906 illustrated the potential 
electoral strength of left-wing forces operating under favourable 
circumstances. Yet whilst the Conservative vote of 1906 was actually 
lower than in 1885, despite the increased electorate, it had retained 
a remarkably constant level over the previous twenty years. Almost 
immediately after 1906 the Conservatives began to reduce the margin 
and in 1910, when the party dropped the liability of tariff reform, 
they were in striking distance of parity. (65) Liberal success had 
been based upon the coincidence of influential, though temporary, 
issues that gradually lost their political effect. Mor"eover 1906 was 
only a parliamentary victory; in most of the large towns - Manchester, 
Salford, Liverpool, Blackburn, Bolton and Preston - the Conservatives 
dominated municipal politics. 
Of the Labour party's Lancashire M.P.'s only two - Snowden and 
Clynes - had achieved any pro~inence in the socialist movement; Snowden 
was the only one not to have been sponsored by a trade union. Thus 
the trade union element was exceptionally strong and able to lend its 
weight to the Trade Disputes Bill and working class measures favoured 
by the Liberals such as the Unemployed Workmen Bill; on the otherharid 
it could provide no political alternative to Liberalism. Before the 
First World War the parliamentary position of Labour in Lancashire did 
not improve. Some gains were made in local elections, most successfully 
at Manchester and usually at the expense of the Liberal party. Few 
local Labour parties had progressed beyond the stage of management 
committees for trade union M.P.'s before 1914 and even fewer allowed 
individ~al membership to those not already members of an affiliated 
union Or socialist society. Nevertheless the Labour principle had 
been established and was attractive enough to win over the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain in 1909. No doubt there were still many 
trade unionists who opposed the Labour party outright as well as some 
who preserved a minority group mentality, wishing Labour well but 
voting Liberal or Co~servative in important elections. But a new 
generation was growing up for whom the Labour party would appear as 
fact of political life and ftwas to this sector of the community that 
the party would have to look for support. 
The First World War clearly enhanced Labour'S position as a 
political force. It was responsible for the well-known split in the 
Liberal party between the followers of Asquith and Lloyd George, with 
the latters' participation in a Conservative dominated Coalition 
government in the immediate post-war years. The trade unions had also 
played a crucial role in the war effort by sharing in government and 
concerting industry; with full employment their numbers swelled, 
increasing the Labour party's finances and active membership. The War 
also resulted in the 1918 Reform Act which extended the franchise to 
almost all adult males and to women over thirty. In the municipal 
elections of 1919 the Labour party made extensive gains throughout the 
country; Lancashire was no exception. Now, in contrast to the 
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disproportionate picture of pre-war days, only one town in the region, 
Bacup, was without Labour representatives on its local council. 
Manchester advanced quickly towards an archetypal political alig~~ent 
based on class; the new working class wards, created in the city 
immediately after the war, were seized by Labour, helping th9 party 
to establish superiority in the new parliamentary divisions of Ardwick, 
Clayton and Platting. At Liverpool 21 Labour councillors were 
returned in 1919, an increase of eleven over pre-war days, with the 
encouraging prospect that the working class was beginning to throw over 
its old allegiances: ten of the Labour gains had been made at the 
expense of the Conservatives. Heavy Tory defeats were seen in their 
old strongholds of Preston, Blackburn, Bolton and Birkenhead, the damage 
being done by Labour. At Wigan the Labour party, with the second 
largest group in the Council, controlled a Progressive coalition of 
Liberals and socialists which constituted a majority of the councillors. 
Labour was also beginning to make its political breakthrough in towns 
which had before the War witnessed no local labour movement: Bury, 
Widnes, Mossley, Southport and Heywood were examples of this trend. 
At Stalybridge, on the other hand, the Conservatives and Liberals had 
already negotiated an anti-Labour pact which was responsible for the 
defeat of seven Labour candidates in 1919. (66) 
Polling was light and the Labour party clearly exhibited a zeal 
and efficiency which the established parties could not match.(67) 
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But was this a new dawn for the Labour party in Lancashire? The next two 
decades were a disappointing period for the party nationally, fraught by 
the problems of a Minority Government, unemployment and internal 
disruption. Even in this context, however, Lancashire's position in the 
party declined. In pre-war years Labour M.P.'s from Lancashire had been 
on average about one third of the Parliamentary Labour party but after 
1922 they were never more than one seventh (1929) and in 1931 were less than 
one tenth. Moreover a closer look at the real Labour strongholds in 
Lancashire shows that the party was most successful in the areas where 
advances had been made before the War. (Map 12). 
The reason for the lack of expansion after 1919 lay partly in the 
economic and social changes in Lancashire during the 1920's and 1930's. 
In short, the Labour party was attempting to expand in a society that WJS 
stagnating. To say that the economy of the region collapsed during this 
period would not be an exaggeration. The cotton trade slumped drastically, 
mainly as a result of foreign competition, the decline of home markets Jnd 
bad industrial management; because of the linked industrial structure of 
the region its ancillary trades also declined. Before the First World War 
the difference between the rates of decline in industrial output and 
population had been small enough to keep the economy steady with only 
temporary periods of unemployment, but the Depression of the 1920's created 
so sUdden a downswing in industrial activity that the staple trades were 
completely unable to sustain the high population. Widespread, permanent un-
employment resulted, reaching a peak of over half a million workers, 
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two thirds of them men, in 1930-31 and 1933. Despite occasional years 
of revival, especially 1927, the previous high level of activity was 
not reproduced; neither could the newer engineering industries provide 
the buoyancy needed to sustain the region's economy, their existence 
serving only to mitigate the severity of unemployment. The coarse 
weaving centres, around Blackburn, and the mining communities in the 
central area of the coalfield were the worst hit with more than a 
quarter of the working population unemployed. Since three fifths of 
the Lancashire working population was engaged in declining staple 
industries many other mining and cotton towns experienced unemployment 
at the rate of between 15 and 25 per cent of the working population.(68) 
The social consequences of this collapse were crucial to political 
development. The various economic sub-regions found it difficult to 
attract new industries and with them the new migrant workers who would 
have supplied fresh vigour to the trade unions and Labour party. The 
population remained rooted, slow to realise the extent of unemployment 
and its perdurability and in any case without the industrial training 
necessary to transfer to new jobs. In towns for so long dominated by 
a single trade, the work force could only hope for an economic revival 
and therefore re,mffined, slightly stupefied, undynamic, conservative 
in outlook. In the more economically diversified centres around 
Manchester some workers were ab6o~ into more healthy industries by 
means of extending their journey to work by public transport, but 
this was not always possible in the comparatively isolated weaving 
towns of north east Lancashire, with approximately four fifths of 
their workers in declining trades, or on Merseyside, with its high 
proportion of unskilled labour.(69) The cotton unions were never 
again able to reach their peak membership of almost half a million 
which had been achieved d'Jring the short post-war boom. 
In this situation the Labour party proved to be equally as in-
effective as the Conservatives in providing remedies for the problems 
of, the economy. , It therefore maintained a lastin~ hold only in 
those regions where a strong tradition had been established - Nelson 
and Colne, Manchester and the mining towns; in the first two cases 
its success owed something to the socialist influence which had been 
welded to trade unionism in the early years of the century; the mining 
towns around Wigan, St. Helens and Leigh became even more the rock-
backbone of the party, which corresponded very closely to the trade 
union and hence to a feeling of class consciousness against the 
employers. It was not uncommon in these areas for individual mernber!:.hlp 
of the Labour party to be quite low since its work was covered almost 
completely by the trade unions, whose funds provided the M.P.'s and 
whose branches formed the basis of party organisation.(70) Converts 
to the Labour party, for these were what was needed, did not come 
readily in other areas, and in consequence the need for more militant 
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propaganda with an alternative to the rather timid policies of 
MacDonald and Snowden accounted for the growing influence of a Labour 
left-wing in Lancashire during the 1920's. The I.L.P., under the 
direction of Elijah Sandham, "a blunt spoken and thick-headed business-
man who had once been a pillar of local Conservatism", (71) became more 
powerful than it had ever been in the region, refusing to supply, in 
Sandham's words, "publicity agents for the merits of the Labour party,,(72) 
and cherishing parliamentary ambitions; it was a serious challenge to 
. (73) local Labour partles. The Communist Party also did some useful 
work, reviving the old S.D.F. tactic of unemployed demonstrations under 
the leadership of Jack Braddock in Liverpool and organising cells among 
the miners of Wigan and Manchester. Its membership at Nelson was quite 
influential during the disputes in the cotton trade in 1927 but in 
general the Communist Party found the expanding engineering and electrical 
trades more congenial territory in which to work.(74) 
Clearly by about 1935 the Labour party had established itself as a 
viable alternative to Conservatism in Lancashire, but it is not the 
intention in the present study to examine in detail the Labour party's 
development during the inter-war years. It may be suggested, however, 
that the laggardly pace of Labour growth was conditioned by two factors: 
the economic conditions of the post-war years, which made it difficult 
for any party based on an industrial structure to expand; and, like 
Liberalism before it, the left wing party's tendency to develop internal 
schisms as a result of differences over policy and tactics. The 
Labour party was particularly vulnerable to both of these situations 
in Lancashire; 1906 had produced a party with special emphasis on 
trade unionism as its mainstay; it was therefore strong in numbers 
but weak on policy. When the nu~bers contracted there was no wider 
political ideology to sustain interest. 
APPENDIX: LABOUR AND SOCIALIST CAMPAIGNS, 
BARROW-IN-FURNESS 
Duncan 5167 
Con. 3395 
BLACKBURN 
Con. 10291 
Snowden 10282 
Con. 8932 
Lib. 8892 
BOLTON 
Lib. 10953 
Gill 10416 
Con. 6693 
BURNLEY 
Lib. 5288 
Con. 4965 
Hyndllan 4932 
LIVERPOOL KIRKDALE 
Con. 3749 
Con1ey 3157 
LIVERPOOL WEST TOXTETH 
Con. 3373 
Sexton 2592 
MANCHESTER N. E • 
Clynes 5386 
Con. 2954 
.~-~ '---.~-----~-----
1906 
MANCHESTER 
Kelley 
Con. 
ROCHDALE 
Lib. 
Con. 
Hobson 
ST. HELENS 
Glover 
Con. 
PRESTON 
McPherson 
Lib. 
Con. 
Con. 
STOCKPORT 
Ward1e 
Lib. 
Con. 
WIGAN 
Con. 
Smith 
Lib. 
ACCRINGTON 
Lib. 
Irving 
Lib. 
S.W. 
4101 
2875 
5912 
4449 
2506 
6038 
4647 
10181 
8538 
7303 
6856 
7299 
6544 
4058 
3573 
2205 
1900 
7209 
4852 
619 
4,1;:,-' 
; 'i i 
CLITHEROE 
Shack1eton 12035 
Con. 3828 
ECCLES 
Lib. 5841 
Con. 5246 
Tillett 3985 
GORTON 
Hodge 8566 
Con. 4341 
INCE 
Wa1sh 8045 
Con. 3410 
NEWTON-le-WILLOWS 
Seddon 6134 
Con. 5893 
WESTHOUGHTON 
Wilson 9262 
Con. 6134 
--- --- ------------- ---
CONCLUSION 
Having charte d some of the hitherto unexplore d are as of 
Lancashire politics between the years 1885 and 1906 we may 
now consider a few of the more important features that have 
emerged and attempt to match the Lancashire political land_ 
scape with that of other regions. 
First of all, in parliamentary politics we have seen 
that until 1900 the idea of independent labour representation 
made scant impression on the region's political structure. 
During the 'eighties and 'nineties parliamentary representa-
tion in Lancashire was shared between the two traditional 
nineteenth century parties, though the balance between them 
was very unequal. It would not be misleading to say that 
this was a period of Conservative hegemony. The Tory party 
acquired its strength through two principal factors. In the 
first place, there seems little doubt that the religious issue 
which divided immigrant Catholic Irish and indigenous Protestant 
workers produced a xenophobic backlash in the constituencies 
where Irish immigration was marked and that this helped to 
give the Tories a lasting, nationalist hardcore. Secondly, 
the party was able to win seats where the religious issue was 
not very pronounced because of its adversary's own problems. 
The series of extremely unfavourable electoral issues, encom-
passing Home Rule, the Indian cotton tariffs and the Boer War, 
which beset the Liberal party between 1885 and 1900 and caused 
it to lose much of what might have been cons ide re d its "natural" 
support enabled the Conservatives to gain seats where, in the 
normal course of events, they would have been far more hard 
pressed for votes. In 1906, however, with an Election fought 
on the Liberal party's own terms and with a fresh electoral 
register and greatly increased electorate, the party was in a 
position to sweep up most of the seats outside the hardened 
Tory districts in harness with the new Labour party. It would 
seem, therefore, that the Conservatives had been able to hold 
their own with a predominantly working class electorate until 
1906, when the attractions of voting Liberal were considerably 
greater for working people than they had been for many years. 
Yet conditions had not remained static since the 1880's. 
1906 was more like an Indian Summer for the Liberals than a 
springtime of electoral resurgence.' Their problems had not 
been simply electoral ones. Their unwillingness to place 
greater emphasis on social and industrial reform as a means of 
winning working class support betrayed the essentially middle 
class nature of their party. By the early 1900's the Liberal 
position as the champion of radical working men's aspirations 
was being strongly challenged by a working class party, the LRC, 
especially in the industrial towns of the region. It is worth 
considering, therefore, what the rise of the Labour party 
s ignifie d. 
----------------------- --- ------_._--------_. 
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The emergence of the LRC was, to some extent, a symbiotic 
process. There had been two sides to working class action 
socialism and trades unionism _ and by about 1903 the 
relationship between them was beginning to resolve itself in 
favour of a trade union based Labour party; yet before this 
time the hopes for any sort of independent posture in working 
class politics had been kept alive by socialism. It was only 
in the areas where vigorous socialist· groups were operating 
Manchester, Burnley, Nelson and, in the later 1890's, 
Blackburn - that anything like permanent Labour parties had 
taken hold in the local political environment. For the re st, 
the picture was bleak; trade union political action was either 
hesitant and partisan, as with the cotton workers' amalgama_ 
tions, or else confined to a couple of mining constituencies. 
Local labour representation of a non-socialist character, as 
pursued by the trades councils, might have gone on for years 
in its piecemeal fashion without ever threatening to change 
the political scene. With the socialists carrying the 
independent banner, then, why was it that they had not been 
able to exert greate~ influence? 
The explanation lies in tactics rather than ideology. 
During twenty years of campaigning the SDF had·failed to pursue 
a consistent course. Initially the social democrats had 
attempted to work as the sole agents in converting the working 
class to socialism ignoring the trade unions, the most powerful 
- ---__ J 
existing expressions of working class strength and community 
of interest. This approach had been thrown over in the early 
1890's when the SDF was made to realise the value of working 
inside a Labour Alliance. The experience of Burnley showed 
that social democracy could play an important part in working 
class politics. But many social democrats, especially national 
leaders who lacked first hand experience of Lancashire con-
ditions, were never happy about co-operating with non-socialist 
trade unionists and it was their distaste for the liaison, 
rathe r than the att i tude of the more pragmatic c8mpaigne rs like 
Dan Irving, which led to the SDF's withdrawal from the LRC in 
1901 and, consequently, from participating in the Labour 
Alliance at parliamentary level. Events had shown that this 
course was likely to have proved more fruitful than the policy 
of socialist unity, tested in some areas during the later 
'nineties but never satisfactory in keeping alive SDF influence. 
It was thus the party's own internal discord, always likely 
to develop in an organisation keenly concerned with its ideology, 
that prevented its growth with the new LRC. 
The story of the ILP before 1900 is very similar. As we 
have seen,the ILP had its internal divisions which served to 
weaken its political efforts. By most standards, there was 
little to choose between it and the SDF by the mid 1890's in 
--~. ----...,.-~-~---~ 
terms of influence o Yet the ILP had, in one respect, a more 
promising future: this stemmed from its greater willingness 
to enlist the support of non-socialist workers in the estab_ 
lishment of an independent workers' party. It was this facet 
of the party's policy, more so than its nonconformist character, 
as expressed through the Labour Church, or its links with the 
new unions, which were weak, that explains the ability of the 
ILP to draw ahead of the SDF in terms of support during the 
early 1900's. 
But the rapid transition to Labour politics at the turn 
of the century was not the result of socialist leadershipo 
Its inspiration was trades unionism. The issues that dominated 
political discussion at this time - particularly Taff Vale, 
but also industrial reforms and, after 1903, Tariff Reform -
were all of relevance to working people, especially trade 
union members. Allied to relative decline in the conditions 
of the cotton and mining trades they were responsible for 
occasioning the Labour breakthrough in 1902-03. It was essen-
tially a short term movement and the issues with which it was 
concerned seemed unlikely to sustain a new political party 
~ tout jamais. That there was no consistent and universal 
theory of political action binding trade union people at this 
time may be judged from the election campaigns of 1906. And 
yet we must be wary of seeing this increased interest in labour 
representation as a bolt of lightning in a clear sky. The 
decisions of the miners and the cotton workers, arrived at 
as they were by a different process, to join the LRC was the 
outcome of almost fifteen years of experience in parliamentary 
lobbying and campaigning. The origins of the Labour break-
through go back to 1885. 
1906, then, saw the arrival of a working class political 
coalition based on co-operation between socialists and trade 
unionists, both at parliamentary and local level: the Labour 
Alliance which some people had been striving for since the 
early 1890·s. But, to be sure, the influence of the socialists 
was now very restricted, especially in parliamentary politics; 
in Lancashire the ILP could point to very few MPs whilst the 
SDF, being outside the LRC, had none. The future seemed to 
suggest for the ILP the role of a ginger group, an elite of 
militant left wingers providing ideas and propaganda, but not 
numbers, for the Labour party. For the SDF the future looked 
even less promising. 
Considering now the related position of the established 
political parties and the emergent Labour party we may ask -
was this in any sense a period of political change? At the 
outset the inconclusive nature of the present study must be 
acknowledged. The terminal data of 1906 represents a General 
Election fought over the issue of whether nineteenth century 
economic behaviour and thinking was to be rejected by the 
introduction of innovatory fiscal measures that would have 
destroyed the operation of classic free trade and brought in 
a form of imperial protectionist economics. As it was, the 
polls of 1906 confirmed the electorate's faith in the past. 
In other respects, too, 1906 represents no significant break; 
in Lancashire the Victorian economic and social structure, 
though suffering cracks in its facade, was still substantially 
intact. With the appe arance of the Labour party we see a new 
political development, it is true, but even so we should be 
careful of overestimating with the benefit of hindsight the 
significance of this event. There was no guarantee at the 
time that the Labour party would burgeon into one of the great 
political parties; in fact, it seemed more likely that for the 
time being its position would be that of a parliamentary 
pressure group something like the Irish party. Furthermore, 
it has been argued that the Liberal party was not seriously 
weakened by the Labour challenge before 1914 but that its 
eventual demise was the result of special circumstances that 
occurred during the First World War. (1) 
And yet, with the example of Lancashire to draw on, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that by about 1910 
"Labour had come to stay". Its future growth may still 
have been uncertain but its appearance at Westminster con_ 
firmed the changes that had been taking place in politics 
since the Third Reform Acto In spite of the insubstantial 
appearance of Labour's ideology the party was far better 
placed than either the Conservatives or the Liberals to draw 
upon working class su~port on a class basis. Its basis, the 
trade unions, were genuinely working class institutions and 
it was this feature, more so than its ideology, that made 
the Labour party a distinctive new organisationo We have seen 
how it enabled the working class voter to make the transition 
from his previous political loyalty. Moreover, social change 
would determine the pace of Labour's growth. It has already 
been suggested that the factors which shaped the political 
environment during much of our period - religious conflict 
and social leadership - could not maintain their influence for 
ever; anti-immigrant feeling was probably on the wane at the 
time when this study closes whilst the pre-eminence enjoyed 
by industrialists in social and political life was also becoming 
less marked. But even without this change the politics of 
Lancashire were very different in 1906 from those of 1885. 
As P F Clarke has shown in his case study of Blackburn for 
the relatively short period 1900-1910, we are not witnessing 
simply swings in party fortunes but "a qualitative change in 
the style of politics." (3) 
• 
How does the Lancashire story compare with that of other 
regions? We are presented with many points at which the Labour 
movement in Lancashire differed from its counterparts in the 
rest of the British Isles. The most outstanding contrast lies 
in the fact that nowhere else was the early Labour breakthrough 
So pronounced. Two features - strong trades unionism and 
political divisions among the working class - have been isolated 
as exerting a major influence in Lancashire's transition to 
Labour, but in no other region were these two features 
exhibited to quite the same extent. In the North East and 
South Wales, for example, trades unionism was of comparable 
strength but the break from the established parties was slow 
to develop because of nonconf~rmity and working class radi-
calism. In South Wales the Miners' Federation had about 
150,000 members by the eve of the First World War but noncon_ 
formity was only slowly disappearing as an influence in working 
class life and was even boosted by a temporary revival in 
1904-05. Moreover, the Liberal party appears to have expressed 
quite well working class opinion and, consequently, the rise 
of the Labour party was geared much more than in Lancashire to 
the slow transformation of deep rooted social features, among 
which the anglicisation of the workforce played its part, along 
with the process of rationalisation in the structure of colliery 
ownership. The political changes of significance took place 
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in South Wales during and after the First World War, not (/), ,:. ) -' 
before. (4) I; Northumberland and Durham, where there was 
probably a higher incidence of trade unionists in the popula-
tion than in Lancashire, Liberalism was as strong as in Wales 
and there was an old guard of miners' leaders who had been 
comparatively successful in arranging for labour representation 
with the Liberal party after 1885. This group bitterly opposed 
the forces of change, represented by the ILP, and there deve-
loped within the miners' ranks in the North East an influential 
socialist group in contrast with Lancashire, where the miners 
had always been able to allow the union leadership to express 
their political and industrial grievances. Whilst, therefore, 
socialism never became particularly strong among the Lancashire 
Miners the North Eastern coalfields by 1910 were "hotbeds of 
socialist activity." (5) r,,"'" \ .. ,.":1 
The West of Scotland provides an interesting comparison 
with Lancashire. Irish immigration was heavy and, as in 
Lancashire, this helped to strengthen the Conservative party. 
It might therefore be thought that divisions of loyalty among 
trade unionists would render the pursuit of an independent 
Labour course attractive, especially since the Scottish Liberals 
were quite intractable on the question of co-operation with 
Labour candidates. During this period there were in fact many 
examples of Labour candidates fighting the two established 
parties from an independent platform, though with little success. 
The most important barrier to development lay in the weakness 
of the trade unions, especially in the mining industry, and 
their inability to win workers away from the Orange and Green 
struggle. Consequently the Labour party made slower headway 
than in Lancashire though the ILP was always stronger in the .. '/ 
f I,'!· 
West of Scotland, a reflection of trade union weakness. (6) . 
In some respects the strength of socialism in working class 
politics in Scotland was analogous to the position of the ILP 
among the textile worke rs of the West Riding. Here the socia-
lists were active, and were able to install themselves in 
positions of influence, before the woollen textile trade unions 
became really strong and consequently working class action in 
local politics took a more directly socialist line than on the 
other side of the Pennines. (7) 
For one area, London, we are able to make a more detailed 
comparison. (8) It would be difficult to imagine two regions 
so different from each other as London and Lancashire. Though 
each was equally weighty in its electoral significance (between 
them they accounted for over one fifth of the House of Commons' 
membership) they were sharply contrasted in their economic and 
social features. Whereas Lancashire embodied the traditional 
Victorian staple trades London possessed little heavy industry; 
it was a city of small workshops with a high proportion of pro-
fessional people and far more socially diverse than Lancashire, 
, ~I 
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with its predominantly working class character. In London 
the social classes were already becoming segregated in their 
respective suburbs, a process that was only beginning to visit 
Lancashire in the cities of Manchester and Liverpool. London 
was, in fact, "more like the conurbation of the future than '\h0r'("v 
( 9) I' the city of the past." ~It would, therefore, be stretching 
the imagination too far to expect the political history of 
these two regions to have followed a similar pattern and indeed 
Jt!y did not, each presenting a different model of Labour's 
emergence. 
In parliamentary politics,however, London and Lancashire 
shared a common feature: the strength of the Conservative party. 
But, unlike Lancashire, the backbone of London's Toryism was 
middle class and although to some extent it relied on working 
class voting the dependence was less marked than in the North 
~"\- ("\ 
West. (10)u In fact London voting patterns showed a more pro-
nounced class basis than did Lancashire's and the battle for 
the working class vote was fought out in London between the 
Labour and the Liberal parties. Moreover, it appears that from 
the 1880's onwards London Liberalism was gradually withering 
away. The reasons were partly social, the segregation of the 
classes by residence causing working class communities to lose 
religious and political contact with middle class people. Since 
\ 
. / 
the Liberal party relied heavily on middle class patrons for 
its funds it came to espouse policies that were more in line 
with the electoral demands of this class: " ••• London Liberalism 
remained closer to Nonconformity than to working class radi-
( ll){iS 
calism." Although in the early 1890's and around 1906 
the party made temporary revivals based on working class support 
these were largely of a parliamentary nature and were not 
substantiated by gains at local level. It might seem, there-
fore, that with the Liberal party gradually losing its grip on 
the working class voter and with Toryism entrenched in the 
wealthier suburbs, the Labour party was ideally placed to rise 
to prominence in London well before the First World War. Yet 
in 1906 London could produce only 3 LRC representatives, as 
against Lancashire's 13, whilst the London Labour party was 
not established until 1914. It seems that Lancashire, an 
"old fashioned" region in economic and social terms, moved into 
twentieth century politics more quickly than London, which was 
already beginning to "anticipate the pattern of development 
(12) 1--
of most British cities in the 20th century." Why was this? 
The explanation reveals the real difference between working 
class politics in the two regions. For one thing London was 
much more dominated by socialism, the socialism of the SDF and 
the Fabian Society especially. The SnF enjoyed some support 
but was not interested until a comparatively late stage in 
leading an independent party based on the working class and 
consequently failed to exploit the t"'l4~ strength of the workers 
in politics. Not that this achieved the same dimensions as in 
Lancashire until the eve of the First World War because of the 
weakness of trade unionism. "London was never a trade union 
( 13) fl'" 
stronghold." Even after the new unionist upsurge after 
1889 London trade union membership still compared unfavourably 
(' ( {}, (14) le l,;1l )-\ 
with that of Lancashire and it was not until 1914 that London 
possessed trade unions which could provide the funds and member-
ship from which to sustain a Labour party. Here we may see how 
London's social structure, with its lack of working class homo-
geneity and community spirit - features readily fostered in the 
industrial centres of Lancashire - proved a disadvantage to the 
growth of the Labour party. Yet when socialism and trade unionism 
could be brought together London was perfectly capable of pro-
ducing solidly based local Labour parties of a lasting nature, 
as the example of Woolwich shows. (15)1~~:~IWiCh Labour party 
was as impressive an organisation as the best equipped Lancashire 
parties of Manchester and Nelson and a great improvement on the 
purely trade union parties that sprang up in Lancashire during 
the years 1900 to 1906. So, although the weakness of trade 
unionism proved a hindrance to Labour development in London for 
many years the movement there was probably in a stronger position 
from which to grow by the eve of the First World War than it was 
in Lancashire, whose reliance on trade unions based on staple 
industries was to bring setbacks during the 1920's and 1930's. 
The preceding narrative may have conveyed the impression 
that the Labour party was simply the product of a variety of 
local movements. But, of COUI"Se, each region was I"esponding 
to problems common to the entire country. There was clearly 
a general drift towards Labour politics throughout Britain in the 
thirty or so years before the First World War. The interesting 
feature, however, in discussing a movement like the Labour 
party lies in the interaction between national themes and local 
responses. It was this that accounted for the differing speeds 
of political change and the varied balance of forces within the 
movement from region to region. Any study of these processes 
must bring into focus all the local peculiarities of Victorian 
political society. There is no .representative region. 
- --~. -----------
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M.F.G.B. President, speaking to the annual conference in 1904). 
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strike on the lines of the Taff Vale Railway Co. in 1900. The 
Society.appealed but the original judgement was upheld by the 
House of Lords thus making it possible for the Taff Vale 
Railway Co. to proceed with actions for damages against the 
union officials. The Railway Servants lost the case and were 
obliged to payout £42,000 in 1903 to cover damages and costs. 
The resulting threat to strike action was immense and led to 
demands throughout the trade union world for a statute to 
reverse the Taff Vale judgement and keep union funds inviolable. 
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30. 7.2., 26.12.02. 
31. Weavers' Amalgamation, Annual Report, 1902. 
32. Cotton Factory Times, 24.1.02. 
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34. Cotton Factory Times, 18.7.02. 
35. ibid., 11.7.02. 
36. ibid., 8.8.02. 
37. See ibid., 7.2.02. His colleague, Thomas Ashton of the Spinners, 
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much smaller unions of Beamers and Twisters, Overlookers and the 
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(V.T.F.W.A., Statement of the Ballot on the Question of Direct, 
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Congress Library. ) 
FOR L.R. AGAINST FOR LEVY AGAINST NEVT NO VOTE 
--Card Room 14173 9573 . 14098 4342 942 4402 
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Beamers 2509 377 2487 402 1046 
Weavers 54637 11352 53568 11701 4266 8299 
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B1eachers 1647 327 1565 331 
40. 4.4.02. 
41. 6.2.03. 
42. M.F.G.B., Conference Report, 1900. 
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43. M.F.G.B., Report of Executive Committee Meeting, 6.12.01. 
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deal of control over candidates. Affiliated unions were to pay 
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members would be allowed one candidate; unions with more members 
than this were permitted an additional candida'te for each 10,000 
members. (This would have given Lancashire three candidates). A 
parliamentary salary of £350 a year was available for each successful 
candidate, as were funds for returning officers' expenses and legal 
costs. 
44. L.C.M.F., 28.12.01. 
45. Speech to' M.F.G.B. Conference, 1903. The L.C.M.F. had paid Woods 
a salary of £200 a year from 1897 to 1900. 
46. L.C.M.F., Conference Report, 1902. 
47. L.C.M.F., 8.11.02. 
48. ibid., 27.4.01. 
49. ibid., 13.9.02. 
50. ibid., 3.1.03. 
51. ibid., 23.5.03. 
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53. ibid., 25.4.03. 
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parliament in 1906, they were paid a yearly salary of £350 out of 
the M.F.G.B. fund. The L.R.C. also paid £200 for each of them to 
the L.C.M.F., which decided to pay Glover and Walsh £100 each out 
of this instead of continuing to pay them an agent's salary. 
55. By 1905 there were 59 Lancashire trade unions (including the local 
cotton societies) and 20 trades councils affiliated to the L.R.C. 
Besides these, there were 14 local labour representation committees. 
(L.R.C., Conference Report, 1905, 75.) 
56. Cotton Factory Times, 6.2.03. 
57. Oldham Trades Council, Annual Report, 1898. 
58. Edward George, From Mill Boy to Minister, 50. 
59. The Trades Council acted as the Oldham L.R.C., affiliating to the 
national L.R.C. during 1903. 
60. Cotton Factory Times, 23.10.03. 
61. ibid., 1.5.03. 
62. ibid., 3.4.03. 
63. ibid., 20.10.05. 
64. ibid., 3.11.05. The Cardroom Amalgamation offered Crinion every means 
of support (Minute Book, 19.10.05.) but his own society at 01dham backed 
his refusal to stand. 
65. The U.T.F.W.A. refused to submit another candidate and closed its 
account book for the Oldham election, switching its energies to 
Shackleton's campaign at Clitheroe. (Cotton Factory Times, 10.11.05.) 
The Oldham Carpenters and Joiners, with the support of the Twisters 
and Beamers and the I.L.P., tried to secure the nomination of their 
national agent George Dew but the Executive of the A.S.C.J. refused 
to sanction the plan. (Cotton Factory Times, 17.11., 15.12.05.). 
An interesting postscript occurred in January 1906 when the Oldham 
Spinners and Cardroom Operatives held a ballot on whether to pay 
levies to the Trades Council for local Labour candidates; only one 
tenth of the membership voted. (Cotton Factory Times, 2.2., 23.2.06.) 
66. Bolton United Trades Council, Annual Report, 1896. 
67. Bolton Chronicle, 18.10.02. 
68. ibid., 30.8.02. In 1902 the Bolton L.R.C. even refused to have the 
socialist speakers, Keir Hardie and James Sexton, appear at their 
conference, preferring instead the Lib-Lab. W.J. Davis. (L.R.C. Minute 
Book,1.9.02.) 
69. Who Was Who, 1916 - 1928 
70. Bolton Chronicle, 25.10.02. 
71. for biographical details see Cotton Factory Times, 15.5.03. 
72. Cotton Factory Times, 3.11.05. 
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Public Library), vol. 1900-05, 148. 
74. St. Helens Newspaper, 5.1.06. 
75. Herbert G1adstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss , 46106, cxxii. 
76. Ince Divisional Labour Registration Association, Minute Book, 1903 
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(Unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1963), 528. 
78. Northern Daily Telegraph, 16.10.03. 
79. ibid., 29.9., 16.10.03. 
80. L.R.C., Minute Book, 5.9.03. 
81. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 46484, cxlv. 
82. See Frank Bealey, "Negotiations between the Liberal Party and the 
Labour Representation Committee Before the General Election of 
1906," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 1956. 
83. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss , 46106, cxxii. 
84. ibid. , 
85 Northern Daily Telegraph, 9.10.03 
86. L.R.C., Minute Book, 30.10.03. 
87. G1adstone Papers, 46485, cx1vi. 
88. See pp. 373 - 1>: 
89. L.R.C. Minute Book, 27.9.04. 
90. L.C.M.F., 5.11.04. 
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92. L.R.C. Minute Book, 2.12.04. 
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99. L.R.C. Minute Book, 4.10.05. 
100. Justice, 11.11 05. 
101 Accrington Observer, 25.2., 11.2., 25.3., 25.7.05 
102. L.C.M.F., 7.11.03. 
103. Gladstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 46106, cxxii. 
104. "I would like to hear from you as to whether you propose to put a 
candidate in Mr. Woods' place and if you would be good enough to 
give me information for my Committee upon the prospects in Newton-
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(L.C.M.F., 5.12.03.) 
105. ibid., 23.4.04. 
lO6. ibid., May, 1904 
107. L.R.e., Minute Book, 30.6.04. 
108. L.e.M.F., 16.7.04. 
109. ibid., 3.12.04. 
110. ibid., 22.4.05. 
Ill. ibid., 30.12.05. 
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112. For additional biographical details: euttings Book, (St. Helens 
Public Library), vol. 1900-05, 92, 114. 
113. L.R.e. Minute Book, 4.10.05 and pamphlet issued by Seddon's 
committee: Newton Parliamentary Division: J. A. Seddon's Candidature 
(1905), contained in Infancy of Labour, vol. 1. 
114. L.C.M.F., 24.2.06. 
115. G1adstone Papers, B.M. Add. Mss., 46485, cx1vi. 
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119. Cotton Factory Times, 8.5.03. 
120. Clarion, 26.1.06. 
121. See Jack Mowat and Albert Power, Our Struggle for Socialism!!: 
A Short History of the Barrow-in-Furness Labour Party, (1949) 
122. Cotton Factory Times, 8.5.03. Barrow News, 2.5.03. 
123. Barrow News, 15.8., 29.8.03. The national L.R.C. agreed subject 
to Duncan's signing the Constitution, (Minute Book, 30.10.03.) 
124. Barrow News, 22.10.04. 
125. ibid., 2.4.04. 
126. ibid., 5.11.04. 
127. L.R.C. Minute Book, 18.6.03. 
128. Account from Bolton Chronjc1e, 6.5., 20.5., 27.5.05. 
129. See e.g., Preston Herald, 17.7.95. 
130. ibid., 1.4.03. 
131. ibid., 6.5.03, 
132. Cotton Factory Times, 8.5.03. 
133. John Hodge, Workman's Cottage to Windsor Castle (1931), 138-141 
134. ibid., 146. 
135. Preston Herald, 13.5.03. 
136. Hodge claimed that Kerr was "no speaker and a duffer at question 
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